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ABSTRACT 
The Antarctic is one of the world's largest and most isolated wilderness areas. The 
Antarctic krill is a small crustacean that is one of the most pivotal species in the 
vulnerable Antarctic ecosystem. Accordingly, it is extremely important that the krill 
is given adequate legal protection by the international regulatory and management 
regime. The purpose ofthis thesis is to provide a comprehensive analysis of the 
world's international legal regime in the context ofthe Antarctic krill. In particular, 
this thesis examines the adequacy of the current legal regime to provide effective 
management ofkrill and other Antarctic. marine species in light of the problem of 
illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing in the Southern Ocean. The thesis 
examines both legal theory and practical management in the specific context of the 
Antarctic krill. The aim of the thesis is to recommend an appropriate regulatory 
framework for the Antarctic krill in light of the "precautionary approach" to fisheries 
management, given the krill's importance to the Antarctic ecosystem. 
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the international legal regime surrounding the Antarctic 
krill, a small crustacean that is one of the most pivotal species in the vulnerable Antarctic 
ecosystem. There is scientific uncertainty surrounding the Antarctic krill population and the 
exact effects of krill harvesting on other dependent species. Accordingly, this thesis submits that 
an Antarctic krill fishing moratorium should be introduced because of this uncertainty and the 
Antarctic krill's vital role in the ecosystem. The current system of binding international treaties 
and conventions is not adequate to implement such a moratorium and does not offer adequate 
protection to Antarctic krill. Non-binding international law does offer a more comprehensive set 
of marine conservation principles, however, because of its non-binding status its effects are 
limited. Accordingly, it is proposed that there be a strengthening of current international legal 
regime and the use of alternative mechanisms to enforce a moratorium such as trade related 
measures. 
The Antarctic krill is located at the base of the Antarctic food chain and forms a vital link 
between plankton and larger species, channeling nutrients to those higher in the food chain. 
Antarctic species depend either directly or indirectly on krill for their survival. Accordingly, it is 
extremely important that krill is given adequate legal protection by the international regulatory 
and management regime. 
The exploitation of krill poses such a direct and alarming threat to dependent species in the 
Antarctic ecosystem, (many of which are currently threatened because of past exploitation,) that 
krill should receive the full protection of a complete moratorium on further harvesting. The 
pivotal role of krill in the ecosystem and the dependence of so many species on krill make it 
crucial that krill population is protected. Uncertainty surrounding krill population and its 
interactions with dependent species and localised predator populations make it particularly 
important that a harvesting ban is introduced. The application of a strong form of the 
precautionary approach to resource management (discussed below) justifies a krill fishing 
moratorium because of current scientific uncertainty. For such a ban to prove effective, it must 
be a universally binding legal obligation. Only with a strong legal obligation that binds all 
parties, even on the high seas, can krill receive the protection they need. At a minimum, 
localised krill fishing bans should be introduced in sensitive areas in Antarctica where fishing 
may have the most impact. 
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It will be submitted that the current legal regime can facilitate the introduction of a krill fishing 
moratorium. Southern Ocean fisheries are regulated predominantly by the Convention for the 
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources ("CCAMLR"), a Treaty that aims to achieve 
sustainable exploitation of marine stocks in the Antarctic. In addition, the marine areas of the 
Antarctic are governed by a whole host of binding and non-binding international conservation 
instruments such as the Law of the Sea Convention, the Convention for Biological Diversity and 
the UN F AO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fishing. It will be shown that although many 
international agreements (soft and hard law) focus on conservation of marine species, they 
contain some legal weaknesses, and accordingly there have been problems with States failing to 
fully implement such agreements. These instruments also suffer from a lack of legal strength in 
that a Treaty such as CCAMLR only binds those States which are parties to the Convention. 
This gives rise to problems with non-party compliance. However, this thesis submits that 
CCAMLR is the appropriate body to implement and monitor a krill fishing moratorium. 
Improvements in enforcement mechanisms will help CCAMLR to prevent illegal, unreported and 
unregulated ("IUU") fishing in the Southern Ocean. The UN General Assembly has also 
recently advocated a strengthening of the international legal framework for fisheries management 
in order to combat IUU fishing. This may provide an impetus for the international community to 
re-examine and strengthen current regulatory arrangements so that a krill fishing moratorium has 
a greater chance ofbeing successful. 
Chapter 1 of this thesis examines the scientific data concerning the size of the Antarctic krill 
population and the significance of krill to the Antarctic ecosystem and why the preservation of 
krill is vital for the continued existence of that ecosystem. It is critical to this thesis to examine 
the data which highlights the scientific uncertainty because this thesis advocates a krill 
moratorium in light of the uncertainty because of the Antarctic krill's role in the ecosystem. The 
chapter will also examine the history of exploitation in the Antarctic and the dangers posed by 
exploitation to krill and its dependent species. Furthermore, chapter 1 will also analyse the effect 
that krill harvesting is currently having on the ecosystem including effects on local predator and 
krill populations. Krill industry as a whole will also be examined together with the reason why a 
likely expansion of this industry necessitates a total krill ban. 
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Chapter 2 examines the precautionary approach to resource management, particularly in the 
context of Antarctica and krill management. As discussed, there is enormous scientific 
uncertainty concerning krill population and the effect of krill harvesting on the Antarctic 
ecosystem. Accordingly, the precautionary approach provides a basis for a more careful 
approach to management of fisheries resources such as the Antarctic krill. Adopting a 
precautionmy approach for the Antarctic krill should, taking into account krill's pivotal role in 
the ecosystem, result in the imposition of an Antarctic krill fishing moratorium. At the very 
least, under this approach, localised krill fishing bans should be introduced in areas where krill 
fishing could affect genetically distinct krill populations or land based predator colonies. 
Chapter 3 of this thesis will analyse the conservation treaties and conventions that are applicable 
to krill and are entered into through formal processes and are binding on the parties (often 
referred to as "hard" law). Examination of this "hard" law is necessary to determine whether it 
can place sufficient binding legal obligations on States to protect the Antarctic krill through a 
fishing moratorium. In particular, the major regulatory instrument of the Southern Ocean, 
CCAMLR, will be examined to assess its legal status and effectiveness in preventing threats to 
krill population and the whole Antarctic ecosystem. Furthermore, this chapter will focus on the 
Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty and its interaction with CCAMLR, 
including its ability to provide effective legal protection to krill. Maritime sovereignty and the 
existence of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) in Antarctica will be also analysed to determine 
whether krill could receive protection from the introduction of a fishing ban within these zones 
of national jurisdiction. The chapter will also look at the Law of the Sea Convention and the 
United Nations Agreement on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Species to highlight 
both the strengths and weaknesses of these instruments and the need to improve them for the 
greater good of krill and other marine species. Finally, this chapter will examine the Convention 
for Biological Diversity and the role it can play in the conservation of Antarctic biodiversity. 
Chapter 4 of this thesis will examine the non-treaty quasi-legal instruments and resolutions that 
are, in general, non-enforceable/binding on parties (loosely referred to as "soft" law). In 
particular, this chapter will analyse the application of these soft law instruments to Antarctic krill 
conservation and the implementation of a krill fishing moratorium. Furthermore, the limitations 
of these soft law instruments will also be discussed. The chapter will first look at the Stockholm 
and Rio Declarations and their ability to offer any meaningful protection to krill given their non-
binding status and a focus on development wi~hin the instruments. 
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The sustainable use objectives of Agenda 21 will also be analysed to highlight current 
weaknesses that need to be resolved before a complete fishing ban can be effectively introduced. 
These sustainable use goals will also be examined in light of the UN F AO Code of Conduct for 
Responsible Fisheries and subsequent instruments supporting it, to determine whether it would 
accord with a complete ban and whether it can offer meaningful protection to krill in its current 
form. The creation of binding obligations through the entry of the Code's principles into 
customary international law will also be discussed to highlight the effect that such a development 
would have on krill protection. Finally, this chapter will focus on the 2002 World Summit on 
Sustainable Development and the General Assembly resolutions introduced in the wake of this 
conference. The World Summit gave rise to a number of conservation principles that could help 
to manage krill and other species. 
Chapter 5 will examine the practical aspects of the investigation, management and enforcement 
of Antarctic krill conservation. Only with an effective and efficient management and 
enforcement system can a krill moratorium be successfully implemented, particularly with the 
risk ofiUU fishing. Strong universally binding legal obligations are necessary for the 
introduction of a comprehensive krill harvesting ban but such obligations will only prove 
effective if they are fully implemented by all States and observed by all fishing vessels. This 
chapter will firstly examine CCAMLR's ecosystem approach towards management of marine 
species in the Antarctic. Chapter 5 will outline the threat posed by IUU fishing and the 
effectiveness of current international instruments that aim to reduce that threat. Even if strong 
universally binding legal obligations exist, those obligations will only be effective if they are 
backed with a comprehensive enforcement regime and strong sanctions. Chapter 5 will conclude 
with an examination of the range of enforcement mechanisms currently available to determine 
whether any of them can be effective in enforcing a comprehensive krill fishing ban. 
Furthermore, the current sanctions that can be imposed on IUU vessels will be analysed to 
determine whether they are of sufficient strength to deter vessels from flouting a comprehensive 
harvesting ban. The world's nations must vigorously enforce their conservation obligations so 
that a total krill fishing ban can be successful and the whole Antarctic ecosystem can receive the 
crucial protection that such a ban will provide. 
Due to the Antarctic krill's vital role in the ecosystem and the scientific uncertainty discussed 
above, this thesis concludes that the current hard and soft law regimes are not capable of 
ensuring the security of the Antarctic krill and their dependent species. 
Current enforcement and management techniques have also proved ineffective in dealing with 
the IUU fishing problem. Accordingly, it is critical that alternative means of protecting the 
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Antarctic krill are examined. Chapter 6 will examine an alternative means of combating IUU 
fishing through restrictive trade measures. 
In particular, this chapter will analyse the legality of such measures, when applied in an 
environmental context, under the free trade principles of the World Trade Organization ("WTO") 
system and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"). There are certain 
exceptions to these principles which will also be examined to determine whether trade measures 
to protect Antarctic species would fall within their ambit. The current status of environmental 
issues under the WTO system will also be looked at, including the work of the WTO's 
Committee on Trade and Environment ("CTE"). Several multilateral environmental agreements 
("MEAs") utilise trade measures to enforce their provisions. This chapter will look at the 
interaction between WTO regulations and these agreements and also the interaction between 
these WTO principles and customary international law. Furthermore, it will examine whether 
particular types of trade measure could be used to protect krill without infringing WTO 
requirements and the application of the precautionary approach under the WTO. Finally, this 
chapter will outline potential alternative avenues to the WTO for dealing with environmental 
issues with a trade focus. 
The final chapter ofthis thesis discusses the problem of overcapacity of the world's fishing 
fleets. This problem has been cited as one of the reasons for the growth of IUU fishing and has 
caused many fishers to seek alternative fisheries. Overcapacity is a problem that will focus 
fishers' attention much more on alternative fishing grounds such as the Southern Ocean and 
alternative species such as the Antarctic krill. Accordingly, it is vital for this thesis to analyse the 
overcapacity problem because of its potential to impact on the effectiveness of an Antarctic krill 
fishing moratorium. 
Chapter 7 will begin by defining overcapacity and looking at the current status of that problem. 
The chapter will then analyse the types of solutions that have been used by States to deal with 
this issue and the effectiveness of such solutions. A strong legal regime is also necessary to curb 
fleet overcapacity. This chapter will briefly consider the international measures that have been 
undertaken to reduce capacity and will discuss whether stronger measures are required. One of 
the potential causes of fleet overcapacity is the maintenance of fishing subsidies by national 
governments. Chapter 7 will outline this issue and consider whether subsidies should be 
maintained in any form. The status of such fishing subsidies under the WTO system will also be 
discussed. In particular, the legality of fishing subsidies under the WTO' s free trade principles 
will be examined to determine whether the WTO can effectively curb such subsidies and hence 
curb the overcapacity problem. 
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This thesis makes a significant contribution to the field of Antarctic and Southern Ocean Studies. 
In particular, as opposed to many of the existing works on Antarctic krill management which 
focus on scientific factors, this thesis provides a comprehensive analysis of the application of all 
significant international law instruments and theories to krill. The thesis provides a critique of 
current legal deficiencies that need to be addressed in the future, which is something that impacts 
not only on krill but all Antarctic species. Furthermore, this thesis also goes into an in-depth 
analysis of how theoretical concepts in international law impact specifically on krill and on 
treaties regulating the Antarctica. In particular, the thesis looks at how legal theory can be used 
to justify practical action in Antarctic in respect of krill or can provide a basis for legal challenge 
or future negotiation in respect of Antarctic regulation. The thesis also canvasses a number of 
alternative means that could be introduced to enhance both conservation of krill and other 
Antarctic species. Finally, this thesis examines a number of recent international law and fisheries 
developments that took place between 2003 and the end of 2005. In particular, there has been an 
original analysis of the impact of these developments on the Antarctic krill and Southern Ocean 
fisheries. 
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CHAPTER 1: BACKGROUND AND HISTORY 
Introduction 
Apart from phytoplankton, Antarctic krill is a marine living resource that forms the base of the 
Southern Ocean food chain. Krill channel a large amount of nutrients and energy to higher 
species in the food chain and are a vital link between plankton and these larger species. Part I of 
this Chapter will examine the unique status of the Antarctic ecosystem and the long history of 
natural resource exploitation in Antarctica. The thesis will chart the rapid degradation of many 
species through overexploitation which has forced people to turn their attention to new sources 
of Antarctic exploitation, culminating in the rise of a modern krill harvesting industry. The 
concern surrounding the new industry's effect on krill will then be examined, as well as the steps 
towards introducing conservation measures to protect krill. This Part will then focus on the 
introduction of the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources and 
chart the Convention's development of measures to protect krill. 
Parts II and III will examine the significance of krill to the Antarctic ecosystem and why it is 
important that krill be conserved. Firstly, the biology of the Antarctic krill, its distribution, and 
its feeding habits in Antarctica will be examined. The. significance of krill will then be discussed 
in terms of its vital role at the base of the ecosystem and the dependence of other species on it. 
Part IV focuses on this important function and the reason why uncertainties concerning krill 
population estimates will mean that a greater level of krill conservation is required. The need to 
adopt a precautionary approach to krill management is necessary because of this uncertainty. 
The precautionary approach is discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
Part V of this Chapter will examine krill harvesting and krill fishing industry. The current 
management regime has both legal and enforcement weaknesses that make it inadequate to 
effectively conserve krill. The problem of by-catch from krill harvesting and the uncertainties 
surrounding the problem will be outlined together with the detrimental impact on dependent 
predator species from localised krill harvesting. A precautionary approach should be adopted 
because of these weaknesses and uncertainties. Finally, this Part will detail current levels of krill 
fishing and the effect that those levels will have on the ecosystem. Part VI will look at the likely 
increase in current harvesting levels that will result from increases in demand for current krill 
products. New uses of krill in aquaculture and biotechnology are also likely to increase demand 
for krill. This Part will outline recent developments in technology that will reduce krill 
harvesting costs and lead to greater profits and likely greater levels of harvesting. Because of the 
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uncertainties surrounding krill population itself and the impact of fisheries on dependent species, 
the threat of increased harvesting levels should be a justification for adopting a precautionary 
approach to krill management. This approach will be discussed in Chapter 2, the strongest form 
of which would suggest that a moratorium on Antarctic krill fishing should be introduced. 
Finally, Part VII of this Chapter will discuss the uncertainty of environmental effects on krill 
population. The problems that such uncertainty poses in setting catch limits for krill will be 
examined along with the potentially detrimental effect on dependent species if catch limits are 
incorrectly set. A higher level of krill conservation is necessary because of the uncertainties 
surrounding krill population and their interaction with other species. A comprehensive ban on 
krill harvesting should be considered as a real option because ofthe vital role of krill in the 
ecosystem. A high level of conservation is also necessary because lower costs of krill harvesting 
and greater demand for krill are likely to lead to a larger krill industry in the future. 
I. The Historical Exploitation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources 
Antarctica is an ice covered continent straddling the southern end of the globe. The Antarctic 
land mass is 13.5 million square kilometres in area and seventy percent of the world's fresh 
water is contained in the ice cap that covers the continent. 1 However, despite this expanse ofice, 
Antarctica is really a desert that receives a very small amount of precipitation in the form of 
snow. 2 Antarctica's land mass is also surrounded by ice shelves and annual sea ice that expands 
dramatically during the winter.3 Antarctica is home to many marine species in the nearby 
Southern Ocean. The Southern Ocean makes up approximately 10 percent of the geographic 
area of the world's ocean4 and is home to many varied and unique species. The distinctive 
nature of the Southern Ocean makes it essential that these unique species are conserved so that 
their inherent and economic value can be preserved for future generations. Preservation of such 
marine species will ensure that the biological diversiti of the Antarctic ecosystem as a unique 
world habitat remains intact. The Antarctic ecosystem has been threatened in recent years by 
exploitation of its natural resources, which has been compounded by the inadequacies of the 
current regulatory regime. Krill need to be protected by a strong legal regime because of their 
1 Friedham, R. and Akaha, T. 1989. Antarctic Resources and International Law: Japan, the United States, 
and the Future of Antarctica. Ecology Law Quarterly, Vol 16: 119-154 at 124 
2 Ibid 
3 Kindt, J.W. 1988. Ice-Covered Areas and the Law of the Sea: Issues Involving Resource Exploitation and 
the Antarctic Environment. Brooklyn Journal of International Law, Vol 14(1): 27-71 at 28 
4 Ibid, 29 
5 The concept of biological diversity will be discussed in greater detail in a subsequent chapter. 
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vital role in the ecosystem. The dependence of many species on krill means that a complete ban 
on harvesting or the introduction of localised "no-take" zones (which amount effectively to 
localised harvesting bans) should be considered as possible options. Legal and enforcement 
problems with the current regulatory system give impetus for the need to adopt a precautionary 
approach to krill management. 
Exploitation of the Antarctic 
The exploitation of Antarctica's natural resources is not a new phenomenon. People have been 
plundering the Antarctic ecosystem for several centuries. Antarctica has been exploited ever 
since South Georgia Island was discovered in 1775 by Captain Cook.6 Seals were one of the first 
Antarctic resources to be utilised. There was major exploitation of fur seals in Antarctica and the 
sub-Antarctic islands. 7 The Sealing industry began on South Georgia and spread to other sub-
Antarctic islands. 8 Fur seal colonies in South Georgia, the Falkland Islands and the South 
Shetland Islands were exploited heavily by early hunters.9 Fur seals were almost wiped out from 
South Georgia by 182i0 and were hunted virtually to extinction in the South Shetlands. 11 On 
Macquarie and Heard Islands significant depletion of seal stocks also occurred.12 
6 Chittleborough, G. 1984. Nature, extent and management of Antarctic living resources. in Australia's 
Antarctic Policy Options edited by Harris, S. Centre for Resource and Environmental Studies: Canberra at 
141 
7 Gulland, J.A. 1988. The Management Regime for Living Resources. in The Antarctic Legal Regime. 
edited by Joyner, C.C. and Chopra, S.K. Martinus NijhoffPublishers: London. at 221 
8 Chittleborough, G. Supra, fn 6, 141 
9 Couratier, J. 1983. The regime for the conservation of Antarctica's living resources. in Antarctic 
Resources Policy. edited by Vicuna, F.O. Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridg~: Melbourne. at 
139 
1° Chittleborough, G. Supra, fn 6, 141 
11 Gulland, J.A. Supra, fn 7, 221 
12 Chittleborough, G. Supra, fu 6, 143 
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The degradation of fur seal stocks then resulted in a change of focus for hunters to exploitation of 
elephant seals. 13 The elepha~t seals were harvested from 1830 for their oil. 14 The level of 
harvesting reduced as seal numbers declined. 15 The fur sealing industry was revived in 187016, 
particularly on South Georgia. 17 Seals were exploited until 1920 and this exploitation continued 
on South Georgia until1964. 18 In June 1972, the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic 
Seals was adopted to protect the seal population.19 To date, commercial sealing has not resumed 
in Antarctica. However, the history of commercial sealing shows the huge potential for 
exploitation in Antarctica to have a catastrophic effect on populations. Krill could easily suffer 
the same fate if an uregulated krill industry took hold in Antarctica. 
Commercial exploitation of the larger Antarctic species has also taken place in the past. Modem 
whaling in Antarctica began with the establishment of a whaling station on South Georgia in 
1904?0 Many species were exploited including blue, sei, sperm, fin, minke and killer whales. 21 
There were huge reductions in the numbers of larger Antarctic whales as a result.22 In the 1930s, 
several whale species were threatened by excessive harvesting.23 The severe danger posed to 
sustainable exploitation of whales provided the impetus for a Convention to regulate whaling, 
which was signed in 1946.24 An increased concern with whale exploitation gave momentum to 
the need for complete conservation of whales. The International Whaling Commission made a. 
recommendation for whaling to cease in the Antarctic in 1982. This moratorium came into 
operation in 1986?5 Whales in Antarctica are currently protected from exploitation except for 
certain scientific purposes. Prior to the whaling moratorium the urgent need for an international 
legal regime for whaling that would address management and conservation issues demonstrated 
the impossibility of sustainable exploitation if no controls were imposed on fishing vessels. King 
and royal penguins were also harvested for their oil on places such as Macquarie and Heard 
Islands, again leading to a dramatic reduction in their numbers.26 
13 Ibid 
14 Couratier, J. Supra, fh 9, 139 
15 Chittleborough, G. Supra, fu 6, 143 
16 Couratier, J. Supra, fu 9, 139 
17 Chittleborough, G. Supra, fu 6, 143 
18 Couratier, J. Supra, fu 9, 139 
19 Ibid, 144 
2° Chittleborough, G. Supra, fn 6, 144 
21 Friedham, R. and Ak:aha, T. Supra, fu 1, 125 
22 Chittleborough, G. Supra, fu 6, 144 
23 Couratier, J. Supra, fu 9, 139 
24 Ibid, 141 
25 Baird, R. 1997. Fishing the Southern Ocean: The Development ofFisheries and the Role ofCCAMLR 
in their Management. University of Tasmania Law Review, Vol16(2): 160-183 at 166 
26 Chittleborough, G. Supra, fu 6, 143 
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Similar to these abovementioned species, krill also require an effective regime to regulate and 
control commercial harvesting if sustainable exploitation of krill is to be achieved. A similar 
regime would be required if a comprehensive ban on harvesting were a desired objective. The 
likely future increases in krill harvesting and the scientific uncertainty surrounding the 
population would justify such a moratorium. 27 
The decline in numbers of larger species combined with renewed conservation concerns about 
those species turned the attention of fishing nations to species lower down the food chain. The 
Southern Ocean provides a habitat for about 100 different species of fish. 28 Overexploitation of 
these Antarctic species was quite common in the past. Finfish, for example, were extremely 
overfished around South Georgia in the early 1970s and stocks took years to recover. 29 
Overexploitation of such resources is still a problem that needs to be overcome. These 
difficulties stem from the inability of the current system to adequately regulate and control 
fishing activities in the Southern Ocean. The historical decline in levels of Antarctic fish 
populations focussed attention on species lower down the food chain such as the Antarctic krill. 
Between 197 6 and 1977 there was a huge increase in interest displayed by countries in krill 
fishing. 30 Such interest was due in part to a greater level of research conducted by countries such 
as Poland and West-Germany. 31 This research improved the harvesting technology and the 
efficiency of krill fishing. This initial exploratory fishing had the potential to substantially 
increase krill harvest. 32 
The changing fisheries pattern of world fishing fleets was also a major problem. Numerous long 
distance fishing vessels were no longer able to fish in their traditional grounds because of an 
increasing number of State declarations of Exclusive Economic Zones. 33 Greater attention was 
therefore directed towards Antarctic marine resources. Concerns about overexploitation of 
fisheries resources provided the impetus for negotiation by the Antarctic Treaty Parties for a 
comprehensive conservation regime for the Southern Ocean.34 The increased interest in krill 
exploitation in recent years has made some kind of conservation regime essential. The history of 
overexploitation of other species has shown the potential for serious detrimental harm to occur 
when a species is commercially harvested. 
27 These ideas are discussed in more detail in connection with the precautionary approach/principle in 
Chapter 2. 
28 Friedham, R. and Akaha, T. Supra, fn 1, 125 
29 Gulland, J.A. Supra, fn 7, 222 
30 Auburn, F.M. 1982. Antarctic Law and Politics. Croom-Helm: Canberra. at 206 
31 Ibid 
32 Ibid 
33 Ibid 
34 This regime has become known as the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living 
Resources. 
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An effective management regime is therefore necessary to ensure that krill do not suffer from the 
same pattern of overexploitation that has plagued other species throughout Antarctica's history. 
The weaknesses embodied in the current legal regime, including the mechanisms for 
enforcement, makes it difficult to maintain adequate control of fishing activity. This is a 
particular problem in the Antarctic due to its geographic isolation and the vast area it 
encompasses. The likely expansion in krill industry makes it vital that a precautionary approach 
to krill management is adopted. A complete harvesting ban would be the strongest form of such 
an approach. Such a measure could help to achieve sustainable exploitation of larger species that 
depend on krill and are more economically attractive to fishers. 
History of Krill Conservation 
The first signs of a Southern Ocean conservation regime came in the Seventh Antarctic Treaty 
Party Consultative Meeting in 1972, which involved informal talks on the need to regulate 
exploitation of living resources. 35 The following Eighth meeting in 197 5 had little focus on a 
potential regime regulating marine Antarctica but saw some agreement among the parties of the 
need to accomplish protection, scientific study and rational use of marine living resources?6 The 
critical step in gaining protection for the Antarctic kiill had its origins in the decision at the Ninth 
Consultative Party Meeting in 1977 to hold a Special Consultative Meeting in 1978 in order to 
plan protection for marine species in Antarctica.37 A comprehensive management regime was to 
be designed by that time. 38 Such a regime was necessary if krill were to be given effective 
protection from exploitation. Simply maintaining an unregulated environment was not 
acceptable because it exposed krill to the same risk of exploitation that decimated seal and whale 
numbers beforehand. A marine regulatory regime was necessary to prevent krill from being 
overexploited, an outcome which would have had major ramifications for the whole ecosystem. 
35 Howard, M. 1989. The Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources: A Five-
Year Review. International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol38: 104-149 at 108 
36 Ibid 109 
37 Hea~, J.A. 1991. Has CCAMLR Worked? Management Policies and Ecological Needs. in The Antarctic 
Treaty System in World Politics. edited by Jorgensen, A. and Ostreng, W. Macmillan: London. at 46 
38 Auburn, F.M. Supra, fu 30, 205 
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The Ninth Antarctic Treaty Party Consultative Meeting saw the formulation of the main 
components of the Convention. 39 Recommendation IX-2 of this meeting contained the basic 
features of the new regime and many principles contained in it were eventually placed in the 
Convention.40 These principles included the geographical area covered by the Convention and 
the need for an ecosystem approach to resource management.41 The recommendation also 
focussed on the effective conservation of marine living resources. 42 The Final Report by the 
Working Group on Living Resources of the Ninth Meeting made it clear that the concept of 
conservation also embodied rational use of the resources. 43 A concluding round of negotiation 
took place at the Tenth Antarctic Treaty Party Meeting44 before a final meeting was held in 
Canberra in May 1980 to put the finishing touches to the new Convention for the Conservation of 
Antarctic Marine Living Resources.45 Signature of the Convention was possible from August 
198046 and Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, East and West Germany, Japan, New 
Zealand, Norway, Poland, South Africa, USSR, UK, and the US were the original parties.47 The 
Convention came into force on 25 May 1982 at the first meeting in Hobart.48 
The new Convention did not provide immediate protection for the Antarctic krill although 
possible management approaches for krill were first considered in 1984 and there was a major 
conference in 1989.49 The early history of the Convention was characterised by a lack of action. 
In 1984, net mesh sizes and a fishing prohibition within 12 miles of South Georgia were the only 
conservation measures in place. 50 The Scientific Committee's first meeting was held in 1982.51 
There was, however, conflict between parties over the Committee's role in the early years of 
CCAMLR.52 Some countries saw the Committee as simply a consultative body which expressed 
scientific opinion, others saw it as a political body.53 The danger with the Scientific Committee 
being perceived as a political body is that its opinions may be given less credence by parties. A 
purely consultative body may have more weight given to its scientific opinions and it may 
therefore perform a more effective role than if it was seen as political. 
39 Ibid 215 
4° Cou~atier, J. Supra, fn 9, 145 
41 Ibid 
42 Auburn, F.M. Supra, fn30, 215 
43 Ibid, 216 
44 Howard, M. Supra, fu 35, 111 
45 Howard, M. Supra, fu 35, 112 
46 Baird, R. Supra, fu 25, 166 
47 Ibid 
48 Puissochet, J. 1991. CCAMLR- A Critical Assessment. in The Antarctic Treaty System in World 
Politics. edited by Jorgensen, A. and Ostreng, W. Macmillan: London. at 73 
49 Croxall, J.P, Everson, I. and Miller, D.G.M. 1992. Management of the Antarctic krill fishery. Polar 
Record, Vol28(164): 64-66 at 64 
50 Gulland, J.A. Supra, fn 7, 234 
51 Howard, M. Supra, fu 35, 117 
52 Ibid 
53 Ibid 
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In the beginning of CCAMLR there were also problems with the statistics needed to formulate 
and implement conservation measures. Many countries gave basic statistical data only. 54 There 
was a much more detailed definition of the data needed to monitor exploited and dependent 
species by the Scientific Committee and Working Groups during 1984 and 1985.55 Statistical 
data is a necessity if precautionary catch limits are to be properly formulated. This original 
reticence of members to give statistical data could have created great difficulties in formulating 
catch limits and made it hard for CCAMLR to provide an effective management regime. Indeed, 
a lack of data still makes it difficult for CCAMLR to formulate accurate precautionary catch 
limits for krill. 
There was finally some movement towards krill conservation when the Ad Hoc Working Group 
on krill was established in 1987.56 The Ad Hoc Working Group on krill had the task of 
reviewing studies of krill population; looking at growth rate studies; reviewing estimates of 
reproductive mortality rates; looking at krill distribution studies; and looking at data on existing 
krill catches.57 This Working Group was set up as a permanent body in 1988.58 The Working 
Group on krill reviewed the methods used to estimate krill populations; reviewed information on 
the size and distribution and composition of krill harvesting; looked at the effect of future krill 
harvesting; reported to the Scientific Committee; and liaised with CCAMLR's Ecosystem 
Monitoring Programme (CEMP) Working Group on impacts of krill fisheries on other species.59 
The permanent Working Group looked much more at management issues, rather than just 
focussing on biological parameters like the ad hoc group.60 A management focus may be a 
necessity when studying krill. Because CCAMLR focuses on how to manage the whole 
Antarctic marine ecosystem, scientific studies should take into account the relationship between 
krill and other species and how biological factors may impact on any potential management 
regime. Scientific studies that also consider management implications of biological data can 
only strengthen krill conservation in the future. However, uncertainties with the data still exist 
and this provides one justification for introducing more comprehensive krill conservation 
measures. 
54 Gulland, J.A. Supra, fu 7, 235 
55 Ibid 
56 Croxall, J.P, Everson, I. and Miller, D.G.M. Supra, fu 49, 64 
57 Nicol, S. 1991. CCAMLR and its approaches to management of krill fishery. Polar Record, Vol27: 
229-36 at 231 
58 Croxall, J.P, Everson, I. and Miller, D.G.M. Supra, fu 49, 64 
59 Nicol, S. 1991. Supra, fu 57, 231 
60 Ibid 
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There were concerns in 1989 about the possible adverse impact of krill fisheries on krill and its 
predators.61 The Working Group came to the conclusion a year later in 1990 that the deficiencies 
in data made it impossible for them to adequately advise CCAMLR's Scientific Committee. 62 
The possible adverse effects of krill fisheries on krill predators was also highlighted in 1992, but 
inadequate data again restricted the ability of the Working Group to advise the Commission. 63 
This highlights the problem with data uncertainty concerning krill, however, in line with the 
precautionary approach a lack of data should not have stopped the Commission introducing some 
form of protection for krill. The lack of protection for krill was also shown by the lack of 
discussion on the topic by the Commission of CCAMLR. The Commission did not have a 
reported discussion on krill until the Fifth meeting. 64 Substantial discussion of krill was not a 
feature of the Commission's deliberations until the Ninth meeting.65 This shows an extreme lack 
of foresight on the Commission's part. The Commission should not have avoided dealing with 
krill protection because of data uncertainty. Leaving krill fishing unregulated exposed krill to a 
huge and unacceptable risk of exploitation that could have affected krill in the same way as it has 
damaged other Antarctic species in the past. 
The Eighth meeting of the Commission did acknowledge the Scientific Committee's view that 
the possibility of precautionary catch limits for krill should be examined.66 Part of the Agenda 
for the Ninth meeting involved an examination of the need for such precautionary limits. 67 
Fishing nations were against such limits because of the lack of data concerning krill 
populations.68 They wanted more scientific data before such limits were imposed.69 It was also 
argued that future krill catch numbers were not going to increase, so limits were not required?0 
This view ignores the potential for new krill products to be introduced and potential changes in 
the economics of krill harvesting. As evidenced by current developments, new krill products are 
being developed and these new markets, combined with decreases in harvesting costs, have 
improved the economic viability of krill industry. Krill finally received some protection in the 
form of precautionary catch limits in 1991. 
61 Baird, R. Supra, fn 25, 176 
62 Ibid 
63 Ibid, 177 
64 Nicol, S. 1991. Supra, fn 57,232 
65 Ibid 
66 Ibid, 234 
67 Ibid 
68 Ibid 
69 Ibid 
70 Ibid 
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Alarmingly, krill received no protection for this substantial period after CCAMLR's inception, 
despite the fact that krill harvesting levels then were a great deal higher than present levels. The 
lack of action could partly be attributed to deficiencies in scientific data on krill at the time, 
however, CCAMLR's precautionary approach dictates that lack of data should not prevent 
conservation measures being put in place.71 CCAMLR cannot afford to take such a long time in 
the future before acting if krill are to be conserved by that regime. 
71 The precautionary approach will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2. 
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II. Krill Biology 
Krill are a species of crustacean72 that form an essential link in the Antarctic ecosystem between 
phytoplankton and higher forms oflife.73 The largest species of Antarctic krill is known as 
Euphausia superba74 and can grow to a maximum of 6.5cm and weigh over a gram. 75 Antarctic 
krill have a circumpolar distribution76 but are scarcer in the open ocean than near the edge of ice 
sheets.77 Krill are found in swarms that are extremely dense, with some swarms having densities 
of over a million animals per cubic metre ofwater.78 These swarms give the water a reddish-
brown colour because of their density.79 The main concentrations in Antarctica are near the 
South Orkney Islands, South Georgia, South Sandwich Islands, Bouvet Island, the Ross Sea, and 
off Wilkes Land.80 This makes strong conservation measures in these waters essential if krill are 
to be protected. Even if a comprehensive ban on krill fishing is not introduced, some form of 
seasonal or total ban should be introduced for at least some of these high krill concentration 
areas. 
Krill Biology 
Source: Nicol, S. 1995. Antarctic Krill. Encyclopaedia of Environmental Biology. Academic 
Press 
72 Nicol, S. 1995. Antarctic Krill. Encyclopaedia of Environmental Biology. Academic Press at 389 
73 Ibid 
74 Alverson, D.L. 1980. Tug-of-War for the Antarctic Krill. Ocean Development and International Law, 
Vol8: 171-181 at 177 
75 Nicol, S. 1995. Supra, fu 73,389 
76 Nicol, S. and Endo, Y. 1999. Krill Fisheries: Development, management and ecosystem implications. 
Aquatic Living Resources, Vol12(2): 105-120 at 106 
77 Nicol, S. 1995. Supra, fu 73, 391 
78 Nicol, S. and Endo, Y. Supra, fu 75, 106 
79 Nicol, S. and De Ia Mare, W. 1993. Ecosystem Management and the Antarctic Krill. American Scientist, 
Vol81: 36-47 at 37 
80 Alverson, D.L. Supra, fu 75, 174 
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Krill are more mobile than plankton, which are organisms that drift with ocean currents. 81 They 
have 5 pairs of swimming legs and are heavier than water. This impediment requires them to 
swim for short periods to remain afloat. There is some vertical migration of krill, but they are 
usually found in the top 200m of the water column. 82 Krill have several luminous organs located 
near their swimming legs, abdomen, mouth and eyes.83 They also have six pairs of legs that are 
used to collect food and move it into the mouth.84 There are 11 mouthparts that are necessary to 
grind up krill's food. 85 Krill were previously believed to live for only 2 years in the wild, but 
new evidence suggests that they live at least 5 years. 86 In laboratories, their potential life span 
has been extended to as much as 11 years.87 Krill mainly feed on drifting microscopic plants, 
known as phytoplankton. These plants rely on light at the ocean's surface to photosynthesise.88 
The main blooms of phytoplankton begin in October and can continue right through autumn. 89 
Krill can live at least 200 days in the laboratory without food by reducing their body size. This 
could be the mechanism for them to survive Antarctic winters when phytoplankton is scarce.90 
Krill provide a link between the phytoplankton and species higher in the food chain making them 
a crucial speeies in marine Antarctica. Consequently, a comprehensive harvesting ban should be 
considered for Antarctica in order to facilitate greater protection for dependent species and allow 
the continued sustainable exploitation of such species. 
81 Nicol, S. 1995. Supra, fi173, 390 
82 Nicol, S. and Endo, Y. Supra, fu 77, 106 
83 Nicol, S. 1995. Supra, fu 73, 390 
84 Ibid 
85 Ibid 
86 Nicol, S. and De Ia Mare, W. Supra, fu 80, 42 
87 Nicol, S. 1995. Supra, fu 73, 395 
88 Ibid 393 
89 Chi;tleborough, G. Supra, fn 6, 136 
90 Nicol, S. and De la Mare, W. Supra, fu 80, 43 
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III. The Role of Krill in the Antarctic Ecosystem 
Krill represent an essential link in the Antarctic ecosystem. As discussed above, krill are vital 
because they feed off phytoplankton and channel the nutrients and energy of the phytoplankton 
to other species that do not feed on the phytoplankton, either directly or indirectly, higher up in 
the Antarctic food web. As such, Antarctic krill are essential for providing energy to larger 
species in the food web (see, for example, Nicol91 ). 
There are some claims that Antarctic krill plays a more important role than species in similar 
positions in other ocean ecosystems.92 Only a small number of species exist in the extremely 
short Antarctic food chain.93 This makes it extremely vulnerable to exploitation and necessitates 
the maintenance of a strong regulatory regime governing marine species in Antarctica. Many of 
these species are either directly or indirectly dependent on krill. Among the predators that feed 
directly on krill are finfish, squid and seals (particularly the crabeater seal). Penguins, such as 
the Adelie, chinstrap and gentoo, are also highly dependent on krill. Studies of penguins and 
seals have shown that poor breeding seasons correspond to times when krill numbers are 
depleted.94 The baleen whales also feed directly on krill. There have been some suggestions that 
whale migrations to Antarctica are caused by the desire to feed on krill. There is also a 
possibility that huge decreases in whale P?Pulations may have contributed to increases in krill in 
recent years.95 
Krill are also important for species that feed on krill predators. Such species indirectly rely on 
krill for their own prosperity. These species include birds, such as the black-browed Albatross 
and Antarctic petrel, and the toothed whales. The abundance and position of krill in the 
Antarctic food web make it a vital species in the Antarctic ecosystem.96 Krill channel a large 
amount of nutrients and energy to higher species in the food chain.97 Disturbing krill could have 
a much greater effect than depleting species higher up in the food chain.98 The extreme 
importance of krill in the Antarctic ecosystem should provide impetus for the complete 
protection of krill. 
91 Ibid 
92 Alverson, D.L. Supra, fn 75, 177 
93 Gulland, J.A. Supra, fn 7, 220 
94 Brierly, A. and Reid, K. 1999. The Kingdom ofKrill. New Scientist, Voll62, 17 April: 38-41 at 40 
95 Kindt, J.W. Supra, fn 3, 34 
96 Nicol, S. 1995. Supra, fn 73,395 
97 Howard, M. Supra, fn 35, 110 
98 Ibid 
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The total protection of krill provides dependent predators with a more reliable food supply. 
Without protection, dependent species would have a greater vulnerability to fishing and a lower 
recruitment rate because of potential reductions in food. A lack of protection could also threaten 
the whole Antarctic ecosystem because krill forms the base of that ecosystem. Conserving the 
Antarctic ecosystem would also conform with the conservation objectives of international 
instruments such as the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty.99 
Furthermore, krill conservation would give greater protection to the variability of Antarctic 
species in accordance with the objectives of the Convention on Biological Diversity100 and would 
allow the optimum utilisation of other dependent species in conformance with the Law of the Sea 
Convention101 while giving those species some measure of protection by conserving krill as the 
ecosystem's base. 
The role that krill plays in predator breeding will be discussed in greater detail in a subsequent 
section, however, it should be noted that krill does have an important impact on predator species. 
For example, lchii et al conducted a study of the impact of krill fishing on local penguin 
populations and found that the fishery could have an advese impact on penguins during their 
breeding season. 102 Agnew and Marin have also documented the dependence of predator species 
on krill and the multiplying effect that krill fishing can have on predator species. 103 
In respect of whales, a high krill harvest may reduce the rates of increase of baleen whales and 
threaten their existence.104 A low krill harvest combined with a sustainable catch of seals may 
keep seal numbers constant while increasing baleen whale numbers but dramatically increasing 
minke whale numbers. 105 Accordingly, it can be noted that there is a delicate balance between 
krill and other species that should not be disturbed lightly by krill harvesting. 
99 This instrument will be discussed at length in Chapter 3. 
100 The concept of biological diversity and the Biodiversity Convention will be covered in detail in Chapter 
3. 
101 The Law of the Sea Convention will be discussed in Chapter 3. 
102 Ichii, T., Naganobu, M. and Ogishima, T. 1994. An Assessment of the Impact of krill Fishery on 
Penguins in the South Shetlands. CCAMLR Science, Vo11: 107-128 
103 Agnew, D.J. and Marin, V.H. 1994. Preliminary Model of Krill Fishe1y Behaviour in Subarea 48.1. 
CCAMLR Science, Vol 1 : 71-79 at 72 
104 Chittleborough, G. Supra, fn 6, 153 
105 Ibid 
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IV. Uncertainties Surrounding krill Population 
Past perceptions of a huge krill biomass formed the basis for proposed large scale fisheries. 106 
The wide distribution of krill in Antarctica makes it difficult to obtain reliable estimates of 
population size. 107 Krill distribution is not uniform throughout the Southern Ocean. Various 
methods have been used in the past to estimate krill population. Catch rates from nets towed 
behind ships are sometimes used to calculate krill numbers. Nets often do not collect a 
proportion of krill, resulting in underestimates of population. Large animals can swim fast 
enough to evade nets and small krill may slip out of the nets. 108 The production rate of 
phytoplankton has also been used as a measure of krill population. Similarly, the consumption of 
krill by predators and the abundance of krill larvae are also utilised to estimate krill numbers. 109 
All of these techniques are prone to enor which creates uncertainty about the true size of krill 
population and may lead to poor management decisions that could harm the whole ecosystem. 
The current management regime may not be able to provide a high level of protection to krill if 
its decisions are based on inadequate data, although a number of techniques have been 
introduced to take into account this uncertainty (these will be discussed later in this thesis). 
Acoustic surveys have also been used to detect krill. Such surveys utilise an echosounder that 
transmits sound that is then reflected back from objects in the water. The return time and 
proportion of sound returned can be used to determine the depth and quantity of species. Such 
techniques encounter many problems including picking up other species on the echosounder110 
and difficulties using sound reflections to calculate krill density. 111 Vertical migration of krill 
can also complicate the measurements. 112 Krill may be swimming above the echosounder. 
Noisy environments; such as pack ice, also make it difficult for the echosounder to record 
accurate data. Acoustic surveys are unable to survey krill populations living under the ice and 
this can result in a large undetected mass of krill. 113 Complications with estimating krill 
populations have led to wildly fluctuating estimates of krill biomass in the past, ranging from 14 
to 7 000 million tonnes. 114 Such uncertainties make it extremely difficult to manage krill stock 
106 Nicol, S., Constable, A.J. and Pauly, T. 2000. Estimates of Circumpolar Abundance of Antarctic Krill 
Based on Recent Acoustic Density Measurements. CCAMLR Science, Vol 7: 87-99 at 89 
107 Nicol, S. and De la Mare, W. Supra, fn 80, 38 
108 Nicol, S. 1995. Supra, fn 73, 392 
109 Nagata, T. 1983. The Implementation of the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine 
Living Resources: needs and problems in Antarctic Resources Policy. edited by Vicuna, F.O. Press 
Syndicate of the University of Cambridge: Melbourne at 121 
110 Nicol, S. and De la Mare, W. Supra, fn 80,40 
111 Nicol, S. 1995. Supra, fn 73,392 
112 Ibid 
113 Nicol, S., Constable, A.J. and Pauly, T. Supra, fu 107,94 
114 Ibid, 88 
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with a high level of precision. This is an even greater concern for krill because of the large 
number of species that (directly or indirectly) depend on them for survival. 
This thesis submits that, as there are clear difficulties with estimating krill biomass, then krill 
should receive total protection from harvesting until such difficulties are resolved. Such a view is 
consistent with a strong form of the precautionary approach discussed in Chapter 2. Krill's vital 
role in the ecosystem means that errors in estimating the population could lead to decisions that 
may threaten many other species. This would not only conflict with the "rational use" 
conservation objectives of CCAMLR, but would also conflict with the conservation objectives of 
the Madrid Protocol and the sustainable use goals advocated by the Law of the Sea Convention. 
A recent CCAMLR study in 2000 utilised acoustic surveys and estimated the biomass of krill to 
be between 60 and 155 million tonnes. The precautionary catch limit of 1.5 million was revised 
upwards to over 4 million tonnes in accordance with the new estimate. 115 In addition, a "trigger" 
level of 620,000 tonnes was set for Area 48 of the Convention zone at which the Area would be 
subdivided into smaller management units. The 2000 survey employed various techniques to 
reduce estimate error including the use of several survey ships and conducting surveys at the 
same time each day. 116 Error resulting in skewed observations may still be present because of 
problems such as a large undetected krill population. This type of survey may, however, be the 
best method of estimating krill. 117 Uncertainty is still prevalent in krill population estimates 
because of the difficulties in making such estimates. The recent CCAMLR survey has provided 
a krill estimate much lower than previous estimates. That is, to restate the submission presented 
above, if reasonably accurate measurements of krill populations cannot be obtained, then krill 
must be protected from exploitation. Even if the current acoustic survey was the best method 
available it still suffers from uncertainty. Adopting a weak form of the precautionary approach 
involving catch limits may not be enough if, because of inaccurate population estimates, damage 
is done to the ecosystem before its effects can be detected. 118 
115 Ibid, 95 
116 These techniques may have reduced some of the problems in gaining accurate results. 
117 Ibid 
118 CCAMLR does try to take uncertainty into account in its mathematical models used to formulate 
precautionary catch limits. 
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Krill catch densities in Antarctica 
Source: Nicol, S. 1995. Antarctic Krill. Encyclopaedia of Environmental Biology. Academic 
Press 
The models used to estimate krill yield do take into account uncertainties in estimates of 
biological parameters (these models will be discussed in greater detail in a later Chapter). 
However, estimating changes in krill populations is still problematic because of insufficient data 
on matters such as krill consumption by predators119 ; distribution variations; spawning areas; 
development rates; and how krill abundance changes with distance from the edge of the ice. 120 A 
large krill population could, arguably, mean that precautionary catch limits (i.e. a weak form of 
the precautionary approach) are sufficient to protect krill even with a high level of uncertainty. 
119 Nicol, S., Constable, A.J. and Pauly, T. Supra, fu 107,95 
120 Nagata, T. Supra, fu 110, 128 
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At the creation ofCCAMLR in 1980, 424,821 tonnes of krill were harvested. At that time, krill 
industry was the 24th largest fishery in the world and the biggest crustacean fishery. 121 The 
apparently massive krill population has previously given the impression that harvesting levels are 
low. 122 However, there are concerns that even apparently small catch levels could affect 
dependent species. 123 Uncertainty concerning krill populations could have major effects on 
predator abundance despite the adoption of a management approach focussed on catch limits. 
The potential for adverse changes because of estimation uncertainty provides support for a 
comprehensive ban on krill fishing. Such a moratorium would prevent detrimental changes to 
prey populations and would uphold the ecosystem conservation objectives of CCAMLR and 
other international instruments such as the Madrid Protocol. These ecosystem conservation goals 
would also maintain species variability in conformance with the Convention on Biological 
Diversity. 
V. Krill Fishing Industry 
When large Antarctic predators, such as seals and whales, were reduced in number, there was 
increased interest in other Antarctic species. Finfish were the next species to be severely 
depleted as a result of exploitation124 and attention then turned to krill. Experimental krill fishing 
expeditions occurred throughout the 1960s, but only small catches were made. Krill fishing 
became attractive in the 1970s because of the minimal control that coastal states exercised over 
the industry. There were also major improvements in technology125 and subsidies given to 
fishing fleets126 that made krill fishing more viable. Further improvements in technology and 
fishing subsidies will be particularly dangerous if the current regime is not strengthened to 
eliminate some of its legal and enforcement weaknesses. 
121 Nicol, S. 1991. Supra, fn 57, 229 
122 Ibid 230 
123 Eve;son, I. and Goss, C. 1991. Krill fishing activity in the southwest Atlantic. Antarctic Science, Vol 
3(4): 351-358 at 351 
124 Nicol, S. 1995. Supra, fn 73, 397 
125 Peterson, M.J. 1986. Antarctic Implications of the New Law of the Sea. Ocean Development and 
International Law, Voll6(2): 137-181 at 155 
126 Fishing subsidies and the overcapacity of the world's fishing fleet will be discussed in Chapter 4. 
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Fishing fleets can easily locate krill in dense swarms in the upper layers ofthe sea. 127 Ships 
avoid areas where krill are feeding because such krill have a green tint, spoil rapidly and have an 
unusual taste. They aim to harvest 10 tonnes of krill per haul of nets. This can be achieved 
extremely quickly (sometimes in less than 15 minutes) in high concentrations of krill but 
excessive hauls are avoided because krill become crushed in the nets .128 Japan tested a krill 
fishing trawler in 1974 that could catCh 16 tonnes of krill per day. A West German trawler, the 
Weser, could catch 8 to 12 tonnes an hour during intense fishing periods in 1975-76. 129 At its 
peak in 1983 the per annum catch was over half a million tons, the majority being caught by the 
USSR. 130 The major fishing nations in the past have been Japan, the USSR, Korea, Poland and 
the UK. Krill catch by these states rose at one point to 530,003 tonnes per annum. 131 There were 
fears that this increased activity would mean the demise of krill. 132 The emergence of a krill 
fisheries industry means that an effective management regime is necessary to ensure that krill are 
properly protected. The significant krill harvesting that has taken place in the past shows the 
need for CCAMLR to maintain a comprehensive management regime for krill. 
Krill Fishing 
Source: CCAMLR website 
127 Nicol, S. and De la Mare, W. Supra, fu 80, 37 
128 Nicol, S. 1995. Supra, fn 73, 398 
129 Peterson, M.J. Supra, fu 126, 153 
130 Nicol, S. 1995. Supra, fu 73,397 
131 Nicol, S. 1991. Supra, fn 57,229 
132 Peterson, M.J. Supra, fu 126, 155 
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Krill By-Catch 
The harvesting of krill by trawling nets has given rise to concerns about by-catch. The density of 
krill swarms means that other species are not usually contained within the swarms. 133 Fish larvae 
and juvenile fish can be caught in krill trawling nets, especially.ifkrill fishing focuses on less 
dense krill swarms. CCAMLR has requested information from its members on by-catch 
numbers. 134 Japanese datafrom South Georgia indicated that by-catch occurred in a minority of 
the harvests that were investigated and the number of fish involved was low and related to only 
three species of fish. 135 Ukrainian data, however, suggested that there may be large levels of by-
catch, especially if krill catch rates were low. 136 Even if the by-catch is small, it could have a 
drastic impact on recruitment of depleted or endangered species of fish. 137 Exploited stocks 
could be at risk if their breeding stocks are decreased to a level that causes a decrease in 
recruitment 138 In one study, juvenile fish were found to occur frequently as by-catch in waters 
above the continental shelf. 139 The total by-catch of juvenile fish needs further investigation to 
ensure correct estimates. If there is a significant problem with by-catch it could have extremely 
detrimental effects on the whole marine ecosystem. 
There may, however, be other solutions to the by-catch dilemma that do not require an end to 
krill harvesting. The by-catch problem could possibly be reduced by changing the location of 
krill fisheries to open waters away from the continental shelf. Krill fishers are less likely to catch 
juvenile fish in these areas. 140 The high levels of krill close to the continental shelf may reduce 
the viability of this option because krill fishers would have little incentive to move from a 
productive area of high krill concentration to an area where there are less krill available. 141 
Although more information is needed about the problem, it is clear that any upsurge in krill 
fishing would be detrimental to other exploited species due to problems of by-catch. 
There is some suggestion that fishing boats may avoid areas where there is a chance of catching 
other species.142 However, actually achieving compliance with such a law in the vast expanse of 
133 Nicol, S. and Endo, Y. Supra, fu 77, 109 
134 CCAMLR website, http://www.ccamlr.org 
135 Report of the 5th Meeting of the Working Group on Krill, 1993, Scientific Committee CAMLR XII 
136 Ibid 
137 Easson, M. and Beddington, J.R. 1991. CCAMLR: The Practical Implications of an Eco-System 
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the Southern Ocean would be difficult. The practicalities of monitoring and controlling IDU 
fishing in this region, are discussed in greater detail later in this thesis. If this solution is feasible 
it may negate the potential effects of krill fisheries by-catch without the need to place a 
moratorium on krill harvesting. In effect, this solution would be akin to a localised krill ban in 
particular areas of the Southern Ocean. 
CCAMLR Convention Areas, CCAMLR website, http://www.ccamlr.org 
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Localised krill fisheries could also pose problems for dependent predators. Most fishing takes 
place in Area 48, the Atlantic zone. 143 Fishing moves with the seasons from South Georgia 
(48.3) in winter to the South Orkneys (48.2) and South Shetlands (48.1) in summer, 144 Fisheries 
in Antarctica are conducted in localised areas. Summer harvesting occurs in zones used by krill 
predators. 145 Some land based predators are restricted to particular breeding sites during 
summer. In some places there is overlap between fishing zones and the areas of greatest predator 
concentration. Potential overlap between areas where predators feed during breeding periods and 
localised krill fisheries could have an adverse impact on localised predator populations. 146 
Highly mobile predators are less affected. Between 74% and 90% of krill caught in Area 48.1 is 
taken during the critical summer breeding months near predator breeding areas. Future fishing 
activities could expand operations during breeding periods and multiply the impact on 
predators. 147 
A study of penguins in Area 48.1 indicated that there is an insignificant overlap between fishing 
zones and penguin foraging areas. As a result, it may be possible to imply that there is little 
competition between penguins and fisheries in this area. 148 Localised fisheries could, however, 
still be affecting other predators and penguins may be affected in other CCAMLR zones. Future 
krill fisheries could also impact on localised areas. Any affect that localised fishing had on 
predators would exist even with catch limits set at a low level. If a real threat does exist from 
localised fisheries then complete protection of krill may be necessary to ensure the survival of 
local predator populations. Threats to localised populations conflict with the biological diversity 
goals of the Convention on Biological Diversity by threatening the genetic variability of predator 
populations. Dangers to localised predators also clash with the conservation and sustainable use 
objectives of the Law ofthe Sea Convention and the ecosystem conservation goals of the Madrid 
Protocol. Even if a total ban is not introduced, then a seasonal or area specific ban should be 
introduced to better protect localised predator stocks in sensitive areas. A localised ban in areas 
governed by state sovereignty could be effective despite flaws with the current management 
regime. At the very least, a localised ban is justified under the precautionary approach because 
of the scientific uncertainty concerning the effect that krill harvesting concentrated in localised 
areas would have on local predator populations. 
Large scale krill swarms may also constitute genetically distinct biological stocks. 149 If there are 
genetically independent krill populations then sustained fishing in one particular area could 
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144 Ibid, 353 
145 Ibid, 357 
146 Ichii, T., Naganobu, M. and Ogishima, T. Supra, fn 103 krill 
147 Agnew, D.J. and Marin, V.H. Supra, fn 104, 72 
148 Ichii, T., Naganobu, M. and Ogishima, T. Supra, fn 103 
149 Nicol, S. 1995. Supra, fn 73, 392 
28 
destroy an isolated stock ofkri11. 150 Recently, there has been some evidence of genetically 
separate krill stocks. 151 However, there is still uncertainty as to whether these discrete stocks of 
krill actually exist. 152 Ocean currents may carry krill between different areas. This could mean 
there is simply one global krill population153 and destroying biologically distinct krill stocks 
would not be a risk. The perceived problems with insufficient food for localised predators may 
not materialise if ocean currents do carry krill between areas. However, if genetically distinct 
local krill populations do exist, then there will be a need to introduce stronger regulatory and 
enforcement mechanisms to protect them. 
Recently CCAMLR has utilised information from the 2000 biomass survey to explore the 
possible use of small scale geographical management units. 154 An examination of the potential 
ranges of predators at particular locations and the relationship between those ranges and fisheries 
is necessary. 155 CCAMLR has subdivided the subareas of Area 48 of the Convention Area into 
15 of these small scale management units. 156 Five of these units contain the majority of krill 
catch in Area 48 and all of these units are opposite local predator colonies. 157 The 
implementation of such small scale units may eliminate any problems from localised fishing by 
setting catch limits in localised areas. If such a solution is effective then, arguably, rational 
harvesting of krill could be maintained without the need for complete protection to ensure that 
local predator populations are not endangered. However, there still need to be improvements in 
the enforcement mechanisms of the current regulatory system if such new management 
techniques are to be effective. 158 
Current Fisheries 
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The dramatic increase in krill fishing in the past did not bode well for krill. However, the severe 
danger posed by historical increases in harvesting seems to have subsided with declines in catch 
in recent years. The break-up of the USSR, one of the major krill producers, has contributed to 
this decline159 as has the 1998 Asian economic crisis. 160 Massive costs associated with Southern 
Ocean fisheries have also reduced incentives for krill fishing. 161 The amount of fuel needed to 
catch a tonne of krill is the same asis needed to catch a tonne of high quality fish in the Northern 
hemisphere. 162 
Krill catch for the 2002/03 season was 117,728 tonnes and the.projected catch for the 2003/04 
season was 165,000 tonnes. 163 The projected catch for the 2004/05 season was 226,000, although 
the Scientific Committee believed that a more realistic expectation of actual catches for the 
cunent season would be around 160,000 tonnes. 164 These projections would seem miniscule in 
comparison to the cunent catch limit of over 4 million tonnes, but they highlight that the scale of 
krill fisheries seems to be on the rise. Further evidence of this phenomenon is also evidenced by 
suggestions that Russia, a country that exited krill fishing industry in 1993/94, was planning to 
introduce two vessels to harvest krill in the Antarctic. 165 CCAMLR precautionary catch limits 
are also set to ensure a sustainable krill harvest without threatening stocks. Potential future krill 
fisheries are taken into account in determining this precautionary limit. However, there is still a 
massive amount of uncertainty sunounding the size of krill population. Even a small krill 
harvest could potentially have a disastrous impact on depleted predator stocks. 166 Accordingly, a 
strong form of the precautionary approach outlined in Chapter 2 would justify resolute action 
being taken to avert any risks arising because of this uncertainty. 
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World Krill Fishing Catches in Prior Years 
Source: CCAMLR website, http://www.ccamlr.org 
Furthermore, greater krill harvesting is likely to eventuate because of the development of new 
krill products and harvesting technologies (some recent efforts at improving krill harvesting 
technology are discussed below). A higher level of harvesting would harm both krill and their 
dependent species, especially because of the extreme uncertain surrounding the effect of fishing 
on depleted predator populations. 
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VI. The Economics of Krill Fishing 
The current low catch for Antarctic krill is due to a lack of current demand combined with high 
catch costs that have led to poor economic returns. The vast distance to the Southern Ocean 
means that fishing vessels incur high fuel and processing costs. A krill fisheries industry cannot 
be sustained on a year long basis in all Antarctic areas because of ice cover during the winter. 167 
Only around South Georgia is a year round fisheries industry viable. 168 This should mean that 
South Georgia should be a major focus of krill conservation efforts. High costs and poor 
financial returns are the result of such geographical problems. If krill cannot be caught 
economically, then catches will remain at current low levels. Low levels of harvesting arguably 
negate the need for a total fishing ban, although even low levels may have a detrimental effect on 
dependent species, particularly if they are already endangered. Even with low levels of krill 
harvesting, there could be improvements in the current legal regime and the mechanisms of 
enforcement of current precautionary catch limits in order to more effectively regulate the 
current and future krill fishing industry. Particularly because krill harvesting is likely to increase 
in the future as demand increases from the expansion of krill markets and harvesting costs are 
reduced from improvements in processing technology. 
Difficulties also arise from the processing of krill. Krill spoil rapidly after they have been caught 
due" to the powerful enzymes contained in their digestive systems. 169 These enzymes break the 
body down rapidly on death, turning krill into a liquid sludge. In effect, krill eats itself after 
death. Krill that have.been feeding have higher levels of digestive enzymes, causing them to 
spoil more rapidly. Krill storage problems are compounded by the high level of solubility of krill 
proteins170 and the bacteria found in digestive systems of krill. 171 Storing live kr'ill is a possible 
solution, but existing catch systems are not able to do this as yet Krill must be frozen and 
partially processed on board the vessel. 172 Such problems can only increase the costs of 
processing krill and diminish monetary returns. Anything that reduces returns will decrease the 
possibility of larger volumes of harvesting in the future and reduce incentives for new entrants 
into krill market. Static levels of krill harvesting will make it difficult to argue for tighter 
restrictions on krill harvesting or complete protection. 
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These technical problems create high processing costs for krill. However, as processing 
technology improves the costs will diminish. Furthermore, as discussed later in this thesis, there 
overcapacity in the world's fishing fleet causes risks that fishers will switch from exploiting 
depleted stocks to exploiting other species such as krill. As returns from krill fishing improve, 
the harvesting levels are likely to increase. As discussed previously in this Chapter, krill form a 
vital link between phytoplankton and other species which are higher up the Antarctic food web. 
A plethora of species receive their nutrients and energy necessary to sustain the survival of the 
species either from feeding directly on krill or indirectly from feeding on species that directly 
feed on krill. Furthermore, the previous sections of this Chapter have highlighted the scientific 
evidence that illustrates the correlation between krill population numbers in particular areas and 
the recruitment success of dependent species, particularly during the breeding season. 
Accordingly, krill conservation is vital to ensure that significant damage is not done to the whole 
Antarctic ecosystem because, as Everson and Goss point out, even small harvesting levels may 
have a detrimental effect on dependent species. 173 
The exoskeleton of krill contains an extremely high level of fluoride. 174 Fluoride can be toxic to 
humans in high enough levels, so krill need to be specially processed ifthey are to be used for 
human consumption.175 Fluoride is contained only in krill's shell, however, on death it leaches 
into the body. To prevent this occurring either the shell either be removed quickly on death; krill 
must be snap frozen to prevent fluoride leaching; or krill must be boiled to fix fluoride in the 
shell. 176 Removing the shells can be labour intensive. 177 The need to specially process krill to 
deal with fluoride can increase costs and reduce the profitability of krill fisheries which provides 
another disincentive for larger harvesting levels in the future. However, as discussed, 
improvements in processing technology can reduce these technical difficulties and, with a 
reduction in cost, krill harvesting will become more profitable. 
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The demand for krill products and the profitability of such products also threatens the viability of 
the industry. Profitability depends on the final product. In the past, lack of technology and poor 
profitability has prevented the extensive use of krill except for high value/low volume products, 
such as whole krill and tail meat. 178 The small size of krill industry has also contributed to high 
costs and low returns from standard catching and processing technology. 179 Krill can be caught 
economically, however, expensive processing and marketing has previously inhibited-the 
industry. 18° Consumer resistance to krill taste has also limited krill markets for human 
consumption. 181 A substantial investment is also required for any large scale krill production. 182 
All of these factors have meant that it has been extremely difficult to achieve acceptable 
economic returns from krill fisheries. Vessels have little incentive to enter the market or to 
increase their volumes of krill catch when it is so difficult to make an acceptable profit. If there 
is little incentive for an expansion of krill industry then, arguably, current catch limits and 
management procedures may be sufficient. However, although krill themselves may not be 
under threat, the potential for species that depend on them to be detrimentally affected by even a 
low level of krill harvesting should provide the basis for stronger controls on krill fishing. 
Economic returns from krill fishing are also likely to improve in the future. With the 
development of new krill products and the expansion of existing ones, demand for krill is likely 
to improve significantly. Any improvements in processing technology will also lead to reduced 
costs and better economic returns. 
The current low levels of krill fisheries may be indicative of the poor economic viability of the 
industry. Given the high costs of krill fisheries; the lack of demand; and historically low 
economic returns then, arguably, no protection is required for krill. Products that are sold on a 
high volume basis, such as krill meal, also have their price restricted by competition from 
alternative meal based products such as soya beans and fish. 183 A threat to ·krill may not exist if 
harvesting the species is not worthwhile. 
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However, there is still a huge potential for krill industry to become profitable in the future with 
the advent of new technologies and products. New products and better marketing is likely to 
lead to greater demand for krill. Japan already has an economically sustainable krill industry, 
albeit on a small scale and stocked mostly from the Indian Ocean.184 Antarctic krill has been 
touted as a means to supplement global protein supplies. 185 There are also fewer opportunities to 
expand conventional fisheries because of the exploitation of traditional fish stocks. 186 
Diminishing returns from existing fisheries, coupled with greater demand for new krill products, 
will force fisheries fleets to refocus their attention on krill. 
Krill has been utilised in a variety of ways in the past. There is a small demand for krill as 
fishing baie 87 and for home aquariums. 188 Although this is only a fraction of current krill 
demand, there is no reason why (with clever marketing) demand for such products cannot rise. 
One of the major markets for krill in the future is likely to be in aquaculture. Krill have been 
used in the aquaculture industry as feed189 because they are a good source of proteins and 
minerals. Krill are also high in astaxanthin, a pigment that gives aquaculture fish, such as 
salmon, their colour. 190 This makes krill an extremely useful product for the aquaculture 
industry. Krill hydrolysates can also act as a feeding stimulant to make cheaper grain feeds in 
aquaculture more palatable to the fish. 191 A Canadian company is currently planning a large 
venture to increase the usage of liquid krill hydrolysates. 192 The huge increase in global 
aquaculture in recent years is likely to provide a greater demand for such hydrolysates and also 
for krill as aquaculture feed. 193 
This increased demand for krill aquaculture feed products is already beginning to materialise. 
Several companies have begun commercial sales of krill-based products to the aquaculture 
industry. One company, AqualnTech Inc. has recently made a krill oil product available for use 
as a feed supplement in commercial aquaculture. 194 Another company, Argent Labs, is selling 
commercially freeze-dried Pacific krill for use as feed in the aquaculture industry. 195 
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Furthermore, at the World Aquaculture Society's 2005 meeting, Antarctic krill was touted as a 
potential alternative feed in the aquaculture industry. 196 An FAO study predicts that global 
demand for fish will expand from 133 million tonnes in 1999/2001 to 183 million tonnes by 
2015. 197 This willbe accompanied by an increase in world fish production from 129 million 
tonnes in 1999/2001 to 172 million tonnes by 2015. 198 The F AO study projects that world 
aquaculture production will increase substantially and 73% of the increase in fish production will 
come from aquaculture. China and South East Asia currently produce 90% of world aquaculture 
output and the F AO projects that Chinese aquaculture will continue to expand. These findings 
suggest that world aquaculture production will continue to expand. Such an expansion will 
require increased use of aquaculture feed and other aquaculture products. As discussed above, 
there are now a range of commercially available krill-based aquaculture products on the market. 
Any expansion of the aquaculture industry could very well be accompanied by increased usage 
of these krill products. 
The problem of global overfishing could also provide the impetus for dramatic jumps in 
aquaculture levels in the future. Such a large increase in demand for krill would mean that 
harvesting volumes would dramatically increase in the future. This could have a huge impact on 
krill and reduce a food source for dependent species with potentially devastating effects on the 
whole Antarctic ecosystem. The reasons why excessive krill fishing would have this effect have 
been outlined throughout this Chapter. However, it is useful to reiterate that the vital link that 
krill forms in channelling nutrients and energy to higher species is clear. What is not so clear is 
the effect that particular levels of krill harvesting will have on other Antarctic species and on 
krill population itself. It is this scientific uncertainty that not only provides a justification for a 
krill harvesting ban, but requires it. As discussed there is even uncertainty as to whether even a 
small level of krill harvesting will be harmful to dependent species, and because the predictions 
concerning the exact size of krill population are also wildly uncertain, then it makes it difficult to 
sustain an argument that precautionary catch limits will not result in harm to krill population and 
dependent species. Indeed, as will be expounded later in this thesis, even the mathematical 
models which are used to formulate precautionary catch limits are extremely uncertainty, 
particularly in respect of the variables that are input into those models ( eg recruitment rates of 
krill and krill population size). Accordingly, this uncertainty strengthens the argument that, at a 
minimum, no-take zones in sensitive areas are required for krill. 
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A complete krill harvesting ban now would eliminate the need for dramatic action in the future if 
the projected increases in aquaculture production materialise. Such a move would prevent 
threats to the Antarctic ecosystem that may breach the conservation objectives of the Madrid 
Protocol and the Convention on Biological Diversity. 
Human consumption of krill has previously been limited in scale. 199 In the past, China sold 
breaded krill sticks on an experimental basis 200 and a krill paste could be obtained in the former 
Soviet Union. 201 Krill was also used in other products in the Soviet Union such as butter, cheese 
and sausages. 202 There was also use of krill in salads and pate. 203 The possibility of using krill 
for food aid in developing countries has also been raised in the past and krill protein concentrates 
were even produced for this purpose. 204 However, such a use has not been developed. Currently 
krill are sold for human consumption as tail meat, frozen whole krill or as krill pastes. Krill 
concentrate has also been used as a food additive and is currently being marketed as a dietary 
supplement. Such speciality products only use small amounts of krill, but are potentially high 
value.Z05 The development of new high value products will enhance the returns available from 
krill fisheries and is likely to cause a rise in krill harvesting levels. 
In recent years there has been more interest in the chemical and pharmaceutical applications for 
krill. Krill is a good source of the chemical chitin. Chitin has many possible uses, including use 
in cholesterol lowering drugs.Z06 The enzymes found in krill could be employed in a variety of 
ways, particularly in light of the strength of such enzymes. The potential applications range from 
use in medicine to use in restoring art works.207 Future pharmaceutical benefits from krill are 
indicative of the increased focus on developing new krill products. This is highlighted by the 
very recent (2005) launching of a patent by a Chilean company, Osteos21 Ltd, for a patent for a 
product which combines krill and salmon processing by-products and assists in calcium intake 
and deposition on bones to help prevent and cure osteoporosis.Z08 Such innovative applications 
may expand demand for krill and therefore increase returns from krill fisheries. New markets for 
krill may encourage new entrants into krill fishing, which could be extremely harmful to krill. 
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New krill products and the expansion of existing krill markets could significantly increase future 
demand. Greater demand would increase price and thus increase the economic viability of the 
industry. Higher harvesting levels may also lead to economies of scale and recoupment of the 
large initial investments necessary to participate in krill industry. This may increase financial 
returns and result in greater krill catches. Recently there has been increased usage of krill waste 
products, including the shell and liquid waste.Z09 Utilising a greater proportion of krill could 
increase the returns per volume of catch and thus place the industry on a much sounder economic 
basis. Current krill harvesting vessels may find it more profitable to harvest larger volumes of 
krill if they are able to reap a greater return for each krill caught. This increases the danger that 
krill fishing volumes may be higher in the future and heightens the need for effective 
conservation measures. 
The viability of the industry could also be aided by decreased harvesting and processing costs 
from the development of new technologies. Already there have been efforts to develop such 
technologies to produce economically sustainable returns from krill fisheries. Recently an 
Alaskan company, Top Ocean, has started harvesting, processing and selling krill products for 
animal and human consumption.Z10 The company is using technology developed by countries 
that have previously been involved in krill fishing. The company has hybridised different 
technologies from nations such as the USSR and Japan.211 Top Ocean has purchased two 
Russian vessels to use for commercial krill fishing operations. The company has been 
experimenting with processing equipment to improve the quality of the meat and rneal for human 
consumption. Technology may now be advanced enough for this purpose. The company can 
also produce krill products for human consumption aboard fishing vessels. 212 Such an 
achievement has eluded other krill harvesting operations. However, no market exists for the 
meal product as yet. According to the company, the product has been tested in Kosovo with 
promising results. Krill meat has already been sold in Japanese and Australian markets.213 
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Furthermore, CCAMLR's Scientific Committee at its 23rd meeting in 2004 noted that a 
Vanuatian vessel, the Atlantic Navigator, appeared to be using new technology to catch and 
process krill.Z14 These major efforts to develop cost effective harvesting and processing 
technologies pose a danger to krill. The drive to discover innovative new uses for krill and to 
increase the usage of current krill products is likely to lead to a greater demand for krill. A much 
greater economic incentive to become involved in krill fisheries would then exist and a huge 
expansion of krill industry is probable as a result. This likely expansion should provide the 
impetus for tough protection for krill now, so that there is no threat to krill or dependent species 
from overfishing. 
Greater demand for krill products and therefore the need for larger catch volumes are likely to 
lead to krill fishing economies of scale which will increase economic returns. This would help to 
offset the high initial investment required to engage in krill fisheries. Greater demand for krill or 
substitutes for krill products will drive up the price of krill products, especially if supply was 
capped by a precautionary catch limit. Higher prices could provide a greater incentive to become 
involved in the industry. The high initial investment costs of obtaining efficient krill harvesting 
technology also provide significant barriers of entry into the market. This could reduce 
competition and provide significant advantages to those already involved in krill fisheries. 
A lack of economic data on krill industry also contributes to the problem.215 Information on the 
costs and returns from krill harvesting and the economics of marketing krill products is absent. 
Gauging the potential of a large scale krill industry is extremely difficult without such detailed 
data. Any substantial harvesting could damage the Antarctic ecosystem, despite CCAMLR's 
precautionary approach. If krill can provide good economic returns there will be an incentive to 
aggressively fish the species in breach ofCCAMLR's directives. The weak enforcement 
mechanisms available to CCAMLR and the current problems with IUU fishing will be discussed 
later in this thesis. Any significant fisheries could cause detrimental change to populations by 
threatening krill dependant species. This would conflict with international instruments such as 
the Madrid Protocol's ecosystem conservation obJectives. The endangering of species through 
detrimental changes would conflict with the conservation and sustainable use objectives of the 
Law of the Sea Convention and the Convention on Biological Diversity. Ideally, the legal 
regime governing the high seas and the Antarctic in particular should also be strengthened over 
time in a greater effort to restrict IUU fishing in this region. 
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VII. Environmental Factors affecting krill population 
Environmental factors can affect krill populations and are therefore able to threaten the viability 
of any large scale krill industry. The Antarctic sea ice changes annually from a minimum area of 
around 4 million square kilometres to a maximum of around 19 million square kilometres.216 
The sea ice plays an important role in the marine ecosystem. Juvenile krill feed on algae that live 
underneath the ice sheets.217 When pack ice melts it releases microscopic plants. These 
phytoplankton are trapped near the surface because of the low density freshwater released by the 
melting ice. Algae thrive in the sea ice environment.218 The high levels of nutrients and 
sunlight provide ideal conditions for algae reproduction. Krill can then feed on this 
phytoplankton. Ice also gives protection from predators219 and from fishing fleets during winter 
months. South Georgia remains ice free during winter and is the only area where krill fishing 
can take place during this time.220 ,This makes it difficult for any large scale krill industry to be 
maintained because of the limits placed on supply during the winter months. South Georgia's ice 
free status during winter makes it of particular importance for krill harvesting and makes it 
extremely vulnerable to overfishing. A likely increase in the scale of the fishing industry will 
threaten kril! population in the waters surrounding South Georgia because of the area's unique 
characteristics for krill harvesting.221 Any localised krill bans that were introduced would need 
to, at a minimum, cover this vital krill fishing ground (this idea will be developed further later in 
this thesis). 
Krill is pften more abundant near the ice than in open ocean. The majority of krill are found near 
the edge of Antarctica's continental shelf. Krill populations have also been observed at their 
greatest levels when there has been more ice.222 There is some controversial evidence suggesting 
that reductions in krill abundance in recent times are due to lack of winter ice cover.223 During 
such periods a particular type of zooplankton, salps, are more abundant. Salps are probably not 
useful as food for many krill predators. A correlation may exist between increases in salps, 
decreases in krill, and poor breeding seasons for land based predators. This would result in 
predators being unable to find sufficient food for their offspring because of the lack ofkrill.224 
216 Nicol, S. arid Allison, I. 1997. The Frozen Skin of the Southern Ocean. American Scientist, Vol 85(5): 
426-439 
217 Brierly, A. and Reid, K. Supra, fu 95, 40 
218 Ibid 
219 Ibid 
220 Nicol, S. and Allison, I. Supra, fu 218 
221 Issues of sovereignty and conservation concerning South Georgia and other sub-Antarctic islands will 
be discussed in Chapter 3. 
222 Brierly, A. and Reid, K. Supra, fu 95, 40 
223 Nicol, S. and Allison, I. Supra, fn 218 
224 Ibid 
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Reductions in sea ice would therefore have a detrimental effect, not only on krill, but also on 
dependent species. The uncertainty of the relationship between sea ice and krill and the 
difficulty in predicting the extent of sea ice in any one year should be grounds for caution when 
formulating conservation measures. If an unforeseen reduction in the sea ice occurred in any 
particular year, then a reduction in krill could be the result.225 If any management measures or 
mathematical models226 failed to accurately take into account the effect of potential reductions in 
sea ice on krill numbers, then both krill and dependent species would be detrimentally affected 
by fishing levels that have not been set in accordance with these reductions. 
Increased global temperatures would have a profound impact on the extent of sea ice cover.227 
Such decreases in ice cover would harm both krill and dependent predator populations. 
However, the exact effect of climate change on krill populations is uncertain. This uncertainty 
makes it impossible to ascertain the extent and direction of any change in krill population.228 
Such uncertainties only add to the complexities involved in determining a sustainable level of 
krill harvesting. Conservation of krill is essential to ensure that dependent species are not 
detrimentally affected by these uncertainties and to ensure that the conservation objectives of 
international instruments are achieved. A comprehensive ban on krill fishing should be 
introduced because of the inability of the current regime to deal with such uncertainties, although 
weak enforcement mechanisms will make it difficult to effectively maintain any such ban. If 
recent improvements in enforcement mechanisms are implemented in the Antarctic, any 
comprehensive or localised krill ban would be more likely to succeed. 
225 This, of course, depends on the relationship between krill numbers and the extent of sea ice which, as 
mentioned, is uncertain. 
226 The precautionary catch limits of CCAMLR are set using mathematical models that try to take into 
account data uncertainty. 
227 Nicol, S. and Allison, I. Supra, fu 218 
228 There is insufficient data to make such predictions. 
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Why introduce a harvesting ban?: A summary of the position 
The purpose of this section is merely to draw together the reasons why some form of ban, rather 
than mere precautionary catch limits, is required in respect of krill fishing industry in Antarctica. 
Firstly, there is an issue as to whether any form of management or conservation measures are 
required at all given the seemingly low level of krill harvesting compared to CCAMLR's 
precautionary measures. As discussed, based on CCAMLR statistic the level of krill fishing has 
clearly increased in the past few years. Furthermore, there is now a greater demand for krill 
because there has been a greater demand for existing products and new uses have emerged such 
as in the aquaculture, medical and chemical industries. In particular, the range of krill products 
in the aquaculture industry has dramatically increased as is the demand for these products. Due 
to the huge predicted increase in aquaculture in the near future, there is also likely to be a 
corresponding increase in demand for krill products. As discussed, this has already been evident 
from the new krill products that are appearing on the market. 
Furthermore, the costs of actually engaging in krill fishing are likely to decrease dramatically 
because of the improvements in harvesting technology that have been discussed in this Chapter. 
This renewed investment in harvesting technology also demonstrates an increased interest in krill 
fishing. Greater demand for krill products combined with lower costs should lead to greater 
profits from krill fishing, although it should be noted that there are no recent major studies 
concerning the economics of krill harvesting. Higher profits should lead to a much greater krill 
catch in the future and, accordingly, some form of management measures are required to prevent 
krill IUU fishing having the same effect that exploitation on other Antarctic species has had in 
the past. This history of devastating effects of Antarctic exploitation has been described in detail 
at the beginning of this Chapter. The historic evidence is a clear and unquestionable reason why 
some form of management regulation is required in respect of the Antarctic krill. 
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Secondly, once it has been established that some form of Antarctic krill management or 
conservation is necessary there is an issue as to whether current CCAMLR precautionary catch 
limits are adequate. There are a number of reasons why these limits are inadequate which have 
been described throughout this Chapter as follows: 
• The size of krill population is very uncertain and previous estimates have fluctuated 
wildly. Little comfort can be achieved from setting precautionary catch limits where a 
population size is largely unknown as, if the population is a lot smaller than the largest 
estimates, precautionary catch limits could be permitting fishers to catch a large 
proportion of the stock in a single season, thus harming recruitment rates and 
detrimentally effecting the size of the stock in the following season. 
• As outlined above, the scientific study of Everson and Goss regarding krill fishing 
concludes that even low levels of krill harvesting could have a detrimental effect on 
dependent species. Accordingly, setting these precautionary catch limits could still be 
harming dependent species. Therefore, as outlined in Chapter 2, it would be prudent to 
suspend krill fishing until more scientific certainty is achieved regarding the exact effects 
of krill fishing on dependent species. 
• As discussed, there is scientific evidence concerning a correlation between the extent of 
Antarctic sea ice and recruitment levels of krill. Accordingly, if climate change has a 
major effect on the extent of seas ice in Antarctica, this is likely to have an effect, maybe 
even an extremely significant effect, on krill recruitment. Of course, given the massive 
uncertainty concerning krill population size, such changes would not be detected in a 
timely manner. Accordingly, CCAMLR could still be setting precautionary catch limits 
at high levels at the same time as krill recruitment rates were being detrimentally eroded 
by changes in sea ice cover caused by climate change. This highlights the inadequacies 
of simply maintaining precautionary catch limits. 
• As will be outlined in further detail in Chapter 5, CCAMLR sets precautionary catch 
limits by taking an ecosystem approach which sets the limits based on effects of fishing 
on the target species and other species in the ecosystem. However, the exact nature and 
effect of interactions between krill and other species is wildly uncertain. Accordingly, 
the mathematical models CCAMLR uses to set the catch limits are inaccurate, although 
they do attempt to take into account uncertainty in variables such as population size. 
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• Following from this point, CCAMLR uses a feedback management system which 
changes the precautionary catch limits of species based on new scientific data concerning 
the effects of fisheries and other variables on the species. However, this system 
inevitably suffers from a time lag in that corrections to the management system are made 
as impacts from previous decisions become apparent and so this can result in damage 
being done before adjustments can be made. 
At a very minimum, localised no-take zones are required in respect of krill. As discussed in this 
Chapter, there is scientific evidence that points both to localised genetically distinct krill 
populations and detrimental effects from krill fishing on localised predator populations during 
breeding season. Simply having precautionary catch limits in these zones would not be sufficient 
because of the uncertainties highlighted above concerning the effect that even small levels of 
krill fishing may have on dependent species. Furthermore, enforcement of precautionary catch 
limits or any form of krill ban will always be a problem in large Southern Ocean areas .. 
However, a moratorium may make enforcement easier, particularly with trade related measures 
and port state controls, because differentiation would not be required between legitimate krill 
catches and those caught by IUU fishers. This reduces problems of proof in respect of species 
which can be caught legally. 
The final question is why a krill fishing moratorium is the ideal management response in respect 
of Antarctic krill. Localised no-fish zones may help local dependent predator populations but 
they may not solve the problem in respect of the Antarctic ecosystem as a whole. Evidence 
concerning the efficacy of no-fish zones and the impact on areas outside those zones is discussed 
in further detail subsequently in this thesis. 
The uncertainties, inaccuracies and time lags concerning precautionary catch limits cannot be 
accepted in respect of krill above all other Antarctic marine species. Damage to krill population 
caused by time lags in CCAMLR's feedback management system cannot be accepted in respect 
of krill because, unlike other species, it will have global consequences to the Antarctic 
ecosystem. As strongly emphasised earlier in this Chapter, the Antarctic food chain is extremely 
short which makes it extremely vulnerable to exploitation. Krill forms the crux of the ecosystem 
and so, because of the relatively few species that exist in the Antarctic system, damage to krill 
will not just affect a few dependent species it will have ripple on effects in respect of the whole 
ecosystem. As discussed above, some scientists have claimed that krill plays a more important 
role than species in similar positions in other ocean ecosystems. Accordingly, krill is a unique 
species, exploitation of which, has the potential to have dramatic effects on other species in the 
Antarctic ecosystem. 
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Krill SHOULD be treated differently from other species in Antarctica because the well being of 
those other species is dependent, at least in part, to the continued well being of krill. This is the 
fundamental reason why exploitation of krill should be halted in the face of scientific 
uncertainties concerning appropriate catch limits, the interaction of krill with other species and 
even the size of krill population itself. 
Conclusion 
This Chapter has examined the significance of krill to the Antarctic ecosystem and why 
conservation of krill is essential for the survival of that ecosystem. The history of natural 
resource exploitation in Antarctica has led to the depletion in numbers of many species. The 
development of a modem krill harvesting industry requires us to ensure that past problems of 
overexploitation are not repeated with krill. A legal conservation regime is necessary in 
Antarctica to ensure that krill does not suffer from the same pattern that has threatened other 
Antarctic species in the past. 
The current legal regime, the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living 
Resources, took a substantial period of time before it introduced krill conservation measures. 
Swifter action is necessary in the future to respond to potential threats to krill because of krill's 
vital role in the Antarctic ecosystem. Antarctic krill form the base of the Antarctic ecosystem 
and play a vital role by channelling nutrients and energy to higher level species. The magnitude 
of krill's position in the ecosystem means that a comprehensive ban on krill harvesting is 
appropriate. A complete ban would give greater security to dependent species and would allow 
continued exploitation of such species, although there are some weaknesses in the current 
regulatory regime which would reduce the effectiveness of such a ban. 
Conserving krill should be given high priority, not only because of its role in the ecosystem, but 
also because of the high level of scientific uncertainty surrounding the species. There is extreme 
uncertainty surrounding estimates of krill populations; interactions with other species; and the 
effects of environmental factors on krill numbers. There is also uncertainty as to whether krill 
harvesting will have a major effect on predators because of juvenile fish by-catch and on 
localised predator populations because of localised krill fishing. Such uncertainty could have 
detrimental effects on predator populations, even with the precautionary catch limits imposed by 
CCAMLR. A complete ban on krill harvesting would help to prevent such adverse changes to 
these populations and would conform to the ecosystem conservation objectives of CCAMLR. 
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A krill fishing moratorium is appropriate because of likely increases in krill harvesting levels in 
the future. New uses in areas such as aquaculture (which is likely to be a high growth area, 
particularly because of overfishing) are likely to result in greater demand for krill and greater 
profitability from krill fishing. Advances in technology will also reduce the harvesting and 
processing costs of krill fishing and lead to better economic returns. Greater demand and higher 
returns would increase the levels of krill fishing and require a stricter level of krill conservation. 
The scientific uncertainty described above should not form a barrier to taking decisive action to 
secure krill's long-term future. The adoption of a moratorium on krill fishing or, at the very least 
the implementation of localised fishing bans is justified because of this uncertainty. This 
justification is based on what is known as the "precautionary approach" to resource 
management". These concepts and their application to krill management in the Antarctic are the 
subject of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE PRECAUTIONARY APPROACH 
Introduction 
The purpose of this Chapter is to examine the precautionary approach/principle to resource 
management, particularly in the context of Antarctica and krill management. As highlighted in 
Chapter 1, krill are a vital link in the Antarctic ecosystem on which many other species are 
directly or indirectly dependent. Krill harvesting is currently permitted up to certain 
precautionary catch limits. However, there is still enormous scientific uncertainty concerning the 
effect of krill harvesting on the Antarctic ecosystem and even on the approximate size of the 
Antarctic krill population. A krill moratorium or localised krill bans should be introduced in 
light of this uncertainty and the vital role krill plays in Antarctica. This Chapter argues that the 
precautionary approach/principle is the justification for such a move and, perhaps, in its strongest 
form demands that such action be taken. 
Part II of this Chapter will examine the "precautionary approach/principle" itself. There are 
problems in defining exactly what constitutes a "precautionary approach". This Part will outline 
the different "degrees" ?fthe precautionary approach and which one is the most appropriate. 
The Part will then conclude by discussing what this means in terms of krill management in 
Antarctica. 
Part II of this Chapter then examines the importance of krill to dependent species and the role 
that precautionary catch limits play in permitting sustainable harvesting of krill despite the 
uncertainty that exists. The approach of the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic 
Marine Living Resource to setting precautionary catch limits is a particular focus of this Part. 
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Part III of this Chapter will examine other areas in international law where the precautionary 
approach has been advocated. In particular, an analysis will be conducted of the legal support 
that these areas can give to the application of a precautionary approach to krill and other 
Antarctic species. This Part will begin by examining the acceptance of the precautionary 
approach in international hard law instruments including its standing within the United Nations· 
Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982; United Nations Agreement on Straddling Fish Stocks 
and Highly Migratory Species 1995; FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries 1995; and 
the Convention for Biological Diversity 1992. This part will conclude by examining the 
precautionary approach/principle's standing within customary international law and the role that 
such law can play in facilitating krill conservation. 
Finally, Part IV of this Chapter highlights some of the criticisms that have been levelled at the 
precautionary approach. The Part examines the validity of these criticisms and asks whether a 
precautionary approach should be adopted at all in respect of krill management. 
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I. Different degrees of a "precautionary approach" 
Environmental concerns first began to appear in international legal instruments in the Stockholm 
Declaration of 1972. The precautionary principle appeared as part of the 1987 Second 
Ministerial Declaration of the International Conferences on the Protection of the North Sea. The 
precautionary approach to environmental management was subsequently advocated in the Rio 
Declaration,229 which will be discussed in greater detail below. This approach supports the 
introduction of conservation procedures regardless of whether sufficient information exists.230 
As will be discussed further below, the Code of Conduct and Fish Stocks Agreement endorse the 
approach. Article 10 of the Kyoto Declaration also gives support to states applying the 
precautionary approach as referred to in the F AO Code of Conduct and the UN Fish Stocks 
Agreement. The 1982 World Charter for Nature also recognises a form of the precautionary 
approach. 
The precautionary approach has sometimes been referred to as the precautionary principle, 
although there is unlikely to be any difference between the meaning of the terms.Z31 At its most 
basic level, the precautionary approach seeks to solve the problem that long term predictions on 
the effects of human activities on ecosystems may never be possible. 232 The precautionary 
principle suggests that scientific uncertainty should be a justification for action, rather than 
waiting until definitive evidence is available. 233 This places the burden of proof on states 
advocating development if scientific uncertainty exists.234 The precautionary approach is 
significant for achieving sustainable development because the ability of regional ecosystems to 
withstand resource exploitation is mostly unknown. 235 The Antarctic ecosystem's capacity to 
withstand krill exploitation, particularly because of krill's vital role in that ecosystem, is still 
uncertain. This makes the precautionary approach extremely important for conservation of krill 
and the Antarctic ecosystem. Even if a comprehensive ban on krill fishing is not adopted, the 
precautionary approach still justifies setting precautionary catch limits in the absence of accurate 
data. 
229 Rio de Janeiro, 1992, United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration 
principle 15 
230 Baird, R. Supra, fu 25, 178 
231 Birnie, P. and Boyle, A. 2002.International Law and the Environment (2"d ed). Oxford University 
Press: New York at 116. 
232 Gullett, W. 1997. Environmental Protection and the "Precautionary Principle": A Response to Scientific 
Uncertainty in Environmental Management. Environmental and Planning Law Journal, Feb issue: 52-65 at 
54 
233 Ibid 
234 Dernbach, J.C. 1998. Sustainable Development as a Framework for National Governance. Case 
Western Reserve Law Review, Vol49: 1-103 at 61 
235 Ibid, 62 
49 
There is also uncertainty surrounding the precautionary approach/principle in respect of whether 
it refers to the identification of potential risks to the environment or whether it refers to actually 
taking measures to respond to those risks.236 The precautionary approach requires states to take 
action where there is a threat of environmental harm even though there may be scientific 
uncertainty as to the exact harm that an activity will cause.237 However, there still needs to be a 
scientific basis for the threatened harm before states are legally required to act, it simply means 
that there is yet insufficient scientific certainty to determine the effect that a risk will have.238 
This also means that states when conducting activities must take into account possible errors in 
the scientific data and that legal measures should not be delayed by states to await more scientific 
certainty.239 
The principle requires precautionary measures to be taken that are proportionate to the likely 
harm that will be caused by an activity.240 Arguably, because the harm resulting from krill 
fishing could be significant because of krill's important role in the Antarctic ecosystem then, the 
appropriate proportionate response to such possible damage would be a complete krill harvesting 
ban. If this statement holds weight then, for states to comply with the precautionary principle, 
they would need to introduce measures for a complete harvesting ban. However, the 
precautionary principle must also take into account the probability of environmental harm.241 
The probability of harm involves taking the worst possible situation into account when making a 
decision.242 Considering the probability of harm also involves adopting the best guess of the 
harm when formulating regulations. 243 Depending on which interpretation is taken, the 
precautionary approach can be applied in different ways which gives rise to conflicting ideas of 
what constitutes the "appropriate" precautionary approach or precautionary catch limit. 
However, whether a complete ban is adopted or if there are merely precautionary catch limits, 
krill still need an effective legal regime to manage them. Current enforcement mechanisms must 
be improved to prevent the threat of ruu fishing, particularly in light of likely increases in krill 
harvesting as a result of greater economic returns. 
236 Birnie, P. and Boyle, A. Supra, fu 233, 116 
237 Ibid at 117. 
238 Ibid 
239 Ibid at 117-118. 
240 Dembach, J.C. 1998. Supra, fn 236, 61 
241 Charest, S. 2002. Bayesian Approaches to the Precautionary Principle. Duke Environmental Law and 
Policy Forum, Vol12: 265-291 at269 
242 Ibid, 270 
243 Ibid 
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The different possible interpretations of the precautionary approach are also evident in some 
international instruments. For example, Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration directly recognises 
the precautionary approach. Principle 15 states that the "precautionary approach shall be widely 
applied by States according to their capabilities [and] [w]here there are threats of serious or 
irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing 
cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation." Principle 15 constitutes a weak 
formulation of the precautionary approach244 because of its requirement for "threats of serious or 
irreversible damage" before the approach must be applied. What constitutes "serious or 
irreversible damage" is a subjective matter and requiring such harm may mean that the 
probability of damage needs to be high before the precautionary approach will be applied. The 
requirement for the approach to be "widely applied" could arguably suggest that the approach 
should be adopted in a wide variety of circumstances, alternatively, it could be argued that this 
suggests that it does not need to be applied in all circumstances. 
The 1989 Oslo Commission decision concerning the dumping of industrial wastes in the North 
Sea constitutes an extremely strong application of the precautionary approach because it arguably 
requires states to prove that there will be no harm from an activity before it can take place.245 
Such a strong statement of the principle has, arguably, no justification because of the extreme 
difficulties in proving that there will be no adverse impacts from an activity. 246 
The World Charter for Nature 1982 also appears to embody a form of the precautionary approach 
which leans towards the "strong" type of precaution. Article 11 states that activities which 
"might have an impact on nature shall be controlled and the best available technologies that 
minimise significant risks to nature or other adverse risks shall be used." Article ll(a) goes on to 
state.that activities which are "likely to cause irreversible damage to nature shall be avoided" and 
Article 11 (b) requires that activities which are "likely to pose a significant risk to nature shall be 
proceeded by an exhaustive examination; their proponents shall demonstrate that expected 
benefits outweigh potential damage to nature, and where potential adverse effects are not fully 
understood, the activities should not proceed". Accordingly, theW orld Charter also appears to 
reverse the burden of proof in certain circumstances. 
244 Gullett, W. Supra, fn 234, 60 
245 Gullett, W. Supra, fn 234, 60 
246 Ibid 
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The precautionary approach has recently been the subject of a project to investigate the 
application of the approach in the areas of biodiversity conservation and resource management 
and to out guidelines on its application.247 The Project was begun in August 2002 by four Non-
Government Organisations including the TIJCN- World Conservation Union and was completed 
in January 2006.248 A set of guidelines was developed after investigation of case studies on the 
application of the approach and consultation with external parties. 
The guidelines formulated as a consequence of the precautionary principle project are as follows: 
A. ESTABLISH THE FRAMEWORK 
• Guideline 1: INCORPORATE 
Incorporate the Precautionary Principle explicitly into appropriate legal, institutional and 
policy frameworks for biodiversity conservation and natural resource management. 
• Guideline 2: INTEGRATE 
Integrate application of the Precautionary Principle with the application of and support for 
other relevant principles and rights. 
• Guideline 3: OPERATIONALISE 
Develop clear and context-specific obligations and operational measures for particular 
sectors and contexts, or with respect to specific conservation or management problems. 
• Guideline 4: INCLUDE STAKEHOLDERS AND RIGHTHOLDERS 
Include all relevant stakeholders and rightholders in a transparent process of assessment, 
decision-making and implementation 
• Guideline 5: USE THE BEST INFORMATION AVAILABLE 
Base precautionary decision-making on the best available information, including that 
relating to human drivers of threats, and traditional and indigenous knowledge 
247 The Precautionary Principle Project: sustainable development, biodiversity conservation and natural 
resource management, http://www.pprinciple.net 
248 The Precautionary Principle Project: sustainable development, biodiversity conservation and natural 
resource management, http:/ /www.pprinciple.net 
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B. DEFINE THE THREATS, OPTIONS AND CONSEQUENCES 
11 Guideline 6: CHARACTERISE UNCERTAIN THREATS 
Characterise the threat(s), and assess the uncertainties surrounding the ecological, social 
and economic drivers of changes in conservation status 
11 Guideline 7: ASSESS OPTIONS 
Identify the available actions to address threats, and assess the likely consequences of 
these various courses of action and inaction 
• Guideline 8: ALLOCATE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR PROVIDING EVIDENCE 
Allocate roles and responsibilities for providing information and evidence of threat and/or 
safety according to who is proposing a potentially harmful activity, who benefits from it, 
and who has access to information and resources 
C. DEVISE THE APPROPRIATE PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES 
• Guideline 9: BE EXPLICIT 
Specify that precautionary measures are being taken and be explicit about the uncertainty 
to which the precautionary measures are responding. 
• Guideline 10: BE PROPORTIONATE 
In applying the Precautionary Principle adopt measures that are proportionate to the 
potential threats 
• Guideline 11: BE EQUITABLE 
Consider social and economic costs and benefits when applying the Precautionary 
Principle and where decisions would have negative impacts on the poor or vulnerable 
explore ways to avoid or mitigate these 
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D. IMPLEMENT EFFECTIVELY 
• Guideline 12: BE ADAPTIVE 
Use an adaptive management approach, including the following core elements: 
• monitoring of impacts of management or decisions based on agreed indicators; 
• promoting research, to reduce key uncertainties; 
• ensuring periodic evaluation of the outcomes of implementation, drawing of lessons and 
review and adjustment, as necessary, of the measures or decisions adopted; 
• establishing an efficient and effective compliance system. 
One can see that the above guidelines draw on the meaning of the precautionary approach as 
elaborated in other international instruments/arenas. For example, guideline 5 requires the use of 
the best available information, which parallels the requirements in other instruments such as the 
F AO Code of Conduct to use the "best scientific information" 
Guidelines 6-8 outline the initial steps for applying the precautionary approach. In particular, 
Guideline 6 firstly suggests characterising the threat to the environment and then assessing the 
uncertainties surrounding the drivers of changes in conservation status. The guidelines contain 
further supplementary elaborations which suggest that the threats are not only direct ones, but 
also indirect, secondary and long-term ones. The threat in respect of the Antarctic krill has been 
discussed in Chapter 1, being a threat to both krill itself; its genetically distinct populations; 
localised dependent predator species; and other species higher in the Antarctic food web. The 
threat is a serious one because it has potential consequences for the entire Antarctic ecosystem. 
The uncertainties are also high concerning the exact effect of even a minimal level of krill fishing 
on the ecosystem and also concerning even the size of krill population. 
Guideline 7 suggests identifying the available actions to address threats and assessing the likely 
consequences of various actions and inaction. The potential courses of action regarding krill will 
be assessed below but broadly these would include precautionary catch limits; no-take zones; a 
krill moratorium or complete fishing freedom in respect of krill. Guideline 8 elaborates on the 
application of the precautionary approach by suggesting that those who propose/benefit from an 
activity should bear the responsibility and costs of providing the evidence that those activities 
are, in fact, safe. Accordingly, krill fishers and those who benefit from the industry or others 
who propose that krill fishing should be conducted (i.e. there should be no moratorium) should 
be the groups providing evidence that krill fishing will not have a significant impact on the 
Antarctic ecosystem. 
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In respect of the application of particular precautionary measures in response to a threat, 
Guideline 1 0 suggests that measures should be adopted that are proportionate to the potential 
threats. The elaboration to this principle suggests that a reasonable balance must be struck 
between the stringency of the precautionary measures and the seriousness and irreversibility of 
the potential threat. This concept of proportionality will be discussed further below in respect of 
the Antarctic krill. 
The strongest possible application of the precautionary approach would mean that no krill catch 
would be allowed until it was certain that there was no risk from harvesting. 249 If the 
requirements efthe Oslo Commission were adopted, then states would, arguably, actually have 
to prove that krill fishing would not cause harm before harvesting was allowed. Such a 
requirement may be too burdensome, particularly because of the difficulties in obtaining 
definitive data concerning krill and their interactions with other species?50 However, this does 
not mean that a comprehensive ban should not be introduced. Such a ban is necessary because of 
the vital role played by krill in the Antarctic ecosystem and the need to facilitate sustainable use 
of krill dependent species that provide greater economic returns than krill. 
CCAMLR's precautionary approach falls short of this level of protection and takes into account 
current uses of krill resources and potential future economic opportunities involving krill. 251 
Such an approach involves imposing precautionary catch limits but does not go so far as to ban 
krill fishing altogether. Economic considerations are relevant to the precautionary principle 
because costs will be incurred in order to prevent the occurrence of future harm. 252 However, if 
the precautionary principle is applied to maximum effect, then the future economic costs from 
potentially unnecessary action gives weight to arguments concerning economic inefficiency and 
reduces the validity of the principle in the future.253 Economic considerations should not become 
too important in applying the precautionary principle otherwise there is a danger that it will 
become a mere cost-benefit analysis which would provide minimal protection for the 
environment. 254 
249 Miller, D.G .M. 2002. Antarctic Krill and Ecosystem Management-- From Seattle to Siena. CCAMLR 
Science, Vol9: 175-212 at 179 
250 eg See Chapter 1 for a discussion of the difficulties in obtaining accurate data on the size ofkrill 
population. · 
251 Miller, D.G.M. 2002. Supra, fu 251, 179 
252 Gullett, W. Supra, fn 234, 58 
253 Ibid, 59 
254 Ibid 
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Even if economic considerations are important in applying a precautionary approach, a total ban 
would still be justified. Species higher in the food chain provide much greater economic returns 
than krill. Protecting krill, as a vital linchpin of the ecosystem, will help to facilitate the 
sustainable development of these higher species. However, stronger regulatory mechanisms 
must be introduced to ensure that any catch limits or total bans are effectively implemented. 
Arguably, CCAMLR should adopt a stronger form of the precautionary approach that takes into 
account the extent of the potential harm that could occur from krill fishing and relies less on the 
loss of future economic benefits. Where there is a greater risk of harm, the precautionary 
principle permits action even where there is a high level of scientific uncertainty. 255 Where 
anticipated harm is minimal, a greater level of certainty is necessary before action can be taken 
under the precautionary approach. 256 
If krill fishing does have a detrimental impact on krill and dependent species, the potential harm 
could be great. Krill fishing, as discussed in Chapter 1, affects localised predator and krill 
populations. Furthermore, the extreme importance of krill to the Antarctic food chain (including 
dependent species) means that high krill harvesting levels would have a dramatic effect on the 
whole Antarctic ecosystem. Because high levels of harvesting would, arguably, cause significant 
damage, a stronger form of the precautionary approach advocating a total krill ban is justified. 
Although, requiring proof that no harm will occur before any fishing activity can be conducted 
would not be justified because it would prevent the sustainable exploitation of higher species in 
the food chain without proof that fishing did not cause harm. 
255 Ibid 
256 Ibid 
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H. CCAMLR and the precautionary approach 
The precautionary approach allows CCAMLR to consider effects of data uncertainty before 
making decisions. Possible long term impacts of delaying until sufficient data is available are 
minimised. 257 
CCAMLR currently allows depletion of krill stocks, provided that they can recover in several 
decades. Although krill are short lived, depleting the stock results in lower recruitment rates and 
a lower krill population in subsequent seasons. Permitting such activities will have dramatic 
effects on dependent species. For example, exploitation of krill will affect the rebuilding of 
depleted stocks of baleen whales.258 A reduction in whale numbers caused by large scale 
whaling has allowed krill numbers to grow. Resulting increases in other krill dependent species, 
such as seals, could prevent recovery of baleen whale numbers because of increased 
competition.259 Krill consumption by seals currently exceeds consumption by baleen whales.260 
Further competition by krill fisheries will seriously hinder the recovery of whale numbers, 
especially given likely increases in harvesting levels. The vital role played by krill in the 
survival of direct and indirect predator species should mean that krill are protected from fisheries 
by a total harvesting ban. A harvesting ban will help to prevent detrimental changes to 
populations of dependent species in accordance with the conservation objectives of international 
treaties including the Madrid Protocol, the Biodiversity Convention and the Law of the Sea 
Convention.261 At a minimum, current enforcement techniques in Antartica must be improved if 
such a ban is to be effective. This is particularly the case because of the threat posed by IUU 
fishing from likely increased economic returns from krill harvesting. Ideally, the world 
community should work towards strengthening current legal regime in order to curtail IUU 
fishing on the high seas and in areas of national jurisdiction. 
Krill fisheries will have some impact on dependent species. However, the exact effect of 
fisheries on such species is difficult to predid62 because of the uncertainty and insufficiency of 
257 CCAMLR website, http://www.ccamlr.org 
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data on krill population and its interactions with these species. This uncertain data can also 
affect the mathematical models used by CCAMLR to set precautionary catch limits.263 The 
position of krill at the base of the marine Antarctic food chain may magnify the effect of krill 
fisheries on dependent species and harvesting of any species so low in the food chain may not be 
prudent. Larger species (such as anchovies) which share an analogous level in the food chain to 
krill have been harvested for many years.264 This implies that krill can be harvested in a 
sustainable manner without any lasting effects on dependent species. If other species at the base 
of a marine food chain can be harvested sustainably then, arguably, the mere fact that krill are at 
the base of the Antarctic food chain should not be a justification for preventing their exploitation. 
However, the extremely short Antarctic food chain distinguishes it from other ecosystems. The 
smaller number of species makes krill even more important than species at analogous levels in 
other marine ecosystems. This makes it vital that krill are protected by a comprehensive 
harvesting ban and current regulatory mechanisms must be strengthened to resolve weaknesses 
with the current regime and reduce the threat of IOU fishing. 
Even if krill fisheries currently, or in the future, have a significant impact on dependent species 
there will be difficulties proving such effects. Opponents can argue that other factors are causing 
decline or that a particular decrease in population size is not significant.265 For example, they can 
argue that environmental factors are causing dependent species to decline, rather than 
overfishing. Altematively, they can argue that a decline in population caused by fishing is 
insignificant when compared to the population as a whole. The lack of data conceming 
interrelationships between species makes it difficult to prove a decline has occurred or to present 
a counterargument to opponents of conservation. Furthermore, a lack of data would make it hard 
to show that a decline in dependent species was caused by excessive krill harvesting. However, 
as outlined below, when taking a precautionary approach a lack of data should not be used as a 
justification for not introducing conservation measures. Accordingly, strong regulatory measures 
supporting a moratorium or localised bans are necessary to adequately protect krill and conserve 
their dependent species. 
Legal weaknesses in the Convention 
263 These mathematical models (krill Yield Model is one of these) will be discussed further below. 
, 
264 Nicol, S. and Endo, Y. op. cit., 115 
265 Gulland, J.A. op. cit., 237 
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CCAMLR itself also presents difficulties in protecting dependent species. Article II(3)(a) 
requires that harvested populations remain above levels ensuring "stable recruitment". However, 
maintaining populations at a level corresponding to "stable recruitment" is dependent on the 
levels of other species and can affect the abundance of such species?66 "Stable recruitment" 
requires a level ensuring the "greatest net annual increment". This level conflicts with the 
Convention's conservation principles because harvesting at such a level is likely to be 
detrimental to other species protected by the Convention.267 This is especially true in light ofthe 
multiple species that feed on krill.268 An indirect impact on species that feed on krill-dependent 
predators is also likely. Removing krill from the diet of predators that do not feed exclusively on 
krill will result in a greater impact on other species on which those predators depend?69 
Clarification of Article II(3)(a) has been advocated so that effects on predators are specifically 
recognised in the harvesting of prey species.270 This is to prevent adverse changes to populations 
of those predators. However, if the Article is read as a whole, then Article Il(3)(b ), in 
conjunction with Article II(3)(a), could remedy this legal flaw. Article II(3)(b) requires the 
maintenance of ecological relationships between harvested, dependent and related populations. 
A less equivocal statement is still necessary.271 However, this could merely be a legal, rather 
than a practical, problem. Given CCAMLR's ecosystem approach to management (discussed 
subsequently) this is unlikely to be a problem encountered in the practical implementation ofthe 
Convention. In practice, the mathematical models used by CCAMLR attempt to take into 
account interactions between species, rather than just focussing on a single species. 272 
The application of Article II(3)(a) is also fraught with legal difficulties because of the Article 
II(3 )(b) requirement that depleted populations should be restored to the point of maximum net 
recruitment. With interdependent species, net recruitment of one stock is necessarily dependent 
on the numbers of the other stock and it is unlikely that both species can reach "the greatest.net 
annual increment".273 This problem makes it difficult to maintain krill at the levels advocated by 
the Convention whilst maintaining similar levels for dependent species. Such legal weaknesses 
must be resolved to provide a strong and certain legal regime that can adequately conserve krill 
in light of likely harvesting increases or protect krill if a complete ban is instituted. 
266 Easson, M. and Eeddington, J.R: Supra, fu 138, 56 
267 This is the basis of the ecosystem approach that is promoted by CCAMLR which will be discussed later 
in this thesis. 
268 Easson, M. and Eeddington, J.R. Supra, fu 138, 58 
269 Ibid 63 
270 Aub~rn, F.M. Supra, fu 30, 211 
271 Gardam, J.G. Supra, fu 404, 302 
272 Although such an approach was used in the first 8 to 10 years of CCAMLR. 
273 Gulland, J.A. Supra, fu 7, 230 
59 
The precautionary catch limits introduced by CCAMLR set a point at which complex 
management procedures must take over.274 The form of precautionary approach used by 
CCAMLR looks at the proportion ofunexploited biomass that can be exploited using certain 
management criteria.275 Precautionary measures for krill are required because of insufficient data 
regarding krill and interactions with other species.276 This particular form of the precautionary 
approach was adopted in relation to krill fisheries management because of the uncertainty 
concerning interactions between krill and other species; the uncertainty surrounding the effect of 
harvesting on krill and other species; and the fact that a krill stock collapse could have a much 
greater effect on dependent species higher in the ecosystem that could provide much more 
important benefits in terms of tourism, conservation and fishing. 277 Pre~autionary catch limits 
are deliberately set at levels that will not compromise the future sustainability of krill fisheries. 278 
Such limits also aim to provide the fishing industry with a basis for future planning so that large 
investments are not made unnecessarily.279 Strong legal and regulatory mechanisms must be 
maintained if such precautionary measures are to be effectively enforced in light of the IUU 
fishing problem. Particularly important is the need to improve current enforcement mechanisms 
and to strengthen the legal safeguards in order to prevent TIJU fishing in areas of the high sea in 
the Antarctic. A moratorium on krill harvesting must be supported by such reforms in order to 
be effective. 
Precautionary catch limits for krill are calculated using conservation models. Statistical models 
are used to simulate the population levels of particular species both with and without fishing 
exploitation. 280 These models derive estimates using variables such as total krill stocks; the 
natural mortality rate (including predation); the growth rates of krill; and inter-annual variability 
274 Nicol, S. and De !a Mare, W. Supra, fn 80, 44 
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in recruitment.281 Originally CCAMLR used a single species management approach, but has 
developed the "Krill Yield Model" to better meet the objectives of the Convention and to take 
into account the uncertainty surrounding potential krill yield.282 One of the criteria used in 
formulating these precautionary catch limits is the viability of the species. For Antarctic laill 
there must be a less than 10% chance that the population will fall to less than 20% of its 
unexploited median level. 283 Krill predator populations are also taken into account. The median 
population of laill predators must be at least 7 5% of unexploited median population level. 284 
Long term population projections are also used to calculate these risks. 285 Precautionary limits 
can be difficult to determine because of data uncertainty and natural fluctuations, particularly 
with recruitment of young laill. Precautionary limits are not a completely accurate reflection of 
sustainable stock levels because of difficulties with estimating input variables.286 Much greater 
I 
data on laill fishing is required to formulate more accurate models and precautionary limits. 287 
Although CCAMLR mathematical models do attempt to accurately utilise all variables in 
formulating precautionary catch limits, a comprehensive ban on laill fishing should still be 
introduced because oflaill's vital role in the ecosystem. A strong form of the precautionary 
approach would support such a move until more accurate scientific information is available. 
CCAMLR's preferred approach to laill management is a feedback system288 that adjusts 
management measures according to ecosystem monitoring. 289 Implementing this approach fully 
may require improvements to the current CCAMLR ecosystem monitoring program. 290 Better 
mathematical models that link laill, their predators, environmental factors and laill harvesting are 
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also necessary.291 Some of the data needed to improve current management systems can be 
obtained from observers placed on krill fishing vessels or from real-time satellite monitoring 
systems. In particular, a new automated fishery monitoring system has been trialled in Canada 
that provides more accurate real-time data without the need for observers.292 More accurate data 
is also required if a comprehensive harvesting ban is introduced. Even if a seasonal or regional 
krill harvesting ban were introduced, the legal regime still needs to be stronger to make those 
bans effective. 
The original krill conservation measure restricted the total catch in Area 48 to 1.5 million 
tonnes.293 CCAMLR conducted a krill survey in early 2000 in Area 48 to set new catch limits?94 
The current limit in Area 48 is 4 million tonnes in a fishing season. If the catch in Area 48 
exceeds 620,000 tonnes, then catch limits can be applied to smaller management units?95 This is 
a level of harvesting at which rapid increases in catch volumes are likely and it prevents krill 
harvesting becomin'g too concentrated in particular areas.296 Division 58.4.1 has a current limit 
of 440,000 tonnes297 and Division 58.4.2 has a limit of 450,000 tonnes.298 This may appear to be 
a huge jump in allowable krill catch. Arguably, if a precautionary approach is taken then, given 
the uncertainty of the data, krill catch limit should be set lower rather than higher. However, the 
precautionary catch limits are aimed at maintaining a sustainable krill industry. The CCAMLR 
survey supports an increase in the potential sustainable krill harvest. Relationships between krill 
and other species are factored into these precautionary limits but, as discussed, greater data 
certainty is required to formulate more accurate models. 
The uncertainty that exists could result in detrimental impacts on dependent populations, despite 
the existence of precautionary catch limits. A complete ban on krill fishing is necessary to 
facilitate the conservation of dependent species. This would help to prevent detrimental 
decreases in predator populations and would support the Madrid Protocol's objective of the 
comprehensive protection of the Antarctic environment and dependant and associated 
291 Ibid 
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ecosystems?99 Uncertainty surrounding the size of krill stock could also diminish the 
effectiveness of precautionary catch limits, although CCAMLR's mathematical models try to 
take such uncertainty into account. 
The estimated krill population from the 2000 acoustic survey is a biomass of 44.3 million tonnes 
and this has led to a proposed increase in krill catch limit to 4 million tonnes.300 This increase 
has now been implemented in CCAMLR's precautionary catch limits. There are, however, 
uncertainties that need to be resolved before the fishery can expand to 4 million tonnes. 301 More 
work must be done to ensure that krill fishing is not concentrated in localised areas threatening 
local land-based predator populations before the fishery can expand to 4 million tonnes. 302 As 
previously discussed, CCAMLR is trying to develop small-scale management units for krill 
fisheries. These units are necessary if krill precautionary catch limits are to be increased without 
threatening local populations. CCAMLR is also developing another mathematical model, the 
"Foraging Fishery Model", to assess interactions and potential overlap between krill fishery and 
krill predators.303 This model will be useful as a management tool for protecting localised 
predator populations. 
Uncertainties surrounding the existence of a localised krill population must also be resolved 
before the fishery can increase to 4 million tonnes. 304 Krill may migrate from the Bellingshausen 
Sea and the Weddell Sea. There are differences in DNA that may imply that krill from these 
areas could potentially constitute genetically distinct populations. 305 Intense localised fishing 
would have an impact on any such distinct populations. As previously discussed, there is some 
evidence that suggests that krill reproduction levels depend on environmental factors such as the 
299 The objectives of the Madrid Protocol are discussed in detail in Chapter 3. 
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extent of sea ice. 306 When sea ice is more abundant, krill reproduction is more extensive 
possibly due to less access from their salp competitors and greater access to ice algae and refuge 
from predators. 307 Greater research needs to be done to reduce the uncertainty surrounding these 
environmental factors. The Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition ("ASOC") has recently 
submitted a paper to CCAMLR recommending that further expansion of krill fishery in coastal 
areas be halted because of scientific uncertainty concerning impacts on local predators.308 ASOC 
has also recommended the subdivision of precautionary catch limits for krill for Area 48 among 
CCAMLR's small scale management units for that Area due to this uncertainty.309 
Because of the uncertainties outlined above, a strong form of the precautionary approach would 
advocate a moratorium on krill fishing. At the very least localised krill no-fish zones should be 
established to protect against the potential for decimation of genetically distinct local krill 
populations. Improvements in enforcement on the Antarctic high seas are necessary to facilitate 
any bans.310 In particular, future international examination of IUU fishing should focus on legal 
mechanisms for enforcing CCAMLR precautionary catch limits against non-parties or on 
political means to expand CCAMLR to a greater number of parties. The expansion of CCAMLR 
(perhaps by way of economic or political pressure on non-parties) would give the Convention 
greater legal force in terms of combating ruu fishing. 
HI. Other Sources of Law 
The Law of the Sea Convention 
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 ("Law of the Sea Convention") does 
not mention the use of the precautionary approach.311 Furthermore, the Law of the Sea 
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measures on the best scientific evidence available. From one perspective it could be argued that this 
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Convention advocates freedom of fishing on the high seas (albeit with some general conservation 
requirements) and this creates some problems for the precautionary approach.312 Any state can 
fish on the high seas without having to show that its activities are not adverse to existing 
fisheries. 313 Therefore, in the absence of clear evidence that harm will be caused by krill 
harvesting, the Law of the Sea Conv.ention appears to give precedence to high seas fishing rights 
over precautionary catch limits for krill. However, the high seas fishing freedom must be 
exercised under Article 87 of the Law of the Sea Convention "under the conditions laid down by 
this Convention and by other rules of international law". Furthermore, Article 87(2) requires 
"these freedoms [to be] exercised by all States with due regard for the interests of other States in 
their exercise of the freedom of the high seas and also with due regard for the rights under [the] 
Convention with respect of activities in the Area." These requirements will be discussed in 
greater detail below. The Fish Stocks Agreement, as discussed in Chapter 3, also attempts to 
remedy many of the flaws in the Law of the Sea Convention. 
FAO Code of Conduct 
The FA 0 Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries 199 5 ("Code of Conduct") also requires 
states to apply the precautionary approach widely to conservation management and exploitation 
of living aquatic resources.314 In particular, Article 6.5 states that: 
supports krill conservation measures because, although there is great uncertainty, it is the "best" evidence 
available. Alternatively, it could be argued that the 1982 Convention does not support krill conservation 
limits because the uncertainty of information concerning krill means that there is no real "evidence" to 
support krill precautionary catch limits. 
312
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States and subregional and regional fisheries management organizations should apply a 
precautionary approach widely to conservation, management and exploitation of living 
aquatic resources in order to protect them and preserve the aquatic environment, taking 
account of the best.scientific evidence available. 
Article 6.5 goes on to state that the absence of scientific information is not to be used as a reason 
for failing to take conservation measures.315 These principles are reiterated in Article 7.5 ofthe 
Code of Conduct, which.outlines how the precautionary approach is to be applied.316 Based on 
the wording of these articles, the Code of Conduct would appear to embody a stronger form of 
the precautionary approach than for example, the Convention on Biological Diversity (which is 
discussed further below), which requires a threat of "significant reduction or loss" in biological 
diversity before it applies. The Code of Conduct, however, requires a precautionary approach to 
be applied "widely" to conservation, management and exploitation of living aquatic resources. 
One potential argument may be that applying the approach "widely" would require, not only the 
application of the approach in a wide range of circumstances, but in this respect, an application 
of a strong form of the precautionary approach. As discussed previously, a strong form of the 
precautionary approach would imply that, even with a lack of data on krill populations and 
species interactions, measures should be introduced to protect krill and dependent species. 
Furthermore, this argument is also supported by the stated objective in Articles 6.5 and 7.5 of 
applying the precautionary approach in this manner "in order to protect and preserve the aquatic 
environment". Accordingly, the objective is one of protection and preservation, not one which 
requires exploitation of species to maximum sustainable yield. Although the Code of Conduct 
does embody sustainable use principles within its provisions,317 the objectives of the Code 
include to "promote protection of living aquatic resources and their environments" as well as 
establishing principles "for responsible fishing and fisheries activities, taking into account all 
their relevant biological, technological, economic, social, environmental and commercial 
aspects". 318 
There is therefore clear support in the Code of Conduct's precautionary approach for the 
protection and preservation of the aquatic environment. As discussed, krill are vital in protecting 
and preserving the Antarctic ecosystem because of the pivotal link that they form between 
phytoplankton and higher species and because of the relatively smaller number of species in the 
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Antarctic ecosystem than other ecosystems around the world. Accordingly, the precautionary 
approach in the Code would appear to support krill conservation measures that are aimed at 
protecting other species even in the absence of scientific certainty. 
Under Article 3.2 of the Code, it is to be applied and interpreted in a manner consistent with the 
"relevant provisions" of the Fish Stocks agreement, however, the Fish Stocks agreement, as will 
be discussed below, also requires a similar form of the precautionary approach to be adopted. 
Although Article 7.5 .3 of the Code of Conduct does require States and regional fisheries 
management organisations to determine stock specific target reference points and the action to be 
taken if they are exceeded, the Code also requires that the precautionary approach be applied 
widely taking into account the "best scientific evidence available" in accordance with the 
conservation objectives outlined above. As discussed in Chapter 1, the best scientific evidence in 
respect of krill clearly demonstrates that krill fishing has an adverse impact on dependent land-
based predator species during breeding season. Furthermore, the best scientific evidence 
indicates that even a low level of krill harvesting could potentially have an adverse impact on 
dependent species. Accordingly, based on the best scientific evidence, the precautionary 
approach embodied in the Code of Conduct should support a krill moratorium or at the very 
least, local no-take zones. 
The Code of Conduct also outlines uncertain factors that should be considered when 
implementing the precautionary approach including size and productivity of stocks; levels and 
distribution of fishing mortality; impact of fishing activities on dependent species; and 
environmental and economic conditions. 319 This means that, under the Code, the uncertainty 
concerning krill population size and interactions with dependent species should be considered 
when implementing precautionary catch limits. Furthermore, the uncertainty concerning the 
effect of sea ice distribution on krill recruitment should also be taken into account. 
The uncertainty concerning these important factors provides a justification for arguing that, 
under a precautionary approach, it would be more prudent to initiate a complete krill harvesting 
ban.32° Krill's role in the Antarctic ecosystem means that it is vital that they are protected so that 
319 Article 7.5.2, FAO Code of Conduct on Responsible Fisheries 1995 
320 Article 7.5.4 of the Code also requires "cautious" conservation measures to be adopted for new or 
exploratory fisheries until there is sufficient data to allow assessment of the impact of fisheries on long-
term sustainability of stocks. The large amount of uncertainty surrounding krill fishing may mean that 
there is still insufficient data to determine its impact and so "cautious" measures should still be maintained. 
"Cautious" measures could arguably include complete protection for krill until there is more data certainty. 
Krill fishing has gone on since the 1970s, but the need for continued research into harvesting technology 
may mean that it could still be classed as a "new or exploratory fisheries". Article 7.5.2 of the Code also 
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dependant species are not adversely affected by krill harvesting, especially in light of likely 
increases in demand and fishing levels. Both the enforcement mechanisms and the legal 
machinery of the current regulatory regime should be strengthened over time in order to make 
the introduction of any ban a worthwhile exercise. 
Furthermore, Article 6.5 states that the "absence of adequate scientific information should not be 
used as a reason for postponing or failing to take measures to conserve target species, associated 
or dependent species and non-target species and their environment." Accordingly, the form of 
the precautionary approach embodied in the Code of Conduct does not just focus on conservation 
measures in respect of target species, it also applies to associated/dependent species, non-target 
species and their environment. Conservation measures which are aimed at protecting krill for the 
purpose of conserving dependent and non-target species are therefore covered by the 
precautionary approach in the Code of Conduct. 
Article 7.5.4 of the Code also requires "cautious" conservation measures to be adopted for new 
or exploratory fisheries until there is sufficient data to allow assessment of the impact of fisheries 
on long-term sustainability of stocks. The large amount of uncertainty surrounding krill fishing 
may mean that there is still insufficient data to determine its impact and so "cautious" measures 
should still be maintained. "Cautious" measures could arguably include complete protection for 
krill untilthere is more data certainty. Krill fishing has gone on since the 1970s, but the fact that 
it has been previously carried on at relatively low levels, combined with the fact that new 
research is being done into harvesting technology to make it a more viable fishery may mean that 
it could still be classed as a "new or exploratory fisheries". Article 7.5.2 of the Code also 
requires that uncertainty concerning economic factors be considered which would include 
potential harm to the harvesting and other krill industries and potential future harm to the 
aquaculture industry. 
Fish Stocks Agreement 
The United Nations Agreement on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Species 1995 
("Fish Stocks Agreement") outlines the methods states should use to apply the precautionary 
approach to conserve straddling and highly migratory species. 321 As discussed in Chapter 3, the 
requires that uncertainty concerning economic factors be considered which would include potential harm 
to the harvesting and other krill industries and potential fuh1re harm to the aquaculrure industry. 
321 Article 6( 1 ), The United Nations Agreement on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Species 
1995 
68 
Agreement's precautionary approach will only be relevant to krill if they come within the 
definition of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory species. If krill do come under the 
Agreement, states cannot use the uncertainty surrounding krill populations and interactions with 
dependent species as a justification for failing to implement krill conservation measures.322 The 
Fish Stocks Agreement also provides support for the adoption of a CCAMLR-type feedback 
management system.323 CCAMLR's management techniques would, therefore, seem to parallel 
the requirements of the Fish Stocks Agreement, which provides support for states to comply with 
the CCAMLR measures so that they are also in compliance with the Fish Stocks Agreement. 
Similarly, the Fish Stocks Agreement parallels the support for the prycautionary approach found 
in other international instruments which gives greater weight to these agreements.324 
Accordingly, there is strong support in international law for the adoption of the precautionary 
approach by all states. A strong form of this approach justifies a moratorium or localised krill 
fishing bans in sensitive areas because of scientific uncertainty surrounding the Antarctic krill 
and dependent species. 
Furthermore, the Fish Stocks Agreement actually requires application of the precautionary 
approach. Article 5(c) requires application of the precautionary approach in accordance with 
article 6. Article 6(1) says that states "shall apply the precautionary approach widely [emphasis 
added] to conservation, management, and exploitation of straddling fish stocks and highly 
migratory fish stocks in order to protect the living marine resources and preserve the marine 
environment." One potential argument may be that applying the approach "widely" would 
require, not only the application of the approach in a wide range of circumstances, but in this 
322 Article 6(2) of the Agreement requires states to be more cautious when information is uncertain, 
unreliable or inadequate and they are not allowed to use the lack of adequate scientific information as a 
justification for failing to take conservation and management measures. 
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which are estimated values corresponding to the state of the resource, and of the fishery, which can be used 
as a guide for fisheries management. Article 6(3)(b) requires states to apply the guidelines in Annex II and 
determine the action to take if reference points are exceeded. CCAMLR already has a feedback 
management system which determines specific stock reference points and catch limits. CCAMLR adjusts 
the catch limits according to stock and fisheries levels. As discussed, these limits also have specific 
critical "trigger" levels of fishing at-which further management action is required. 
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provision then "cautious" conservation measures could potentially include complete protection until 
greater data certainty exists. 
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respect, an application of a strong form of the precautionary approach. As discussed previously, 
a strong form of the precautionary approach would imply that, even with a lack of data on krill 
populations and species interactions, measures should be introduced to protect krill and 
dependent species. 
In particular, Article 6(2) also requires that states "be more cautious when information is 
uncertain, unreliable or inadequate. The absence of adequate scientific information shall not be 
used as a reason for postponing or failing to take conservation and management measures." 
Arguably, due to the extreme uncertainty concerning krill population, its interaction with 
dependent species and the Antarctic ecosystem as a whole and the effect of krill harvesting on 
dependent species, states are required to be evc;n "more cautious". It is submitted that this 
extreme level of uncertainty should require a degree of caution evinced by no-take zones or a 
complete harvesting ban. 
In this respect, in implementing the precautionary approach, Article 6(3) also requires states to 
implement "improved techniques for dealing with risk and uncertainty" and "take into account, 
inter alia, uncertainties relating to size and productivity of the stocks .... and the impact of fishing 
activities on non-target and associated or dependent species". This gives further weight to the 
argument that the high level of uncertainty concerning krill stock should require a higher level of 
caution concerning its exploitation. 
Furthermore, Article 6(6) requires, in respect of new or exploratory fisheries, that states adopt 
"cautious conservation and management measures, including, inter alia, catch limits and effort 
limits. Such measures shall remain in force until there are sufficient data to allow assessment of 
the impact of the fisheries on the long-term sustainability of the stocks, whereupon conservation 
and management measures based on that assessment shall be implemented. The latter measures 
shall, if appropriate, allow for the gradual development of the fisheries." Ostensibly; if these 
requirements could be applied to krill, the "cautious conservation and management measures" 
required until sufficient data is obtained would require either low precautionary catch limits or 
no-take zones, particularly in light of the extreme uncertainty surrounding krill population. 
Although, it is questionable whether krill fishery would constitute a "new" fishery given that it 
has been in place for decades, it may still constitute an "exploratory" fishery since it has never 
reached extremely high levels and cost pressures have previously been a disincentive for large 
numbers of fishers to enter this fishery. 
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Just because the Fish Stocks Agreement refers to concepts of sustainable use does not mean that 
a strong form of the precautionary approach is inconsistent with the agreement. However, if a 
strong form of the precautionary approach were not embodied in the agreement, then it could still 
support a krill harvesting ban or no-take zones, even though a lesser form of the precautionary 
approach would not legally require such measures to be introduced. As discussed previously, 
under the precautionary approach, action is required where a risk to the environment is identified 
that is proportionate to the potential damage, in the absence of scientific certainty/evidence. 
Because krill play a unique and pivotal role in the Antarctic ecosystem, the risk of harm to the 
ecosystem is extremely high from krill harvesting, including the risk to dependent species (for 
which there is already some scientific evidence), the risk to genetically distinct krill populations 
and the risk to already depleted populations such as the baleen whales. Accordingly, this high 
risk of a high level of potential damage to the Antarctic ecosystem justifies a proportionate 
response such as no-take zones or a moratorium even though there is not yet scientific certainty 
concerning the exact effects of krill harvesting on the ecosystem and what level of harvesting 
will be harmful. Accordingly, a lesser form of the precautionary approach in the Fish Stocks 
Agreement would still justify a ban even though, as stated above, it would not require a ban to be 
imposed. 
Convention for Biological Diversity 
Article 4 of the Convention on Biological Diversity sets out its jurisdictional scope. In 
particular, it applies in the case of"components of biological diversity" within areas of national 
jurisdiction and, in the case of processes and activities (regardless of where their effects occur) 
carried out under its jurisdiction or control, within the area of its national jurisdiction or beyond 
the limits of national jurisdiction. The difference between these two concepts is not outlined in 
the Convention which gives rise to possible ambiguities when interpreting the Convention 
because processes and activities will affect components of biological diversity. 325 The 
Convention refers to "components of biological diversity", however, this concept is not defined. 
"Biological diversity" is however, defined as the variability among living organisms from all 
325 Anton, D.K. 1997. Law for the Sea's Biological Diversity. Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 
Vol36: 341-371 at 356 
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sources including, inter alia, terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems and the ecological 
complexes of which they are part; this includes diversity within species, between species and of 
ecosystems. Accordingly, as a vital key to the Antarctic ecosystem, krill would be a 
"component" because of its necessity in maintaining the variability of the ecosystem. As such, 
krill would be covered by the Convention in areas of national jurisdiction. Furthermore, the 
more detailed provision in Article 9 dealing with conservation outside areas of national 
jurisdiction sets out requirements for states to adopt "measures" for ex-situ conservation of 
components of biological diversity. Accordingly, it would appear the "processes and activities" 
as referred to in respect of ex-situ conservation in Article 4, would include any activities such as 
fishing which could affect the conservation of components of biological diversity. Accordingly, 
krill harvesting should also be covered in respect of ex-situ conservation on the high seas. 
The precautionary principle is also rekvant to biodiversity because of the uncertainties 
surrounding this concept.326 The principle is recognised in the Convention for Biological 
Diversity's preamble which states "that where there is a threat of significant reduction or loss of 
biological diversity, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing 
measures to avoid or minimize such a threat" [emphasis added]. Furthermore, the preamble also 
notes "that it is vital to anticipate, prevent and attack the causes of significant reduction or loss of 
biological diversity at source". The threat discussed in the preamble is a "significant" reduction 
or loss of biological diversity and, accordingly, it would appear that the Convention for 
Biological Diversity embodies a weaker form of the precautionary approach. 
One argument may be that further support for this view is found in some of the main provisions 
of the Convention. For example, Article 10 advocates sustainable use of biological diversity and. 
requires parties "as far as possible and as appropriate" to do things to this end such as adopting 
measures relating to the use of biological resources to avoid or minimise adverse impacts on 
biological diversity. Article 14 also requires parties to "as far as possible and as appropriate" 
introduce appropriate procedures requiring environmental impact assessment of its proposed 
projects that are likely to have "significant" adverse effects on biological diversity. Accordingly, 
it may be argued that these provisions show that the Convention is aimed at exploiting biological 
resources and so only "significant" risk of loss of these resources justifies conservation measures 
without full scientific certainty. Although, an alternative argument would be that these other 
provisions should not impact on how the precautionary approach embodied in the preamble is 
interpreted. 
326 Bodansky, D.M. 1995. The Meaning of Biodiversity: International Law and the Protection ofBiological 
Diversity. Vanderbilt Journal a/Transnational Law, Vol28: 623-634 at 627 
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The weaker form of the precautionary approach in the Convention should still support a krill 
fishing moratorium or no-take zones even though it would not legally require these to be 
implemented. In particular, as highlighted in Chapter 1, there is a threat of "significant reduction 
or loss of biological diversity" in respect of the Antarctic krill. As discussed, krill are a pivotal 
link in the Antarctic ecosystem and which the entire ecosystem depends on to channel energy 
and nutrients to species higher in the food web. There is a threat particularly because of the fact 
that, as highlighted in Chapter 1, even a small amount of krill fishing may have an adverse 
impact on other species. Accordingly, there is a threat of significant reduction or loss of 
biological diversity from krill fishing, not just to other Antarctic species, but also with localised 
and genetically distinct krill populations. There is already scientific evidence that krill fishing 
has a detrimental effect on localised predator populations during breeding season and further 
scientific certainty on the effect of krill fishing and the extent of krill population should not, in 
accordance with the Convention, be used as a reason to postpone measures to avoid or minimise 
a threat. Measures to avoid such a threat would be a moratorium. Measures to minimise such a 
threat could arguably be either a moratorium, no-take zones or extremely strict precautionary 
catch measures. Although, precautionary catch measures could not, in the absence of greater 
scientific certainty, be said to minimise a threat because as discussed in Chapter 1 in respect of 
the study by Everson and Goss, even a low level of krill harvesting may have an adverse effect 
on other Antarctic species. 
Uncertainty about the effect that activities will have on ecosystems and species should mean that 
the precautionary principle should apply to biodiversity conservation. 327 Its application to 
biodiversity may help to protect krill because of their important role in preserving biodiversity.328 
The uncertainties surrounding the effect of even a small level of krill fishing on dependent 
species and the ecosystem as a whole means that, the precautionary approach supports a 
complete krill harvesting ban is required to protect against any threat to biodiversity. Parties to 
the Biodiversity Convention are, arguably, obliged to implement comprehensive krill protection 
because of its recognition of the precautionary approach, although as discussed earlier in this 
Chapter the exactform of the conservation measures is not mandated by a form of the 
precautionary approach less than the strongest form. 329 As discussed in Chapter 3, the 
Biodiversity Convention is very weak and, unless it is amended to introduce stronger provisions, 
it is hamstrung by its lack of effective enforcement measures. However, its main strength is in 
327 Tinker, C. 1995. The "Rio" Environmental Treaties Colloquium: A "New Breed" ofTreaty: The United 
Nations Convention on Biological Diversity. Pace Environmental Law Review, Vol 13: 191-218 at 200 
328 See Chapters 1 and 3 for a discussion of krill's role in maintaining biodiversity. 
329 Although that form does not dictate actual measures it ostensibly requires no activities to be undertaken 
until it is certain there is no detrimental harm from those activities. 
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providing legal justification for the introduction of a moratorium on krill harvesting, even though 
it may not legally require a moratorium to be introduced. Enforcement mechanisms can come 
from interested states, such as the Antarctic claimant states, or parties to CCAMLR. 
The precautionary approach, although providing beneficial support for krill conservation, does 
not have significant binding effect in international law. The precautionary principle is often 
embodied in soft law instruments330 or, if included within binding treaties, it may not be given 
full binding force. 331 The precautionary approach could, however, have emerged as a principle 
of customary international law. 332 If it has evolved into custom then states would be under an 
obligation to apply its principles. This would require states to give complete, or at least a high 
level, of protection to krill because of the uncertainties surrounding environmental and other 
factors affecting krill and their dependent species. 
Customary International Law 
The precautionary approach has been embodied in a number of international instruments.333 
There is also acceptance of the concept in the domestic law of several countries including the 
European Union and it has been accepted widely in respect of policy considerations.334 This high 
level of support for the principle may imply the existence of a state practice supporting the 
approach. However, most of these instruments are non-binding, which may suggest that opinio 
juris is lacking. The ICJ has also been unclear as to whether the precautionary approach is a 
principle of binding international law and the WTO in its jurisprudence has also found that the 
status of the approach in general international law is uncertain.335 Some commentators argue that 
the strong emphasis of the precautionary approach in some international instruments such as the 
330 The F AO Code of Conduct, for example, is merely a soft law instrument. As discussed, there are, 
however, some binding treaties, such as the Fish Stocks Agreement, which have embraced the concept. 
331 Gullett, W. Supra, fn 234, 57 
332 For customary international law to arise there must be evidence of a State practice having arising and an 
intention for those States to be legally bound by that practice (i.e. opinio juris) 
333 As discussed, the Code of Conduct and Fish Stocks Agreement endorse the approach. Article 10 of the 
Kyoto Declaration also gives support to states applying the precautionary approach as referred to in the 
Code of Conduct and Fish Stocks Agreement. The 1982 World Charter for Nature also recognises a form 
of the precautionary principle (see, for example Article 11 of the Charter). Finally, Principle 15 of the Rio 
Declaration gives direct support for the concept. 
334 Birnie, P. and Boyle, A. Supra, fn 233, 118. 
335 Ibid 
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Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, may lead to the 
precautionary approach reaching customary law status.336 Treaties can contribute to the 
development of customary law or provide evidence of customary law where they are widely 
accepted.337 Although, it should be noted that the existence of a Treaty alone does not 
necessarily mean customary law exists if the particular principle is not adopted in practice by 
states.338 There is also is not universal application of the precautionary approach in international 
treaties, which may suggest that the necessary opinio juris is lacking for the principle to become 
part of customary intemationallaw.339 
Some commentators argue that the requirements for the precautionary approach to become 
customary law have not been satisfied.340 In particular, some argue that state practice has not 
materialised as yet and that opinio juris is not present because some states have not become 
parties to or ratified certain instruments embodying the precautionary approach?41 Although it is 
not necessary for all states to accept a principle as legally binding for it to become part of custom 
(as will be discussed in Chapter 3 of this thesis) and just because particular instruments have not 
yet been accepted by certain states does not mean that those states do not accept the 
precautionary principle itself. The same commentators argue that a period of time needs to 
elapse before the precautionary approach can become part of customary law.342 It is not 
contended that the approach is part of customary law as yet, however, one should note that 
although one would expect a period of time to elapse before state practice evolves and the 
necessary opinio juris is present, if those two ingredients are present, there would not appear to 
be any reason as to why customary law would not exist. 
336 Stewart, T. and Johanson, D. 2003. A Nexus ofTrade and the Environment: The Relationship Between 
the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety and the SPS Agreement of the World Trade Organization. Colorado 
Journal oflnternational Environmental Law and Policy, Volume 14 
337 Ibid 
338 Ibid 
339 Birnie, P. and Boyle, A. Supra, fn 233, 119 
340 Stewart, T. and Johanson, D. Supra, fn 341 
341 Ibid 
342 Ibid 
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In particular, in respect of the Rio Declaration, Priess and Pitschas argue that the participation of 
immerous states in the Rio Declaration does not "qualify" Principle 15 of the Declaration 
(regarding the precautionary principle) as customary international law. These commentators 
argue that it is a mere starting point, "if at all for the evolution of international customary law".343 
In a similar vein, these commentators argue that the inclusion of the principle in many other 
treaties such as the Biodiversity Convention does not mean that it is customary law because most 
of these do not require parties to follow the principle.344 Just because the Rio Declaration was · 
accepted by most states does not necessarily mean that Principle 15 is customary law. However, 
the fact that most states have accepted the Principle may evidence acceptance to be bound by the 
principle, even though they may not yet have adopted it in their state practice. Furthermore, it is 
disputed that the claim by these commentators that the fact that many international instruments 
that contain the precautionary principle are soft law means that states do not accept to be bound 
by the principle. States may still believe that they have an obligation to follow the principle as a 
consequence of becoming party to soft law instruments evincing it, even though such instruments 
are not hard law treaties, 
Furthermore, actual implementation of the approach by states would provide more definitive 
evidence of state practice. As discussed, parties to CCAMLR already apply the precautionary 
approach. However, there needs to be a widespread state practice for custom to exist. The lack 
of strong evidence of state practice and opinio juris concerning the precautionary principle 
suggests that it is not part of customary international law ?45 Some commentators also argue that 
because the precautionary principle can be interpreted in a number of different ways and because 
some of its applications are new, it is not customary internationallaw.346 The inclusion of the 
concept into a large number of international instruments may, at the very least, support it as a 
principle of international law. 347 A state that has given its support to the principle may be liable 
for activities that could cause future environmental harm, although it may not be certain until 
some future date that damage will actually occur.348 If states were liable for potential future 
effects of krill fishing, there would be a greater incentive to comply with precautionary catch 
limits because states would be held responsible for future harm that could be caused by excessive 
343 Priess, H. and Pitschas, C. Protection of Public Health and the Role of the Precautionary Principle 
under WTO Law: A Trojan Horse Before Geneva's Walls? Fordham International Law Journal, Volume 
24: 519 at 527 
344 Ibid 
345 Gullett, W. Supra, fn 234, 57 
346 Barton, C. 1998. Note: The Status of the Precautionary Principle in Australia: Its Emergence in 
Legislation as a Common Law Doctrine. Harvard Environmental Law Review, Volume 22: 509 at 517 
347 Ibid 
348 Ibid 
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krill fishing. However, strong enforcement mechanisms would still be needed to curb IUU 
fishing in the light of likely increases in demand for krill products. 
The acceptance of the precautionary principle in customary law or as a means of regulation is 
difficult because of uncertainties concerning its exact meaning or how it is to be applied. 349 In 
particular, the consequences of the approach differ widely and it is difficult to formulate a clear 
outcome of the precautionary approach applying?50 Accordingly, this makes it difficult to reach 
the status of customary international law. The concept's general nature hinders it from having 
any real practical impact. 351 However, not all instruments treat the approach as simply a general 
concept. The Fish Stocks Agreement, for example, outlines the approach in much greater detail 
than other instruments.352 There are, however, still problems in defining exactly what constitutes 
a "precautionary approach". However, it may not be necessary for the precautionary principle to 
become part of customary law if it forms part of general international law principles. 
General Law Principles 
As discussed above, the Law of the Sea Convention requires the high seas fishing freedom to be 
exercised under the conditions laid down by other rules of international law. Article 31(3)(c) of 
the Vienna Convention also requires that any relevant rules of international law applicable in the 
relations between the parties are to be considered when interpreting a Treaty. It may be argued 
that the precautionary approach is a general principle of international law that needs to be taken 
into account when interpreting treaties. As a principle advocated in both international non-
binding "soft" law (eg Rio Declaration) and binding "hard" law (eg Convention for Biological 
Diversity), arguably, the precautionary approach is a general international law principle, even if 
it has not hardened into binding customary law. Accordingly, it may be necessary to interpret the 
Law of the Sea Convention's high seas fishing freedom in light of the precautionary approach.353 
If the high seas fishing freedom were interpreted as being subject to the precautionary approach 
as a general principle of international law then, as discussed above, a strong form of this 
approach would actually require an Antarctic krill fishing moratorium or local no-take zones in 
349 Ibid 
350 Birnie, P. and Boyle, A. Supra, fu 233, 119 
351 Ibid 58 
352 Arti~le 6 and Annex II of the Agreement both outline the precautionary approach in specific, rather than 
general, terms suggesting that it is more than simply a vague idea. Annex II also provides details on how 
the approach is to be applied in relation to precautionary reference points, suggesting that it is a concept 
that can be applied in practice. 
353 See Boyle, A. 2005. Further Developments of the Law of the Sea Convention: Mechanisms for Change. 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol 54: 563-584 at 573-574 relying on the Southern Bluefin 
Tuna Cases (Provisional Measures) (1999) ITLOS Nos 3 and 4 
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Antarctica. The reason being that it requires proof that there is no risk from an activity before it 
is allowed. As highlighted with great vigour in Chapter 1, there is already actual scientific 
evidence that krill harvesting can cause harm to local predator populations and the study by 
Everson and Goss discussed in Chapter 1 concluded that even a small level of krill harvesting 
could potentially have an adverse impact on the Antarctic ecosystem (although there is no 
definite scientific evidence in this respect as yet). 
Furthermore, as highlighted in Chapter 1, krill harvesting could have an adverse affect on 
dependent species that have already been depleted in number, such as the baleen whales and may 
reduce the rate of replenishment of such species. Accordingly, because, as discussed in Chapter 
1, krill plays a vital and fundamental role in the Antarctic ecosystem, the risk of harm to the 
ecosystem is extremely high from krill harvesting. Because the risk is so high, even a form of 
the precautionary approach less than the strong form would still justify the introduction of a krill 
harvesting ban or no-take zones despite the scientific uncertainty concerning krill, although a 
lesser form of the precautionary approach would not legally require a ban to be introduced. As 
mentioned above, Article 87(2) also requires the high seas fishing freedoms to be exercised with 
due regard to the interests of other States. Arguably, taking account of the conservation interests 
of other States would provides further weight for other States' high seas fishing freedoms to be 
restricted by an Antarctic krill fishing moratorium if it were adopted by a regional organisation 
such as CCAMLR. 
IV. Adoption of a Precautionary Approach? 
There have been doubts as to whether a precautionary approach should be adopted at all. Some 
commentators argue that the precautionary principle is nothing more than a political ideology 
that rejects scientific method.354 Indeed, the approach did emerge as one of the Rio Declaration 
principles out of the Rio Summit, which was a predominantly political conference. The 
implementation of the approach has also been endorsed at the 2002 World Summit on 
Sustainable Development.355 However, because of the soft law status of many of these political 
texts the precautionary approach will not bind states unless, as discussed in Chapter 4, these soft 
law instruments achieve hard law status. Furthermore, arguably, a precautionary approach 
should not be adopted to protect krill if it has no scientific grounding. There are also concerns 
that a precautionary principle will embody a rejection of statistical predictions of future 
354 Ibid, 55 
355 Article 1 09(f), Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development 2002 
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environmental consequences. 356 Adoption of a precautionary principle for krill could constitute 
a rejection of the statistical data concerning the future effects of krill fishing and the future 
population levels of krill and dependent species. However, CCAMLR's implementation of a 
precautionary approach actually uses statistical data to determine precautionary catch limits so 
this criticism is not justified. 
It has also been argued that the precautionary approach constitutes unnecessary precaution.357 
However, although scientific certainty does exist, there will be much greater harm in the future if 
the approach is not implemented. Even if this harm does not actually materialise, arguably, it is 
better to guard against it than deal with the consequences of that damage in the future. In the 
case of krill, the harmful impact of krill fishing on the Antarctic ecosystem could be quite high. 
Arguably, avoiding this possible damage by adopting the precautionary approach would be 
preferable to dealing with the consequences after the damage has occurred. As already outlined 
in this thesis, the problem is effectively implementing a precautionary approach. Whether some 
form of krill ban is implemented (total or merely seasonal/regional) or precautionary catch limits 
are maintained, the current mechanisms still need to be stronger to provide the legal and 
enforcement mechanisms necessary to ensure that such management measures are effective. 
There are also problems in determining exactly which precautionary measures should be 
adopted. 358 As discussed above, if the precautionary approach is adopted in too strong a form it 
may draw criticism because of the lost future economic benefits. 359 CCAMLR has adopted a 
form of the precautionary approach that allows continued exploitation of krill through 
precautionary catch limits. Such a formulation of the principle still permits the economic 
benefits of krill exploitation. CCAMLR may therefore avoid the criticism concerning lost social 
ber:efits that could arise if a stronger form of the precautionary approach was adopted. If a total 
ban on krill fishing were adopted under the precautionary approach, it may draw a high level of 
criticism because of foregone economic benefits. However, banning krill harvesting would still 
permit economic benefits to flow from more lucrative sustainable exploitation of species higher 
in the food chain. Protecting krill, as a vital link in the ecosystem, helps to maintain levels of 
these species thus permitting their continued sustainable exploitation. 
The criticisms of the precautionary approach, particularly those concerning its scientific validity, 
are not fully justified. Science has often failed to anticipate environmental disasters and the 
356 Gullett, W. Supra, fn 234, 56 
357 Ibid 
358 Ibid 60 
359 Cha;est, S. Supra, fn 243, 267 
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extent of some environmental problems is difficult to predict with certainty. 360 The uncertainty 
surrounding krill and its interactions with other species has made it difficult to accurately predict 
the effect of krill harvesting on the ecosystem. The unique position of krill in the Antarctic food 
chain should provide a justification for the adoption of a precautionary approach in relation to 
krill. Because the potential for future harm from krill fishing is great, a precautionary approach 
should be implemented especially in light of likely increases in krill harvesting levels. 
Conclusion 
This Chapter has examined the precautionary approach in the context of Antarctica and krill 
conservation and management and concluded that adoption of a precautionary approach would 
justify the introduction of a krill fishing moratorium despite the scientific uncertainty outlined in 
chapter 1. 
This chapter has examined CCAMLR's application of a form of the precautionary approach 
based on precautionary catch limits for krill and other marine species. The techniques used by 
CCAMLR to implement the approach suffer from some flaws and scientific uncertainties in 
respect of krill population and its interaction with other species. In light of this uncertainty, it is 
submitted that a stronger form of the precautionary approach should be applied by CCAMLR in 
respect of the Antarctic krill. This could involve either a moratorium on krill fishing or 
localised/seasonal krill bans in sensitive geographical areas. Such an approach would also need 
to be accompanied by a wider implementation of improved enforcement techniques and a 
strengthening of the legal mechanisms of enforcement against non-CCAMLR parties. 
Alternatively, CCAMLR Members could attempt to encourage more non-parties to accede to the 
Convention. 
Support for the precautionary approach can also be found in many international agreements 
which gives weight to such an approach being adopted in respect of krill and other Southern 
Oceans species. The use of the approach in other international instruments provide a legal 
justification for CCAMLR adopting a much stronger form of the precautionary approach in 
respect of krill than is currently the case. 
360 Ibid, 266 
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If there is weight to the argument that some form of a "precautionary approach/principle" has 
become enshrined in customary international law, this would give greater legal force to the need 
for States to comply with krill conservation measures such as a fishing moratorium. The 
ascendance of a "precautionary approach" into customary international law is constrained by the 
definitional uncertainty of the concept. However, the precautionary approach is, arguably, a 
general legal principle that should be taken into account when interpreting treaties such as the 
Law of the Sea Convention. Accordingly, the traditional high seas fishing freedoms of other 
States may be restricted by this principle, including the freedom of other States to harvest 
Antarctic krill. This chapter has examined the different forms of the precautionary approach and 
concludes that a stronger version of the precautionary approach should be applied in respect of 
krill than is currently being adopted by CCAMLR. A stronger form precautionary approach 
would require a comprehensive krill fishing ban to be implemented because of the risk of future 
damage to the Antarctic in light of current scientific uncertainties. 
This chapter has examined criticisms that have been levelled at the precautionary approach and 
concluded that they are not fully justified. This thesis submits that the unique position of krill in 
the Antarctic food chain should provide a justification for the adoption of a precautionary 
approach in relation to krill. Such an approach is necessary to facilitate conservation of the 
Antarctic krill and the Antarctic ecosystem. 
Krill conservation is facilitated by the plethora of hard law international instruments governing 
the world's oceans and environment. "Hard" law instruments are formal international treaties 
and conventions that are binding on the parties that ratify them. The next chapter will focus on 
the Antarctic Treaty system as a whole and CCAMLR's integration into that system. The 
chapter will also look at other hard law agreements such as the Madrid Protocol, the Law of the 
Sea Convention and the Convention on Biological Diversity to determine whether those 
instruments can provide effective aid in the conservation of krill. 
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CHAPTER 3 THE CONTEMPORARY HARD LAW REGIME 
Introduction 
The important role played by krill in the Antarctic ecosystem should be the basis for 
implementing a krill moratorium or localised conservation zones under the precautionary 
approach. There are many binding "hard" law instruments in existence that could provide the 
necessary protection needed to conserve krill. Part I of this Chapter gives a brief overview of the 
Antarctic Treaty System. Parts II and III of this chapter will examine the function served by 
these agreements and will analyse whether they can help to conserve krill in light of the 
precautionary approach. The most important agreement governing marine Antarctica is the 
Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR). This 
chapter will look at the conflict between CCAMLR's conservation and "rational use" objectives 
that could detract from conservation of krill, particularly in light of the form of precautionary 
approach adopted by CCAMLR. This section will also focus on several procedural issues 
surrounding the binding effect of the Convention and its decision making processes. These 
issues have the potential to reduce the effectiveness of CCAMLR in conserving krill and other 
species. 
Part IV of this Chapter will then focus on the relationship between the Protocol on 
Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (the Madrid Protocol) and CCAMLR. The 
Madrid Protocol is important because it is the first single instrument that attempts to tackle the 
comprehensive protection of the Antarctic environment and its ecosystems. The Madrid Protocol 
is extremely significant for krill because it requires activities to be conducted in a way that 
prevents detrimental changes to populations. The potential for krill harvesting to conflict with 
the Protocol's objectives will be discussed. The subordination of the Madrid Protocol to 
CCAMLR will also be examined, together with the consequent implications for a comprehensive 
krill ban. The need to align these instruments more closely will also be analysed. 
Part V of this Chapter will focus on maritime sovereignty in the Antarctic. In particular; the 
potential existence of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) in Antarctic will be outlined. This 
section will discuss coastal states and whether they can provide more effective, comprehensive 
protection to krill such as through the introduction of a krill fishing ban within zones of national 
jurisdiction. The conservation provisions of the Law of the Sea Convention and their 
relationship with these potential EEZs will also be analysed. 
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This Part will also look at the protection offered in the Law of the Sea Convention to straddling 
fish stocks and highly migratory species. Krill's status as a highly migratory species will be 
examined, together with the protection offered by the subsequent United Nations Agreement on 
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Species 1995 (hereafter known as the Fish Stocks 
Agreement). The greater detail embodied in the Fish Stocks Agreement, and the extensive 
conservation provisions it contains, will be examined to determine their potential to facilitate a 
total krill harvesting ban. Finally, the Part will analyse the alternative protection offered by the 
Law of the Sea Convention for krill on the high seas if krill are not covered by the Fish Stocks 
Agreement. This Part will also look at the relationship between CCAMLR and potential 
Exclusive Economic Zones in Antarctica. 
This chapter concludes with a discussion on the Convention on Biological Diversity. Biological 
Diversity relates to the variability of and within species and the variability of ecosystems. Part 
VI will begin by analysing how the concept of biological diversity can relate to krill and the 
importance of krill in maintaining biological diversity in Antarctica. The Convention on 
Biological Diversity could provide further protection for krill and could form the basis for a 
comprehensive harvesting ban because of the need to conserve krill to preserve Antarctic 
biological diversity. The precautionary approach would justify the protection measures 
canvassed by this thesis because of the uncertainty concerning the effect of krill fishing on 
biological diversity. The provisions of the Convention will be analysed to determine whether 
they can offer any substantive protection to krill. Finally, the relationship between the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, the Law of the Sea Convention and CCAMLR will be 
examined to determine whether there is scope for the more effective co-ordination of these 
instruments. An effective interaction between these instruments is necessary so that CCAMLR 
can be given full effect without any restrictions on its operation on the high seas by the Law of 
the Sea Convention. This is necessary to ensure that CCAMLR gives adequate protection to krill 
and their dependent species, particularly if potential Antarctic Exclusive Economic Zones are not 
valid. 
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I. The Antarctic Treaty System 
The original legal regime governing Antarctic territory was the Antarctic Treaty. This 
instrument was concluded in 1959 and came into force in 1961. The Treaty does not directly 
look at living resource conservation.361 This failing shows the lack of concern for conservation at 
the time?62 However, Article IX(l )(f) does contemplate consultation on measures relating to the 
preservation and conservation of living resources in Antarctica. Following its entry into force, 
the third Consultative Party Meeting adopted the Agreed Measures for the Conservation of 
Antarctic Fauna and Flora.363 These measures declared the Antarctic Treaty zone to be a Special 
Conservation Area. The wording of the measures suggests that they are not applicable to marine 
life in the Southern Ocean?64 It is likely that the measures only apply to land areas and ice 
shelves because Article 1 introduces the wording of Article VI365 of the Antarctic Treaty, 
repeating the high seas exception included in that provision.366 Comprehensive measures for the 
protection ofthe marine environment were not introduced for some time after the Treaty was 
implemented. 
U. The Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources 
The Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) came 
into force in 1982 after it was concluded in 1980.367 CCAMLR can be seen as mainly an 
extension of the Antarctic Treaty because negotiations to implement it took place nearly 
exclusively under the Treaty system.368 The preamble also recognises the Antarctic Treaty 
System and the responsibilities under Article IX(l)(f) of the Treaty.369 The Co~vention extends 
the Antarctic Treaty, which covers areas south of 60 degrees, to the whole region south of the 
Antarctic convergence.370 This area can reach as far as 45 degrees. 371 The Antarctic 
convergence forms the barrier between cold surface water and warmer nutrient-rich sub-
361 Baird, R. Supra, fu 25, 164 
362 Rothwell, D.R. 1994. A Maritime Analysis of Conflicting International Law Regimes in Antarctica and 
the Southern Ocean. Australian Year Book of International Law Vol15: 155-181 at 169 
363 Puissochet, J. Supra, fu 48, 72 
364 Blay, S.K.N. 1992. New Trends in the Protection of the Antarctic Environment: The 1991 Madrid 
Protocol. The American Journal of International Law, Vol86(2) 377-399 at 380 
365 Article VI states that "nothing in the present Treaty shall prejudice or in any way affect the rights, or the 
exercise of the rights, of any state under international law with regard to the high seas". 
366 Overholt, D.H. 1990. Environmental Protection in the Antarctic: Past, Present and Future. The 
Canadian Yearbook of International Law, Vol28: 227-261 at 233 
367 Baird, R. Supra, fu 25, 166 
368 Howard, M. Supra, fn 35, 105 
369 There are currently 24 state parties to the Convention, 7 acceding states and several observers. 
370 Article I(l), CCAMLR 
371 Puissochet, J. Supra, fu 48, 72 
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Antarctic waters moving southwards. The convergence produces conditions allowing the 
development of heavy concentrations of phytoplankton, leading to an abundance ofkrill.372 
Depletion in seals, whales and finfish was one of the main reasons for the implementation of 
CCAMLR.373 CCAMLR has therefore been regarded by some as a conservation convention for 
environmental protection, rather than a standard fishing convention.374 The origins and context 
of CCAMLR suggest that it was designed for environmental protection. Exploitation is not 
mentioned anywhere in the convention. Many of the articles are, however, similar to traditional 
regional fishery conventions.375 
The Convention itself states that its objective is the conservation of Antarctic marine living 
resources.
376 Conservation includes rational use377 , but this term is not defined. Before the 
Convention was conceived, fishing States wanted to increase their territorial claims as well as 
implement a regime to exploit Antarctic resources. 378 Non-fishing nations mid Antarctic 
claimants wanted to preserve their claims and implement a strong conservation regime. 379 The 
inclusion of "rational use" is a compromise between the twin goals of exploitation and 
conservation of living resources. The ambiguity of "rational use" prevents particular interests 
gaining ascendancy.380 A comprehensive krill harvesting ban would, arguably, not accord with 
"rational use". However, this thesis submits that "rational use" of other krill dependent species 
would be facilitated by the introduction of a complete ban. 
The Convention purports to have conservation as its main objective. However, "rational use" 
seems to give commercial exploitation equal priority to any conservation objective. The Soviet 
Union delegation to the Working Group of the fifth CCAMLR meeting submitted that "rational 
use" meant "obtaining maximum output of the highest quality with the minimum amount of 
effort during the course of an indefinitely long period oftime".381 This highlights the possibility 
for the Convention to become focussed on sustainable commercial exploitation at the expense of 
conservation. If such a focus gained ascendency, it would be extremely detrimental to krill and 
the Antarctic marine ecosystem as a whole. 
372 Auburn, F.M. Supra, fn 30,218 
373 Nicol, S. and De Ia Mare, W. Supra, fn 80, 36 
374 Couratier, J. Supra, fn 9, 14 7 
375 Ibid, 148 
376 Article II, CCAMLR 
377 Article II, CCAMLR 
378 Gardam, J.G. 1985. Management Regimes for Antarctic Marine Living Resources- An Australian 
Perspective. Melbourne University Law Review, Vol 15(2): 279-312 at 294 
379 Ibid 
380 Baird, R. Supra, fn 25, 171 
381 Heap, J.A. Supra, fn 37,51 
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In relation to krill, a focus on commercial exploitation would prevent or hinder the 
implementation of a total krill harvesting ban. As discussed above, the introduction of a krill 
moratorium would be consistent with the objectives of CCAMLR. A krill moratorium (or 
localised krill bans) would reduce the threat that krill fishing poses to dependent species. In 
accordance with CCAMLR's objectives, this would facilitate the "rational use" of other more 
commercially valuable species higher up the food chain. As such, this thesis submits that such 
conservation measures would be consistent with CCAMLR and could be introduced under the 
CCAMLR system. 
III. CCAMLR Procedural Issues 
At CCAMLR's inception, the parties were faced with many difficulties in developing 
management procedures for fish stocks.382 Fishing nations were eager to implement a regime 
based on maximum exploitation and limited conservation measures that would allow efficient 
harvesting of marine species. Such a system would be similar to existing fisheries management 
conventions. Non-fishing states lobbied for the inclusion of the conservation measures in the 
Convention itself. However, this was contrary to the desires of the fishing states.383 At 
CCAMLR's inception, fears were also raised concerning fishing in areas claimed as sovereign by 
coastal states.384 The procedures used to implement conservation measures have been criticised 
because of the compromises embodied in CCAMLR. If such mechanisms are fundamentally 
flawed, then the Convention can arguably be said to provide krill with inadequate protection. 
Any weaknesses in the legal and management regime must be resolved because of the likely 
expansion of krill industry. As discussed below, a recent 2004 UN General Assembly resolution 
"affirms" the need to strengthen the international legal framework for intergovernmental 
cooperation in the management of fish stocks and in combating IUU fishing in a manner 
consistent with internationallaw.385 Accordingly, this provides an impetus for states to look at 
strengthening international marine management instruments such as CCAMLR to combat IUU 
fishing in Antarctica. A strengthening of this and other international agreements would help to 
facilitate the effective implementation of a comprehensive krill harvesting ban. Such a ban is 
justified under the precautionary approach because of krill's pivotal role in the ecosystem and 
current scientific uncertainty in this regard. 
382 Nicol, S. and De Ia Mare, W. Supra, fu 80, 38 
383 Gardam, J.G. Supra, fu 404, 301 
384 Koch, M. Supra, fu 164, 120 
385 Articles 26 and 28, Sustainable fisheries, including through the 1995 Agreement for the Implementation 
of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to 
the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, and 
related instruments A/RES/59/25, 2004 
86 
Binding Effect of the Convention 
The Commission of the Convention can only recommend conservation measures/86 but these 
measures are binding on all members within 180 days of notification. 387 However, there is an 
opt-out mechanism that enables states to evade the conservation measures. A member can avoid 
being bound by a measure by notifying the Commission that it is unable to accept the measure.388 
This provision may allow nations to avoid measures that will be too restrictive on fishing. 389 The 
actual effect of this procedure may, however, be minimal. The mechanism has only ever been 
utilised for practical reasons.390 The CCAMLR method of consensus decision making could 
make it morally difficult to object to conservation measures. The provision may have been 
applied more often if decisions were based on majority voting.391 However, the very existence of 
such a mechanism provides a threat to krill. The exclusive use of the provision for practical 
reasons in the past does not negate the fact that it could be used to evade conservation measures 
in the future. The procedure is of particular concern to the introduction of a total krill fishing ban 
because such a ban must be consistently applied to be effective. 
Effective sanctions for the breach of conservation measures are also necessary to fully protect 
krill stocks. Contracting parties to CCAMLR are required to take appropriate measures to ensure 
compliance with the Convention and its conservation measures.392 Conservation measures have 
not been implemented uniformly by Antarctic claimants in claimed areas in the past.393 The 
Convention requires the Commission to draw the attention of contracting parties to any activities 
affecting the objectives of the Convention.394 This is the only method of dealing with 
infringements but it is not really an effective sanction.395 However, breach of the Convention 
would result in pressure from other states.396 A mere moral obligation is not sufficient to enforce 
a comprehensive krill ban. 
386 Gardam, J.G. Supra, fu 404, 296 
387 Article IX(6)(b), CCAMLR 
388 Article IX(6)(c), CCAMLR 
389 Peterson, M.J. Supra, fn 126, 156 
390 Therefore, in reality, it may not pose a danger to the fulfilment ofCCAMLR's objectives. 
391 Ibid 
392 Article XXI, CCAMLR 
393 Rothwell, D.R. Supra, fu 388, 173 
394 Article X, CCAMLR 
395 Auburn, F.M. Supra, fu 30, 232 
396 Howard, M. Supra, fu 35, 138 
87 
More effective sanctions are crucial if such a ban is to be enforced, particularly in light of likely 
increases in demand for krill products and greater economic returns from harvesting. These 
provisions would, prima facie, appear to provide CCAMLR with very little "teeth". Efforts have 
been made recently by CCAMLR and its member states to introduce more effective enforcement 
mechanisms. These efforts will be discussed in detail in a later Chapter of this thesis. CCAMLR 
member states need to continue to improve these enforcement mechanisms and extend them to 
krill fishing so that krill conservation measures will prove effective. 
CCAMLR raises an issue of whether conservation measures can be applied and enforced against 
non-members on the high seas. 397 The Convention can be acceded to by any State interested in 
research or harvesting activities in relation to marine living resources covered by the 
Convention.398 There are, however, no legal obligations imposed on non-members?99 Antarctic 
claimant states can still enforce the Convention against non.:members in coastal jurisdictions 
claimed by them.400 The Convention requires that attention be drawn to non-party states of any 
activities affecting the objectives of the Convention.401 The effectiveness of such a provision is 
questionable. Because non-members are not bound by the Convention they could flout its 
conservation and management measures and prevent the effective implementation of an 
ecosystem approach. The Convention's application to only member states on the high seas is one 
of its major weaknesses. A comprehensive krill harvesting ban can only prove effective if it 
binds all parties both in areas of national jurisdiction and on the high seas. Current efforts by the 
Commission to increase co-operation with non-parties to CCAMLR in order to combat IUU 
fishing are discussed in a subsequent Chapter. Such efforts may help to better control IUU 
fishing in Antarctica but, as discussed above, in accordance with the UN General Assembly's 
recent resolution there needs to be a strengthening of international fisheries agreements to 
facilitate this objective. 
Contracting parties are required under Article XXV of CCAMLR to solve disputes between 
themselves. A dispute resolution mechanism relying wholly on the parties may be ineffective.402 
The Convention contains no provisions compelling resolution. Such disputes will threaten krill 
stocks if timely resolution is not achieved. Article XXV provides a mechanism to refer disputes 
to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), but consent is required. Any party can become 
involved in a dispute which allows third parties to prevent referral of disputes to the ICJ or an 
397 Rothwell, D.R. Supra, fn 388, 170 
398 Article XXIX, CCAMLR 
399 Rothwell, D.R. Supra, fn 388, 170 
40
° Koch, M. Supra, fn 164, 121 
401 Article X, CCAMLR 
~02 Howard, M. Supra, fn 35, 138 
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arbitration tribunal. The Antarctic Treaty has similar weaknesses regarding dispute resolution.403 
However, disagreement over CCAMLR is of much greater concern because of the likely threat to 
krill stocks from conflict over the Convention. 
Decision Making 
Decisions of the Commission are based on the research of CCAMLR's Scientific Committee. 
The Committee acts as a consultative body. It collects information and conducts activities as 
directed by the Commission.404 This requirement potentially gives the Commission control over 
the Scientific Committee. Political influences could affect the process as a result.405 
Conservation measures passed by the Commission must accord with the conservation principles 
in Article II.406 Non-members and third parties could have some scope to argue that a particular 
measure does not fall within the objectives of the Convention.407 This can undermine the 
findings of the Commission. Decisions of the Commission are also subject to the views of 
contracting parties. These political weaknesses could prevent the introduction of conservation 
measures to protect krill even if those measures have a sound scientific basis. This will provide 
an obstacle to the introduction of a complete krill harvesting ban, although localised protection 
zones may be more politically palatable to such parties. In accordance with the General 
Assembly resolution, a greater strengthening is needed of international management instruments 
such as CCAMLR so that political interests do not affect sound conservation policy. Several 
recent General Assembly resolutions have urged states that have not currently acceded to the 
Law of the Sea Convention to do so and to implement its requirements. Even though CCAMLR 
is not an agreement originating from the UN, the General Assembly should make similar calls to 
non-parties to CCAMLR. Political pressure may be enough to sway at least some non-parties to 
accede to CCAMLR, which would likely enhance CCAMLR's effectiveness as a fisheries 
management regime. 
403 Ibid 
404 Article XV, CCAMLR 
405 Auburn, F.M. Supra, fn 30, 230 
406 Article IX(l ), CCAMLR 
407 Auburn, F.M. Supra, fn 30, 232 
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Convention decisions on matters of substance are made by consensus.408 The consensus 
approach has been criticised because it is a lengthy process. A single nation also has the ability 
to block a conservation measure.409 The inclusive nature of the consensus approach could make 
conservation measures more binding. If consensus is properly obtained with full agreement and 
no pressure or coercion it is morally difficult for parties to object to decisions.410 However, 
actually making a decision could prove to be quite difficult.411 Once a decision is reached, the 
support of all parties for the decision increases the likelihood that it will be observed. 
Consensual agreement to a complete krill fishing ban would make those parties more likely to 
observe and enforce the decision. However, actually agreeing to such a ban would be a lengthy 
process because of the need to reach consensus. A likely expansion of krill industry means that 
fast decisions are required and CCAMLR parties cannot afford delay because of krill's vital role 
in the ecosystem. 
IV. The Madrid Protocol 
The Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty was approved at a meeting of 
the Antarctic Treaty States in Madrid in 1991.412 The objective of the Protocol is the 
comprehensive protection of the Antarctic environment and dependent and associated 
ecosystems.413 The instrument also designates Antarctica as a "natural reserve, devoted to peace 
and science".414 This protection is the fundamental consideration in the conduct of all activities 
in the Antarctic Treaty zone.415 Activities are to be conducted in such a way as to prevent 
detrimental changes in distribution, abundance or productivity of species or populations.416 Any 
interference with krill will have a detrimental effect on the Antarctic environment and dependent 
ecosystems because of krill's vital role in those ecosystems. Such effects would directly conflict 
with the main objective of the Madrid Protocol. Activities that deplete krill numbers will also 
conflict with the Protocol by causing detrimental changes in distribution and abundance of 
dependent species. 
408 Article XII(l ), CCAMLR 
409 This is one of the drawbacks of a consensus decision making approach. 
410 Ibid 
411 Overholt, D.H. Supra, fn 392, 242 
412 Blay, S.K.N. Supra, fn 390, 377. Negotiation took place between both Antarctic consultative parties 
and non-consultative parties (Thornton, B.S. 1992. Protecting Antarctica: Suggestions for US 
Implementation of Three Specific Areas Addressed in the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the 
Antarctica Treaty. Wisconsin International Law Journal, Vol 11 (1 ): 49-99 at 53). The Protocol was finally 
approved on 4 October 1991. 
413 Article 2, Madrid Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty 1991 
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As mentioned, the Madrid Protocol is an amending Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty and, 
accordingly, parties to that Treaty are bound to implement the obligations set out in the Protocol. 
The Madrid Protocol places an obligation on states to adhere to certain requirements in respect of 
the planning and conduct of activities in Antarctica. In particular, Article 3 sets out a series of 
binding environmental principles, the most important of which is that the "protection of the 
Antarctic environment and dependent and associated ecosystems, including its wilderness and 
aesthetic values .... shall be fundamental considerations in the planning and conduct of all 
activities in the Antarctic Treaty area." Furthermore, under Article 8, parties are obliged to 
. conduct environmental impact and assessment studies before conducting any activities in 
Antarctica. 
There are also annexes to the Protocol which contain more detailed obligations including an 
obligation to conduct environmental impact assessments before conducting any activities in 
Antarctica (Annex I), certain obligations in respect of Antarctic living species (Annex II), 
obligations in respect of waste disposal and management (Annex III), obligations in respect of 
marine pollution (Annex IV) and specifically protected areas (Annex V). The Protocol itself 
specifies in Article 9 that the Annexes form part of the Protocol and, accordingly, have the same 
binding effect as the Protocol. 
Article 11 of the Protocol also establishes a Committee for Environmental Protection whose 
functions include providing advice to parties on implementation of the agreement and the 
effectiveness of measures taken pursuant to the agreement. 
The provisions of the Protocol are intended to bind states with maximum possible effect. Article 
13 requires parties to take measures to ensure compliance with the Protocol including adopting 
laws, administrative actions and enforcement measures and parties are required to exert 
appropriate efforts to ensure that no-one engages in activities in breach of the Protocol. For 
example, Canada introduced an Antarctic Environmental Protection Act in 2003 as part of 
Canada's attempt to implement the Protocol's requirements. Furthermore, unlike many other 
hard law environmental instruments, the Protocol requires the parties to put together a set of rules 
and procedures relating to liability for damage which are to be integrated as an Annex to the 
agreement (Article 16) and reservations are not permitted (Article 24). Accordingly, the Protocol 
has very strongly binding provisions. 
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Proponents of krill fishing can argue that the immediate economic benefits of the industry 
outweigh the possibility of harm to Antarctica's marine ecosystem.417 The likely increase in 
economic returns from krill fishing gives weight to continued krill fishing industry in Antarctica. 
However, because the Madrid Protocol looks at adverse impacts purely on ecological grounds 
then any economic benefits will not be taken into consideration. If activities depleting krill 
numbers had an adverse impact on the Antarctic ecosystem then, under the Protocol, such 
activities should not be carried out, regardless of their economic advantages. A comprehensive 
krill harvesting ban must be introduced because of the adverse impacts on the Antarctic 
ecosystem that will stem from a likely expansion of krill industry. Such a ban would still provide 
economic benefits because a protected krill population would benefit dependent species and 
facilitate their continued exploitation. The precautionary approach justifies such a moratorium 
because of the scientific uncertainty concerning the effect of krill fishing on the Antarctic 
ecosystem. 
The taking, or harmful interference with, native flora and fauna is also prohibited by the Protocol 
unless a person has a permit for scientific activities.418 Harmful interference includes any 
activity resulting in significant adverse modifications of habitats of any species or population of 
native mammal, bird, plant or invertebrate.419 Arguably, "harmful interference" is caused from 
decreases in populations of birds or mammals who rely directly or indirectly on krill if the 
abundance of krill is reduced by exploitation. This thesis submits that any harmful or negative 
affect from krill fishing on the Antarctic ecosystem would be a breach the Protocol. A complete 
krill fishing ban should be introduced to protect krill's pivotal role in the ecosystem and avoid 
breaches of the Madrid Protocol. 
417 The formulation of Article 3(2)(b) makes it clear that any adverse impacts on Antarctica's environment 
are based on ecological grounds and do not depend on an economic assessment (Francioni, F. 1993. The 
Madrid Protocol on the Protection of the Antarctic Environment. Texas International Law Journal, Vol 
28(1): 47-72 at 60). 
418 Article 3, Annex 2, Madrid Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty 1991 
419 Article 1, Annex 2, Madrid Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty 1991 
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Avoidance of further jeopardy to endangered or threatened species or populations of such species 
is also a requirement of the Protocol.420 Krill fishing will conflict with such a necessity if 
reductions in krill numbers cause further jeopardy to endangered or threatened species that 
depend on krill either directly or indirectly. For example, some of krill dependent baleen whales 
are currently threatened. The World Conservation Union has classed the minke, sei and blue 
whales as currently endangered.421 Large scale krill fishing would jeopardise such krill 
dependent species and breach the Madrid Protocol's requirement to avoid further jeopardy to 
endangered species. This thesis submits that such krill harvesting would also conflict with the 
Protocol's requirement to protect areas of biological and wilderness significance.422 A complete 
harvesting ban must be introduced to prevent further harm to threatened or endangered krill 
dependent species and to ensure that the goals of the Madrid Protocol are fulfilled. 
Activities in the Antarctic Treaty area must be planned and conducted to limit adverse impacts 
on the Antarctic environment and dependent and associated ecosystems.423 The requirement that 
protection extend to Antarctica's "dependent and associated ecosystems" means that the Protocol 
can apply beyond the Antarctic Treaty zone of enforcement.424 The Protocol's conservation 
objectives can therefore offer protection to ecosystems outside the Treaty area provided they are 
"dependent and associated" with the Antarctic ecosystem. The Antarctic Treaty applies south of 
60 degrees latitude.425 However, many large concentrations of krill, such as those found around 
South Georgia, occur outside this area. Including "dependent and associated" ecosystems allows 
the Madrid Protocol to extend protection to krill and dependent species found outside the Treaty 
zone. This gives the Protocol a protective sphere at least equal to that provided by CCAMLR's 
Antarctic convergence boundary. 
420 Article 3(2)(b)(v), Madrid Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty 1991 
421 McGonigal, D. and Woodworth. L. 2002. Antarctica- the blue continent. The Five Mile Press: Noble 
Park. at 106 
422 Finally, Article 3(2)(b )(vi) requires "activities to be planned and conducted to avoid degradation of, or 
substantial risk to, are!lS of biological, scientific, historic, aesthetic or wilderness significance." As one of 
only two polar ecosystems, and one with a food web of limited size, the Antarctic ecosystem is of 
biological significance. The Southern ocean is also unique because of its major influence on world climate 
and ocean currents (McGonigal, D. and Woodworth. L. Supra, fn 447, 30). The Antarctic ecosystem also 
differs from the world's other polar region. One of the major differences is the absence of an Arctic 
equivalent of the Antarctic convergence (McGonigal, D. and Woodworth. L. Supra, fn 447, 31). The 
convergence of cold and warm waters in the Arctic is not circumpolar. The Southern Ocean and the 
Antarctic sea ice are also major drivers of biological activity (Nicol, S. and Allison, I. Supra, fn 218, 426). 
Any threat to krill would endanger Antarctica's unique ecosystem that is an area ofbiological, scientific, 
aesthetic and wilderness significance. This would constitute a breach of Article 3(2)(b )(vi) of the Madrid 
Protocol. 
423 Article 3(2)(a), Madrid Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty 1991 
424 Francioni, F. Supra, fn 443, 60 
425 Article VI, Antarctic Treaty 1959 
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For a krill harvesting ban to be effective, krill must be protected in all areas of the Southern 
Ocean. However, any regulatory regime or conservation instrument must bind all parties on the 
high seas to prove effective and this is one of the major legal weaknesses of current instruments 
that must be resolved. As previously mentioned, the UN General Assembly is now making 
efforts towards strengthening international instruments to combat IUU fishing. This provides a~ 
opportunity for the introduction of stronger legal measures to curb IUU fishing on the high seas. 
The Madrid Protocol appears, however, to be consistent with some level of krill fishing in 
Antarctica.426 Although krill fishing does have an adverse impact on the environment, engaging 
in such fishing is, arguably, not at odds with the Protocol provided that its harmful effects on 
krill and dependent species are limited.427 However, permitting a change up to a point where it 
threatens the existence of a species would not be in accordance with the Protocol's objective of 
protecting the Antarctic environment and ecosystem.428 A complete harvesting ban is crucial so 
that dependent species are not threatened by krill fishing, particularly localised predator 
populations. 
426 Article 3(2)(a) of the Protocol states that activities should be conducted to "limit" adverse impacts on 
the environment. This suggests that activities adversely afTecting the environment can be conducted so 
long as measures are taken to limit the impact. 
427 Article 3(2)(b)(iv) also aims to avoid "detrimental" changes to the abundance of species. Krill fishing 
may result in changes to populations of species, however, if they are not "detrimental" then krill fishing 
may not conflict with the Protocol. "Detrimental" change is not defined in the Protocol. One 
interpretation would be that change is detrimental if it threatens the future viability of the species. 
428 Article 2(2) of Annex 1 does permit activities that, after an Environmental Impact Assessment, are 
shown to have more than a "minor or transitory" impact. However, if such an impact is possible then 
appropriate procedures, possibly including monitoring, must be put into place to verify the impact of the 
activity. The requirement for special procedures to be put into place once an activity has more than a 
"minor or transitory impact" may suggest that the Protocol gives special status to such activities because of 
the danger that they may infringe the Protocol's conservation objectives. This requirement could aid in the 
interpretation of other sections of the Protocol. The special status given to activities that are more than 
"minor or transitory" may imply that activities having more than a "minor or transitory" impact will be 
"detrimental". If so, a "detrimental change" would ensure from any krill fishing that resulted in more than 
a "transitory" period being necessary to restore stocks of krill or dependent species. Alternatively, 
"detrimental" change may refer to a "significant" change such as a large decrease in populations that did 
not affect species' viability. Any change that took a long period of time to reverse in order to restore 
population numbers could also come within such an interpretation. Precautionary catch limits may be a 
means of allowing krill fishing that does not conflict with the Protocol if these limits prevent "detrimental" 
changes to krill and dependent species and "limit" the adverse impacts of fishing. The Madrid Protocol 
also requires that, in conducting and planning activities, priority be given to scientific research and 
preserving the value of Antarctic as an area for the conduct of such research (Article 3(3). "Priority" to 
scientific research suggests that other activities in Antarctica are permitted but they must be subordinate to 
scientific programmes (Watts, A 1992. International Law and the Antarctic Treaty System. Grotius 
Publications: Cambridge at 280). Krill fishing is obviously an activity that is primarily commercial, rather 
than scientific, in nature. However, this particular section does not prevent such activities taking place. 
Provided that krill fishing does not interfere with scientific research and "priority'' is given to such 
research, then fishing will not conflict with this section of the Protocol. 
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The Madrid Protocol's obligations do not derogate from rights and obligations in other 
international instruments under the Antarctic Treaty System.429 The use of marine resources 
could be included in the definition of such "rights".430 The consultative party meeting noted that 
the Protocol will not derogate from rights and obligations under CCAMLR.431 The Preamble to 
the Madrid Protocol also reaffirms the conservation principles of CCAMLR.432 As such, 
CCAMLR's notion of rational commercial exploitation is preserved under the Protocol. Krill 
can still be exploited, despite any potential ecosystem effects that conflict with the Protocol's 
conservation objectives. This is a major legal weakness of the Protocol that must be resolved for 
a total krill fishing ban to be effectively introduced. CCAMLR's exploitation objectives should 
not be used as a barrier to a ban which would protect a pivotal part of the Antarctic ecosystem. 
Parties to the Protocol are under an obligation to cooperate with parties to other international 
instruments to ensure that the objectives of the Protocol are achieved and to avoid inconsistency 
between the implementation of those instruments and the Protocol.433 Parties also have an 
obligation to take appropriate measures to comply with the Protocol.434 Although the Madrid 
Protocol is subordinate to CCAMLR, the two instruments are not fully consistent. The Madrid 
Protocol is aimed at comprehensive protection by avoiding detrimental changes to species 
populations whereas CCAMLR allows species to be commercially exploited, and even 
significantly depleted, so long as the species will recover. Parties are under an obligation to 
resolve any potential inconsistencies between these instruments. 
The Protocol also designates Antarctica as a natural reserve, devoted to peace and science.435 
This provision implies that all activities within the Antarctic Treaty zone should be conducted 
and managed in conformance with the Protocol.436 The provision places another obligation on 
parties to act in a manner consistent with the Protocol. Although the Protocol is subordinate to 
CCAMLR, this thesis submits that such provisions imply that parties still need to avoid acting 
inconsistently with the Protocol's provisions. A complete krill fishing ban would facilitate the 
preservation of krill, their dependent species and the whole Antarctic ecosystem because of 
krill's pivotal role in the ecosystem. 
429 Article 4, Madrid Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty 1991 
43° Francioni, F. Supra, fn 443, 56 
431 Final Act ofthe lith Antarctic Treaty Special Consultative Meeting, Madrid, 1991 
432 Madrid Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty 1991 
433 Article 5, Madrid Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty 1991 
434 Article 13, Madrid Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty 1991 
435 Ibid 
436 Cordonnery, L. 1997. Area Protection and Management in Antarctica: A Proposed Strategy for the 
Implementation of Annex V of the Madrid Protocol Based on Information Management. Environmental 
and Planning Law Journal, February: 38-51 at 38 
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CCAMLR allows for decreases in population size but not to levels below those ensuring stable 
recruitment. Stable recruitment does not allow the population to fall below a level close to one 
ensuring the greatest net annual increment.437 Depletion that is potentially reversible over two or 
three decades is permitted.438 The permissibility of such depletion may not be entirely 
compatible with the Madrid Protocol. Population decreases of such magnitude would be 
prohibited as "detrimental changes" to krill abundance. Such depletion would also have a 
serious effect on the whole Antarctic ecosystem arid may not be consistent with the Protocol's 
goal of conserving the ecosystem. 
The Protocol also prohibits such changes affecting distribution of species. If localised krill 
fishing does have an affect on localised predator populations, then rational exploitation of such 
stocks will also conflict with the Protocol because the distribution of species will be affected.439 
The obligation to comply with the Protocol and to resolve inconsistency between the Protocol 
and other instruments should be the impetus for changes to CCAMLR. The Convention should 
be more consistent with the Protocol. Krill's vital role as the linchpin of the Antarctic ecosystem 
should give it complete protection from fishing. Only a comprehensive krill fishing ban will be 
sufficient to ensure that the Protocol's goal of protecting the Antarctic ecosystem is met. 
CCAMLR currently permits a species to be significantly depleted, provided that it can recover in 
several decades. The likely detrimental effects to the ecosystem from depletion of krill should 
warrant the total protection of the species. A complete krill fishing ban will allow the Madrid 
Protocol's conservation objectives to be fulfilled, whilst still allowing sustainable exploitation of 
less vital species under CCAMLR. Accordingly, this thesis submits that a moratorium on krill 
fishing could be introduced under the current CCAMLR system whilst conforming with the 
objectives of both CCAMLR and the Madrid Protocol. 
The Madrid Protocol is the first international instrument that outlines a comprehensive system 
binding all human activity beyond the bounds of national jurisdiction.440 Some environmentalists 
see the Protocol as an enormous move towards a comprehensive environmental management 
regime in Antarctica.441 
437 Article II(3)(a), CCAMLR 
438 Article II(3)(c), CC"'AMLR 
439 This may not pose a problem if CCAMLR' s new regime for local fisheries is effective. As previously 
discussed, there is also uncertainty as to whether localized krill fishing does affect predator populations. 
44° Francioni, F. Supra, fu 443, 51 
441 McCulloch, R.R. 1992. Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty. Georgia Journal 
of International and Comparative Law, Vol 22: 211-232 at 211 
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The core of the Madrid Protocol is the consolidation of previous environmental measures into 
one instrument under the Antarctic Treaty.442 However, the Protocol still fails to provide a truly 
comprehensive "stand-alone" legal regime. Article 4(1) of the Protocol states that it merely 
supplements the Antarctic Treaty and does not modify or amend the Treaty. The Protocol was 
therefore intended to maintain the existing system while supplementing it with a regime that 
takes a major step towards a comprehensive system ofprotection.443 The comprehensive 
conservation principles of the Protocol are, however, diluted by their subordination to other 
instruments such as CCAMLR. Parties have an obligation to ensure consistency between these 
instruments and to fulfil the Protocol's objectives. However, the Protocol really needs to have 
dominance over these instruments to offer truly comprehensive protection to Antarctica's marine 
ecosystem and krill. Only with a single unified and legally strong system can the international 
community hope to protect krill and other Antarctic species from overexploitation. The UN 
General Assembly resolution mentioned above may provide a catalyst to strengthening 
instruments like the Protocol in order to combat IUU fishing. 
Marine "rights" cannot be regulated under the Protocol on more restrictive terms than other 
instruments because of the existence of Article 4. This impossibility is an inappropriate 
restriction of the Protocol's scope.444 If these rights were inconsistent with the wider need to 
effectively protect Antarctica's environment, then it should be possible to curtail them through 
the Madrid Protocol's system of annexes.445 Rights allowing commercial exploitation of krill 
conflict with the conservation goals of the Protocol by threatening the Antarctic ecosystem. 
Because such rights are inconsistent with the protection of Antarctica, it should be possible to 
restrict them through the Protocol's annexes. Such a system would give the Protocol a form that 
is capable of ongoing revision and expansion in order to more effectively respond to new threats 
to the Antarctic environment.446 A strengthening of the current legal regime would make any 
future krill moratorium or local fishing ban more effective. An effective ban is crucial because 
of the likely expansion of krill industry and the consequent threats that IUU fishing would pose if 
a ban were introduced. 
442 Joyner, C.C. 1992. Antarctica and the Law of the Sea. Martinus NijhoffPublishers: London at 273 
443 Blay, S.K.N. Supra, fn 390, 388 
444 Francioni, F. Supra, fn 443, 56 
445 Ibid 
446 Ibid 
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A more appropriate formulation could have simply required consistency between the Protocol 
and the Antarctic Treaty itself, rather than subordinating the Protocol to other instruments such 
as CCAMLR. 447 The Madrid Protocol would then have the potential to introduce more 
restrictive environmental mechanisms than exist under current Antarctic instruments. 
Comprehensive measures protecting the marine environment, including krill, could have been 
introduced under the Protocol's annex system.448 Regional management regimes will make it 
easier to apply the integrated ecosystem and coastal zone management advocated by the United 
Nations Conference on Environment and Development UNCED's 21st century blueprint action 
plan, Rio de Janeiro ("Agenda 21 ").449 The Madrid Protocol adopts a similar approach450 making 
it an appropriate method of conserving krill and the marine environment. 
The effectiveness of the Madrid Protocol in protecting krill is dependent on the enforcement 
mechanisms that underpin it. The Protocol allows observer inspections, but leaves them up to 
the Antarctic Treaty Parties.451 Leaving inspection to the Parties has the disadvantage of 
allowing them to determine whether they have complied. A weakening of standards or breaches 
of the Protocol could be the result. Some of the Parties that have ratified the Protocol were found 
by Greenpeace in the mid-1990s to have permitted major breaches of the Protocol.452 This 
illustrates the result of poor inspection procedures in the past and highlights some of the previous 
deficiencies of the regulatory regime. An effective inspection system is vital if a complete krill 
fishing ban is to be successful. Even the maintenance of current precautionary catch limits 
requires an effective inspection system if they are to prove effective. A later Chapter of this 
thesis will discuss improvements in current enforcement and inspection mechanisms that, if 
447 Ibid, 57 
448 These annexes form a major part of the Protocol. Article 9 allows annexes to be adopted in accordance 
with Article IX of the Antarctic Treaty. As a result, only Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties can decide 
whether further annexes should be adopted. Furthermore, there must be consensus in such decisions and 
those changes must be accepted by Contracting states, which include both Consultative and non-
Consultative parties. Adoption of a new annex could therefore prove difficult, however, if such an annex 
was introduced it could provide a new restrictive regional management regime to protect krill. 
449 Birnie, P. and Boyle, A. Supra, fu 233, 355. Agenda 21 will be discussed in the subsequent chapter. 
450 Ibid, 355 
451 Article 14 states that the ATCPs "shall arrange, individually or collectively, for inspections by 
observers to be made". However, there is no mention of any specific method of carrying out such 
inspections. This leaves the provision open to interpretation and could result in different (and possibly 
even extremely ineffective) inspection systems being adopted in the legislation of different States. Such a 
system would provide inadequate protection for the Antarctic krill. The Antarctic and Southern Ocean 
Coalition (ASOC) (A coalition of non-governmental organizations.) suggested implementing an 
environmental monitoring group to conduct all inspections to ensure compliance with the Protocol 
(Barnes, J.N. and Webb, C.W. 1996. Implementing the Protocol: State Practice and the Role ofNon-
Governmental Organisations. in International Law for Antarctica. Edited by Francioni, F. and Scovazzi, T. 
Kluwer Law International: London at 500). A monitoring group would have the advantage of 
standardising inspections so that a uniform standard for implementing the Protocol was in place (Barnes, 
J.N. and Webb, C.W. 1996. Supra, 500). Such a group could also be made independent from the ATCPs 
to ensure full implementation of the Protocol. 
452 Barnes, J.N. and Webb, C.W. 1996. Supra, fu 477, 500 
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introduced more widely, would aid in combating IUU fishing and making an Antarctic krill 
moratorium effective. 
The Protocol contains some provisions aimed at securing the compliance of non-parties with its 
objectives.453 The provisions may be an attempt to persuade third parties to abide by the 
Protocol's objectives. However, there is no direct suggestion in any section that third parties are 
bound by the Protocol. 454 This is consistent with the principle that treaties do not bind third 
parties without their consent.455 However, the conservation objectives of the Protocol will not 
be fully implemented if third parties are not bound by it. Third parties would be free to flout 
those objectives and so the Protocol would not be able to offer a legally effective fishing ban to 
Antarctic krill if it was adopted as the main instrument for conserving marine Antarctica. 
Current legal instruments must be strengthened to remove such flaws because of complete 
harvesting ban will only be effective if all states are bound by it. If a large proportion of 
influential States fully implemented the Protocol there will, however, be some pressure on non-
parties to comply with its objectives. Furthermore, if enough states adopted and complied with 
the Protocol over a sufficient period of time, then its principles could enter into customary 
international law. Treaties that become customary international law can bind third parties 
without their consent.456 To fully conserve krill and their dependent species, third parties must 
comply with any conservation principles espoused by the Protocol or any other international 
instrument offering protection. The likely expansion of krill fishing industry should necessitate 
moves towards strengthening such legal deficiencies in the Protocol. As discussed, the UN 
General Assembly has supported in a recent resolution the strengthening of international 
instruments in order to combat IUU fishing. 
453 Article 13(5) states that ATCPs shall draw attention to non-parties of any activity that affects 
implementation of the principles and objectives of the Protocol. Article 13(2) goes further stating that 
parties "shall exert appropriate efforts ... to the end that no one engages in any activity contrary to the 
Protocol". 
454 Watts, A. Supra, fn 454, 191 
455 Article 34 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 
456 Article 38 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 
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One of the major gaps in the Madrid Protocol is the lack of civil or international liability for 
damage to the environment. 457 Provisions detailing liability and compensation for damage are 
necessary to ensure that the Protocol is effective as a tool for environmental protection.458 
Compliance can only be achieved if States and their nationals are held responsible for breaches 
of the Protocol. Major breaches of the Protocol are likely if State governments and their 
nationals are not punished for violation of the Protocol's conservation objectives. If the Protocol 
were given the main responsibility for protecting the marine environment and krill, then an 
adequate liability mechanism would be needed to fully ensure that States and their fishing vessels 
complied with its provisions.459 National sanctions have been used as an effective mechanism 
against individuals engaged in IUU fishing. 460 The introduction of some type of liability clause 
into the Protocol would provide a deterrent to States and their nationals against flouting its 
provisions. This would be particularly important if the Prot.ocol were to be used as the legal 
instrument justifying the introduction of a krill moratorium so that there would be a punishment 
for violating such a ban. 
The Madrid Protocol also states that activities in the Treaty area should be planned and 
conducted "on the basis of information sufficient to allow prior assessments of, and informed 
judgments about, their possible impacts on the Antarctic environment and dependent and 
associated ecosystems and on the value of the Antarctic for the conduct of scientific research".461 
The Protocol's requirement to have sufficient information on the impact of activities, combined 
with the requirements for monitoring of activities, provides one mechanism to protect krill and 
their dependent species. These mechanisms are aimed at ensuring that harmful impacts are 
gauged before fishing activities take place and any ongoing activities should be extensively 
monitored to determine their impact. 
457 Francioni, F. Supra, fn 443, 70. Article 16 states that "Parties undertake to elaborate rules and 
procedures relating to liability for damage", but those rules have yet to be formulated. 
458 Thornton, B.S. Supra, fn 438, 97 
459 Discussions on introducing a liability annex to the Protocol have already taken place (Supra, fn 266, 
97). If these discussions eventually culminate in an adequate liability mechanism, then Parties would have 
a much greater incentive to comply with the Protocol. 
460 See the discussion on national legislation later in this thesis. 
461 Article 3(2)(c), Madrid Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty 1991. These 
judgments need to look at the scope, area, duration and intensity of any potential activities (Article 
3(2)(c)(i). They must also consider the cumulative impacts of the activity with otheractivities in the 
Treaty area. A determination of whether the activity will detrimentally affect other activities in the area is 
also required (Article 3(2)(c)(ii) and (iii). The capacity to monitor key environmental parameters and 
ecosystem components in order to identify and to provide early warning of any adverse effects of the 
activity is also a consideration (Article 3(2)(c)(v). Regular and effective monitoring of activities is to take 
place to allow assessment of the impacts of ongoing activities (Article 3(2)(d). 
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The Treaty also restricts the conduct of activities having more than a minor or transitory effect on 
the environment.462 However, the Protocol does not specify what standard is to be used to 
determine such an effect.463 Different nations may adopt different standards and the absence of a 
single measure may prevent the Protocol from being effective.464 Krill and their dependent 
species can never be adequately protected by a Protocol that allows each State to effectively 
determine whether a particular level of fishing has more than a minor or transitory impact. 
Dispute resolution procedures contained in the Protocol can offer a solution to this problem.465 
Allowing independent decisions through the ICJ is a way of resolving interpretative difficulties. 
Independent settlement by the ICJ is not compulsory.466 However, more detailed or clearer 
definitions in the Protocol of terms such as "minor or transitory impact" would prevent disputes 
over interpretation occurring at all. Such disputes can also be reduced if an independent body 
makes decisions concerning whether a particular activity can proceed.467 These interpretative 
difficulties provide further examples of legal areas that could be strengthened so that the Protocol 
and other international conservation instruments can adequately regulate krill fishing. The 
chances of a krill fishing ban being successful will be enhanced if the current legal regime is 
strengthened, in accordance with the recent pronouncements of the UN General Assembly 
resolutions. 
462 Annex 1, Article 2, Madrid Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty 1991 
463Blay, S.K.N. Supra, fn 390, 392 
464 Ibid 
465 Article 18 requires parties on request to consult among themselves with a view to resolving any dispute 
either by negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement or other peaceful means to 
which the parties agree. Article 19 gives parties to the Protocol a choice to settle disputes through the 
International Court of Justice or the Arbitral Tribunal by making a written declaration. 
466 If the parties cannot agree on a settlement mechanism, disputes can only be settled by the Arbitral 
Tribunal (Article 19(5). Unresolved disputes will be sent to that Tribunal on request if they are not 
resolved in 12 months (Article 20(1). Including these dispute resolution mechanisms may reduce problems 
of interpreting the Protocol. 
467 The efficacy of the Protocol depends on who makes the decision to proceed with a particular activity. 
Article 4 of Annex 1 states that "any decision on whether a proposed activity ... should proceed ... shall be 
based on the Comprehensive Environmental Evaluation as well as other relevant considerations". The 
Article could potentially imply that consultative meetings can determine if an activity proceeds (Blay, 
S.K.N. Supra, fu 390, 392). The passage "any decision on whether a proposed activity ... should proceed" 
could also mean that a nation that suggests an activity makes the decision (Blay, S.K.N. Supra, fu 390, 
392). Article 3(5) provides support for such an interpretation by stating that "no final decision shall be 
taken to proceed .... unless there has been an opportunity for consideration ... by the Antarctic Treaty 
Consultative Meeting" (Blay, S.K.N. Supra, fu 390, 392). Consideration bythe Consultative Meeting 
would involve a decision prior to consideration of the Comprehensive Environmental Evaluation, 
suggesting that Article 3(5)'s "final decision" is the one taken by the nation suggesting the activity. This 
may mean that a Consultative Meeting cannot veto an activity having more than a minor or transitory 
impact. If the Protocol's conservation goals were adopted as the main marine protection regime then 
protection ofkrill could truly be ensured only if the Consultative Meetings or another independent body 
had the final decision. 
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Despite some areas which could be strengthened, the Madrid Protocol outlines a comprehensive 
set of principles aimed at protecting Antarctica and its dependent ecosystems. Currently 
CCAMLR is the main instrument governing marine Antarctica and krill. The protection of krill 
was a significant reason for CCAMLR' s creation. The potential for depletion of krill stocks and 
the possible consequences on predators was seen as a serious possibility at the inception of the 
Conve~tion.468 The increased krill fishing in the 1970s was also the impetus for guidelines to be 
drafted in the Second, Fifth and Ninth Consultative Party meetings.469 Brian Roberts, a member 
of the UK delegations to Antarctic Treaty Consultative meetings, believed that CCAMLR's 
objective should be the prevention of a krill fishing industry that would follow a similar 
disastrous pattern to the whaling industry.470 Nicol argues that the omission from the convention 
of a specific reference to krill "is probably a legal nicety".471 However, Croxall contends that the 
Convention was not concerned with any particular species.472 Conservation measures for krill 
were not adopted until 1991, which highlights the difficulties with the current system.473 
CCAMLR cannot afford to wait before acting in the future because of the likely expansion of 
krill industry. 
If krill protection was one of the main objectives ofCCAMLR, then surely CCAMLR should be 
made more consistent with the Madrid Protocol by introducing a comprehensive ban on krill 
fishing. Although CCAMLR is subordinated to the Madrid Protocol, its objectives concerning 
comprehensive conservation of Antarctica could be more effectively achieved if krill were 
completely protected by a harvesting ban. Krill's vital role in the Antarctic ecosystem means 
that a ban on fishing would help to better protect the ecosystem and krill dependent species. 
Such an approach would potentially reduce detrimental changes to the Antarctic ecosystem and 
would still allow the continued commercial exploitation of other species under CCAMLR. The 
application of a strong form of the precautionary approach justifies a krill fishing moratorium or 
localised bans because of the scientific uncertainty surrounding krill and its interaction with other 
Antarctic species. Any harvesting ban could be made more effective if the current legal regime 
is strengthened, a goal which the UN General Assembly has advocated in a 2004 resolution. 
468 Overholt, D.H. Supra, fn 392, 239 
469 Couratier, J. Supra, fn 9, 144 
470 Heap, J.A. Supra, fu 37,44-47 
471 Nicol, S. 1992. Management ofkrill fishery: was CCAMLR slow to act? Polar Record, Vol28: 155-
157 at 155 
472 Croxall, J.P, Everson, I. and Miller, D.G.M. Supra, fu 49 
473Baird, R. Supra, fu 25, 175 
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V. Law of the Sea and Sovereignty 
The first United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS 1) adopted agreements 
governing the world's maritime areas in 1958, during which time the Antarctic Treaty was in the 
process of formation.474 Since that time changes in fishing patterns have increased interest in the 
Southern Ocean and this has led to changes in the old Antarctic regime.475 There were several 
agreements at the third United Nations Conference (UNCLOS III) concerning coastal state 
jurisdiction. 476 This conference culminated in the formulation of a new Law of the Sea 
Convention (the 1982 Convention).477 The new Law of the Sea Convention contains some 
provisions concerning marine exploitation and conservation that can apply to the Antarctic krill 
and its dependent species. 
Sovereignty 
The Law of the Sea Convention can offer sprue protection for krill through its concepts of 
territorial seas and exclusive economic zones. The Law of the Sea Convention recognises a 
territorial sea, over which an adjacent coastal state has sovereignty, extends to a distance of 12 
nautical miles from the baseline (usually the low tide mark).478 .Article 2 recognises that states 
have sovereignty over the sea, its air space, bed and subsoil. Under Article 33, a continguous 
zone is recognised in which states can exercise control to prevent customs, immigration etc 
violations and to punish infringements that have taken place within its territorial sea. The 
continguous zone can extend up to 24 nautical miles from the baseline. The Convention also 
provides for an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)479 adjacent and beyond the territorial sea under 
which the rights and jurisdiction of the coastal state and other states are governed by the Law of 
the Sea Convention. The EEZ can extend up to 200 miles from the territorial sea baselines.480 
The Law of the Sea Convention recognises a coastal state's sovereign rights over all natural 
resources and other activities involving economic exploitation within that zone.481 
474 Peterson, M.J. Supra, fn 126, 139 
475 Ibid 
476 Ibid 
477 Signature for this new Convention closed in 1984. One hundred and fifty-six countries signed the 
Convention at that time (1985. Antarctic Resource Jurisdiction and the Law of the Sea: A Question of 
Compromise. Brooklyn Journal of International Law, Vol XI(l ): 45-78 at 60). Four of the Antarctic 
Treaty parties did not sign the Law of the Sea Convention at the time (Oxman, B.H. 1986. Antarctica and 
the New Law of the Sea. Cornell International Law Journal, Vol19: 211-247 at 218). 
478 Articles 2 and 3, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 
479 Article 55, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 
480 Article 57, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 
481 Kwiatkowska, B. 1989. The 200 Mile Exclusive Economic Zone in the New Law of the Sea. Martinus 
NijhoffPublishers: London. at 4 
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Article 77 of the Law of the Sea Convention recognises a coastal state's sovereign rights over its 
continental shelf, including its right to exploit natural resources. The continental shelf comprises 
the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond the territorial sea of a state 
throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental 
margin or to 200 nautical miles from the baseline.482 
EEZs became extremely popular with states proclaiming them even before UNCLOS III had 
finished drafting a formal instrument. 483 Depletion of world fish stocks meant that fishing fleets 
needed new sources of fish and governments became more protective of their coastal fishing 
resources.
484 
The existence of territorial seas and EEZs in Antarctica depends on the validity of Antarctic 
claims of sovereignty by some parties to the Antarctic Treaty. Argentina, Australia, Chile, 
France, New Zealand, Norway and the UK have made claims over parts of Antarctica's 
mainland.485 As will be discussed further in the following paragraph, these claims and the 
potential Law of the Sea effects flowing from them are frozen by the provisions of the Antarctic 
Treaty from being expanded, but the existence of them is not denied. The non-application of 
many international conservation instruments to high seas areas is one of the major deficiencies of 
current instruments. The existence of territorial seas and EEZs in Antarctica would provide a 
means of applying a comprehensive krill harvesting ban to a greater number of states through the 
exercise of sovereign rights within these zones. 
482 Article 7 6, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 
483 Twelve nations had claimed such zones in 197 5 and by 1978 there were 54 nations claiming EEZs 
(Peterson, M.J. Supra, fu 126, 152). 
484 Peterson, M.J. Supra, fu 126, 151 
485 Ibid, 139. Argentina, Chile and the UK have made overlapping territorial claims (1985. Antarctic 
Resource Jurisdiction and the Law of the Sea: A Question of Compromise. Brooklyn Journal of 
International Law, Vol XI(l): 45-78 at 56). 
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Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty states that "no new claim, or enlargement of an existing claim, 
to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica shall be asserted while the present Treaty is in force". 
There are disagreements as to whether declaring an EEZ in Antarctica would constitute an 
impermissible increase of an existing claim under the Antarctic Treaty.486 An EEZ or fisheries 
zone is not an inherent right of coastal sovereignty. There must be a positive act declaring such 
zones. 487 Declaring an EEZ in Antarctica may therefore breach Article IV as an enlargement of 
an existing claim or assertion of a new claim. 488 If such EEZs were not proclaimed when the 
Antarctic Treaty came into force they would not constitute part of the existing claim. Some 
claimant states and commentators, however, believe that Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty does 
not prohibit EEZs and that they can be declared without breaching the Treaty because EEZs do 
not represent an enlargement of an existing claim or a new claim.489 The legality of such EEZs 
would allow the sovereign states to enforce a krill fishing ban within them against states that 
would otherwise be able to claim freedom of the high seas as a justification for flouting such a 
ban. 
Offshore areas, arguably, come within Article IV despite the reference to "territorial sovereignty" 
in that provision.490 Maritime jurisdiction is based on the exercise of sovereignty over land. 491 It 
is submitted that Article IV applies to territorial seas and EEZs because of the reliance of those 
zones on a land based claim for sovereign rights to exist within them. 492 Maritime sovereignty is 
arguably a mere extension of territorial sovereignty. 493 As such, the emergence or claim of 
maritime sovereignty after the Treaty came into effect may be prohibited. 494 This would include 
the declaration of an EEZ. Any existing sovereign rights in the seas surrounding Antarctica, 
486 Koch, M. Supra, fu 164, 121 
487 Harry, R.L. 1981. The Antarctic Regime and the Law of the Sea Convention: An Australian View. 
Virginia Journal of International Law, Vol21(4): 727-744 at 733 
488 Rothwell, D.R. Supra, fn 388, 162 
489 Conforti, B. 1986. Territorial Claims in Antarctica: A Modem Way to Deal with an Old Problem. 
Cornell International Law Journal, Vol 19: 249-258 at 250. Declaration of an EEZ may not come within 
the ambit of Article IV. Maritime claims may not have a "territorial" content and therefore may not be 
governed by Article IV(2) of the Treaty (Vicuna, F.O. 1983. The application of the law of the sea to the 
Antarctic continent. in Antarctic Resources Policy. edited by Vicuna, F.O. Press Syndicate of the 
University of Cambridge: Melbourne. at 245). The type of sovereignty given by an EEZ may also not 
equate to "territorial sovereignty" (Rothwell, D.R. Supra, fn 388, 163). EEZs give sovereignty over 
resources in a maritime area, not sovereignty over the entire area. Maritime claims may simply give 
jurisdiction over maritime areas (Oxman, B.H. Supra, fn 503, 225). An EEZ declaration may therefore not 
be a claim of sovereignty governed by Article IV (Harry, R.L. Supra, fn 513, 733). This would mean that 
proclaiming an EEZ around Antarctica would not be an enlargement of any existing claim of sovereignty 
or a new claim. 
490 Oxman, B.H. Supra, fn 503, 226 
491 Peterson, M.J. Supra, fn 126, 141 
492 Oxman, B.H. Supra, fn 503, 225 
493 Ibid, 225 
494 Ibid, 226 
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such as the proclamation of an EEZ before the Treaty came into effect, would not breach Article 
IV. 
However, the Antarctic Treaty does not affect existing territorial claims OR the consequences of 
such existing sovereignty. 495 Claimant states have asserted that their land claims give them 
sovereignty over adjacent maritime areas pursuant to the Law of the Sea.496 If Law of the Sea 
rights were already attached to the original claims, then the exercise of sovereignty over such 
areas would not constitute a new claim or an enlargement of an existing one. If such claims are 
valid, then the claimant states can assert sovereignty in these areas by enforcing a krill ban that 
they would have no power to enforce on the high seas. 
However, the concept of an EEZ was not recognised in international law before 1961.497 The 
Antarctic Treaty was concluded before this time and, accordingly, the concept of an EEZ was not 
present when the Treaty came into force. As discussed, all sovereign claims were frozen when 
the Treaty came into force. Because EEZs did not exist in international law when the sovereign 
claims were frozen, arguably, they may not attach to the original land claims that existed at that 
time. An alternative argument is that the original territorial claims that existed at the time of 
freezing such claims also had attached to them potential sovereignty rights that might only 
become apparent under future developments in internationallaw.498 Under this interpretation, 
EEZs would be attached to the original claims because they were a potential sovereign right that 
crystallised under future international law developments. However, the requirement to declare 
an EEZ before it comes into existence, arguably, means that even as a potential sovereign right, 
EEZs did not attach to the original claims. 
The proclamation requirement suggests that something new is being created, rather an existing 
right arising from the land claims. The proclamation can arguably be seen as simply a formal 
recognition of a right that is already attached to the land claims and a declaration is merely 
required to "activate" the rights associated with an EEZ. If EEZs were not attached as a potential 
right to the original claims, then it is likely that the declaration of an EEZ would breach Article 
IV of the Antarctic Treaty. This reduces the likelihood of states using EEZs as a legal basis for 
enforcing a complete krill ban, further highlighting the need to vastly strengthen the current legal 
reg1me. 
495 Harry, R.L. Supra, fu 513, 734 
496 Zegers, F. 1983. The Canberra Convention: objectives and political aspects of its negotiation. in 
Antarctic Resources Policy. edited by Vicuna, F.O. Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge: 
Melbourne. at 152 
497 Rothwell, D.R. Supra, fu 388, 162 
498 Oxman, B.H. Supra, fn 503, 226 
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There is uncertainty as to whether "coastal states" even exist in Antarctica because of the doubt 
surrounding the Antarctic land claims. 499 Because any maritime claim is dependent on the land 
claim, this uncertainty prevents claimant's exercising sovereignty and Law of the Sea rights over 
adjacent seas. However, nothing in international law requires the formal recognition of coastal 
state sovereignty before sovereignty over the sea can be declared. 500 Antarctic claimants can 
therefore make maritime claims despite the legal questions surrounding the land claims. 501 
Although it should be noted, that actual sovereignty must eventually be found to exist over the 
adjacent land for the maritime sovereign claim to be valid. Even if exercising jurisdiction over 
the adjacent seas did not breach Article IV, such an act would still be an implied recognition of 
continental claims and this would be in violation of the Treaty's prohibition on new or enlarged 
claims. 502 If claimants cannot legally assert sovereignty over adjacent seas then some other 
legally binding mechanism must be introduced to regulate third parties on high seas Antarctica. 
Even if EEZs are prohibited by the Antarctic Treaty as new or enlarged claims, this does not 
mean that territorial seas cannot be valid claims. Arguably, asserting a territorial sea does not 
breach Article IV because it is an inherent right of coastal nations. 503 The territorial sea would 
automatically be attached to the original land claims and so would not constitute a new claim if 
sovereign rights were enforced within it. However, increasing an existing claim to a territorial 
sea would mean that sovereignty was exercised over a greater area and so this may constitute an 
enlargement of a claim under Article IV. 504 Under the original Law of the Sea Convention, the 
territorial sea was 3 miles but under Article 3 of the new Convention it is 12 miles. States 
claiming this extension in Antarctica have, arguably, enlarged their claim because a 3 mile area 
would have attached to the original land claim. However, if the "rights" referred to in Article IV 
evolve with changes in international law, then the territorial sea rights attaching to the original 
land claim may have changed without breaching the provision. This would give the Antarctic 
claimants a potential 12 mile territorial sea which would provide a legal justification for asserting 
sovereignty against fishing vessels within the sea to enforce a krill fishing ban. Assertion of 
Antarctic territorial seas provides a legal justification to overcome the flaws with the traditional 
freedom of fishing on the high seas. 
499 Rothwell, D.R. Supra, fi1388, 158 
500 Ibid 
501 Ibid 
502 1985. Antarctic Resource Jurisdiction and the Law of the Sea: A Question of Compromise. Brooklyn 
Journal of International Law, Vol XI(l ): 45-78 at 69 
503 Rothwell, D.R. Supra, fn 388, 160 
504 Ibid 
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The Antarctic Treaty's application to maritime areas is also ambiguous because of the existence 
of Article VI. Article VI states that "nothing in the ... Treaty shall prejudice or in any way affect 
the rights, or the exercise of the rights, of any State under international law with regard to the 
high seas within that area". "High seas" means all parts of the sea that are not included in the 
territorial sea or in the internal waters of a state under the old Law of the Sea.505 The Antarctic 
Treaty does not define the boundaries of the high seas so claimant states may view fishing within 
200 miles of their Antarctic claims as an interference with their sovereignty. 506 The provision 
also does not mention territorial seas or other coastal state jurisdiction. There is no reason to 
interpret the article as excluding from the Antarctic Treaty such areas that individual states can 
regulate by themselves. 507 Arguably, these areas could come within the ambit of the Treaty by 
implication. 508 If they do come within the Treaty, then Article IV can apply to them.509 There is 
also a potential argument that Article VI excludes maritime zones from the Treaty altogether.510 
If maritime areas are excluded from the Treaty, then potential EEZs and territorial seas would not 
be constrained by the prohibition on new or enlarged claims in Article IV. There is, however, 
ambiguity in the Treaty in respect of the reference to high seas rights in this provision.511 Such 
505 Article 1, Convention on the High Seas 
506 1985. Antarctic Resource Jurisdiction and the Law of the Sea: A Question of Compromise. Brooklyn 
Journal of International Law, Vol XI(l): 45-78 at 56 
507 Oxman, B.H. Supra, fn 503, 231 
508 Ibid, 224 
509 Ibid 
510 The reference to "high seas" prevents states exercising power that could not be exercised by a coastal 
state acting alone (Oxman, B.H. Supra, fu 503, 231). Reference to the high seas within the area in Article 
VI expressly includes them within the Treaty zone (VanDer Essen, A. 1983. The application of the law of 
the sea to the Antarctic continent. in Antarctic Resources Policy. edited by Vicuna, F.O. Press Syndicate of 
the University of Cambridge: Melbourne. at 233). However, it is not clear whether this express reference 
to "high seas" impliedly excludes the existence of territorial seas and EEZs within the Treaty zone. Under 
such an interpretation all areas within the Treaty zone would be high seas. The provision may also exclude 
maritime zones altogether from the Treaty area and simply recognise that the Treaty does not affect high 
seas rights, rather than making the Treaty applicable to the high seas. Article VI of the Antarctic Treaty 
states that the Treaty applies to "the area" south of 60 degrees "including all ice shelves". Arguably, the 
inclusion of these words could also implicitly exclude maritime areas from the Treaty zone (VanDer 
Essen, A. 1983. The application of the law of the sea to the Antarctic continent. in Antarctic Resources 
Policy. edited by Vicuna, F.O. Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge: Melbourne. at 233). 
511 The reference to high seas rights in Article VI raises issues concerning the definition of such "rights". 
The provision could mean that all high seas rights recognised in international law when the Treaty 
commenced remain in force during its term of operation. The provision could also mean high seas rights 
that exist at particular points in time during the Treaty's operation (Rothwell, D.R. Supra, fu 388, 157). If 
the second interpretation is valid, then parties may be bound by high seas rights in the new Law of the Sea 
Convention. Article VI also refers to rights "under international law" which may mean that these rights 
change as international law changes (Oxman, B.H. Supra, fu 503, 231). Such an interpretation would 
mean that the Treaty can apply to exploitation of natural resources. Ambiguity also surrounds the question 
of whether "high seas" in Article VI impliedly presupposes the existence of a territorial sea. If high seas 
are defined as areas beyond territorial seas or the internal waters of a state, then expressly recognising that 
high seas exist in Antarctica may also imply that territorial seas exist. Such an interpretation would give 
rise to internal inconsistencies with Article IV of the Treaty. Contradictions within Article VI may be a 
result of changes made during the drafting of the provision. (VanDer Essen, A. Supra, fu 536, 233). 
Article VI of the Antarctic Treaty's high seas exclusion arguably does not apply to areas that could 
potentially be seen as territorial sea under international law (Oxman, B.H. Supra, fn 503, 230) 
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ambiguity causes uncertainty as to the application of the Treaty. This further highlights the need 
to strengthen the legal side of the current regulatory system to provide better protection to krill 
and other Antarctic species in accordance with the UN General Assembly's recent resolution. 
Activities to Assert Sovereignty 
If declaration of an EEZ does constitute a prohibited new claim then Antarctic claimant parties 
cannot exercise control over krill fishing within the EEZ. Control over vessels within such EEZs 
would provide a means of enforcing a krill ban. Without universal application, a comprehensive 
harvesting ban cannot be effective. Even current precautionary catch limits wiil fail if all parties 
are not bound by them and there is no legal means of enforcing the limits against all states. 
Exercising control over a potential EEZ, arguably, amounts to a prohibited enlargement of a 
claim. 512 Although claims under the Treaty system are not recognised, they are also not 
dismissed. 513 Article IV therefore does not negate maritime claims. A Treaty article freezing 
relations between states may not be able to stop states conducting activities to establish 
sovereignty.514 In the Eastern Greenlani 15 case, despite the existence of an agreement to freeze 
sovereignty claims, Denmark's activities to establish territorial sovereignty in Eastern Greenland 
were permissible. 516 This thesis submits that the analogous Article IV in the Antarctic Treaty is 
therefore unable to prevent claimants from conducting activities that would strengthen claims of 
sovereignty when the Treaty expires.517 Despite the existence of Article IV, Antarctic Treaty 
parties can, arguably, exert fisheries control over possible EEZs in Antarctica's surrounding 
waters. Such control would provide a crucial means of enforcing a krill fishing ban or other 
conservation measures in order to establish the potential sovereignty of Antarctic claimants. 
512 Peterson, M.J. Supra, fu 126, 153 
513 1985. Antarctic Resource Jurisdiction and the Law of the Sea: A Question of Compromise. Brooldyn 
Journal oflntemational Law, Vol XI(l): 45-78 at 59 
514 Parriott, T.J. Territorial Claims In Antarctica: Will the United States Be Left Out In the Cold? Stanford 
Journal of International Law, 67-121 at 93 
515 Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Norway v Denmark) 1933 PCIJ 
516 Parriott, T.J. Supra, fn 540, 93 
517 Ibid 
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Other countries do not give much credence to the territorial assertions of Antarctic claimant 
nations. 518 Some countries do not recognise the sovereignty of Antarctic claimant states, which 
makes it difficult for their claims to form the basis for exercising rights over the adjacent 
maritime zones. 519 States with no land claim would not have accepted a 200 mile EEZ over 
maritime areas.520 Non-claimants would have been firmly opposed to any possible exercise of 
control over fishing in these areas. 521 Non-claimant states can simply regard the Southern Ocean 
as high seas.522 This makes it difficult for claimant states to exercise control over fishing to 
enforce a krill harvesting ban in any EEZ adjacent to Antarctica. However, as mentioned 
previously, an uncertain land claim does not prevent the assertion of sovereignty over maritime 
areas. Furthermore, the freezing provisions of Article IV will not necessarily prevent parties 
·carrying out activities to establish sovereignty. Exercising control over fishing in the Southern 
Ocean would help to establish maritime sovereignty whilst also providing protection for krill. 
However, proclamation ofEEZs or EFZs by Antarctic claimant states could upset the balance of 
the Antarctic Treaty. 523 
There is also a question whether such control can be validly exercised against non-Antarctic 
Treaty parties who simply view all of the Southern Ocean as high seas. If control cannot be 
exercised against such parties, then this would give rise to the same problems with illegal, 
unreported and unregulated fishing that exist under CCAMLR. Non-Treaty nations can exploit 
resources freely because only parties to the Antarctic Treaty are bound by its provisions. 524 If 
claimants can assert sovereignty over such states, they would be able to control fishing activities 
of the flag vessels of these nations. Strong universally binding measures must exist if krill are to 
be fully protected. A total fishing ban can only be successful if all parties are legally obliged to 
comply with it and a strong form of the precautionary approach would require all parties to abide 
by such a ban because of current scientific uncertainty. 
518 1985. Antarctic Resource Jurisdiction and the Law of the Sea: A Question of Compromise. Brooklyn 
Journal of International Law, Vol XI(l): 45-78 at 58 
519 Oxman, B.H. Supra, fn 503, 222 
520 Zegers, F. Supra, fn 522, 153 
521 Peterson, M.J. Supra, fn 126, 153 
522 Ibid, 141 
523 Miller, D.G.M. To Krill or Overkrill that is the Question: Sustainable Use of Antarctic Marine Living 
Resources. 1-28 at 16 
524 Parriott, T.J. Supra, fn 540, 95 
110 
Declaration of Sovereignty in Marine Antarctica 
The existence of either territorial seas or Exclusive Economic Zones around Antarctica would 
provide significant protection for the Antarctic krill. A large proportion of krill harvesting areas 
in Antarctica are covered by potential200 mile EEZs.525 Large concentrations of krill are found 
in the Ross Sea adjacent to the New Zealand claim and off Wilkes Land which is claimed by 
Australia. 526 Territorial seas to 12 miles would also provide limited protection. There is a 
question of whether seasonal pack-ice and ice-shelves form part of the Antarctic continent. 527 If 
they do, then Antarctic claimants could assert jurisdiction over a much wider area and provide 
greater protection to krill. The Law of the Sea Convention gives states sovereignty over their 
territorial seas and EEZs, in particular, giving them sovereign rights to exploit, conserve and 
manage living resources within the EEZ.528 This would give Antarctic claimants the right to 
manage krill resources in any EEZs surrounding Antarctica. Because large concentrations of 
krill are found in some of these areas, a ban enforced by claimants in these areas would give 
significant protection to krill. Such a ban could be justified by the precautionary approach and, 
as discussed, if the precautionary approach is or did become part of customary international law 
then there would be a legal justification for enforcement of such a ban within Antarctic EEZs. 
Several Antarctic claimants have asserted sovereignty over some maritime areas adjacent to the 
Antarctic continent. Chile claimed a 200 mile economic zone in 194 7 and asserted sovereignty 
over that area. 529 Because this claim existed before the Antarctic Treaty came into effect it is not 
a "new" claim that is forbidden by Article IV. Claims over a territorial sea have been made by 
Argentina, Chile, Norway, and the UK in conjunction with their territorial claims. 530 Australia 
and France have made separate claims to a territorial sea. 531 New Zealand did not make a formal 
declaration, but there was gradual recognition of such a sea. 532 
525 Auburn, F.M. Supra, fn 30, 207 
526 Alverson, D.L. Supra, fn 75, 174 
527 Kindt, J.W. Supra, fn 3, 57 
528 Articles 2 and 56, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
529 VanDer Essen, A. Supra, fn 536, 234 
530 Rothwell, D.R. Supra, fn 388, 159 
531 Ibid 
532 Ibid, 160 
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Control over fishing by these states would lead to a more effective means of preventing 
unreported fishing. Under CCAMLR, states can only enforce conservation measures against 
parties to the Convention. There is also a problem with fishing vessels using "flags of 
convenience" to avoid compliance with CCAMLR.533 The recognition of territorial seas and 
EEZs around Antarctica would enable claimants to enforce conservation measures against all 
states within those zones. An adequate regulatory system for krill must have some form of 
universally binding legal obligation. Enforcement of a krill moratorium by Antarctic claimants 
in areas near the continent would make it more likely that such a moratorium would succeed, 
particularly in light of the problem with IUU fishing in Antarctica. 
States will require some kind of incentive to proclaim and then enforce fisheries measures in 
territorial seas and EEZs around Antarctica. Non-enforcement by claimant states of their rights 
in these zones will lead to a weakening of their claims. 534 Such a weakening effect would be 
detrimental to the compromise achieved by Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty. 535 Introducing 
200 mile EEZs in the new Law of the Sea Convention will also have placed greater value on 
Antarctic claims by giving potential control over maritime areas to claimants in addition to their 
land claims. 536 This would be a major incentive for claimants to declare EEZs in Antarctica. 
Potential oil and gas reserves off the Antarctic coastline would also provide a major impetus for 
declaring such EEZs. 537 Claimant states will be likely to desire as large a claim as possible. 
Despite uncertain benefits, dropping the claim subsequently wovld be easier than making a new 
claim at a later stage. 538 Uniform assertions by claimants of EEZs would allow them to 
introduce legislation within the EEZs that supported CCAMLR. 539 If the claimant nations 
introduced a krill fishing ban within Antarctic EEZs and territorial seas, they would be able to 
receive benefits from sustainable exploitation of more lucrative fish stocks. Because krill form 
the base of the Antarctic ecosystem, their total protection would give greater protection to these 
krill dependent fish stocks. Furthermore, it would be justified by the precautionary approach 
because ofthe current scientific uncertainty. 
533 Flags of convenience and umegulated fishing will be discussed in more detail in a subsequent chapter. 
534 Auburn, F.M. Supra, fu 30, 207 
535 Ibid 
536 Peterson, M.J. Supra, fn 126, 159 
537 Ibid, 160 
538 Ibid 169 
539 Rothwell, D.R. Supra, fu 388, 180 
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Australia and Antarctic Marine Sovereignty 
The existence of maritime sovereignty adjacent to Australia's Antarctic claim provides a 
somewhat different case to other Antarctic claimants. Australia has asserted a 200 mile 
exclusive fishery zone (EFZ) giving it jurisdiction over Australian fishers. 540 This zone included 
"waters adjacent to an external Territory, whether within or beyond the territorial sea adjacent to 
the Territory"541 when it was proclaimed on 1 November 1979. The government later excluded 
the Antarctic territory from this definition.542 Australian vessels are still subject to Australian 
law in these areas because of their status as "proclaimed waters" under the Fisheries 
Management Act 1991 (Cth).543 Australia declared an EEZ around its Antarctic territory on 1 
August 1994. 544 However, the old EFZ still exists in the new EEZ and so only Australian flag 
ships and nationals are subject to Australian law within the zone. 545 The declaration of an EEZ 
could infringe Article IV of the Treaty as being a new claim or enlargement of an existing one. 
Proclamation by Australia of an EFZ in its Antarctic Territory is, arguably, an attempt to regulate 
Australian flag vessels, rather than a means of strengthening Australia's claim to Antarctic 
sovereignty.546 The Australian EFZ is really just an extension of Australia's domestic laws to 
regulate its citizens in Antarctica. 547 The zone does not attempt to control fishing by foreign 
vessels and so it would not be prohibited by Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty. However, its 
usefulness in protecting krill fishing is limited if it does not apply to foreign vessels. 548 Fishing 
regulations must be applicable to all states for them to ensure effective protection for krill, 
especially if a krill harvesting ban is introduced within the Australian EFZ. 
540 Harry, R.L. Supra, fn 513, 732 
541 s3(a) Fisheries Amendment Act 1978 
542 VanDer Essen, A. Supra, [n 536,241 
543 Rothwell, D.R. Supra, fu 388, 164 
544 Ibid 
545 Ibid 
546 Miller, D.G.M. Supra, fu 549, 16 
547 Ibid 
548 Australia has also claimed a territorial sea in Antarctica. The Australian Antarctic Territory Acceptance 
Act entered into force on August 24, 193 6 and gives the Australian Antarctic territory the same status 
under Australian sovereignty as any other land in Australia. Australia's sovereignty may extend over a 
territorial sea of 3 miles under Australian law. Australia has not separately proclaimed such a sea for 
Antarctica. This is because Australia claims such a sea over all its territory (Harry, R.L. Supra, fn 513, 
730). Australia extended its territorial sea in Antarctica from 3 miles to 12 miles in 1990 (Rothwell, D.R. 
Supra, fn 388, 163). As previously discussed, this may constitute an impermissible enlargement of an 
existing claim. A valid territorial sea in Antarctica could be used by Australia to assert control over krill 
fishing in this zone. 
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There have been recent developments concerning the potential extension of Australia's Antarctic 
EEZ. Section 76 of the Law of the Sea Convention effectively allows parties to extend their 
territorial claim beyond an EEZ if the continental shelf extends beyond this zone. Under section 
77, the relevant coastal state has sovereign rights over the continental shelf and its natural 
resources. Parties are required to provide the necessary information delineating the extent of the 
continental shelf 10 years from the date that the Law of the Sea Convention entered into force for 
them. Australia submitted the requisite information concerning its continental shelf on 15 
November 2004.549 This submission included information concerning the extent of the 
continental shelf in respect of Australia's Antarctic territory. However, in its submission 
Australia specifically recognised Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty and requested the 
Commission not to take any action for the time being in respect of that part of the submission 
relating to the continental shelf of Antarctica. Australia's submission is being considered by the 
Commission during 2005. Some States have already provided specific feedback to the 
Commission on Australia's submission regarding the Antarctic continental shelf. For example, 
the USA informed the Commission that, pursuant to the Antarctic Treaty, it does not recognise 
any State's claim to Antarctica nor to marine areas adjacent to Antarctica. The USA 
acknowledged "with appreciation Australia's request to the Commission that it not take any 
action on that portion of its submission relating to areas of the seabed and subsoil adjacent to 
Antarctica."550 
Although Australia did ask the Commission not to take action, it only requested the Commission 
to refrain "for the time being". This leaves open the possibility of Australia claiming sovereignty 
over part of the Antarctic continental shelf in the future under section 77 of the Law of the Sea 
Convention. This potential assertion of sovereignty gives rise to the same legal arguments 
discussed previously in respect of Antarctic EEZs. One argument would be that a claim by 
Australia over the continental shelf would infringe Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty as a 
prohibited new claim. Arguably, as Australia has only just submitted its continental shelf 
information in 2004, assertions of sovereignty over the continental shelf would post-date the 
Antarctic Treaty and accordingly would constitute a new claim. 
549 Continental Shelf Submission of Australia, Commonwealth of Australia, 15 November 2004. 
550 United States Mission to the United Nations, New York, Diplomatic Note dated 3 December 2004. 
Similar comments were provided to the Commission by the Russian Diplomatic mission, Permanent 
Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations, New York, 9 December 2004. 
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The alternative argument would be either that maritime areas are excluded from the application 
of the Antarctic Treaty or that the continental shelf claim over the marine environment attaches 
to the original land claim and so does not constitute a new or extended claim. If there is legal 
merit to the extension of Australia's sovereignty over marine areas in Antarctica, then Australia 
has a justification to enforce conservation measures against non-parties to CCAMLR whose flag 
vessels fish within those extended areas. Furthermore, as discussed above, a further argument 
would be that the mere freezing of sovereign claims over marine Antarctica does not prevent 
Australia from conducting activities to assert sovereignty over these areas, including marine 
areas falling within any extended area based on the Antarctic continental shelf. 
Sovereignty over sub-Antarctic Islands 
Many States that hold sovereignty over sub-Antarctic islands have proclaimed 200 mile EEZs or 
fishing zones around them. 551 An EEZ has been stated to exist by Australia around Heard, 
McDonald and Macquarie Islands. 552 Australia has also recently established a form of marine 
protected zone in these areas. Kerguelen Island has also had an EEZ declared around it by 
France. 553 France has, in the past, restricted fishing in this zone to allow recovery of depleted 
fish numbers.554 Hence, fish stocks in the area are in a better state than in other Antarctic zones. 
This French experience shows that declaration of EEZs can help to conserve species because of 
the greater level of control that states can exercise over such zones. 
551 Peterson, M.J. Supra, fn 126, 153 
552 Baird, R. Supra, fn 25, 168 
553 Ibid 
554 Ibid 
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States also have a greater incentive to police areas of the sea if they recognise them as part of 
their homeland by a declaration of sovereignty. There are large concentrations of krill around 
many sub-Antarctic islands. The South Orkney Islands, South Georgia, South Sandwich Islands, 
(all claimed by the UK) and Bouvet island (claimed by Norway) are home to substantial krill 
stocks in the surrounding seas. 555 South Georgia is particularly important because it is the only 
area where a year round krill fishing industry is viable.556 Declaration ofEEZs around these 
islands would provide significant protection for the Antarctic krill. The UK could exercise. 
substantial control over fishing in these zones. The UK has already proclaimed 200 mile 
"maritime zones" in May 1993 around South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands in which it 
has introduced regulations and a licensing system to regulate :fishing, although Argentina557 
contests the validity of these regulations.558 Argentina also disputes the validity of the UK's 
claims to the South Orkney Islands. Norway claims a 4 mile territorial sea around Bouvet 
Island.559 These EEZs can be used to enforce a limited krill ban against all vessels within them. 
The current regulatory regime has no legal power over non-parties on the high seas because of 
the traditional fishing freedom. Enforcement of a krill ban within the EEZs of these sub-
Antarctic islands would alleviate that problem, particularly because of the high concentration of 
krill that are found within some of these zones. 
The declaration of EEZs around sub-Antarctic islands by Antarctic Treaty parties is constrained 
somewhat by the Treaty itself. If maritime claims are prohibited by Article IV, coastal states 
outside the Treaty zone may not be able to extend their maritime claims within the zone. 560 
Arguably, the Treaty does not make a distinction between claims based on Antarctic continental 
land and claims based on land outside the Treaty zone.561 If all claims are treated in the same 
manner, then Article IV would apply regardless.562 If sub-Antarctic island EEZs are valid, then 
krill can be protected against vessels of both CCAMLR parties and non-parties. Control over 
non-parties will significantly reduce the level of unregulated fishing and the use of "flags of 
convenience". Such control is vital for the implementation of a successful krill harvesting ban. 
555 Alverson, D.L. Supra, fu 75, 174 
556 Nicol, S. 1995. op. cit., 397 
557 Argentina disputes the ill('s claims to South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands. 
558 UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office website, http://files.fco.gov.uk/info/briefs/falklands.pdf 
559 The World Factbook 2002 website, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/fields/2106.html 
560 Oxman, B.H. Supra, fn 503, 227 
561 Ibid 
562 Ibid 
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Other Protection in the Law of the Sea Convention 
The existence of Exclusive Economic Zones surrounding Antarctica or the sub-Antarctica islands 
would provide enormous benefits for the Antarctic krill. The Law of the Sea Convention gives 
coastal states exclusive coastal rights to manage, exploit and conserve living resources.563 This 
gives the coastal state the right to conserve krill by determining an acceptable level of harvesting. 
Coastal states can therefore place a complete ban on krill fishing within their EEZs. This thesis 
submits that the Convention's provisions also place an obligation on states to ensure that krill 
dependent species are not threatened by exploitation ofkrill. 564 The likely expansion of krill 
industry because of increased demand for krill products and higher economic returns would 
further threaten krill dependent species. A complete krill fishing ban would ensure that other 
species were not threatened within a State's EEZ and would fulfil the requirements of the Law of 
the Sea Convention within such zones. 
A total krill harvesting ban within EEZs would, arguably, conflict with other provisions of the 
Law of the Sea Convention. The Law of the Sea Convention's focus on economic factors does 
not sit comfortably with a complete ban on krill fishing. 565 The requirement in the Convention to 
promote "optimum utilisation", arguably, conflicts with a complete fishing ban. This would 
prevent states from introducing such a measure within their EEZs.566 This highlights the need to 
strengthen current international legal instruments like the Convention so that IUU fishing can be 
combated in an effective manner. As discussed above, the UN General Assembly itself has 
recently supported the need to strengthen international agreements to combat IUU fishing. 
563 Article 56, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 
564 The Law of the Sea Convention Article 56 gives exclusive sovereign rights to the coastal state to 
manage, exploit and conserve living resources. Article 61 (1) also provides that coastal nations "shall" 
determine the allowable catch of living resources in the EEZ. Article 61 (2) also obliges nations through 
proper conservation and management measures to ensure that the maintenance of living resources is not 
endangered by overexploitation. This provision is supplemented by Article 61(4) which requires states to 
take into account the effect on associated or dependent species when another species is harvested so that 
such species are restored above levels that may seriously threaten them. 
565 Article 61(3) requires any measures to maintain or restore populations to maximum sustainable yields, 
taking into account economic needs, fishing patterns and the interdependence of stocks. The use of the 
term "maximum sustainable yield" in conjunction with "economic needs" and "fishing patterns" suggests 
rational exploitation of species such as krill is required by the Convention and total protection of krill may 
conflict with this goal. Article 62(1) also says that coastal states shall promote the objective of optimum 
utilization of living resources in the EEZ without prejudice to Article 61. 
566 However, the provision says states shall "promote" the objective of optimum utilization. It does not say 
that States MUST optimally utilise EVERY species ofliving resources within the EEZ. Furthermore, the 
article says that this objective is to be promoted without prejudice to Article 61. The conservation 
requirements of Article 61 may be threatened if krill were optimally utilised. 
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Other krill dependent species that are currently exploited will be threatened if krill were 
exploited to an optimum level. This would breach the provisions in the Law of the Sea 
Convention that are aimed at maintaining population levels.567 A krill fishing ban would also be 
difficult because of a possible need to give third states access to living resources in the EEZ. 568 
If the coastal state prohibits its own vessels from harvesting krill, third party states, arguably, 
should be able to access krill on their own. However, there is no legal right of access of third 
party states to fishing resources in an EEZ. 569 Access may be granted to foreign vessels on 
conditions conforming to domestic fisheries policy, according to the Convention's requirements 
for conservation and rational management.570 Coastal states can determine which species are 
caught, catch quotas and enforcement procedures for foreign nationals fishing within their 
EEZs. 571 A complete ban is therefore legally justified within these EEZs and coastal states have 
the power to declare such a ban. 
Straddling Stocks and Highly Migratory Species 
Conservation or total protection of krill is difficult because krill are circumpolar in distribution. 
Krill can occur in several different EEZs and also on areas of high seas in the Southern Ocean. 
This can lead to inconsistent policies concerning krill in different EEZs and also on the high 
seas.
572 Although krill occur in several potential EEZs and on the high seas in Antarctica; fishing 
nations that are parties to the Law of the Sea Convention are still under an obligation to ensure 
conservation of the species and other species dependent on krill. Krill dependent species that 
provide greater economic returns than krill would have better prospects if krill were protected by 
a comprehensive harvesting ban. Such benefits would give nations that fish on the.high seas an 
incentive to protect kri11.573 
567 This potential breach of Article 61 may allow coastal States to give total protection to krill rather than 
optimally utilizing them. Such protection would also allow krill dependent populations to be restored to 
levels of maximum sustainable yield in accordance with Article 62(3). 
568 Article 62(2) gives the coastal state the ability to determine its capacity to harvest living resources and 
to give other States access to the surplus where it does not have that ability. 
569 The provisions in Article 62 are merely guidelines (Kwiatkowska, B. Supra, fn 507, 60). 
570 Ibid 
571 Nationals of other states fishing in the EEZ are required by Article 62( 4) to comply with conservation 
measures and other laws and regulations established by the coastal state. 
572 Article 63(1) obliges states, where stocks of species or associated spedes occur within two or more 
EEZs, to coordinate directly or through subregional or regional organisations, to agree upon measures to 
ensure the conservation of such stocks. Article 63(2) places the same obligation on states in relation to 
stocks that occur in both an EEZ and an area beyond and adjacent to the EEZ. So although Article 87 
gives freedom of fishing on the high seas, nations are still under an obligation to liaise with coastal states 
to ensure conservation of stocks occurring in EEZs and on the high seas. 
573 Article 63(1) merely obliges states to "seek" agreement concerning fisheries where stocks or stocks of 
associated species occur within EEZs of two states, not to actually reach such an agreement (Kwiatkowska, 
B. Supra, fn 507, 78). However, this may still place states under a moral obligation to act in good faith in 
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Joint management already occurs in Antarctica for parties to CCAMLR and the Law of the Sea 
require~ents can strengthen such a system in potential EEZs in Antarctica. The precautionary 
approach justifies introducing a krill moratorium because of the scientific uncertainty concerning 
krill population and the effect of krill fishing on dependent species. A moratorium would be 
supported by strong, consistent regulatory practices. Such a strengthening of international 
fisheries management agreements has recently been advocated by the UN General Assembly 
resolution which may provide an impetus for reforms to the current system. 
A co-operative regime for harvesting of some species is also required by other provisions of the 
Law of the Sea Convention.574 Highly migratory species are specifically covered by these 
provisions. However, the Convention does not include krill as a "highly migratory" species.575 
As previously mentioned, it is unclear whether there are localised populations of krill or whether 
there is simply one global population of krill that migrates around Antarctic waters. Krill can 
therefore constitute a highly migratory species despite not being defined as such in the 
Convention.576 Failing to provide for krill reduces the possibility of cooperation to ensure 
conseniation of krill as required by the Convention. The Convention's provisions relating to 
highly migratory species do not outline any specific conservation m~asures and provide little 
protection for such species. 
attempting to reach agreement (Bratspies, R. 2001. Finessing King Neptune: Fisheries Management and 
the Limits oflntemational Law. The Harvard Environmental Law Review, vo125: 213-257 at 228). States 
may still be unable to reach a consensus despite a moral obligation. In many regions, coastal states have 
accepted joint responsibility for conserving and managing these stocks in accordance with the Law of the 
Sea Convention (Kwiatkowska, B. Supra, fn 507, 78). 
574 Article 64(1) obliges coastal states and states whose nationals fish for stocks ofhighly migratory 
species to cooperate directly or through appropriate international organisations to ensure conservation and 
promote optimum utilisation within and beyond the EEZ. The article requires states to "cooperate" rather 
than to reach agreement on ensuring conservation of highly migratory species. This wording may reduce 
the binding effect of the provision. 
575 Highly migratory species are defined as those listed in Annex 1 of the Convention. However, Annex 1 
of the Law of the Sea Convention is not comprehensive because it does not include stocks such as krill or 
squid which could potentially be defined as "highly migratory" species (Birnie, P. and Boyle, A. Supra, fn 
233, 665). Krill float around Antarctica in swarms, so that they will sometimes come within 200 miles 
zones and sometimes come outside such zones (Peterson, M.J. Supra, fn 126, 159). 
576 Annex 1 would also be difficult to amend, making it unlikely that Article 64 will place such obligations 
on states in relation to krill in the future (Birnie, P. and Boyle, A. Supra, fn 233, 665). 
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In order to combat the weakness of the "highly migratory" provisions in the Law of the Sea 
Convention and to provide more effective protection for such species, a UN legal agreement was 
formulated to deal with this issue. This agreement is known as the Agreement for the 
Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 
December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and 
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (the UN Fish Stocks Agreement).577 The agreement applies to 
high seas areas beyond national jurisdiction. 578 The UN Fish Stocks Agreement's objective is the 
long term conservation and sustainable use of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish 
stocks.579 Krill are not necessarily covered by the agreement. "Highly migratory" species are 
not defined in the instrument. "Fish" is defined in Article 1 to include crustaceans, meaning that 
krill could potentially be included in this definition. The omission of krill from the definition of 
"highly migratory species" in the Law of the Sea Convention may, however, suggest that krill are 
also excluded from the Fish Stocks Agreement. Such an argument is strengthened by Article 4 
of the agreement which requires the agreement to be interpreted and applied in the context of and 
in a manner consistent with the Law of the Sea Convention. If krill are not included in the 
definition of "highly migratory" species and "straddling fish stocks" then they will not receive 
the protection of the agreement. 
Assuming that krill are covered by the Fish Stocks Agreement, then the main objective of the 
Agreement is their long term conservation and sustainable use through the effective 
implementation of the 1982 Convention.580 The Fish Stocks Agreement contains a number of 
principles that directly impact on the appropriate level of krill harvesting. The Agreement's 
objectives include the optimum utilisation of stocks and a level of stock maintenance that 
produces maximum sustainable yield.581 As previously discussed, maximum sustainable yield is 
a problematic concept. Interdependence between stocks means that it is not be possible to 
optimally utilise all stocks whilst also maintaining or restoring them to a level of maximum 
sustainable yield. 
577 This "Fish Stocks Agreement" was introduced by the General Assembly on 4 December 1995 
(Christopherson, M. 1996. Toward a Rational Harvest: The United Nations Agreement on Straddling Fish 
Stocks and Highly Migratory Species. Minnesota Journal of Global Trade, Vol5: 357-379 at 358). The 
agreement tries to solve the problems with overfishing on the high seas that have resulted in reductions of 
fish stocks in EEZs (Anton, D.K. 1997. Supra, fn 330, 363) 
578 Article 3(1), The United Nations Agreement on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Species 
1995 
579 Article 2, The United Nations Agreement on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Species 1995 
580 Article 2, The United Nations Agreement on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Species 1995 
581 ArticleS(a), The United Nations Agreement on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Species 
1995. Including an objective of optimum utilisation could mean that complete krill protection is at odds 
with the Fish Stocks Agreement. Furthermore, Article 5(b) requires such measures to be designed to 
maintain or restore stocks at levels capable of producing maximum sustainable yield. 
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This is especially true for krill because of their important position in the food chain. If krill are 
optimally utilised, then some krill dependent stocks such as the baleen whales will be prevented 
from being restored to a level of maximum sustainable yield. Adopting a strong form of the 
precautionary approach would, as previously mentioned, require some form of Antarctic krill 
protection because of scientific uncertainty surrounding krill and dependent species. This would 
permit other more commercially valuable species to be exploited at maximum sustainable yield 
in accordance with the objectives of the Fish Stocks Agreement. 
Optimum utilisation is also merely a desirable objective of the Fish Stocks Agreement, rather 
than a mandatory one.582 Accordingly, a krill fishing moratorium is not necessarily inconsistent 
with the Fish Stocks Agreement. As discussed, protecting krill would allow other species to be 
maintained at levels capable of producing maximum sustainable yield and would allow such 
species to be optimally utilised. Furthermore, the Agreement also requires production at 
maximum sustainable yield to be "qualified by relevant environmental and economic factors". 583 
Exploitation of krill at maximum sustainable yield would have an extremely detrimental effect 
on krill dependent species. If the interdependence of stocks qualifies the requirement to exploit 
species at this level then, this thesis submits that krill do not have to be harvested at maximum 
sustainable yield. Qualification by relevant environmental factors could also include factors such 
as sea ice cover which affect krill recruitment levels. Such factors will necessitate a lower level 
of krill exploitation.584 Alternatively, qualification by relevant "economic" factors means that the 
effect of lower harvesting levels on krill fishers and krill product markets, such as aquaculture, 
must be taken into account and this is, arguably, a justification for higher levels of exploitation. 
However, conservation should come before exploitation and this thesis submits that the 
precautionary approach justifies a krill fishing moratorium despite any negative economic 
impacts on krill product market. The potential economic benefits from increased sustainability 
of krill dependent species is also a justification for ignoring any harm that would be caused to 
krill fishers and krill product markets. 
582 Article 5 merely requires states to "promote" optimum utilisation, rather than making optimum 
utilisation obligatory. 
583 Article 5(b) requires production at maximum sustainable yield to be "qualified by relevant 
environmental and economic factors" including interdependence of stocks and generally recommended 
international minimum standards (including regional standards). 
584 Furthermore, a regional international minimum standard could possibly be CCAMLR's precautionary 
catch limits for krill. Article 5(b) may therefore require krill exploitation at maximum sustainable yield to 
be qualified by CCAMLR's catch limits. Although such limits do not offer complete protection for krill, 
they may help to conserve krill. 
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Further support for krill conservation can be found in other general principles of the Fish Stocks 
Agreement.585 The Agreement does, however, only require dependent species to be maintained 
or restored above levels that could seriously threaten their reproduction. The dependence of 
many other species upon krill means that their optimal exploitation will have a detrimental effect 
on these species. A lower level of exploitation (and the introduction of conservation measures to 
facilitate such a lower level) would allow dependent species to be maintained above levels which 
can seriously threaten their reproduction.586 The need to maintain populations at levels that only 
"seriously" threaten reproduction also implies that a much greater level of krill exploitation is 
permitted, however, as discussed, the uncertainty surrounding krill populations and species 
interactions means that even a low level of exploitation could "seriously" threaten the 
reproductive capacity of dependent species. Accordingly, under the precautionary approach, krill 
must receive the protection of a total harvesting ban because of their pivotal role in the Antarctic 
ecosystem. 
Furthermore, the Fish Stocks Agreement actually requires application of the precautionary 
approach. Article 5(c) requires application of the precautionary approach in accordance with 
article 6. Article 6(1) says that states "shall apply the precautionary approach widely [emphasis 
added] to conservation, management, and exploitation of straddling fish stocks and highly 
migratory fish stocks in order to protect the living marine resources and preserve the marine 
environment." It is submitted that applying the approach "widely" would require, not only the 
application of the approach in a wide range of circumstances, but in this respect, an application 
of a strong form of the precautionary approach. As discussed in Chapter 2, a strong form of the 
precautionary approach would imply that, even with a lack of data on krill populations and 
species interactions, measures should be introduced to protect krill and dependent species. 
In particular, Article 6(2) also requires that states "be more cautious when information is 
uncertain, unreliable or inadequate. The absence of adequate scientific information shall not be 
used as a reason for postponing or failing to take conservation and management measures." 
585 Article 5( d) requires states to "assess" the impacts of fishing on species belonging to the same 
ecosystem as the target stock or associated with or dependent upon the target stocks. Although simply 
"assessing" impacts is unlikely to provide support for krill conservation, Article 5(e) also requires states to 
"adopt, where necessary, conservation and management measures for species belonging to the same 
ecosystem or associated with or dependent upon the target stocks, with a view to maintaining or restoring 
populations of such species above levels at which their reproduction may become seriously threatened". 
586 However, such measures only need to be implemented "where necessary", suggesting either state 
discretion or that reproduction must already be seriously threatened before measures can be introduced. 
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Arguably, due to the extreme uncertainty concerning krill population, its interaction with 
dependent species and the Antarctic ecosystem as a whole and the effect of krill harvesting of 
dependent species, states are required to be even "more cautious". It is submitted that this 
extreme level of uncertainty should require a degree of caution evinced by no-take zones or 
complete harvesting bans. 
In this respect, in implementing the precautionary apprdach, Article 6(3) also requires states to 
implement "improved techniques for dealing with risk and uncertainty" and "take into account, 
inter alia, uncertainties relating to size and productivity of the stocks .... and the impact of fishing 
activities on non-target and associated or dependent speCies". This gives further weight to the 
argument that the high level of uncertainty concerning krill stock should require a higher level of 
caution concerning its exploitation. 
Furthermore, Article 6(6) requires, in respect of new or exploratory fisheries, that states adopt 
"cautious conservation and management measures, including, inter alia, catch limits and effort 
limits. Such measures shall remain in force until there are sufficient data to allow assessment of 
the impact of the fisheries on the long-term sustainability of the stocks, whereupon conservation 
and management measures based on that assessment shall be implemented. The latter measures 
shall, if appropriate, allow for the gradual development of the fisheries." Ostensibly, if these 
requirements could be applied to krill, the "cautious conservation and management measures" 
required until sufficient data is obtained would require either low precautionary catch limits or 
no-take zones, particularly in light of the extreme uncertainty surrounding krill population levels. 
Although, it is questionable whether krill fishery would constitute a "new" fishery given that it 
has been in place for decades, it may still constitute an "exploratory" fishery since it has never 
reached extremely high levels and cost pressures have previously been a disincentive for large 
numbers of fishers to enter this fishery. 
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The fact that the Fish Stocks Agreement also applies to other fishing nations whose vessels fish 
on the high seas587 means that these general principles could provide significant impetus to krill 
conservation (particularly because of the problems of IUU fishing plaguing regional fisheries 
organisations like CCAMLR on the high seas).588 The general principles of protecting marine 
biodiversity and eliminating overfishing are also supported by the Fish Stocks Agreement.589 
The Fish Stocks Agreement outlines strategies to ensure the compatibility of conservation and 
management measures.590 The provisions of the Agreement make it a requirement that 
conservation and management measures are compatible.591 There is no scope to merely 
cooperate and then not introduce consistent measures. Conservation measures must be 
compatible. As discussed, this is important if such measures are to be effective. A number of 
587 Article 1(3), The United Nations Agreement on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Species 
1995 
588 Article 5 also contains a number of other general principles that may be relevant to krill. Article 5(f) 
requires states to minimise catch of non-target species and impacts on associated or dependent species, in 
particular endangered species. As previously discussed, it is unclear whether a problem exists with by-
catch of juvenile fish during krill harvesting. However, the precautionary approach (required by Article 6 
of the Fish Stocks Agreement) would advocate measures being introduced even if there is a lack of 
scientific data. This may require the adoption of some of the possible solutions that have previously been 
discussed such as targeting only krill swarms of high density (where it is less likely that juvenile fish will 
be swimming) or avoiding areas where juvenile fish are likely to be caught. 
589 The Fish Stocks Agreement also gives some support to marine biodiversity. The preamble states that 
parties are "conscious" of the need to preserve biodiversity and maintain the integrity of marine 
ecosystems. The general principles of Article 5 also require states to protect biodiversity in the marine 
environment and maintain the integrity of marine ecosystems. Protecting krill, as a vital species in the 
ecosystem, may also help to maintain biodiversity within the Antarctic ecosystem. Finally, the general 
principles of Article 5(h) require states to take measures to prevent or eliminate overfishing (This provision 
also mentions "excess fishing capacity", a concept which will be discussed fully later in this thesis). 
Although this principle (and the other principles that have been discussed above) is very general and does 
not specify how overfishing and other problems are to be eliminated, the Agreement does go into much 
greater detail in latter provisions. This greater level of detail considerably strengthens the conservation 
and sustainable use objectives of the 1982 Convention. 
590 Article 7 of the Agreement outlines strategies to ensure the compatibility of conservation and 
management measure. Article 7(1)(b) says that, for highly migratory stocks, relevant coastal states and 
other states whose nationals fish for such stocks in the region "shall" cooperate with a view to ensuring 
conservation and promoting the objective of optimum utilisation of such stocks throughout the region 
within and beyond national jurisdiction. The provision is potentially applicable to krill if they are a highly 
migratory species. Cooperation is necessary to ensure that consistent conservation measures are 
introduced. If inconsistent strategies were used to manage krill and other stocks, then such measures 
would be less likely to be effective. Cooperation is particularly important between states whose vessels 
fish on Antarctic high seas and nations that may have claims to potential EEZs around Antarctica and 
declared EEZs around sub-Antarctic islands such as South Georgia. Use of the word "shall" shows that 
there is a clear requirement to cooperate in ensuring conservation, although there is no requirement to 
actually reach agreement. The provision is similar to the requirements of Article 64 of the 1982 
Convention. The provision does not actually require states to cooperate to ensure optimum utilisation, 
there is merely a requirement to cooperate with a view to "promoting" such utilisation. Optimum 
utilisation of krill is not an essential requirement of this provision, however, Article 7(1) does state that the 
provision is "without prejudice" to the right of all states for their nationals to engage in high seas fishing. 
Despite the requirement to cooperate to conserve species, they still have a right to exploit krill even though 
complete krill protection may advance the conservation of other species. 
591 The Agreement, in Article 7(2), reiterates this duty of cooperation between coastal and high seas fishing 
states to achieve compatible conservation and management measures for highly migratory stocks. 
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factors must be considered when formulating compatible measures. States are required to take 
into account conservation and management measures adopted by coastal states in areas of 
national jurisdiction in respect of the same stocks and to ensure that measures introduced on the 
high seas do not undermine the effectiveness of the coastal state measures. 592 States are also 
required to take into account previously agreed measures applied on the high seas by relevant 
coastal states and high seas fishing states. 593 Finally, states are required tq take into account 
measures established by regional fisheries management organisations. 594 
All of these provisions give support to the precautionary catch limits that CCAMLR has already 
introduced for krill. These fisheries management organisation measures have already been 
applied by coastal states (in sub-Antarctic islands) and on the high seas. States are only required 
to take such regional organisation measures into account when formulating compatible measures, 
however, there is a requirement that compatible high seas measures not undermine the 
effectiveness of coastal state measures. This means that any measures introduced on the high 
seas cannot undermine CCAMLR's measures that have been applied by coastal states such as 
around krill fishing grounds of South Georgia. This provision gives a greater legal scope for 
protecting krill on the high seas. High seas measures that allowed a much greater level of krill 
exploitation than the CCAMLR measures (as introduced by coastal states of sub-Antarctic 
islands) would undermine the effectiveness of those CCAMLR measures. Therefore, greater 
krill protection would be facilitated by the requirement not to undermine CCAMLR measures as 
they have been applied by coastal states. However, even if these provisions provide the 
necessary legal justification for CCAMLR conservation measures to have a binding effect on 
third parties on the high seas, greater protection in the form of a complete harvesting ban must be 
introduced. Furthermore, even with legal obligations that bind third parties, there must still be 
effective enforcement mechanisms in place to adequately regulate kri11.595 
592 Article 7(2)(a), The United Nations Agreement on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Species 
1995 
593 Article 7(2)(b), The United Nations Agreement on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Species 
1995 
594 Article 7(2)(c), The United Nations Agreement on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Species 
1995 
595 Enforcement mechanisms are discussed in a later Chapter of this thesis. 
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When determining compatible measures, states are also required to take into account a number of 
factors that relate to species interdependence including biological relationships and 
characteristics.596 Krill fishing, as discussed, is only possible on a year round basis in the waters 
surrounding South Georgia. Furthermore, krill population size may be affected by the extent of 
sea ice so that they are more prevalent near the boundary of sea ice and the open ocean.597 Any 
compatible measures that are introduced need to specifically consider the fact that krill fishing is 
conducted in specific areas and these measures should be adjusted to take into account 
distribution and other environmental factors. Compatible measures are also required to take into 
account the dependence offishing states on the stocks concemed.598 
A comprehensive krill fishing ban is, arguably, not sanctioned by this provision because of the 
dependence of some fishing vessels on krill harvesting and the dependence of some fishing states 
on krill products and markets. The currently low levels of krill fishing imply that this 
dependence is only minimal, however, this still needs to be considered when formulating 
measures. There is also a need to ensure that the measures do not result in a harmful impact on 
living marine resources as a whole.599 The vital role played by krill in the Antarctic ecosystem 
means that a high level of krill exploitation would not be sanctioned by this provision because of 
the detrimental effect on living marine resources as a whole. 
The cooperation between states to introduce consistent conservation and management measures 
will be to no avail if such measures are not introduced in a timely manner. Conservation 
measures need to be implemented quickly and changed quickly, if the need arises, so that marine 
species are not subjected to any more harm than is necessary. The Fish Stocks Agreement 
requires states to formulate compatible measures within a reasonable period of time. 600 Even if 
596 Article 7(2)(d) requires states to take into account biological unity and other biological characteristics 
of the stocks and the relationships between the distribution of the stocks, the fisheries and the geographical 
particularities of the region concerned. This provision may require states to look at the unique 
characteristics ofboth Antarctica and krill. 
597 These factors have been discussed in detail in Chapter 1. 
598 Article 7(1)(e), The United Nations Agreement on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Species 
1995 
599 Article 7(1)(e) and (f), The United Nations Agreement on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory 
Species 1995 
600 To that end, Article 7(3) requires states to agree on compatible measures within a reasonable period of 
time. Such a provision is necessary to avoid lengthy and drawn out negotiations that could allow potential 
harm to occur to krill and other species, although what constitutes a "reasonable period of time" is not 
defined which leaves the provision with some scope for manipulation. 
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parties cannot reach agreement within the allotted time, the Agreement allows them to use its 
dispute settlement procedures to effect a speedy resolution. 601 
Furthermore, there is some scope for interim protection for fish stocks before agreement is 
reached between states.602 Any provisional measures introduced by states are required to have 
regard to the rights and obligations of all states.603 Additionally, they must not jeopardise or 
hamper the reaching of a final agreement on compatible conservation and management measures 
and must not prejudice the settlement of any dispute. 604 These requirements mean that states can 
freely enter into provisional arrangements without fear that those measures will become 
permanent. States would be unlikely to enter into provisional arrangements if those 
arrangements were irreversible and overrode their rights. This is important because it gives krill 
and other species interim protection while agreement is being reached on compatible 
conservation measures, without compromising the rights of states who are negotiating over those 
measures. 
The provision on compatibility of measures also advocates a policy of openness between states. 
Coastal states are required to regularly inform high seas fishing states of measures they have 
adopted for highly migratory species within areas of national jurisdiction. 605 These provisions 
also help to ensure that states are complying with compatible conservation and management 
measures that have been negotiated between states.606 The provisions concerning cooperation 
between states are necessary to ensure that parties reach agreement quickly over conservation 
601 Article 7(4), The United Nations Agreement on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Species 
1995 
602 Article 7(5) also requires states, pending agreement, "to make every effort to enter into provisional 
arrangements of a practical nature". This section gives krill and other species some interim protection 
whilst agreement is being reached. This requirement may prevent species being detrimentally harmed by a 
lack of compatible measures. "Arrangements of a practical nature" are not defined, leaving states with 
some discretion but, arguably, a "practical nature" could be interpreted as concrete, practical measures that 
are going to give practical effect to the conservation and sustainable use objectives of the Fish Stocks 
Agreement. The provision only requires states to "make every effort" to implement such provisional 
arrangements potentially weakening its effect but, if they cannot agree on these arrangements, then 
provisional measures can be granted by a court or tribunal under the Agreement's dispute settlement 
procedures. This provision prevents states that are unable to agree being locked in a stalemate, which 
would only cause further harm to stocks that were to be the subject of the compatible measures. 
603 Article 7(6), The United Nations Agreement on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Species 
1995 
604 Ibid 
605 Article 7(7), The United Nations Agreement on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Species 
1995 
606 High seas fishing states, on the other hand, are required to regularly inform other "interested" states of 
measures they have adopted to regulate the activities of flag vessels fishing for highly migratory species on 
the high seas (Article 7(8), The United Nations Agreement on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly 
Migratory Species 199 5). Both of these provisions can ensure greater compatibility of conservation and 
management measures because, if states are consistently informed of the measures other nations have 
introduced, then they can make adjustments to their own measures to ensure compatibility. 
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measures so that harm is not done to krill and other species while negotiations are taking place.607 
Cooperation is necessary concerning krill and other Southern Ocean species because of the 
problem with non-parties to CCAMLR not observing its conservation measures. 
The Fish Stocks Agreement also focuses on the use of regional fisheries organisations to 
conserve and manage highly migratory species.608 If krill came within the scope of the 
Agreement then CCAMLR conservation measures may apply to all parties to the Agreement 
provided that CCAMLR is "competent" to establish relevant conservation measures. As an 
established fisheries regime in Antarctica it would appear to be competent, however, as a 
subsidiary regime of the Antarctic Treaty system it may, arguably, not be competent because of 
non-recognition of some states of that Treaty system. The inclusion of CCAMLR as part of the 
Fish Stocks Agreement would permit it to be enforced against a much wider range of countries 
that are parties to the Fish Stocks Agreement. 
The Fish Stocks Agreement only allows access to fishery resources to those states that are 
members of the relevant regional fisheries organisation or those states that have agreed to apply 
its conservation and management measures.609 This is an extremely significant provision 
because it denies states access to highly migratory stocks (which could potentially include krill) 
607 The duty of cooperation between states is outlined in much greater detail in Article 8. Article 8(1) 
requires parties to "pursue cooperation" in managing straddling and highly migratory stocks either directly 
or through "appropriate" regional fisheries management organisations, taking into account the specific 
characteristics of the region to ensure effective conservation and management. Cooperation concerning 
krill (if they are highly migratory species) could be carried out through CCAMLR which, as the main 
organisation managing Antarctic marine species, is arguably an "appropriate" organisation. The 
Agreement also requires states to enter into consultations in "good faith and without delay", especially 
where evidence exists of a threat of exploitation or a new fishery is being developed (Article 8(2) As 
discussed, krill are a relatively new fishery and scope exists for a significant expansion of the current 
fishery. Parties would, therefore, be required to negotiate in good faith and without delay if krill are a 
highly migratory species (Article 8(2). Any interested state can initiate consultations with a view to 
establishing appropriate arrangements to ensure conservation and management of the stocks (Article 8(2). 
While consultations are taking place, Article 8(2) also gives protection to states and highly migratory 
stocks by requiring them to observe the provisions of the Agreement and to act in good faith with regard to 
the rights of other states. 
608 Article 8 of the Fish Stocks Agreement also focuses heavily on the use of regional fisheries 
organisations to conserve and manage highly migratory species. Article 8(3) requires high seas fishing 
states and relevant coastal states (in order to give effect to their duty to cooperate) to become members of 
or participants in, or to apply the conservation measures of, regional fishing organisations where such 
organisations have the competence to establish conservation and management measures for straddling and 
highly migratory stocks. 
609 Section 8 also permits states with a "real interest" in the relevant fisheries to become members of, or 
participants in, the organisation. There is also a requirement that the organisation not preclude these states 
from becoming members or participants and that the organisation not discriminate against any of these 
states (Article 8(3). CCAMLR must therefore allow all states with a "real interest" in krill fisheries 
(arguably states must have some involvement in that industry) to become members or participants and 
must not discriminate in any way against those states. Furthermore, Article 8(4) requires that only states 
that are members or participants in these regional fisheries organisations, or which agree to apply their 
conservation and management measures, shall have access to the fishery resources to which the measures 
apply. 
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unless they are members of, or apply the conservation measures of, regional organisations such 
as CCAMLR. This is a major limitation on the traditional high seas fishing rights of states. 
States would not be permitted by the Fish Stocks Agreement to harvest krill unless they applied 
CCAMLR precautionary catch limits. However, there will still be difficulties in enforcing such a 
measure. 
The duty to cooperate through regional fisheries management organisations is also accompanied 
by a number of obligations placed on states. States are required to agree on and comply with 
conservation and management measures to ensure the long-term sustainability of highly 
migratory stocks. 610 This provision is necessary to ensure that states do actually comply with 
conservation measures of organisations like CCAMLR. However, the provision says that states 
are required to comply with such measures "to ensure the long-term sustainability of highly 
migratory stocks". It could be argued that, if a CCAMLR measure concerning krill was not 
likely to ensure long-term sustainability, then states may not be required to comply with it. 
States are also obliged to agree "as appropriate" on participatory rights such as allocations of 
allowable catch or levels of fishing effort. 611 CCAMLR does not contain provisions that permit 
an allocation of allowable catch or levels of fishing effort. 612 Therefore, states with larger fishing 
fleets can catch the greatest proportion of CCAMLR's precautionary catch limits. This section 
of the Fish Stocks Agreement arguably requires CCAMLR (if it is to act as a competent regional 
fisheries organisation within the scope of the Agreement) to rethink its approach to national catch 
allocations and allowable levels of fishing effort. 613 States are only obliged to agree "as 
appropriate" on such rights and, because these rights are not contemplated in CCAMLR, it is not 
"appropriate" for states to agree on them under the CCAMLR system. 614 The current CCAMLR 
610 Article 10(a), The United Nations Agreement on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Species 
1995 
611 Article 1 O(b ), The United Nations Agreement on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Species 
1995 
612 Catch allocation and excess fishing capacity will be discussed in greater detail later in this thesis. 
613 The Fish Stocks Agreement also contains other requirements that are designed to ensure that regional 
fisheries organisations are able to manage highly migratory species in an efficient manner. Article lO(i) 
emphasises the rights of new members of organisations like CCAMLR by requiring states to agree on 
means by which their fishing interests can be accommodated. This may require CCAMLR to make some 
adjustments to its precautionary catch limits or even require it to introduce national catch allocation so that 
the interests of new members are accommodated. However, such accommodations would, arguably, only 
be necessary if they did not threaten the long-term sustainability of a straddling or highly migratory stock 
(if they did pose such a threat, then this would be inconsistent with the main objective of the Fish Stocks 
Agreement). 
614 There is also a need for states to agree on decision-making procedures that will facilitate the adoption of 
conservation and management measures "in a timely and effective manner". The problem with 
CCAMLR's decision making procedures, as discussed, is that they require consensus. Such a requirement 
can potentially result in a lengthy process of decision making. CCAMLR may have to look at mechanisms 
to speed up its decision making process if it is to act as a competent regional organisation under the Fish 
Stocks Agreement so that it can comply with the need to adopt measures in a timely and effective manner. 
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system should strengthened to provide more effective protection to krill and its dependent 
species. 
Even if non-parties to CCAMLR become members or participants, or agree to apply its 
measures, there is still a need for those states to actually implement their obligations.615 If states 
force their own government departments and fisheries bodies to cooperate with organisations 
such as CCAMLR, there is a greater likelihood that those bodies will work towards 
implementing CCAMLR's measures. The Fish Stocks Agreement also requires states to give 
"due publicity" to the measures of organisations such as CCAMLR. Greater publicity means that 
fishing vessels will have a greater awareness of their obligations and makes it more likely that 
those measures will be observed. 616 Vessels must be made aware of a comprehensive ban so 
there is a greater likelihood of observance. 
The Fish Stocks Agreement requires the existing level of fishing effort in respect of a particular 
stock to be considered when determining the nature and extent of participatory rights for new 
members of a regional fisheries management organisation.617 Presumably, if current fishing 
levels are low and the stock is not endangered, then new members would have greater 
participatory rights. Currently krill harvesting is at low levels (in comparison to the actual level 
of CCAMLR's precautionary catch limits) and this will allow greater participatory rights for any 
new krill harvesting nations that join CCAMLR. CCAMLR does not currently allocate fishing 
rights to particular states. 
States must also take into account the interests, fishing patterns, and practices of current and new 
members. 618 Currently, krill harvesting occurs in many localised areas, such as around South 
Georgia.619 New members of CCAMLR would therefore (if CCAMLR introduced participatory 
rights) be unlikely to gain many participatory rights in such areas because of the current 
concentration of krill fishing in those localised zones. Another factor to be considered is the 
615 Article 10(1) requires states to "ensure the full cooperation of their relevant national agencies and 
industries in implementing the recommendations and decisions of the organisation". 
616 Article 10 also contains a requirement to "adopt and apply any generally recommended international 
minimum standards for the responsible conduct of fishing operations" (Article 1 0( c). Arguably, the F AO 
Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, although voluntary, is a generally recommended standard that 
comes within the ambit of this provision. Requiring parties to the Fish Stocks Agreement to adopt and 
apply the Code would give krill much greater protection from the Code's detailed consideration of the 
actions needed to ensure responsible fisheries. 
617 Article ll(a), The United Nations Agreement on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Species 
1995 
618 Article 1l(b), The United Nations Agreement on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Species 
1995 
619 Localised krill fishing and the areas where krill harvesting is greatest have been discussed in Chapter 1. 
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contribution of new and existing members to conservation and management of the stocks.620 
Each existing member state would need to be examined to determine how effectively they had 
implemented the conservation and management measures of CCAMLR and such decis_ions 
would need to be made in a transparent manner.621 
The UN Fish Stocks Agreement's focus on regional organisations will also enhance the 
effectiveness of such organisations in conserving species such as krill. CCAMLR can only 
enforce its measures against Member states on the high seas and this has left non-parties free to 
act inconsistently with CCAMLR conservation measures. CCAMLR would be a much more 
effective management regime if it had power to enforce conservation measures against non-
member states. Management measures must bind all states if they are to be effective and this is 
particularly important for any comprehensive krill fishing ban that is introduced. If states ignore 
CCAMLR measures then species like krill receive less protection because the management 
regime is less effective. Requiring parties to the Fish Stocks Agreement to deter non-party 
vessels from activities that undermine the Agreement's effective implementation is a major step 
towards achieving non-party compliance and reducing the problem ofiUU fishing. 622 One way 
620 Article ll(c), The United Nations Agreement on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Species 
1995 
621 The Fish Stocks Agreement has several measures designed to ensure that regional fisheries 
organisations conduct their activities in a transparent manner. 
Article 12(1) requires states to provide for transparency in the decision-making process and other activities 
of such regional organisations. One area of CCAMLR' s decision making that may lack transparency is the 
right of any Member to call for a vote by secret ballot (Rule 5, Rules of Procedure of the Commission, 
adopted at CCAMLR conference I in paragraph 13). Keeping the votes secret may prevent states being 
held accountable to the world community and political pressure for their position on a particular issue. 
Article 12(2) also requires representatives from intergovernmental organisations and non-governmental 
organisations concerned with highly migratory stocks to be given the opportunity to take part in the 
meetings of regional organisations as observers or otherwise as appropriate, subject to the procedures of 
the organisation. CCAMLR currently conforms to this requirement by allowing the Commission to invite 
these organisations to attend as observers, as appropriate, so long as no Member objects (Rule 30(e), R'ules 
ofProcedure of the Commission, adopted at the first Meeting ofCCAMLR in paragraph 13). Observers 
can attend both public and private sessions of the Commission, (Rule 32(a), Rules of Procedure of the 
Commission, adopted at the first Meeting ofCCAMLR in paragraph 13) which increases the transparency 
of the organisation. These NGOs are also to be permitted timely access to the regional organisation's 
records and reports, subject to procedural rules on access (Article 12(2). CCAMLR itself does not mention 
access to records or reports. CCAMLR's procedural rules do allow the transmission of reports of 
CCAMLR meetings to organisations that have been present as observers (Rule 3 7, Rules of Procedure of 
the Commission, adopted at the first Meeting ofCCAMLR in paragraph 13). CCAMLR's procedural rules 
also allow all Members free access to data (Data could potentially come with the term "record".), but its 
rules of access do not mention non-governmental organisations (Rule (a), Rules for Access and Use of 
CCAMLR Data, adopted at the eleventh Meeting of CCAMLR in paragraph 4.35). A change may have to 
be made if CCAMLR is to comply with this requirement. 
622 The Fish Stocks Agreement also contains a number of provisions that relate to its legal status. Article 
33(1) requires parties to the Agreement to "encourage" non-parties to become parties and adopt legislation 
consistent with its provisions. Merely "encouraging" non-parties to join is unlikely to have much effect, 
however, this provision also contains much stronger procedures aimed at gaining the compliance of non-
parties. State parties are required to take measures consistent with the Fish Stocks Agreement and 
international law to deter the activities of non-party flag vessels that undermine the effective 
implementation of the Agreement The enforcement of the Fish Stocks Agreement against non-parties and 
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in which the effectiveness of CCAMLR could be improved is if pressure was placed on more 
non-parties to accede to the Convention. As previously discussed, several recent UN General 
Assembly resolutions have placed political pressure on states to accede to and implement the UN 
Law of the Sea Convention. Although CCAMLR is not a UN agreement, the General Assembly 
could still place p'ressure on states to join by passing similar resolutions in respect of CCAMLR. 
As discussed above, it is not certain that the Agreement actually applies to krill. This would 
prevent krill from receiving the much greater protection offered by the Agreement in relation to 
high seas fishing than the Law of the Sea Convention provides.623 Greater clarity could be 
sought by the CCAMLR Commission itself from the UN on the applicability of the Fish Stocks 
Agreement to krill. 
High Seas Fishing and the Law of the Sea Convention 
If claims over the adjacent sea are not recognised, then Antarctica's continental shelf and its seas 
could be perceived as beyond any national jurisdiction. 624 Actual practice can also support an 
argument that all oceanic areas surrounding Antarctica are high seas.625 Even if coastal States do 
exist, a large proportion of the Southern Ocean would still be high seas. Non-parties to 
issues of consenting to treaties shall be discusseJ in greater detail in both Chapters 3 and 4. General 
compliance and enforcement procedures and flag states duties under the Agreement will be discussed in 
Chapter 4 in relation to IUU fishing). This provision is extremely significant because it attempts to 
ameliorate one of the major problems that regimes like CCAMLR have had in enforcing their measures. 
623 The Fish Stocks Agreement, as discussed, contains many detailed provisions that improve on the 
generality of the Law of the Sea Convention. Article 10, for example, contains general requirements to 
compile statistical data and conduct scientific research on stocks. Annex 1 then expands on these 
requirements for data collection and sharing by, for example, outlining the types of fisheries and vessel 
data required (Annex 1, Articles 3 and 4). The added specificity in the Fish Stocks Agreement increases 
the effectiveness and reduces the flexibility in interpreting the general provisions of the Law of the Sea 
Convention in relation to straddling fish stocks and highly migratory species. These more detailed 
provisions may, in the future, contribute to a greater protection of such species on the high seas. Specific 
high seas obligations place a much greater restraint on the high seas fishing freedom than the general 
provisions in the Law of the Sea Convention. If krill are included in the agreement, it may strengthen any 
protection they receive under CCAMLR and the Law of the Sea Convention. If krill do not come within 
the definition of "highly migratory species" then amendment of the Agreement may be possible. The 
Agreement contains an amendment procedure under Article 45 which allows amendments by proposing 
amendments and requesting a conference to the UN Secretary General (Article 45(1). If at least half the 
parties agree, a conference can be held to consider the pl,"oposed amendments. The amendment conference 
should "make every effort" to reach agreement by consensus and no voting on the amendments should take 
place until the efforts to reach a consensus have been exhausted (Article 45(2). Such an amendment 
mechanism could provide the means to include krill under "highly migratory" species so that they receive 
protection on the high seas from the Fish Stocks Agreement. 
624 1985. Antarctic Resource Jurisdiction and the Law ofthe Sea: A Question of Compromise. Brooklyn 
Journal of International Law, Vol XI(l): 45-78 at 69 
625 Vicuna, F.O. Supra, fn 515,244 
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CCAMLR can still fish on the high seas and this would mean that they could freely exploit 
kri11.626 However, if they are party to the 1982 Convention they are bound by its provisions. 
The Law of the Sea Convention does provide for high seas fishing freedom, but it contains 
conservation provisions that constrain this freedom. Although Article 87 of the 1982 Convention 
does provide for freedom of fishing on the high seas, it makes that freedom subject to several 
constraints. States have a duty under Article 117 to take or cooperate with other states in taking 
conservation measures concerning their nationals on the high seas. States must also, under 
Article 118, cooperate in the conservation and management of marine living resources on the 
high seas. The introduction of any conservation must involve a consideration of the 
interdependence of stocks (Article 119). These provisions place an obligation on parties to the 
Law of the Sea Convention to introduce measures to conserve the Antarctic krill. Furthermore, 
the requirement in the Convention to consider the interdependence of stocks means that such 
states should consider a total fishing ban bec~use of krill's vital role in the ecosystem. 
This thesis submits that protecting krill on the high seas in Antarctica is necessary for fishing 
nations to fulfil their obligation of conserving other fish stocks. The obligation in these 
provisions is merely to "cooperate" with states on high seas fishing rather than reaching 
agreement, giving the sections limited force. The duties are also extremely general. However, 
there are no detailed provisions outlining how conservation on the high seas is to be achieved and 
there is little in the way of detailed laws governing fishing on the high seas.627 Other krill 
dependent stocks that are currently exploited on the Antarctic high seas would be more easily 
conserved if krill were given the protection of a comprehensive harvesting ban by fishing nations 
who were also parties to the Law of the Sea Convention. The General Assembly's recent 
resolution provides an opportunity for states to push towards strengthening current legal 
agreements such as the Convention so that krill and other species receive better protection. A 
later Chapter of this thesis will also consider improved enforcement techniques that could aid in 
protecting Antarctic species from IUU fishing. During a recent 2005 UN Consultative 
626 This is, of course, assuming that krill are not highly migratory species that receive high seas protection 
under the Fish Stocks Agreement. 
627 Anton, D.K. Supra, fu 330, 363 
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Process,628 delegations from some states expressed support for a network of high seas protected 
areas as proposed by the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation which was drafted at the World 
Summit for Sustainable Development in 2002.629 Other delegations responded by highlighting 
that marine protection zones could restrict high seas freedoms and so their introduction should be 
subject to state consent.630 This once again illustrates the difficulties with controlling the fishing 
activities of some states in high seas areas such as in the Southern Ocean. 
The UN Fish Stocks Agreement contains further provisions concerning the high seas fishing 
freedom recognised by the Law of the Sea Convention. In Rarticular, Article 7 places a duty on 
states to cooperate with a view to conservation and optimum utilisation of highly migratory 
species on the high seas. Furthermore, coastal states and states fishing on the high seas have a 
duty to cooperate to ensure compatibility of conservation measures on the high seas. If 
agreement cannot be reached then the dispute settlement procedures of the Fish Stocks 
Agreement apply in order that agreement can be reached. Provisional measures are also required 
in the respect of the high seas before agreement is met. However, these duties are detracted from 
somewhat, because the opening paragraph of Article 7 makes the duties "without prejudice" to 
the right for all states for their nationals to engage in fishing on the high seas. 
The duties to cooperate are expanded upon in Article 8 of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement. In 
particular, a duty to cooperate in respect of areas where specific regional management regimes 
exist to ensure conservation and effective management of straddling stocks and highly and 
migratory species in respect of such areas, including on the high seas. Furthermore, the Article 
goes on to require states to enter into consultations, particularly where there is evidence of highly 
migratory or straddling stocks being under threat of potential overexploitation or where a new 
fishery is being developed for such stocks. If krill could come within highly migratory stocks, 
then as discussed above, it is still questionable whether krill fishery is a "new" fishery, 
particularly because it has existed for several decades. Accordingly, these duties may not be 
applicable in respect of krill. 
CCAMLR 
628 Report on the work of the United Nations Open-ended Informal Consultative Process on Oceans and the 
Law of the Sea at its sixth meeting, A/60/99, 2005 
629 The World Summit is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
630 Paragraph 44, Report on the work of the United Nations Open-ended Informal Consultative Process on 
Oceans and the Law of the Sea at its sixth meeting, A/60/99, 2005 
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The Law of the Sea Convention and possible EEZs in Antarctica resulting from it will create 
problems for parties to CCAMLR. Article IV of CCAMLR upholds the approach in Article IV 
of. the Antarctic Treaty. However, there was some recognition of state sovereignty in Antarctica 
in CCAMLR. The Chairman's statement, which was included in the final act to formulate 
CCAMLR, was intended to show how CCAMLR applied to the Kerguelen and Crozet Islands 
and other islands whose sovereignty was recognised by all contracting parties. 631 France can 
apply stricter conservation measures than those advocated by CCAMLR in these waters. France 
can also accept or reject any system of observation and inspection chosen by the Convention.632 
A distinction between the Convention's application north and south of 60 degrees could have 
been made to accommodate the recognition of island sovereignty. 633 However, these states did 
not want such a regime because it may have implied that limited sovereignty existed south of 60 
degrees. 634 The express recognition of sovereignty over such islands and the ability to apply 
stricter conservation measures means that an EEZ around such islands may not be in conflict 
with CCAMLR's recognition of Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty. EEZs give complete 
sovereignty over living resources to the coastal state and CCAMLR's recognition of sovereignty 
for particular islands could permit an EEZ to exist around them without breaching CCAMLR. 
Such EEZs are necessary because of the protection that they can provide to krill existing within. 
Coastal states can enforce conservation measures within EEZs, such as a krill fishing ban, thus 
alleviating the problem of non-party compliance in these zones. 
Difficulties arise as to whether EEZs can be declared in other areas to which CCAMLR applies. 
CCAMLR does not provide a definitive answer as to whether a declaration of such zones is valid 
under the Treaty system. 635 Article IV of CCAMLR freezes claims to territorial sovereignty and 
"to any right or claim or basis of claim to exercise coastal state jurisdiction". "Coastal state 
jurisdiction" could either mean jurisdiction around the entire coast of mainland Antarctica or it 
could relate only to jurisdiction over islands ofundisp~ted sovereignty. 636 The ambiguity of the 
term makes it difficult to determine the effect of CCAMLR on territorial claims. 637 Article IV of 
CCAMLR, unlike the Antarctic Treaty's Article IV, also contains a specific reference to 
maritime jurisdiction. 638 When Chile ratified the Convention, its ratification contained a 
reservation that the Convention did not affect the rights of Contracting Parties with respect to 
631 VanDer Essen, A. Supra, fn 536, 240 
632 Ibid 
633 Ibid 
634 Ibid 
635 Conforti, B. Supra, fu 515, 250 
636 Ibid, 251 
637 Ibid 
638 Vicuna, F.O. Supra, fu 515, 245 
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maritime jurisdiction or to legal positions proclaimed concerning maritime jurisdiction.639 
However, other claimant states do not have such protection so the effect of CCAMLR on their 
Antarctic sovereignty is unclear. 
The EEZ provision embodied in the 1982 Convention can also be seen as similar to the ideas of 
cooperative rational utilisation of living resources as embodied in CCAMLR. 640 The EEZ, 
arguably, therefore already has application in Antarctica through the Convention's management 
regime. 641 The Convention's area is also larger than the area that would be encompassed in a 
normal EEZ. 642 However, unlike EEZs, CCAMLR can only be enforced against parties to the 
Convention. An EEZ would offer greater protection to krill because it could be enforced against 
all vessels. Coastal states can therefore enforce a krill fishing ban within the confines of the 
EEZ. 
VI. Biological Diversity 
Biological diversity relates to the variability of species and their ecosystems.643 Biological 
diversity is a concept of maintaining differentiation between species and the prevention the 
destruction of different species. 644 Biodiversity is necessary for nature to adapt to changes in the 
environment. 645 When particular circumstances cause species to decline heavily in number, 
biodiversity can help species to adapt to such changes. 646 Biodiversity refers to three different 
types of variability: genetic variability between separate populations of species; variability 
between different types of species and the maintenance of different types of world ecosystems.647 
639 Ibid 246 
640 Ibid, 
641 Ibid 
642 Ibid 
643 Hubbard, A. 1997. The Convention on Biological Diversity's Fifth Anniversary: A General Overview 
of the Convention- Where Has it Been and Where is it Going? Tulane Environmental Law Journal, Vol 
10: 415-446 at 416 
644 Ibid, 417 
645 Tinker, C. Supra, fn 332, 200 
646 Bodansky, D.M. Supra, fn 331 
647 Anton, D.K. Supra, fn 330, 345 
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In relation to krill, if there are localised populations of krill then krill harvesting in localised 
areas can threaten the genetic biodiversity of the whole krill population. Localised krill fishing 
can also threaten the genetic biodiversity of localised predator populations. A likely expansion 
in krill fishing industry will threaten some krill dependent species. Such an outcome would 
threa'ten species biodiversity within the Antarctic marine environment. Any threat to krill would 
also threaten ecosystem variability. The Antarctic marine ecosystem is a unique ecosystem and, 
because krill forms the base of that ecosystem, they are vital for its survival. Accordingly, due to 
the scientific uncertainty concerning the impact of krill fishing on biological diversity, the 
precautionary approach would justify a krill fishing moratorium being introduced. 
The benefits of biological diversity are often seen in economic terms. Maintaining biodiversity 
helps to keep valuable genetic information that could be used in the future in the pharmaceutical 
or agriculture industries. 648 As discussed previously, the strong enzymes in krill can provide 
pharmaceutical companies with a host of new products. For example, as previously discussed in 
Chapter 1, the 2005 patent that was lodged for an osteoporosis treatment using krill by-products. 
Such treatments would inevitably be an economic incentive to preserve potential genetic 
biodiversity among krill. However, there is an intrinsic, as well as an economic, value of 
biodiversity. Biological diversity in the marine environment also has a large effect on world 
climate; produces a significant proportion of the world's oxygen; and provides a major food 
source. 
649 As such, biodiversity is something worth conserving for its own sake. 
Intergenerational equity is a principle suggesting that resources must be protected for the benefit 
of future generations.650 This principle supports the preservation of biodiversity because future 
generations will benefit from biodiversity. 651 A comprehensive krill fishing ban is crucial 
because of the security it can provide to the maintenance of biodiversity in the Antarctic. Any 
economic costs from a cessation of krill industry should not be used as a justification for 
avoiding the introduction of a ban, particularly because of the economic benefits a ban could 
provide by helping to preserve krill dependent species whose exploitation can provide greater 
economic returns. 
Migration of species, or species found in common global areas of the high seas, makes 
biodiversity of international concern. 652 The Convention on Biological Diversity was drafted in 
the early 1990s to deal with biodiversity issues. The Convention's objectives are outlined in 
648 Bodansky, D.M. Supra, fu 331, 626 
649 Anton, D.K. Supra, fu 330, 348 
650 Bodansky, D.M. Supra, fu 331, 627 
651 Ibid 628 
652 Ibid' 624 
' 
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Article 1 as the conservation of biological diversity; the sustainable use of its components; and 
the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from using genetic resources. Biological 
diversity is defined in Article 2 of the Convention as "the variability among living organisms 
from all sources including, inter alia, terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems and the 
ecological complexes of which they are part; this includes diversity within species, between 
species and of ecosystems". The Antarctic marine envirpnment comes within the scope of this 
instrument. The Convention, if effective, can therefore provide krill with further protection 
because of krill's vital role in maintaining Antarctic biodiversity. The Convention would also 
appear to provide a justification for a krill fishing moratorium because of the need to maintain 
biological diversity. The precautionary approach would support measures to maintain biological 
diversity of the Antarctic ecosystem even though there is scientific uncertainty as to the effect of 
krill fishing on biological diversity. 
The Convention on Biological Diversity attempts to conserve biodiversity by dealing with the 
concept in a comprehensive manner. 653 Individual countries are required to introduce legislation 
and programs to maintain biodiversity because many of the world's biological resources come 
within the jurisdiction of such nations. 654 The Convention recognises sovereign rights over 
resources to states so that they have an incentive to introduce legislation that supports the 
Convention's goals. 655 
Article 4 of the Convention on Biological Diversity sets out its jurisdictional scope. In 
particular, it applies in the case of "components of biological diversity" within areas of national 
jurisdiction and, in the case of processes and activities (regardless of where their effects occur) 
carried out under its jurisdiction or control, within the area of its national jurisdiction or beyond 
the limits of national jurisdiction. The difference between these two concepts is not outlined in 
the Convention which gives rise to possible ambiguities when interpreting the Convention 
because processes and activities will affect components of biological diversity. 656 The 
Convention refers to "components of biological diversity", however, this concept is not defined. 
"Biological diversity" is however, defined as the variability among living organisms from all 
sources including, inter alia, terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems and the ecological 
complexes of which they are part; this includes diversity within species, between species and of 
ecosystems. Accordingly, as a vital key to the Antarctic ecosystem, krill would be a 
"component" because of its necessity in maintaining the variability of the ecosystem. As such, 
653 Hubbard, A. Supra, fu 677, 419 
654 Ibid 423 
655 Ant~n, D.K. Supra, fu 330, 356. Article 3 and Article 15(1) give states the sovereign right to exploit 
their own resources and Article 4 also gives Contracting Parties jurisdiction over "components of 
biological diversity" within limits of national jurisdiction. 
656 Anton, D.K. Supra, fi1 330, 356 
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krill would be covered by the Convention in areas of national jurisdiction. Furthermore, the 
more detailed provision in Article 9 dealing with conservation outside areas of national 
jurisdiction sets out requirements for states to adopt "measures" for ex-situ conservation of 
components of biological diversity. Accordingly, it would appear the "processes and activities" 
as referred to in respect of ex-situ conservation in Article 4, would include any activities such as 
fishing which could affect the conservation of components of biological diversity. Accordingly, 
krill harvesting should also be covered in respect of ex-situ conservation on the high seas. 
This thesis submits that krill are protected by the Convention in potential or declared Exclusive 
Economic Zones surrounding Antarctica and the sub-Antarctic islands. A krill harvesting ban 
' 
within these zones would be consistent with the Convention's goal of conserving biodiversity. 
An alternative view would be that a krill fishing moratorium would be inconsistent with the 
objective of sustain~ble use of such biodiversity. A krill harvesting ban would not allow the 
sustainable use of the Antarctic krill species for fishing purposes. However, conserving krill 
would still allow sustainable use of krill's genetic biodiversity and any potential pharmaceutical 
benefits from its enzymes (provided such enzymes could be synthetically produced or produced 
using a minimal volume of krill). Furthermore, conserving krill would conserve the biodiversity 
of the whole Antarctic marine ecosystem and allow the sustainable use of krill dependent fish 
stocks. Accordingly, this thesis submits that a krill fishing moratorium would be consistent with 
sustainable use of biodiversity because it helps to sustain species higher up in the tropic levels of 
the food web and so allows sustainable use of this variety of other species. 
Although a krill fishing ban, arguably, comes within the ambit of the Convention, this instrument 
is not an appropriate means of conserving krill. The Convention appears to contain few legally 
binding provisions to achieve its conservation and sustainable use objectives. 657 Many 
proponents of biodiversity were unhappy with the weak conservation duties outlined in the 
Convention. 658 The provisions of the Convention were seen as lacking the substance needed to 
take firm steps to conserve biodiversity. 659 The Convention also supplements previous treaties 
rather than creating a comprehensive new agreement dealing with biodiversity. 660 The 
Convention does deal with more areas of biodiversity than antecedent treaties, however, it does 
not detail any specific areas or species to be protected. 661 The use of such general provisions 
make the Convention extremely weak. The Convention does not contain any detailed provisions 
657 Anton, D.K. Supra, fn 330, 356 
658 Ward, W.R. 1995. Is a United Nations Convention the Most Approp.riate Means to Pursue the Goal of 
Biological Diversity?: Man or Beast: The Convention on Biological Diversity and the Emerging Law of 
Sustainable Development. Vanderbilt Journal ofTransnational Law, Vol28: 823-833 at 827 
659 Ibid 
660 Bodansky, D.M. Supra, fn 331, 630 
661 Ibid 
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or obligations outlining how conservation of biodiversity is to be achieved. Without such 
detailed provisions, states will simply apply a minimalist attitude to implementing the 
Convention's objectives within areas of national jurisdiction, including potential Southern Ocean 
EEZs. The Convention is also extremely ambiguous and that will give rise to different 
interpretations by states in their national legislation. 662 As discussed, the Convention does 
however provide a legal justification for introducing a krill fishing moratorium in the Southern 
Ocean. Although the Convention does lack detail and is ambiguous in some respects, this legal 
justification is its real strength. The enforcement mechanisms under CCAMLR could be used to 
enforce a krill ban, but the Convention could give a ban legal force against a wider range of 
parties. 
Article 6 of the Convention requires Contracting parties to develop national strategies, plans or 
programmes for the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity. 663 However, the 
Convention contains no detailed provisions outlining the scope or requirements of such plans. 
Many states that have signed and ratified the Convention have recognised their duties under it664 , 
although there are no enforcement mechanisms or sanctions that arise for breach of the 
provisions. This shows a willingness by states to fully implement the Convention, despite its 
lack of detailed provisions concerning national strategies. 
The Convention also contains other provisions that, although general in nature, are legally 
binding and provide some protection in areas of national jurisdiction. Article 7 requires parties 
to identify components ofbiological diversity important for its conservation and sustainable use 
and monitor such components. The provision also requires states to identify processes and 
activities which are likely to have a significant adverse impact on the conservation and 
662 Tinker, C. Supra, fu 332, 192 
663 The objectives of the Convention in Article 1 should provide weight to interpretation of other 
provisions (Tinker, C. Supra, fu 332, 204). Strategies required by Article 6 should therefore do their 
upmost to ensure conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity. A provision like Article 5 could 
be criticised because it allows states to determine the adequacy of conservation strategies. 
664 Tinker, C. Supra, fn 332, 203 
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sustainable use of biodiversity and monitor such activities. Parties are, arguably, required to 
monitor krill populations within any potential or declared EEZs because krill's important role in 
the marine ecosystem makes it vital for the conservation of biodiversity in Antarctica. Krill 
fishing, as an activity which is likely to have a significant impact on conservation of biodiversity, 
should also be monitored within these zones. Monitoring of such activities provides information 
·that is necessary to determine what effect krill fishing has on biodiversity. 
There are also a number of provisions in the Convention concerning in-situ conservation. Article 
2 defines in-situ conservation as "the conservation of ecosystems and natural habitats and the 
maintenance and recovery of viable populations of species in their natural surroundings and, in 
the case of domesticated or cultivated species, in the surroundings where they have developed 
their distinctive properties". The Convention provides for the establishment of protected areas to 
conserve biodiversity.665 Arguably, potential Antarctic EEZs could be established as protected 
areas. As previously discussed, Australia has established forrn of marine protected area near 
Heard and Macdonald Islands. Parties to the Convention are also required to regulate and 
manage biological resources that are important for the conservation of biodiversity. 
Article 8(c) requires parties to regulate and manage biological resources that are important for 
the conservation ofbiodiversity. Biological resources are defined in Article 2 as "genetic 
resources, organisms or parts thereof, populations, or any other biotic component of ecosystems 
with actual or potential use or value for humanity". Krill have potential value, both 
pharmaceutically and in food and aquaculture, placing them within the ambit of this requirement 
as a biological resource. Parties are therefore under an obligation to regulate krill, as a biological 
resource important for conserving Antarctic biodiversity, within any potential or declared 
Antarctic EEZs. 
However, the Convention focuses on "biological resources" as economic resources rather than 
resources with an intrinsic value. However, if krill were totally protected then they may not be 
"biological resources" because they could not be processed for economic return, although they 
may still have "actual" or "potential" value for humanity despite not actually being harvested. 
Their "actual" value to humanity may also come from their importance to other harvested species 
or they may have an "intrinsic" value to Antarctica's ecosystem. This is so despite the fact that 
the "sustainable use" objective of the Convention seems to suggest that the Convention has an 
economic focus. The preamble to the Convention does recognise the "intrinsic value of 
biological diversity" and "the importance of biological diversity for evolution and for 
665 Article 8 
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maintaining life sustaining systems of the biosphere". However, within the actual provisions 
themselves there is an extremely strong focus on "sustainable use" and the economic benefits of 
biodiversity, rather than any intrinsic worth of biodiversity. The Convention places minimal 
importance on preserving species such as krill simply for their intrinsic value but they, arguably, 
still have "potential" value even if that value is never exploited. 
Despite this focus on the economic benefits of biodiversity, the protection of ecosystems is still a 
central theme of the Biodiversity Convention. Article 8(d) requires parties to "promote" the 
protection of ecosystems, natural habitats and the maintenance of viable populations of species in 
natural surroundings. The protection of the marine Antarctic ecosystem necessarily depends on 
krill as does the maintenance of many viable populations, such as some of the baleen whales. 
Article 8( d) requires parties to "promote" the protection of ecosystems, natural habitats and the 
maintenance of viable populations of species in natural surroundings. The Convention offers 
some protection to threatened species by requiring parties to rehabilitate degraded ecosystems 
and to "promote" the recovery of threatened species. Article 8(f) requires parties to rehabilitate 
and restore degraded ecosystems and "promote" the recovery of threatened species. Article 8(k) 
also requires parties to develop or maintain necessary legislation for the protection of threatened 
species and populations. A complete fishing ban for the Antarctic kr'ill would allow threatened 
species such as the baleen whales to recover more quickly. However, the provision sii:nply 
requires parties to "promote" the recovery of threatened speCies. Parties can therefore argue that 
allowing some level of krill fishing within EEZs does not conflict with "promoting" this 
recovery, even if it is not achieved in the long term. 
Article 8(i) also requires parties to "endeavour" to provide the conditions needed for 
compatibility between present uses and the conservation of biological diversity and the 
sustainable use of its components. A krill fishing industry is one of the present uses. Krill 
fishing on a moderate scale may be possible without endangering biodiversity and as such, 
compatibility between t~e two goals might be achieved. However, the article merely requires 
parties to "endeavour" to achieve this goal. If it is not possible to have a krill fishing industry 
and conserve biodiversity within EEZs, then parties could still permit krill fishing within the 
EEZ without infringing this article. Given the UN General Assembly's recent focus on 
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strengthening international fish management agreements, politically it may be difficult for states 
to adopt such a stance in the future. 
The conservation provisions of the Biodiversity Convention do suffer from some common flaws. 
Many of the sections are extremely general and provide no detail as to how their goals are to be 
carried out. States can still implement them in good faith according to the spirit of the 
Convention, but specificity would give much greater certainty and strength to the Convention's 
obligations. General provisions provide a level of uncertainty and flexibility in their 
implementation that is not appropriate for conserving marine biodiversity in potential Antarctic 
EEZs. 
All of the subsections in Article 8, when referring to in-situ conservation, also adopt the 
limitation "as far as possible and as appropriate". This further dilutes the strength of Article 8 
and may give weak support to krill and the Antarctic biodiversity that depends on them. Similar 
criticism can be made of Article 10 of the Convention. The provision requires measures to be 
adopted relating to use of biological resources to avoid or minimise adverse impacts on 
biodiversity. Avoidance of adverse impacts on Antarctic biodiversity would necessarily involve 
the adoption of comprehensive protection for krill by states within any potential Antarctic EEZs 
that they may control. However, the provision is still very general and contains no specifics in 
relation to these measures. The provision, similar to article 8, is watered down by the inclusion 
of the phrase "as far as possible and as appropriate". This reduces the strength of any legally 
binding effect the provision may have and thus decreases the Convention's potential protection 
for krill within areas of national jurisdiction. As previously discussed, the Convention can be 
useful in providing a broad legal justification for introducing a krill fishing moratorium. It would 
be up to more specific documents, such as those arising from the FAO's International Plan of 
Action for IUU fishing, to specify how such conservation goals are to be achieved. 
Biological Diversity outside National Jurisdiction 
The Convention for Biological Diversity must also provide security in areas beyond national 
jurisdiction to give krill adequate protection. If valid Exclusive Economic Zones do not exist 
around Antarctica or the sub-Antarctic islands, then many areas of significant krill concentration 
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would not be within any areas of national jurisdiction. Even with valid EEZs, some areas of the 
Southern Ocean would not come within state jurisdiction. There is insufficient protection of 
marine biological diversity at present outside national jurisdiction.666 
The Convention appears to contemplate the governance of biological diversity in areas outside 
national jurisdiction. "Biological diversity" includes "marine and other aquatic ecosystems and 
the ecological complexes of which they are p·art".667 This definition seemingly incorporates all 
marine ecosystems, including high seas areas. However, the rest of the Convention makes little 
mention of the need to protect marine biodiversity in areas that do not come within the 
jurisdiction of any state. 668 There is merely a requirement to cooperate to achieve conservation 
in such areas. 669 The conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity in high seas areas 
in Antarctica receives little protection from this provision. As the bedrock of the Antarctic 
ecosystem, krill are essential for conserving Antarctic biodiversity and hence the sustainable use 
of such biodiversity. The provision provides merely a token obligation to protect high seas 
biodiversity in Antarctica and can give little aid to the conservation of krill. A comprehensive 
krill ban will only prove effective if it is universally applicable to all states in all areas of the 
marine Antarctic. Any international instruments such as the Biodiversity Convention must apply 
to all parties on the high seas if they are to provide adequate protection. 
The Convention also appears to place a different emphasis on areas within and beyond national 
jurisdiction. Article 4(a) of the Convention gives Contracting parties jurisdiction over 
"components of biological diversity" within limits of national jurisdiction. Contracting parties 
have jurisdiction, under Article 4 over "processes and activities, regardless ofwheretheir effects 
occur, carried out under its jurisdiction or control", within the area of national jurisdiction or 
beyond that area. The difference between these two concepts is not outlined in the Convention 
which gives rise to possible ambiguities when interpreting the Convention because processes and 
activities will affect components of biological diversity. 670 
666 Anton, D.K. Supra, fn 330, 343 
667 Article 2, The Convention on Biological Diversity 1992 
668 Anton, D.K. Supra, fn 330, 355 
669 Article 5 requires each Contracting party "as far as possible and as appropriate" to "cooperate" with 
other Contracting parties directly or through competent international organisations in respect of areas 
beyond national jurisdiction for the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity. The 
requirement to simply "cooperate" limits the obligation on states in areas beyond national jurisdiction 
(Anton, D.K. Supra, fn 330, 357). The Conference of the Parties to the Biodiversity Convention is trying 
to further define the "cooperation" obligation (Anton, D.K. Supra, fn 330, 357). However, very little has 
happened since on that front (Anton, D.K. Supra, fn 330, 358). The inclusion of the words "as far as 
possible and as appropriate" further reduces the strength of this provision. 
670 Anton, D.K. Supra, fn 330, 356 
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Law of the Sea and Biodiversity 
The Convention on Biological Diversity, arguably, has limited application on the high seas in 
Antarctica because of the Law of the Sea Convention. The Biodiversity Convention would 
appear to be subordinate to the Law of the Sea Convention in maritime areas. There is some 
recognition of the concept ofbiodiversity in the Law of the Sea Convention.671 The Law of the 
Sea Convention, however, contains the traditional freedom of the high seas. High seas freedoms 
granted by the Law of the Sea Convention can prevent the conservation and sustainable use of 
marine biological diversity. 672 States can assert high seas freedoms to ensure open access to high 
seas marine resources. 673 The Fish Stocks Agreement does recognise a duty on high seas fishing 
states to preserve marine biodiversity, but this is only in relation to straddling stocks and highly 
migratory species.674 The subordination of the Biodiversity Convention to the Law of the Sea 
Convention gives such rights precedence over marine biodiversity, even where the high seas 
freedom could be extremely detrimental to biodiversity. As previously discussed, there are 
conservation obligations placed on Law of the Sea Convention parties on the high seas. 
However, the generality of such obligations limits their effectiveness in maintaining biodiversity 
and does not place a huge restraint on high seas krill fishing in Antarctica. 
There are protective provisions in the Biodiversity Convention that could conflict with the Law 
of the Sea in other respects. Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration on the Human 
Environment (June 16, 1972) recognises that States have a responsibility not to harm territory of 
other states or areas beyond national jurisdiction. 675 This principle has been adopted in Article 3 
671 Article 22(2) requires parties to implement the Convention in relation to the marine environment 
consistently with the rights and obligations of states under the Law of the Sea. This provision effectively 
subordinates the Biodiversity Convention to the Law of the Sea in maritime areas. The 1982 Law of the 
Sea Convention contains little recognition of the concept or need for biodiversity in the marine 
environment (Anton, D.K. Supra, fn 330, 354). The obligation in Article 192 of the Law of the Sea 
Convention to "protect and preserve the marine environment" may point towards an obligation to conserve 
marine biodiversity (Anton, D.K. Supra, fn 330, 357). Article 194(5) also defines the "environment" as 
"rare and fragile ecosystems as well as the habitat of depleted, threatened or endangered species and other 
forms of marine life" which may suggest an obligation to preserve marine biodiversity. 
672 Anton, D.K. Supra, fn 330, 361 
673 Ibid 
674 Article 5(g), The United Nations Agreement on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Species 
1995 
675 Tinker, C. Supra, fn 332, 195 
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of the Biodiversity Convention, now making it binding law. The inclusion of this principle, 
arguably, conflicts with the possible exercise of high seas fishing freedoms that could harm 
marine biodiversity.676 
If high seas fishing (including krill fishing) had a detrimental effect on marine biodiversity, the 
Biodiversity Convention's objectives would not be upheld even though the Convention, 
arguably, allows such fishing. 677 As such, the Convention provides weak protection for the 
Antarctic krill and other aspects of Antarctic biological diversity that depend on krill's 
conservation because of its vital role in the ecosystem. If Antarctic EEZs are not legal, then a 
large proportion of Antarctic waters would be high seas. The Biodiversity Convention gives 
limited protection to these waters because of the existence of Article 22 and high seas freedoms 
under the Law of the Sea Convention. Although Antarctic krill are vital for the qontinued 
biodiversity of marine Antarctica, the Biodiversity Convention provides only limited protection 
to any krill located in high seas areas. As discussed, it may be up to other international 
agreements, such as CCAMLR, to fulfil this role. 
CCAMLR and Biodiversity 
The Convention for Biological Diversity must also be looked at in light of CCAMLR. Although 
CCAMLR does not specifically mention biological diversity, it is likely that the two Conventions 
are consistent or at least not open to conflict. CCAMLR' s ecosystem approach to fisheries 
management seeks to manage and conserve all aspects of the ecosystem, with a focus on the 
interdependence of species. Arguably, such an approach is similar to the Biodiversity 
Convention's goal of conserving variability among species. An ecosystem approach that 
monitors and attempts to conserve all levels of the ecosystem will also conserve biological 
variability. The Biodiversity Convention is also aimed at the sustainable use of biological 
diversity, which may take a similar economic focus to the idea of"rational use" embodied in 
CCAMLR. The two Conventions therefore appear to exist without conflict.678 
676 Anton, D.K. Supra, fn 330, 358 
677 Article 22 may permit such fishing. 
678 This does not take into account the possible subordination of the Convention on Biological Diversity to 
the Law of the Seas Convention because of Article 22(2) of the Biodiversity Convention. 
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The failings of the Convention for Biological Diversity in relation to marine biodiversity have 
been recognised and there have been some moves towards correcting the problem.679 A 
strengthening of the current regime and more detailed and legally binding provisions 680 may be 
necessary to effectively conserve biodiversity both within national jurisdictions and on the high 
seas. The Subsidiary Body of Scientific, Technical and Technological Action (SBSTT A) has 
proposed an amendment to either the Law of the Sea Convention or the Convention for 
Biological Diversity in order to conserve high seas biodiversity. 681 One commentator has argued 
that this may still result in conflict between the two regimes. 682 A new system could be 
devised683 but this would take a great deal of time and would probably encounter a great deal of 
political resistance, not to mention the problems of conflict or uniformity with existing 
international instruments. This thesis submits that the most appropriate approach in respect of 
Antarctic species would be to strengthen CCAMLR in line with the UN General Assembly's 
recent declaration of the need to strengthen such international fish management agreements. 
Although CCAMLR is not a UN agreement, if the UN General Assembly passed a similar 
resolution urging states to accede to CCAMLR, it would place political pressure on non-parties 
and may result in more states becoming members. Greater membership of CCAMLR combined 
with improvements in enforcement methods would help to make CCAMLR a more effective 
management regime, especially in light of the need to combat IUU fishing. 
679 The Second meeting of the Conference ofParties to the Convention formulated a program in 1995 (the 
Jakarta Mandate) examine marine and coastal biodiversity (UN website, http://www.un.org). Decision 
II/1 0 encourages parties to establish national legislation so that they can introduce an integrated approach 
to conserve and sustainably use biodiversity (Decision II/10, paragraphs 2 and 3, Report of the Second 
Meeting of the Conference ofParties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, November 1995). The 
decision also requires the Executive Secretary to carry out certain investigations including options for a 
pragmatic, ecosystem approach to marine biodiversity and the activities affecting conservation and 
sustainable use of this biodiversity and the implications on the Biodiversity Convention on such activities 
(Decision II/10, Annex 2(a) and paragraph 2(b) and (c), Report of the Second Meeting of the Conference 
of Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, November 1995). These directives go some way 
towards investigating improvements needed for protection of marine biodiversity. Although the Decision 
does not solve the inadequacies of the Convention concerning marine biodiversity, it is at least a 
beginning. 
680 Anton, D.K. Supra, fn 330, 343 
681 Ibid 367 
682 Ibid, 368 
683 Ibid' 369 
' 
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Conclusion 
A strong form of the precautionary approach justifies the introduction of a krill moratorium (or at 
least localised protection zones) because of the scientific uncertainty concerning krill population 
and the effect of krill fishing on dependent species. However, this chapter concludes that 
international "hard" law instruments do not provide an adequate legal regime for the 
conservation of the Antarctic krill, particularly if a fishing moratorium is introduced. 
CCAMLR, the primary Southern Ocean fisheries management regime, is weakened because it 
does not bind third parties and may not support a moratorium because of its "rational use" 
objective. However, a later chapter of this thesis will examine improvements that are being . 
made and that can be made to enforcement techniques so that CCAMLR becomes more effective 
in combating IUD fishing. Furthermore, the UN General Assembly has recently advocated in a 
2004 resolution a strengthening of international management instruments, which may lead states 
to reconsider amending management instruments like CCAMLR or pressure non-members to 
join. 
The Madrid Protocol, as the first international instrument to attempt to provide relatively 
comprehensive protection for the Antarctic environment and its ecosystems, has the potential to 
give krill significant protection. The Madrid Protocol does not derogate from CCAMLR but 
Parties to both treaties do, however, have an obligation to cooperate to ensure that the Protocol's 
objectives are achieved and to avoid inconsistency between the implementation of the Protocol 
and other instruments. As such, greater efforts should be made to reconcile the Protocol's 
conservation objectives with the sustainable harvesting goals of CCAMLR. However, the 
Madrid Protocol is currently subordinate to CCAMLR, making it subordinate to the rational 
exploitation objectives of that instrument. This thesis submits that a krill fishing moratorium 
could still be consistent with the CCAMLR objective of rational exploitation whilst protecting 
Antarctic krill stocks. A krill fishing moratorium would allow greater recruitment and recovery 
of species that are directly and indirectly dependent on krill. Accordingly, this would permit a 
greater opportunity for such species to be rationally exploited in accordance with CCAMLR's 
objectives. 
This chapter also concludes that the existence of Exclusive Economic Zones ("EEZs") under the 
Law of the Sea Convention would provide significant protection for krill because a large 
proportion of krill population would fall within these zones. There is, however, some conflict 
between a krill fishing ban within these EEZs and other provisions of the Law of the .Sea 
Convention, particularly those concerning optimum utilisation of stocks and third party access to 
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stocks. If claimants can assert sovereignty over third party states within Antarctic EEZs, they 
would be able to control fishing activities of the flag vessels of those nations. Control over 
fishing vessels within these EEZs would reduce the problem of unregulated fishing and allow 
claimant nations to fully implement a krill fishing ban within the zones claimed by them. 
The Law of the Sea Convention also offers some general protection to straddling fish stocks and 
highly migratory species, although krill are not specifically classed as such by the Convention. 
The Fish Stocks Agreement contains much more detailed provisions concerning the conservation 
and management of such stocks. One of the main advantages of the Agreement is that it 
authorises fishing by only those states that are members of, or apply the conservation measures 
of, regional organisations. Krill can benefit from the protection provided by such provisions 
which can reduce the problem of non-parties flouting the conservation measures of organisations 
like CCAMLR on the high seas (although it is unclear whether the Agreement actually applies to 
krill). Prima facie, a krill fishing moratorium would not seem to be consistent with the Fish 
Stocks Agreement because of its focus on optimum utilisation of stocks. However, this thesis 
submits that a fishing ban could still be consistent with the Fish Stocks Agreement because it 
would permit greater annual recruitment and recovery of species that are directly and indirectly 
dependent on krill and so would facilitate a greater optimum utilisation of such dependent 
species. 
The existence of localised krill populations mean that localised krill harvesting can threaten 
genetic biodiversity of krill and localised predator populations, the genetic resources of which 
could have important future economic potential. The position of krill at the base of the Antarctic 
marine food chain justifies a total harvesting ban because of krill's important role in maintaining 
species biodiversity. Although the Bidiversity Convention has sustainable use objectives, the 
precautionary approach should justify a krill fishing moratorium because of the scientific 
uncertainty surrounding krill. The Biodiversity Convention's conservation provisions, although 
legally binding, offer little real protection to krill because of their extremely general nature and 
use of vague language that does not suggest the imposition of substantive obligations. However, 
the Biodiversity Convention provides a legal justification for a krill fishing moratorium because 
of the potential effects of krill fishing on biodiversity. Such a moratorium could be administered 
in practice by CCAMLR parties, the Biodiversity Convention is simply a potential means of 
giving greater scope to CCAMLR so that it applies to a wider range of parties and to place 
political pressure on non-parties to comply with a moratorium. 
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This Chapter has looked at the protection that can be offered to krill by various hard law 
instruments and the possibility that these agreements may sanction complete krill protection. 
The binding effect of these instruments suggests that they can provide strong protection for krill, 
although the very fact that they are binding has led to the inclusion of general and weak language 
in them that reduces their effectiveness. However, the UN General Assembly's recent goals of 
strengthening international fisheries management regimes may provide the impetus to improve 
the current regulatory regime and place political pressure on non-complying states. The next 
chapter will focus on non-binding quasi-legal "soft" law instruments that may be able to facilitate 
conservation of krill. Such instruments appear weak because they are merely voluntary, 
however, this fact allows them to cover a much wider range of topics in much greater detail. 
More countries can also be encouraged to adopt them because of their voluntary nature, which 
could lead to greater protection for krill and other marine species. 
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CHAPTER 4: THE CONTEMPORARY SOFT LAW REGIME 
Introduction 
Krill and other Antarctic species need a strong legal and regulatory regime if they are to be 
conserved in the future. Binding formal treaties and conventions (i.e. "hard" law) could offer 
strong protection to krill but only if they have sufficient legal strength and are fully implemented. 
This chapter will focus on the plethora of non-binding quasi-legal instruments and resolutions 
that do not arise from a formal Treaty process (i.e. "soft" law) to determine whether they can 
provide a similar means of effectively regulating krill and other fisheries in the Southern Ocean. 
The first major "soft" law instrument focussing on the environment, the Stockholm Declaration, 
will be examined in Part I to determine whether a comprehensive krill harvesting ban would 
conform to its environmental principles. The principles of the subsequent Rio Declaration will 
also be analysed to see whether they can offer any meaningful legal or regulatory protection to 
krill. In particular, the concept of sustainable development will be outlined to determine any 
potential conflict with a complete or limited ban on krill harvesting. As discussed in previous 
chapters of this thesis, a comprehensive ban on krill harvesting is justified under the 
precautionary approach because of the vital role played by krill in the ecosystem and the 
uncertainty surrounding krill population and interactions with other species. At the least, a 
seasonal or regional ban should be introduced to protect areas most susceptible to 
overexploitation which could have a damaging effect on localised predator and krill populations. 
Likely increases in harvesting caused by increased demand for krill products, reduced harvesting 
costs and overexploitation of larger fish species make it essential to have a strong legal and 
management regime in place. An analysis of soft law instruments will help to determine whether 
they can provide extra support for the objectives of hard law instruments and for a krill fishing 
moratorium. 
Parts II and III of this chapter will focus on the plan for sustainable development that arose out of 
the UNCED Rio Conference, known as Agenda 21, and the subsequent Earth Summit +5. 
Agenda 21 is aimed at creating a plan for the conservation and sustainable use of the world's 
environment. This plan will be analysed to determine whether it can offer effective regulatory 
mechanisms for the Antarctic krill and whether it would sanction a complete krill harvesting ban. 
Part IV of this chapter will look at the UN FAO's Code of Conduct which attempts to create a 
comprehensive outline of the actions needed to ensure responsible and sustainable fishing. In 
particular, this section will examine whether the Code can offer any real protection to krill and 
whether its sustainable development objectives would accord with a comprehensive harvesting 
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ban. The Code's principles also offer support for the conservation measures of regional 
management organisations such as CCAMLR. Furthermore, the potential for the Code's 
principles to become part of customary international law will be analysed to determine whether 
new customary rules would offer greater protection to krill. This Chapter submits that support 
given to the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fishing in subsequent instruments such as the 
Rome, Kyoto and Reykjavik Declarations can help new customary law to develop. The 
development of new customary law creates a binding legal obligation on states which would 
require states to abide by the principles of the Code of Conduct. Such a development would 
strengthen the current legal regime and provide much greater legal protection for krill on the high 
seas. If the principles of the Code became universally binding there would be a much stronger 
legal obligation on states to conserve krill, although practical problems of enforcement would 
still exist. 
Sustainable development and conservation of the world's oceans were vigorously discussed at 
the World Summit on Sustainable Development in late 2002. Two formal instruments, the 
Johannesburg Declaration and Plan oflmplementation, arose from this conference. Part V of this 
chapter will examine the role that these instruments can play in achieving sustainable 
development in the future. In particular, their effectiveness and their support for conservation 
measures of organisations such as CCAMLR will be discussed. The potential entry of the 
conference's principles into customary law will also be examined to determine whether that 
would have any real impact on krill conservation or whether those principles would support a 
comprehensive harvesting ban. 
Part VI of this Chapter will focus on the General Assembly resolutions in respect of the world's 
oceans that were introduced after the World Summit. These resolutions give support to the 
World Summit's principles, but they may not have any substantive binding effect. This section 
will examine the binding nature of the resolutions to determine if their principles can help to 
conserve the Antarctic krill through sustainable exploitation or to facilitate a comprehensive krill 
harvesting ban. 
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I. The Stockholm Declaration and the rise of Environmental Protection 
What is soft law? 
Non-binding international agreements are known as "soft law".684 In particular, these agreements 
are often a stage along the process of forming strict, legally binding obligations in the form of 
international treaties.685 In all areas there is a scale of hardness or softness where prescriptions as 
to behaviour are made.686 
Soft law agreements are often in the form of non-binding agreements such as codes of practice of 
declarations.687 Soft law instruments are extremely different in their scope. Some are very vague 
and generalised whereas others are much more specific in their provisions.688 Soft law is an 
ambiguous term because a principle must usually be compulsory to be considered as "law".,689 
Soft law has been argued to be something less than "law" because of the apparent lack of an 
intention to impose controls on behaviour. 690 However, because they go through a rigorous 
negotiation process and do contain expected standards of behaviour,691 they do still form part of 
the body of international law even though they do not constitute traditional, legally binding 
internationalinstruments (although one commentator has raised the possibility that soft law 
agreements are not governed by international law at all692). 
Soft law often embodies aspirational objectives that set out expected norms of behaviour. 
However, one critical characteristic is that these expected standards have been agreed to by a 
number of states and this agreement has been recorded. 693 
684 Teece, D.R. 1997. Global Overfishing and the Spanish-Canadian Turbot War: Can International Law 
Protect the High Seas Environment? Colorado Journal of International Law and Policy, Vol 8: 89 at 102 
685 Birnie, P. and Boyle, A Supra, fu 233, 25 
686 Panel Discussion. 1988. A Hard Look at Soft Law. Proceedings of the American Society of 
International Law, Vol82: 371-395 at 375 
687 Birnie, P. and Boyle, A Supra, fu 233, 25 
688 Chinldn, C.M. 1989. The Challenge ojSoft Law: Development and Change in International Law. 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol38: 850-866 at 852 
689 Panel Discussion. 1988. A Hard Look at Softl"aw. Proceedings of the American Society of 
International Law, Vol82: 371-395 at 381 
690 Panel Discussion. 1988. A Hard Look at Soft Law. Proceedings of the American Society of 
International Law, Vol82: 371-395 at 374 
691 Birnie, P. and Boyle, A Supra, fu 233, 25 
692 Schachter, 0. 1977. The Twilight Existence of Nonbinding International Agreement. American Journal 
oflnternational Law, Vol 71: 296-304 at 300 
693 Birnie, P. and Boyle, A Supra, fu 233, 25-26 
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Weaknesses of Soft law 
There are many perceived weaknesses with international soft law. Some argue vehemently 
against soft law because they see its non-binding nature as weakening the system of international 
law making. 694 Soft law may also create uncertainty in international law because of its non-
binding nature and, accordingly, states have no degree of certainty that other states will follow 
any soft law instruments to which they have been a party.695 Arguably, states need to be able to 
anticipate the actions of other nations in the international arena in order to formulate their own 
international policies. 696 
Because soft law instruments do not legally bind states and their principles are very general in 
nature, arguably, they can have little substantive effect because states can choose to avoid their 
prescriptions whenever they wish to. Soft law is often quite broad and the standards embodied in 
it may appear to be discretionary.697 Accordingly, it could be argued that states are able to 
interpret soft law instruments in a manner that suits their own self-interest and they have 
discretion as to how to apply soft law principles. 
Soft law agreements also suffer from the disadvantage that breaching them does not give rise to a 
right to demand compensation or other remedies.698 Accordingly, because there may be no real 
sanctions from breaching soft law instruments (although other state parties to those agreements 
could still unilaterally or multilaterally decide to impose sanctions), there is arguably not a strong 
disincentive to avoid breaching them, although this is not necessarily the case. Furthermore, 
even where disputes may arise between states concerning the interpretation and application of 
soft law principles, the subjective and discretionary nature of soft law instruments makes them a 
difficult subject for adjudication of disputes. 699 
___ ,_________ _ 
694 Panel Discussion. 1988. A Hard Look at Soft Law. Proceedings of the American Society of 
International Law, Vol 82: 371-395 at 377 
695 Panel Discussion. 1988. A Hard Look at Soft Law. Proceedings of the American Society of 
International Law, Vol 82: 371-395 at 392 
696 Panel Discussion. 1988. A Hard Look at Soft Law. Proceedings of the American Society of 
International Law, Vol82: 371-395 at 393 
697 Palmer, G. 1992. New Ways to Make International Environmental Law. The American Journal of 
International Law, Vol 86: 259-283 at 269 
698 Schachter, 0. 1977. The Twilight Existence of Nonbinding International Agreement. American Journal 
of International Law, Vol 71: 296-304 at 300 
699 Chinkin, C.M. Supra, fn 733, 862 
154 
What effect can soft law have? 
Soft law becoming hard 
Soft law may also provide a means to change the international legal framework by outlining new 
ideas and solutions that may change state practice or opinions. 700 Accordingly, the raising of 
new ideas in this manner can culminate in new hard law treaties which are legally binding on 
states and for breach of which sanctions can be imposed legitimately by other states.701 Even if 
soft law does not culminate in hard law instruments, it may still perform important functions in 
the international legal regime, despite its aspirational nature. 702 
Expected Behaviour 
Even though soft law is not binding, it can help to outline the standards of behaviour that states 
would be expected to comply with. 703 Soft law can help to create standards of conduct to guide 
the actions of states. 704 Expected standards can, in tum, influence the behaviour of states and 
can help to instigate change in customary international law or give rise to new binding treaties. 705 
Political Behaviour 
Soft law may influence the political decisions of nations706 and, accordingly, could have an 
impact on domestic policy and law. In this manner, soft law environmental principles could go 
from a non-binding statement of principle, to binding obligations that are present in the domestic 
legislation of a particular state. Having a very specific, binding instrument is more desirable, but 
the usefulness of such instruments will be minimal if states simply ignore their provisions. Soft 
law instruments can be implemented with greater vigour by states because their generalist nature 
allows more scope for state discretion. 
700 Palmer, G. Supra, fn 742,269 
701 Ibid 
702 Panel Discussion. 1988. A Hard Look at Soft Law. Proceedings of the American Society of 
International Law, Vol82: 371-395 at 376 
703 Panel Discussion. 1988. A Hard Look at Soji Law. Proceedings of the American Society of 
International Law, Vol82: 371-395 at 388 
704 Wirth, D.A. Supra, fn 762, 603 
705 Teece, D.R. Supra, fn 729, 102 
706 Palmer, G. Supra, fn 742, 270 
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Controlling behaviour 
Just because there may appear to be a great deal of discretion in states deciding when and how to 
apply soft law does not mean that they can ignore such agreements wholesale. Just because it is 
soft law does not necessarily mean that states have a right under international law to breach such 
agreements or ignore them altogether when acting. 707 At the very minimum, soft law gives rise 
to a moral or political duty of good faith compliance,708 although the precise meaning of a moral 
or political obligation may not be clear.709 
Compromise and Flexibility 
One of the great benefits of soft law is that, because of its non-binding nature and often general 
language, it can be used as a compromise to difficult international disputes or problems.710 The 
requirement of unanimous consent is one of the major problems in Treaty making that makes it 
difficult to achieve agreement in a timely manner.711 Agreement is more easily achieved 
precisely because soft law instruments are so broad. 712 
Furthermore, the length of time required to negotiate new treaties means that often changes in 
circumstances can occur that make the negotiated Treaty obsolete. 713 Speedy agreement is 
essential in environmental law because of the need for flexibility and rapid change.714 The 
lengthy negotiation process of hard law instruments creates significant problems because of the 
changing needs of environmental regulation. Because soft law instruments are general and non-
binding, they can be adapted relatively easily and relatively quickly in order to accommodate 
changing circumstances. This provides flexibility and dynamism to allow states to react quite 
quickly to changing conditions. 
707 Schachter, 0. fu 743, 300 
708 Ibid, 303 
709 Ibid 
710 Ibid, 376 
711 Palmer, G. Supra, fu 742,272 
712 Ibid, 269 
713 Palmer, G. Supra, fu 742,271 
714 Panel Discussion. 1988. A Hard Look at Soft Law. Proceedings of the American Society of 
International Law, Vol 82: 371-395 at 382 
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Legal Justification 
Although soft law itself may not be legally binding, soft law can be used as a justification by 
states to argue that particular actions are legitimate or illegitimate.715 Accordingly, states can use 
soft law to mount arguments, and accordingly, pressure against states with, for example, poor 
environmental practices that may not be in accordance with soft law. Thus, soft law can 
strengthen standards as a consequence, even though it is not actually legally binding on states. 
The journey to customary law 
As will be discussed further in this Chapter, soft law may result in states following new practices 
which eventually leads to the creation of new customary international law. 716 Although 
customary law is not the same as a hard law Treaty, it still should be binding on states and thus, 
soft law can lead to binding obligations even where no formal Treaty is eventually concluded. 
The Stockholm Declaration 
Modem international environmental law had its origins in the United Nations Conference on the 
Human Environment that took place in Stockholm in June 1972. 717 The Stockholm conference 
resulted in 26 environmental principles being formulated as part of the Stockholm Declaration.718 
Although non-binding, these principles provide guidelines as to the environmental objectives that 
states should aim to achieve. Several of the Declaration's principles are aimed at maintaining the 
environment for developmental benefits to mankind.719 
715 Ibid, 393 
716 Chinkin; C.M. 1989. The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in International Law. 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol38: 850-866 at 857 
717 Wirth, D.A. 1995. The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development: Two Steps Forward and 
One Back, or Vice Versa? Georgia Law Review, Vol29: 599-652 at 600 
718 Ibid, 602 
719 Principle 1 of the Stockholm Declaration advocates the need for "environment of a quality that permits 
a life of dignity and well-being". Principle 11 of the Stockholm Declaration goes in the other direction by 
stating that "the environmental policies of all States should enhance and not adversely affect the present or 
future development potential of developing countries, nor should they hamper the attainment of better 
living conditions for all. .. " 
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If these principles were strictly followed in relation to krill, then a comprehensive krill harvesting 
ban would be in conflict with the Declaration's goals. Such a ban would prevent krill being used 
as an aquaculture feed or supplement. Because krill are extremely useful for expanding 
aquaculture production, preventing their exploitation would harm an industry that can benefit 
developing countries, especially those with food shortages. As previously discussed, krill has 
been touted in the past as a source of protein that could solve some of the food shortage problems 
of developing nations. A comprehensive ban would prevent such a goal being fulfilled and 
would "hamper the attainment of better living conditions for all" and "adversely affect 
the ... development potential of developing countries". However, disregarding the need for a 
complete harvesting ban would result in adverse impacts on the quality of the environment in 
conflict with principle 1. The status of the principles as mere guidelines means that strict 
adh«rence is not obligatory, particularly in light of the potential for conflict between them. 
The Declaration also advocates the need to protect natural resources and the environment for the 
benefit of present and future generations.720 Some form of krill conservation is necessitated by 
these principles so that krill are protected for future generations. The concept of 
intergenerational equity is, prima facie, inconsistent with a complete harvesting ban. Allowing 
present and future generations to benefit from krill implies an exploitative, rather than an 
aesthetic, benefit. If so, sustainable exploitation of krill would be consistent with 
intergenerational equity. However, a comprehensive harvesting ban would give greater 
protection to other dependent species, allowing them to be exploited to provide benefits to 
present and future generations. Indeed, if krill were protected then dependent species would 
have a greater chance of survival so that future generations would benefit from them. 
720 Principles 1 and 2 (Wirth, D.A. Supra, fn 762, 625) 
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The Declaration does focus on the necessity to reconcile developmental and environmental 
needs.721 The goal of achieving compatibility between development and environmental 
protection, at first glance, appears to be at odds with a comprehensive krill harvesting ban. 
Arguably, krill can be commercially harvested and, as long as there are appropriate and effective 
catch limits in place, this would be consistent with environmental protection goals. However, 
even limited krill exploitation can have an extremely detrimental effect on the ecosystem 
(especially on localised predator populations) and this will not allow compatibility between 
development and Antarctic environmental protection to be achieved. 722 The uncertainty 
surrounding the interrelationships between Antarctic species and krill population makes it even 
more difficult to predict the impact that development will have on the ecosystem. 723 
Accordingly, the precautionary approach would justify a complete fishing ban because ofthese 
difficulties in reconciling developmental and environmental needs. 
States have a duty to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause 
damage to areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.724 Krill fishing by flag vessels on the 
high seas would come within the jurisdiction of the flag state. The difficulties in introducing 
conservation measures to govern Antarctic high seas areas have already been outlined. States 
must ensure that their flag vessels do not fish in a manner that causes damage to the Antarctic 
high seas environment if they are to fulfill this duty. Unrestricted krill fishing would not only 
cause damage to krill population, it would harm the entire Antarctic ecosystem. Therefore, states 
need to enforce krill conservation measures of some sort against their flag vessels on the high 
seas to comply with the Stockholm Declaration's environmental principles. Furthermore, they, 
arguably, need to comply with conservation measures of regional organisations such as 
CCAMLR in order to "ensure that international organisations play a coordinated, efficient and 
dynamic role for the protection and improvement of the environment".725 
721 Principle 13 of the Stockholm Declaration favours states taking "an integrated and coordinated 
approach to their development planning so as to ensure that development is compatible with the need to 
protect and improve environment for the benefit of their population". Principle 14 is also in favour of 
reconciling conflicts between development needs and environmental protection through rational planning. 
Similarly, Principles 15 and 17 ofthe Stockholm Declaration advocate the need for planning to avoid 
adverse impacts on the environment. (Wirth, D.A. Supra, fn 762, 632) 
722 The potential effect of krill exploitation on the ecosystem has been discussed in detail in Chapter 1. 
723 The uncertainty concerning such relationships has been discussed in detail in Chapter 1. 
724 Principle 21, Stockholm Declaration 
725 Principle 25, Stockholm Declaration 
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Environmental concerns first raised by the Stockholm conference were examined once again 20 
years later at the 1992 United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development 
(UNCED).726 The UNCED was held as a result of the World Commission on Environment and 
Development's study727 in 1987. 728 This report gave rise to the concept of "sustainable 
development" and recommended the formulation of a Declaration and Convention on 
environmental protection and sustainable development. 729 The idea of sustainable development 
was fully adopted at the Rio Conference in the Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development.730 There are, however, uncertainties as to what exactly is meant by sustainable 
development.731 
The Rio Declaration does focus on the needs of humans in sustainable development.732 The way 
some of its principles are formulated suggests that humans arc the primary concern in sustainable 
development and the environment is of secondary concern.733 This is a step back from the 
environmental focus of the Stockholm Declaration.734 The Declaration also appears to sanction 
the need for development to benefit future generations, rather than a focus on simply conserving 
the environment for future generations. 735 The Rio Declaration's greater emphasis on 
development, rather than just environmental protection, limits its usefulness in providing a basis 
for a complete krill harvesting ban. Giving development a greater emphasis suggests that krill 
should be preserved for their commercial benefits to future generations rather than simply their 
intrinsic value for environmental protection. An alternative argument is that a comprehensive 
harvesting ban would allow more sustainable commercial harvests of other species and so krill's 
complete protection would, under the Rio Declaration, have future benefits beyond the mere 
aesthetic. 
726 The conference, also known as the "Earth Summit", took place in Rio de Janeiro between 3 and 14 June 
1992. (Wirth, D.A. Supra, fu 762, 599) The Rio Earth Summit was attended by more than 170 countries 
and was intended to be a successor to the Stockholm Conference. (Wirth, D.A. Supra, fu 762, 601) 
727 This was also known as the Brundtland Commission. 
728 Grzybowski, D.M. 1995. The "Rio" Environmental Treaties Colloquium: A Historical Perspective 
Leading Up to and Including the United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks. Pace Environmental Law Review, vol 13: 49-74 at 57 
729 Wirth; D.A. Supra, fn 762, 606 
730 This Declaration embodied a series of 27 principles that outlined the concept of sustainable 
development. 
731 Birnie, P. and Boyle, A. Supra, fu 233, 85 
732 The Rio Declaration in Principle 1 recognises that human beings are the central concern of sustainable 
development and Principle 3 states that a right to development exists to meet the needs of present and 
future generations. 
733 Wirth, D.A. Supra, fn 762, 614 
734 Principle 1 of the Stockholm Declaration has an environmental focus. Wirth, D.A. Supra, fu 762, 615 
735 Principle 3 of the Rio Declaration states that the "right to development must be fulfilled so as to 
equitably meet developmental and environmental needs of present and future generations". (Wirth, D.A. 
Supra, fu 762, 627) 
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Other provisions of the Rio Declaration appear to recognise the importance of environmental 
protection.736 The aim of these provisions is to prevent states disregarding the environment when 
they are considering development. 737 These principles, however, still appear to allow 
environmental protection to be of secondary concern to development and economic goals. 738 
Environmental protection must be paramount because the continued existence of many species 
will not be ensured if economic and developmental goals are allowed to gain ascendancy over 
environmental concerns. 
There is nothing specific in the Rio Declaration that refers to natural resources. 739 However, 
there are some principles that do offer protection for natural resources?40 Although these 
principles do not specifically mention marine resources, they require unsustainable consumption 
of resources to be eliminated through national legislation. Krill should therefore receive national 
protection from vessels that harvest them in an unsustainable manner. This would advocate 
national governments enacting environmental measures to prevent their flag vessels engaging in 
unsustainable harvesting of krill on the high seas. These principles do not justify a total 
harvesting ban, but they at least justify greater protection on the high seas from flag vessels of 
states that are not party to current Antarctic or high seas conservation regimes. The uncertainty 
surrounding krill populations cannot be used as a basis for refusing to apply such measures. This 
is because the Rio Declaration requires a precautionary approach that does not allow scientific 
uncertainty to be used as a reason for postponing conservation measures that may prevent 
environmental damage. 741 
736 Principle 4 appears to recognise the importance of environmental protection by stating that, to achieve 
sustainable development, "environmental protection shall constitute an integral part of the development 
process and cannot be considered in isolation from it." 
737 Birnie, P. and Boyle, A. Supra, fn 233, 86 
738 Ibid 87 
739 Ibid, 88 
740 Prin~iple 2 reiterates the Stockholm Declaration's principle that states must ensure that activities within 
their control do not harm areas beyond national jurisdiction. As discussed, this could potentially offer 
protection to krill in the Antarctic high seas. Principle 8 also places states under an obligation to 
"eliminate unsustainable patterns of production and consumption" in order to "achieve sustainable 
development". States are also placed under an obligation by principle 11 to enact effective environmental 
legislation. 
741 Principle 15, Rio Declaration. The precautionary approach will be discussed in detail in the subsequent 
chapter. 
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The Rio Declaration also provides a justification for pressuring states to conform to regional 
conservation measures such as CCAMLR or at least to try to reach agreement with such 
bodies.742 Because regional organisations such as CCAMLR are aimed at rational exploitation or 
sustainable use of resources, as well as having ecosystem conservation objectives, this thesis 
submits that the Rio Declaration obliges non-parties to cooperate with such organisations in 
order to achieve sustainable use of resources. As discussed, one of the major problems with 
instruments such as CCAMLR is that they do not bind third parties, which can hamper the 
implementation of conservation measures for species such as krill. Although the Rio Declaration 
only requires cooperation between states, it still goes some way towards establishing a guideline 
for third party states which may make it easier to achieve their cooperation in the future. At the 
very least, it provides a justification for exerting pressure on third party states to attempt to 
secure their compliance with conservation measures. As discussed, the UN General Assembly 
has recently made several resolutions that urge states to accede to particular UN agreements 
including the Law of the Sea Convention and the Fish Stocks Agreement. As such, the UN 
General Assembly could be a useful mechanism to exert pressure on states to comply with 
CCAMLR conservation measures in the Antarctic. 
The Stockholm and Rio Declarations may be seen by some as less effective than hard law 
instruments because of their non-binding status. Non-binding international agreements are 
known as "soft law".743 Because these declarations do not bind states and their principles are 
very general in nature, they can have little substantive effect. Soft law is often quite broad and 
the standards embodied in it may appear to be discretionary. 744 Soft law can, however, be 
advantageous because it is often used as a compromise solution to a problem. 745 Agreement is 
more easily achieved precisely because soft law instruments are so broad. 746 Speedy agreement 
is essential in environmental law because of the need for flexibility and rapid change. 747 The 
lengthy negotiation process of hard law instruments creates significant problems because of the 
changing needs of environmental regulation. Soft law can be used to argue that particular actions 
are legitimate or illegitimate. 748 The Stockholm Declaration has been used by many 
742 Principles 7 and 27 place states under a good faith obligation to cooperate to achieve sustainable 
development and to "conserve, protect and restore the health and integrity of the Earth's ecosystem". 
743 Teece, D.R. 1997. Global Overfishing and the Spanish-Canadian Turbot War: Can International Law 
Protect the High Seas Environment? Colorado Journal of International Law and Policy, Vol 8: 89 at 102 
744 Palmer, G. Supra, fh 742, 269 
745 Ibid, 3 76 
746 Palmer, G. Supra, fn 742, 269 
747 Panel Discussion. 1988. A Hard Look at Soft Law. Proceedings of the American Society of 
International Law, Vol 82: 371-395 at 382 
748 Ibid, 393 
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governments as a legal justification for their actions or rights and state practice has also been 
influenced by its provisions. 749 
Furthermore, just because instruments are ratified does not mean that nations will observe them. 
750 Soft law instruments can be implemented with greater vigour by states because their 
generalist nature allows more scope for state discretion. The general nature of the Stockholm 
and Rio Declarations does, however, make them difficult to implement in any effective manner 
for the very reason that it is difficult to determine precisely what they mean. 751 The 
environmental principles of these instruments provide a greater legal justification for krill 
conservation and these principles can be used to pressure other states into accepting krill 
conservation measures. These benefits are reduced because of practical difficulties in 
determining exactly what the principles mean and how they are to be implemented, however, 
they can still.be a useful political tool. 
Despite the advantages of soft law, the Stockholm and Rio Declarations are still weakened 
because of their nonbinding status. Nonbinding agreements, arguably, do not have legal effect. 
Breaching such agreements does not give rise to a right to demand compensation or other 
remedies. 752 However, soft law gives rise to a moral or political duty of good faith compliance. 
753 The precise nature of such a duty is unclear. The obligation provides a justification for the 
international community to exert pressure on states that do not comply with the principles of the 
Stockholm and Rio Declarations. Hence there would a justification for pressuring states that do 
not abide by environmental protection measures for krill such as a comprehensive ban or current 
CCAMLR catch limits. 
749 Ibid 383 
750 Pal~er, G. Supra, fn 742,265 
751 Panel Discussion. Supra, fu 704, 377 
752 Schachter, 0. fu 743, 300 
753 Ibid, 303 
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Soft law can help to create standards of conduct to guide the actions of states. 754 Expected 
standards can influence the behaviour of states and can help to instigate change in customary 
international law or give rise to new binding treaties. 755 For soft law to create customary 
international law there needs to be evidence of state practice and opinio juris.756 In the context of 
the Rio Declaration, its environmental protection principles will benefit krill if they have entered 
into customary international law. Hard law instruments such as CCAMLR have no binding 
effect on third party states. Parties to such treaties have no justification for enforcing 
conservation measures against non-parties. Third parties can create major difficulties if they do 
not observe conservation measures and there can also be problems with reflagging of vessels to 
avoid such measures.757 This is already a major problem in Antarctica and other world fishing 
zones, particularly on the high seas. Major krill concentrations occurring on the high seas will be 
subjected to these problems because of likely expansions in the current krill industry caused by 
higher demand for krill products and reduced harvesting costs. If third party states were bound 
by a concept such as sustainable development, they would be under an obligation to harvest krill 
and other stocks in a sustainable manner. This would provide a much stronger legal regime to 
govern krill. As discussed above, the concept of sustainable development outlined in the Rio 
Declaration does, arguably, permit a comprehensive krill fishing ban because of the benefits to 
sustainable exploitation of other species and the threat to sustainable development if krill is not 
protected. A binding obligation also gives other states the justification to introduce such a ban 
and to exert pressure on non-CCAMLR members to abide by it. 
Any assertions that soft law principles have attained the status of hard law are based on the view 
that state practice has caused a change in the effect of those principles. One way in which state 
practice can be ascertained is from the introduction of binding hard law treaties.758 The concept 
of sustainable use has been referred to in many international instruments concluded after the Rio 
Declaration including the Convention on Biological Diversity; the International Tropical Timber 
Agreement; the Desertification Convention; the Agreement for the Conservation of Straddling 
and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks; the F AO Code of Conduct; and the Convention on the Non-
Navigational Uses of International Watercourses.759 
754 Wirth, D.A. Supra, fn 762, 603 
755 Teece, D.R. Supra, fn 729, 102 
756 Dixon, M. and McCorquodale, R. 2000. Cases and Materials on International Law (3rct ed). Blackstone 
Press: London at 30 
757 The practical problems of flag vessels will be discussed at a later stage. 
758 Panel Discussion. Supra, fn 704, 387 
759 Birnie, P. and Boyle, A. Supra, fn 233, 88 
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State practice also includes the actions of states as well as declarations made by them. 760 The 
attendance of the Rio conference by over 170 states and the fact that all agreements were 
consensus based761 places a strong moral obligation on states to implement the Rio Declaration. 
Domestic law is also evidence of state practice. 762 Many countries, including Australia, have 
adopted the concept of sustainable use in domestic fisheries legislation.763 This provides some 
evidence of a new emerging practice of sustainable use764 in the marine environment. 
However, for sustainable use to become part of customary law there needs to be some kind of 
consistent practice765 , although a practice does not need to be accepted by all states only a 
majority of states. The problem ofiUU fishing in the Antarctic suggests that many states do not 
follow the practice of sustainable use because IUU fishing directly threatens the sustainable use 
of many Southern Oceans stocks. In the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against 
Nicaragua Case (Nicaragua v USA) (Merits/66 it was held that it is sufficient if state practice is 
generally consistent with a particular principle for it to be part of customary law. 767 If there are 
examples of inconsistent behaviour, they are arguably simply breaches of the principle rather 
than negating it as customary law. 768 Therefore, if a customary law of sustainable use has 
emerged, states condoning IUU fishing are simply breaching the law rather than negating its 
existence. However, this is usually only true for practices that have been established over time 
from a strong original period of formation. 769 State practices that are, from the outset, 
inconsistent with a particular principle make it extremely difficult to argue that it has become 
part of customary law. 770 IUU fishing took place before the Rio Declaration was formulated 
(although it first identified in a CCAMLR meeting in 1997) so inconsistent state practice in the 
marine environment has existed even at the inception of the concept of sustainable development 
which will hinder its ascendancy into customary law. This provides an obstacle to the creation of 
a universally binding principle of sustainable use. 
76° Chinkin, C.M. Super, fn 733, 857 
761 Bratspies, R. Supra, fi1 599, 231 
762 Chinkin, C.M. Supra, fu 733, 858 
763 In Australia the relevant legislation is the Fisheries Management Act. 
764 Sustainable use is part of the concept of sustainable development. 
765 Chinkin, C.M. Supra, fu 733, 857 
766 ICJRep 198614 
767 Panel Discussion. Supra, fu 704, 379 
768 Ibid 
769 Ibid 
770 Ibid 
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For sustainable development in the marine environment to truly become part of customary law, 
there must be specific state practices identifying what constitutes "sustainable use". 771 
Otherwise, this general label becomes too difficult to define in practice and leaves states too 
much discretion to determine its meaning. In the marine environment, the existence or 
development of fisheries management regimes that utilise the concept provides sufficient 
specificity of practice. 772 The Fish Stocks Agreement outlines the concept of sustainable use and 
has some very specific provisions as to its implementation. The agreement has enough 
specificity to define the practice of sustainable use in a marine context. CCAMLR, although 
preceding the formulation of "sustainable development" as a concept, works on the basis of 
"rational exploitation" which appears to be akin to the concept of sustainable use. Both concepts 
seek to harvest species in a manner that can be continued indefinitely in the future. If 
CCAMLR's provisions can be equated with sustainable use, then they can help to define the 
practices that constitute sustainable use in the marine environment. Certainty is absolutely vital 
for a clearly defined customary law obligation to emerge. A customary law principle of 
sustainable use will strengthen the current legal regime because third parties will be bound by it 
and if it is sufficiently specific, it can be implemented in practice. Third parties to current 
management regimes must be subject to some form of binding obligation if a comprehensive krill 
harvesting ban is to prove effective and is necessary even for the maintenance of current 
precautionary catch limits, particularly because of likely increases in krill fishing levels. A 
sufficiently specific binding principle is vital so that third parties cannot seek to avoid their 
obligations by relying on ambiguities or uncertainties in the principle. 
The formulation of a new principle of customary international law also needs opinio juris. 
Opinio juris requires an intention to be bound by a principle and such an intention may be 
negated by the express words of the agreement or implicitly by the soft law nature of the 
agreement. 773 The Rio Declaration is a soft law instrument which may suggest that states acting 
in accordance with the concept of sustainable development do not intend such a practice to bind 
them. However, the subsequent adoption of the concept of sustainable use of natural resources in 
hard law instruments such as the Fish Stocks Agreement and the Convention on Biological 
Diversity suggests that states have formed the requisite intention to be bound. The concept of 
sustainable use has also been introduced in subsequent soft law instruments such as the F AO 
Code of Conduct. General or vague provisions in an instrument, .such as those in the 
Biodiversity Convention, support an argument that there is no intention to be bound by the 
771 Birnie, P. and Boyle, A. Supra, fu 233, 89 
772 Ibid 
773 Chinkin, C.M. Supra, fu 733, 857 
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concept. 774 If opinio juris and state practice are both evident, then a customary international law 
principle supporting sustainable use of marine living resources can exist. 
The acceptance of a customary international law principle of marine sustainable use needs to 
have some kind of practical effect for it to be of any substantive value to krill. Customary law 
does not have sufficient strength to protect krill because of its inability to provide and enforce 
adequate sanctions to prevent breaches of the law .775 However, it can provide the necessary 
universally binding legal obligation that is lacking with current legal instruments. All parties 
must be under a legal obligation to uphold any krill fishing ban if it is to prove effective. Even if 
the current system is maintained, a universally binding obligation to follow precautionary catch 
limits is required, particularly because of likely increases in harvesting levels. Such an 
obligation provides the legal justification to pressure states into complying and places a legal 
duty on them to comply. Customary law can also be useful if domestic courts use it in 
interpreting law or the International Court of Justice is used to determine disputes concerning the 
implementation of a rule ofmarine sustainable use in Antarctica.776 However, the subjective and 
discretionary nature of soft law instruments makes them a difficult subject for adjudication of 
disputes. 777 A general principle such as sustainable use is difficult to adjudicate on, although 
guidance on its application in the marine environment is present in hard law instruments that 
have adopted the concept. Customary international law can actually strengthen standards 
because it allows nations to mount strong arguments against poor environmental practices that 
have led to breach of customary law. 778 States would have a justification to place pressure on 
those nations acting contrary to sustainable development principles in the Southern Ocean. A 
rule of customary international law supporting marine sustainable use also gives states a 
justification to enforce conservation measures against other states in Antarctic waters. 
774 Schachter, 0. fu 743, 298 
775 Palmer, G. Supra, fu 742, 266 
776 The ICJ will, of course, only be able to resolve disputes if parties submit to its jurisdiction. 
777 Chinkin, C.M. Supra, fn 733, 862 
778 Palmer, G. Supra, fu 742, 264 
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II. The impact of Agenda 21 on krill management and regulation 
The Rio Conference also gave birth to a plan of action for sustainable development known as 
Agenda 21. 779 The Agenda has outlined a plan that recommends the changes that need to be 
made to achieve sustainable development a~d preserve the environment. 78° Chapter 17 of the 
report deals with the oceans and the marine environment.781 Coastal states commit themselves 
under the plan to integrated management and sustainable development of the marine environment 
under their jurisdiction. Planning is to be on a precautionary basis with a focus on promoting 
compatibility and a balance ofuses.782 International cooperation must support such national 
efforts by coastal states.783 
Area C of Agenda 21 concerns the sustainable use and conservation of marine living resources 
on the high seas. The problems with enforcement of conservation measures against non-parties 
to CCAMLR in high seas areas of the Southern Ocean makes this extremely relevant to krill and 
other Antarctic species. Agenda 21 uses similar language to CCAMLR requiring populations to 
be maintained or restored to levels that can produce maximum sustainable yield, taking account 
ofrelationships between species.784 As with CCAMLR, the concept of maximum sustainable 
yield can create some difficulties. If krill were exploited to maximum sustainable yield then it 
would not be possible to fully protect and restore endangered species such as baleen whales. It 
would also be difficult to achieve maximum sustainable yield for krill whilst still trying to restore 
other dependent species to such a level because of their reliance on krill. 
779 Hafetz, J.L. 2000. Fostering Protection of the Marine Environment and Economic Development: Article 
121(3) of the Third Law of the Sea Convention. American University International Law Review, Vol15: 
583-636 at 608. Agenda 21 had its roots in the calling of the UNCED by the UN General Assembly on 22 
December 1989 (Grzybowski, D.M. Supra, fn 773, 56). Most of the text of Agenda 21 was written when 
the summit commenced (Grzybowski, D.M. Supra, fn 773, 58). 
780 Grzybowski, D.M. Supra, fn 773, 56 
781 The opening paragraph of Chapter 17 outlines a need for new integrated approaches to marine 
management in areas such as the sustainable use and conservation of marine living resources of the high 
seas and in national jurisdiction. 
782 Paragraph 17 .5, Agenda 21 
783 Paragraph 17.1 0, Agenda 21 
784 Paragraph 17.46 requires states to commit themselves to conservation and sustainable use of these 
resources on the high seas. The provision also requires states to protect and restore endangered marine 
species. 
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Agenda 21 also focuses on human nutritional, economic and development needs.785 As 
discussed, the use of krill as a protein source or as a feeding stimulant have been touted as major 
benefits to human nutrition in both aquaculture and in krill products for human consumption. A 
comprehensive krill harvesting ban seems to be contrary to this provision because of the 
nutritional, economic and developmental benefits of krill. However, the instrument still 
advocates sustainable use of marine resources, so some level of krill conservation or the 
introduction of catch limits would still be required. The problems surrounding maximum 
sustainable yield also highlight the need to improve current instruments aimed at marine 
conservation. 
Chapter 1 7 also advocates the need to take "effective" action including multilateral cooperation 
to ensure that high seas fisheries are managed in accordance with the Law of the Sea.786 The 
extremely general nature of the Law of the Sea provisions regarding the high seas and the lack of 
specific conservation measures in the Convention means that these sections add little to high seas 
krill protection. As previously discussed, there is simply a duty in the Law of the Sea 
Convention to "cooperate" in relation to high seas conservation which weakens the requirements 
of its high seas conservation provisions. Chapter 17's need for "effective" action and "full 
effect" to be given to provisions relating to highly migratory species suggests that states really 
need to make some good faith effort so that effective conservation measures on the high seas are 
put in place. However, what is meant by "effective" action is really a matter for each state to 
subjectively determine. Krill also receive little benefit from the provision in relation to highly 
migratory species because of their exclusion from the definition of"highly migratory species" in 
the Law of the Sea Convention. Chapter 17' s greatest strength has been to focus the attention of 
states on the need to better regulate high seas fishing. The Agenda's objectives have been 
examined in subsequent fora such as the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development, 
which has given the issue greater consideration by the world community. 
785 Paragraph 17.46 requires states to "develop and increase the potential of marine living resources to 
meet human nutritional needs, as well as social, economic and development goals". 
786 Paragraph 17.49, Agenda 21. "Full effect" is to be given to provisions regarding highly migratory 
species (Paragraph 17 .49(b ), Agenda 21). 
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Chapter 17 also tackles the problem of flag state control over fishing vessels on the high seas that 
has plagued fisheries management regimes such as CCAMLR.787 In relation to krill fishing, if a 
problem with juvenile fish by-catch does exist, vessels are likely to be required to implement 
some of the previously suggested solutions such as not harvesting krill swarms of low density or 
avoiding areas where other species are likely to be caught.788 States must also take measures to 
increase availability of marine living resources as human food by reducing wastage and 
improving processing, distribution and transportation techniques. Recently there have been 
many new advances in krill processing technology that are aimed at using a greater proportion of 
each individual krill. These techniques would reduce wastage in compliance with Agenda 21.789 
Agenda 21 does, therefore, contain some positive legal requirements that are beneficial to 
Antarctic krill conservation. 
Agenda 21 also places obligations on states to control their nationals to ensure that they comply 
with conservation and management measures and to take effective action to deter them from 
reflagging their vessels to avoid compliance. Problems with reflaggi~g and non-compliance by 
non-parties on the high seas have plagued regional organisations such as CCAMLR in the past 
and reduced the efficacy of conservation measures. These provisions make it a state's 
responsibility to control their nationals to ensure that they do comply with conservation and 
management regimes.790 State control is fundamental to the enforcement of any krill harvesting 
ban (regional or comprehensive) or even to the enforcement of precautionary catch limits. These 
provisions concerning state control must have legally binding effect to have a substantive value. 
787 Paragraph 17.51 requires states to ensure that their flag vessels fishing on the high seas conduct 
activities in a manner to minimize incidental catch. 
788 The possible problem ofby-catch from krill fishing is discussed in detail in Chapter·!. 
789 These advances have been discussed in Chapter 1. Paragraph 1 7.56 refers to "human food", so utilizing 
a greater proportion of krill for other products would not come within the ambit of the provision. 
79° Furthermore, paragraph 17.61 says that states with an "interest" (States whose flag vessels fish within 
high seas areas of the CCAMLR zone would, presumably, have an interest in that high seas fishery 
activity). in high seas fishery regulated by an existing regional fisheries organisation of which they are 
members should be encouraged to join, where appropriate. Although this may influence some states with 
vessels fishing in Antarctic waters to join CCAMLR, the non-mandatory language used makes it a weak 
provision. States are merely "encouraged" to join and only "where appropriate", giving the provision little 
force. Provisions governing flag states may also have less importance if they do not have binding effect. 
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Agenda 21 is not a binding legal text requiring ratification by states which implies that it 
constitutes a soft law instrument.791 Even as a soft law instrument it can have some use to krill. 
States are under a strong moral obligation to comply, particularly in light of the large number of 
states that were involved in the report's formation. The effectiveness of a moral obligation is, 
however, questionable. Such an obligation provides states with a means to apply pressure to 
nations who do not comply, although it has little usefulness beyond this role. Agenda 21 does, at 
the very least, force states to re-examine basic regulatory programs and their application. 792 
Agenda 21's general goals are now being implemented in national regulatory regimes. 793 As 
discussed, soft law instruments can create expected standards that influence how states behave. 
Creating a standard that requires states to conserve and sustainably use high seas fisheries 
resources and control their high seas flag vessels will influence more states to adopt that 
standard. This would go some way towards alleviating the problem of non-compliance with 
conservation measures on the Antarctic high seas. 
The likely expansion of krill industry from new krill products and reductions in harvesting 
costs794 , makes high seas protection from non-parties to CCAMLR essential to ensure effective 
conservation. The introduction of a comprehensive krill fishing ban would make this even more 
important. As discussed, soft law standards can result in hard customary law if a new state 
practice is established. The standards outlined in Chapter 17 could eventually harden into new 
rules of customary law, although the usefulness of such customary laws in protecting the high 
seas is questionable. The Icelandic Fisheries Case (UK v Iceland/95 and the Icelandic Fisheries 
Case (Germany v lee land) arguably, already support a customary international law rule for 
cooperation between states to achieve the conservation and sustainable use of high seas fisheries 
resources. 
796 The repetition of Chapter 17's principles in other international law instruments 
makes it more likely that a new customary rule will evolve. Chapter 17 has already been adopted 
in part by a hard law instrument in the UN Fish Stocks Agreement. The hardening of Chapter 1 7 
principles into customary law would arguably provide CCAMLR parties with a legal justification 
to enforce conservation measures against non-parties on the Antarctic high seas. 
791 Birnie, P. and Boyle, A. Supra, fn 233, 566 
792 Carr, C.J. and Scheiber, H.N. 2002. Dealing with a Resource Crisis: Regulatory Regimes for Managing 
the World's Marine Fisheries. Stanford Environmental Law Journal, Vol21: 45-79 at 77 
793 Ibid, 72 
794 See Chapter 1 for a discussion of the potential for a large scale krill industry to arise. 
795 ICJ Rep. (1974) 
796 Birnie, P. and Boyle, A. Supra, fn 233, 88 
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The Fish Stocks Agreement includes the ideas of conservation and sustainable use outlined in 
Agenda 21. The Agreement also implements the provisions relating to the precautionary 
approach797 and those relating to states with an interest in high seas fishing becoming members 
of regional organisations. The Fish Stocks Agreement also goes further than previous 
instruments in placing obligations on non-parties.798 A comprehensive krill ban, or even 
precautionary catch limts, can only be effective if third parties are bound. Accordingly, the Fish 
Stocks Agreement would, if it applies to krill, appear to provide greater legal protection than 
other international agreements. 
The Fish Stocks Agreement restricts access to fisheries resources to states applying the 
conservation measures of regional management organisations and obliges states to cooperate for 
the conservation of highly migratory species. This places conservation duties on even flag 
vessels of non-parties to the agreement. m Failure to comply will mean that a flag state is not 
able to participate in the fishery. 800 The instrument, in effect, has the capacity to solve the 
problems with third party states ignoring conservation measures on the high seas. In particular, 
inspectors could enforce krill conservation measures by using force on vessels in Antarctic high 
seas.
801 This would only be the case if krill were covered by the agreement or an amendment 
was made. 
A Treaty is only binding if a state consents to it, which brings into question the legality of 
measures that aim to bind third party states. The need for consent has been one of the major 
constraints on international environmental law. 802 There is nothing in the Vienna Convention 
that explicitly states or implies that nations can be bound without consent. 803 The Rio 
Conference involved a majority of world nations and, because Agenda 21 was formulated out of 
this conference, states have arguably committed themselves to its principles. 804 If any 
commitment in Agenda 21 to "sustainable use and conservation of marine living resources of the 
high seas" necessitated a constraint of the traditional high seas freedom, then the Fish Stocks 
Agreement is a means of applying the consent that nations have arguably given to Agenda 21. 805 
797 A more detailed discussion of the precautionary approach will take place in Chapter 4. 
798 Article 8(4) of the Fish Stocks Agreement says that only nations that are members or participants of 
regional fishing organisations or apply their conservation measures shall have access to the fishery 
resources. Article 17(1) places an obligation on states to cooperate in the conservation and management 
of straddling and highly migratory stocks even if the state is not a member of a fishing organisation. 
799 Bratspies, R. Supra, fn 599, 239 
800 Ibid 
801 Article 22(1 )(f) also gives inspectors the power to use force against vessels on the high seas even if they 
are non-parties. 
802 Palmer, G. Supra, fn 742,271 
803 Ibid, 272 
804 Bratspies, R. Supra, fn 599, 244 
805 Ibid 
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If so, states would be bound by the Fish Stocks Agreement because of their consent to Agenda 
21. This also raises implications about other future Treaties that embody the principles of 
Agenda 21. States could find themselves bound by provisions of such Treaties simply by 
consenting to Agenda 21. However, an alternative argument is that Agenda 21 is simply a 
means of outlining possible future goals rather than evidencing consent to new management 
regimes. 806 The generality of Agenda 21 and the absence of specific proposals for future regimes 
make it improbable that states intended to be bound by future agreements that arise from its 
principles. 807 The high seas provisions of the Fish Stocks Agreement that affect non-parties 
would have been implicitly agreed to by those parties if it constitutes customary international 
law.808 Consistent state practice is a necessary prerequisite for the formation of customary law 
and the absence of similar enforcement mechanisms in the management regimes of any regional 
management organisations implies that the enforcement procedures are not customary law and 
are therefore invalid. 809 
Agenda 21 also contains a chapter on biological diversity. Krill, as the base of the Antarctic 
marine ecosystem, are a necessity for maintaining species biological diversity in Antarctica.810 
Chapter 15 of Agenda 21 is directed more towards supporting the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, which was simultaneously introduced at the Rio Conference, rather than outlining any 
new principles. Indeed, one of its stated intentions is to support the Biodiversity Convention as 
well as to improve the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity. 811 The principles 
contained in Agenda 21, like the Biodiversity Convention, are also very general and do not go · 
into a great deal of detail as to how they are to be achieved. 812 These requirements are similar to 
those of the Biodiversity Convention and, like that Treaty, there are few specific provisions 
outlining how such goals are to be achieved. 
806 Ibid 
807 Paragraph 17.50 also simply calls for a conference to be held on highly migratory species. There are no 
detailed provisions governing such species, making it less likely that states consented to a management 
regime concerning them. 
808 Bratspies, R. Supra, fn 599, 244 
809 Ibid 246 
810 The,importance of krill to biological diversity has been discussed in the previous chapter. 
811 Paragraph 15.1, Agenda 21 
812 Paragraph 15.5, for example, requires governments to develop or strengthen plans for the conservation 
and sustainable use of biological diversity; integrate such strategies; take action to conserve ecosystems 
through in situ conservation; and promote the recovery of threatened and endangered species. 
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Agenda 21 also uses similar vague language to the Biodiversity Convention calling on states to 
"promote cooperation" and "strengthen support" for regional instruments. Such provisions fall a 
long way short of a strong requirement for coordinated efforts to achieve conservation and 
sustainable use ofbiological diversity. The provisions of Agenda 21 add little to the Convention 
on Biological Diversity. Both instruments are extremely weak because of their general nature. 
As discussed previously, their real strength lies in focussing the attention of states on the issue of 
conserving biodiversity and placing political and legal pressure on states to adopt necessary 
conservation measures. 
III. Earth Summit +5 
Five years after Agenda 21 was introduced, in June 1997, the UN General Assembly held a 
special session (also known as the Earth Summit +5) to review the implementation of the 
Agenda. 813 Out of this conference came a General Assembly resolution called the Programme 
for the Further Implementation of Agenda 21. The opening paragraphs of this resolution 
constitute an acknowledgement of the problems still being faced since Agenda 21 was 
formulated. 814 These provisions merely recognise current problems and do not suggest any 
solutions, making them of little consequence. However, they do once again focus the attention of 
states on these issues and the need to strengthen and improve environmentql regulation such as 
international fisheries management regimes. 
813 Lee, J. 2000. The U~derlying Legal Theory to Support a Well-Defined Human Right to a Healthy 
Environment as a Principle of Customary International Law. Columbia Journal of Environmental Law, Vol 
25:283-340 at 322. 133 countries took part in Earth Summit +5 (Lee, J. Supra, fu 859, 322). 
814 Paragraph 9 of the programme acknowledges that marine fish stocks are still being used at rates beyond 
their viable rates of regeneration. Paragraph 10 lists achievements since the Rio Conference, including the 
Convention on Biological Diversity and the Fish Stocks Agreement and observes that they still need to be 
carried out and their provisions may need to be strengthened for this to occur. 
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The Programme also has a section devoted to the oceans and seas.815 This section recognises the 
problems with overfishing and the need for greater implementation of regional fisheries 
agreements. However, the section simply states that there is "an urgent need" for action in these 
areas, creating no binding obligations and doing nothing at all to address the problem. The Earth 
Summit +5 resolution outlines no potential solutions for such problems and contains no binding 
agreements in relation to marine resources. As such it offers nothing additional to Agenda 21 
that could help to protect the Antarctic krill. 
Earth Summit +5 has been touted as a failure because there was no formulation of binding 
environmental targets by the participants.816 Participants in the conference did not support a 
renegotiation of Agenda 21. 817 Earth Summit +5 added little to Agenda 21 but it still reiterated 
the need for the world community to take further action to deal withproblems facing the 
environment such as the issue of overfishing in the world's oceans. 
815 Paragraph 36 recognises the progress made since the Rio Conference in the fisheries area, but that fish 
stocks continue to decline. The paragraph also acknowledges that "there is a need for" concerted action by 
all countries so that relevant international agreements concerning fisheries management and conservation 
can be implemented. However, simply recognising a "need" for such action creates no binding obligation 
and there is nothing to say how this will be achieved. Paragraph 36 acknowledges that "there is an urgent 
need for" a number of actions to be conducted by states. These actions include the ratification and 
effective implementation of relevant fisheries agreements; better identification of priorities for action to 
promote conservation and sustainable use of marine resources; greater international cooperation to support 
the strengthening of regional agreements for protection and sustainable use of the oceans; and governments 
to prevent or eliminate overfishing by adopting management regimes to ensure sustainable management. 
816 Farr, K.T. 2000. A New Global Environmental Organisation. The Georgia Journal of International and 
Comparative Law, Vol28: 493-525 at 493 
817 Earth Summit Review Ends with Few Commitments. United Nations Department of Public Information-
DPI/1916/SD- July 1997, UN website http://www.un._Q[g. Even the President of the General Assembly at 
the time, Ambassador Razali Ismail of Malaysia, stated that the outcome of the Earth Summit +5 was 
"sobering" and a "wake-up call" for states. The President observed that the absence of any strong 
agreements for action from the conference was a result of the "enormous difficulties of overcoming short-
term and vested interests that would enable concrete commitments to specific targets and to global 
programmes" (Earth Summit Review Ends with Few Commitments. United Nations Department of Public 
Information- DPI/1916/SD- July 1997, UN website http://www.un.org). 
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IV. The Code of Conduct for Responsible Fishing 
The Code of Conduct for Responsible Fishing is a Code that outlines the duties of states that 
need to be fulfilled in order to promote responsible fishing. 818 The UN Food and Agriculture 
Organisation (FAO) completed the Code in 1995 and it was adopted by the Twenty-eighth 
Session ofthe FAO Conference on 31 October 1995.819 The Code of Conduct is a voluntary 
agreement,820 leaving it open to the criticism that it is a weak instrument that states will only 
follow when it suits them. The voluntary nature of the Code has actually been a majo'r benefit 
because it has allowed the instrument to address a much wider range of topics than a binding 
Treaty ever could. 821 .The Code's principles are intended to apply universally to fishing 
activities822 which gives it a greater scope than a binding Treaty could ever hope to achieve. The 
rationale behind the Code is that structural change is needed if sustainability objectives are to be 
met for world fisheries. 823 The Code's provisions adopt the idea of sustainable use and are 
relevant to the protection of krill on the Antarctic high seas. High seas protection is vital for the 
effective introduction of a krill fishing ban and is equally necessary if precautionary catch limits 
are maintained instead. 
The universal connotations of the Code make it extremely beneficial for the protection of high 
seas Antarctic krill. The Code applies to all fishing and all bodies having an interest in it, 
including states, fishing organisations and individuals involved in the industry. 824 The Code's 
principles are mainly intended to apply to the conservation, management and development of 
fisheries, although they also apply to other fisheries areas such as processing, trade, aquaculture 
and research. 825 One of the main objectives of the Code is to formulate principles for 
responsible fishing and for the implementation of national policies governing such fishing. 826 
818 The Code had its origins in the International Conference on Responsible Fishing that was held in 
Cancun, Mexico in May 1992. The Declaration ofCancun was the result of that conference. This 
instrument outlined the need for a comprehensive fisheries regime governing the concept of responsible 
fisheries, which included the sustainable use of such fisheries resources. The Declaration also gave 
support to a Code of Conduct for Responsible Fishing being drafted in the future (Doulman, D.J. 1998. 
The Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries: The Requirement for Structural Change and Adjustment 
in the Fisheries Sector. UN FAO website, http://www.fao.org). Some movement towards drafting the Code 
took place, but the impetus for its completion came from the Rome Consensus on World Fisheries in 1995. 
This consensus urged governments to complete the Code (Annex 2, F AO Code of Conduct on Responsible 
Fisheries 1995) so that greater action could be taken to prevent overfishing and it was adopted by the F AO 
Ministerial Conference on Fisheries in 1995. 
819 UN FAO website, http://www.fao.org 
820 Article 1.1, FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries 1995 
821 Doulman, D.J. 1998. Supra, fu 864 
822 Can, C.J. and Scheiber, H.N. Supra, fn 837,70 
823 Doulman, D.J. 1998. Supra, fu 864 
824 Article 1.2, FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries 1995 
825 Article 1.3, FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries 1995 
826 Article 2, FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries 1995 
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The Code can be used as a guideline when states are formulating legislation on responsible 
fisheries or are drafting international instruments on the subject. 827 This guidance function also 
aids individuals who are involved in the fishing industry. 828 Like many soft law instruments, this 
guidance function helps to outline expected standards of behaviour. States can draw on the 
Code's provisions when drafting national legislation because of these expected standards. The 
Code will benefit krill if states adopt its provisions because of its detailed conservation goals. 
However, these goals will only help to justify a comprehensive fishing ban if they have a 
primarily environmental focus. 
The Code is intended to "promote protection of living aquatic resources and their environments 
and coastal areas". 829 The Code recognises that a right to fish comes with an obligation to fish in 
a responsible manner that ensures conservation.830 The Code's focus on maximum sustainable 
yield and optimum utilisation does imply that there is an underlying development goal in the 
Code. However, as previously mentioned, a concept of sustainable use that requires the 
objectives of optimum utilisation and maximum sustainable yield could still leave room for a 
moratorium on krill fishing if one focuses on the optimum utilisation of other species in the 
Antarctic ecosystem. Protecting krill would allow the Antarctic ecosystem as a whole to have 
greater biological security and produce a greater biological yield. Accordingly, a krill fishing 
moratorium would still arguably be consistent with the Code's objectives. 
827 Ibid 
828 Ibid 
829 Article 2(g), FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries 1995 
830 Article 6.1, FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries 1995. States are required, under Article 
7 .1.1 to adopt measures for the long-term conservation and sustainable use of fisheries resources. Such 
measures should be aimed at long-term sustainability by "promoting the objective of optimum utilisation." 
(Article 7 .1.1 ). This provision also requires resources to be available for present and future generations 
(Article 7 .1.1 ). The provision recognises the concepts of sustainable development and intergenerational 
equity that have been previously outlined in other instruments such as Agenda 21. Article 6.2 of the Code 
also supports these concepts. Article 7.2.1 also recognises the overriding importance oflong-term 
sustainability in management measures. However, it also requires states to adopt measures to "maintain or 
restore stocks at levels capable of producing maximum sustainable yield". 
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The objective of maximum sustainable yield does, as previously discussed, carry with it a unique 
set of problems. As discussed, the maintenance of a particular stock at a level ensuring its 
maximum sustainable yield will not necessarily mean that interrelated stocks will be kept at such 
a level. Maintaining one stock at a level ensuring maximum sustainable yield can actually 
prevent some dependent species being restored to levels of maximum sustainable yield. 
However, it is submitted that the Code permits krill conservation measures that do not embrace 
the concept of optimum utilisation of krill at a level of maximum sustainable yield. 831 If the 
short-term goals of krill harvesting compromise the conservation and sustainable use of krill or 
their dependent species, then a comprehensive ban (or a level of protection less than optimum 
utilisation) is arguably permissible. Relevant environmental factors, such as the potential for 
dependent species to be depleted or unable to recover to levels of maximum sustainable yield 
would also qualify the need to maintain krill at maximum sustainable yield. Requiring krill 
fishing at a level lower than maximum sustainable yield can facilitate the recovery of other 
species, such as the baleen whales, in accordance with the long-term conservation objectives of 
the Code. The long-term conservation and sustainable use of dependent fish stocks would be 
threatened if krill were optimally utilised and maintained at maximum sustainable yield. This is 
more likely given increased demand for krill products and the development of new products. A 
comprehensive ban, or a level of protection that did not permit optimum utilisation, would 
prevent the Code's objectives being compromised. 
The Code of Conduct also appears to allow a less stringent approach than optimum utilisation of 
all target species. The Code recognises the need to consider the impact on species that are 
associated with, or dependent upon, target stocks or belong to the same or an associated 
ecosystem. 832 This seems to embody a similar approach to ecosystem management because it is 
an approach that does not just focus on conserving target species. 833 Such an approach would 
allow conservation of krill at less than a level of optimum utilisation and, arguably, allows a 
complete krill harvesting ban, at least in the short-term because of the likely expansion of krill 
industry. The key role of krill in the Antarctic ecosystem means that its exploitation can have a 
major impact on dependent species populations and, as discussed, its harvesting can dramatically 
effect local predator populations. This thesis submits that the Code's recognition of interspecies 
impacts permits a complete krill fishing ban because such species are likely to be affected by 
krill harvesting in a way that does not permit their long-term conservation and sustainable use. 
831 Article 7 .2.1 states that this requirement is to be "qualified by relevant environmental and economic 
factors". Article 7.1.1 also states that short term considerations should not compromise the objectives of 
long-term conservation and sustainable use. 
832 Article 7.2.3 and Article 6.2, FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries 1995. This provision 
also requires relationships among ecosystem populations to be assessed. 
833 Song, Y. 1997. Concluding Perspectives on Ecosystem Management: Comments on Mr. Carr's 
Presentation. Ecology Law Quarterly, Vol 24: 861-864 at 862 
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Furthermore, Article 7.5 of the Code of Conduct specifically recognises that states should take a 
precautionary approach to fisheries management. The Code does not outline which form of the 
precautionary approach should be adopted. Accordingly, because of the scientific uncertainty 
surrounding krill population a strong form of the precautionary approach would justify the 
introduction of a krill fishing moratorium and would appear to be consistent with the provisions 
of the Code. 
The Code also offers krill protection in its requirement that measures conserve the biodiversity of 
ecosystems and protect endangered species.834 The Code supports this requirement by making it 
a necessity for users of living resources to conserve aquatic ecosystems835 and to promote the 
diversity of fisheries resources. 836 The Code, if adopted by states, will be important for ensuring 
that the fisheries objectives of the Convention on Biological Diversity are achieved.837 The 
previously discussed importance of krill to maintaining biodiversity, arguably, permits a 
complete ban under the Code, or at least allows exploitation at a level less than optimum 
utilisation. The Code also requires that any depleted stocks should be allowed to recover or be 
actively restored "where appropriate". 838 Depleted stocks that are dependent on krill can be 
actively restored, or allowed to recover, by protecting their main food supply of krill. A greater 
food supply would allow greater levels of recruitment for depleted stocks and hasten their 
recovery. The requirement to correct adverse environmental impacts merely "where appropriate" 
weakens the application of these provisions to a complete krill fishing ban because of krill 
fishing interests.839 This is despite the fact that a comprehensive harvesting ban could allow the 
reversal of environmental impacts on depleted species such as baleen whales. 
834 Article 7.2.2, FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries 1995 
835 Article 6.1, FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries 1995 
836 Article 6.2, FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries 1995 
837 De Fontaubert, C., Downes, D.R. and Agardy, T.S. 1998. Biodiversity in the Seas: Implementing the 
Convention on Biological. Diversity in Marine and Coastal Habitats. Georgetown International Law 
Review, Vol10: 753-854 at 791 
838 Article 7.2.2, FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries 1995. This is mirrored in article 6.3 
which requires states to take measures to rehabilitate populations "as far as possible and when 
appropriate". 
839 Active recovery only applies "where appropriate", which weakens this provision. In determining long-
term conservation and sustainable use, fishers' interests are also to be taken into account (Article 7 .2.2). 
The adverse environmental impacts from human activities on resources are also to be assessed and 
corrected "where appropriate" (Article 7.2.2). The interests of krill fishers may appear to prevent complete 
conservation of krill under the Code's provisions, despite potential threats to other species from krill 
harvesting. 
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Management measures 
The Code also focuses on the preferred approach to stock management. Its approach is similar 
to that of CCAMLR. 840 Such an approach is necessary for krill because of the effects on 
localised predator krill harvesting and the possibility of separate genetic populations of krill 
existing. 841 The Code of Conduct contains guidelines on management measures that require 
states to ensure that fishing volumes are consistent with the level of fisheries resources. 842 The 
Code requires states and regional fisheries organisations to implement measures to facilitate the 
sustained recovery of resources threatened with depletion. 843 This paper submits that these Code 
provisions support a krill fishing moratorium. The recovery of currently depleted krill dependent 
stocks, such as baleen whales, can be hastened by a comprehensive harvesting ban. As 
previously discussed, current competition from other krill dependent stocks inhibits the recovery 
of baleen whales. and their recovery can be facilitated by total krill protection. 
When evaluating alternative conservation and management measures, the Code requires cost 
effectiveness and social impact to be considered. 844 The choice between a comprehensive 
harvesting ban and a lesser form of protection (such as maintaining precautionary catch limits) 
will be influenced by the social impact on current krill fishers and the impact and cost of a total 
fishing ban on current krill markets. However, the comprehensive approach embodied in the 
Code can help fishers to avoid the competitive need to fish in an unsustainable manner. The 
vessels of all states will be required to use the same methods, rather than being forced to cut 
costs by using unsustainable practices. 845 The Code also requires conservation and management 
measures to be continually reviewed to determine their efficacy. 846 
Any comprehensive ban that was implemented now could be reviewed and lifted or limited to 
sensitive areas in the future if it was not effective or it was not facilitating the recovery of 
depleted stocks such as baleen whales. 
840 Article 7.3 .1 advocates a management approach that focuses on the whole stock unit over its entire area 
of distribution. 
841 These two issues and the uncertainty surrounding them are discussed in Chapter 1. 
842 Article 7.6.1, FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries 1995 
843 Article 7.6.10, FAO Code ofConductfor Responsible Fisheries 1995 
844 Article 7 .6. 7, FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries 1995 
845 De Fontaubert, C., Downes, D.R. and Agardy, T.S. Supra, fn 883, 793 
846 Article 7.6.8, FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries 1995 
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Trans boundary Stocks and Highly Migratory species 
The Code of Conduct also specifically focuses on straddling, highly migratory and high seas fish 
stocks. However, it only offers weak protection for these species because of the way in which its 
provisions are drafted. 847 It is also unclear whether krill come within the definition of highly 
migratory stocks because the expression is not defined, and as mentioned earlier, it is not clear 
whether krill are localised or highly migratory. The Code states that its provisions are to be 
"interpreted and applied in conformity" with the Law of the Sea Convention and in "a manner 
consistent" with the Fish Stocks Agreement. 848 The Fish Stocks Agreement does not define the 
expression either but the Law of the Sea Convention does not include krill within its specific 
definition of highly migratory stocks. If the Code is to be "interpreted and applied in 
conformity" with the Law of the Sea Convention, then krill may not be highly migratory stocks 
and would not be covered by these provisions of the Code. 
The Code of Conduct also contains provisions that strengthen the role of regional fisheries 
organisations. If such an organisation already exists and has competence to establish 
conservation and management measures, states are required to cooperate by becoming a member 
or participants of the organisation. 849 States that are not members should still cooperate by 
giving effect to conservation and management measures of the organisation. 850 These provisions 
can give weight to the validity ofCCAMLR's conservation and management measures and can 
help to persuade other states to either join the organisation or to conform to its measures. 
However, the Code still does not give total support to regional management organisations.851 
847 Article 7 .1.3 states that nations "should cooperate to ensure effective conservation and management" of 
highly migratory, straddling, transboundary and high seas fish stocks. As discussed, an obligation to 
"cooperate" may weaken conservation provisions aimed at these fish stocks. Despite this failing, the 
obligation to ensure "effective" conservation and management may place a greater duty on the state than 
merely one to cooperate. The requirement of"effectiveness" may mean that a state has to take genuine 
measures to protect these stocks, rather than simply cooperating regardless of the outcome. However, 
"effectiveness" may also cause problems of interpretation because of the subjectivity involved in defining 
such a concept (Bratspies, R. Supra, fn 599, 235). States may place their own slant on what constitutes 
"effective" conservation of these stocks. The objective is to be achieved "where appropriate" by 
establishing a regional fisheries organisation (Article 7.1.3). This may suggest that parties should conform 
to CCAMLR's conservation measures. 
848 Article 3.1 and 3.2(a), FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries 1995 
849 Article 7.1.4, FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries 1995 
850 Article 7 .1.5, FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries 1995 
851 Article 7.3.4 also requires states and "where appropriate" regional fisheries organisations to "foster and 
promote" international cooperation and coordination in all matters related to fisheries. This provision 
gives added support to the need for consistent conservation measures governing Antarctic krill that are 
subscribed to by all states. Simply requiring these bodies to "foster and promote" such coordination and 
only "where appropriate" decreases the strength of the section. Although there is an increased emphasis on 
regional organisations in the Code, there is still less than total support for such organisations. If States 
wish to take action through non-fishery organisations which could affect a competent organisation's 
measures, they are required to consult in advance "to the extent practicable" and take its views into 
account (Article 7.3.5). However, prior consultation is not essential and even with consultation an 
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The Code attempts to provide a comprehensive guide for responsible fisheries that can ensure 
conservation and sustainable development of fisheries resources. The Code is, however, too 
broad in scope to provide adequate protection and is not be defined with sufficient clarity. 852 
Such an approach weakens the Code because states have discretion in how it is to be 
implemented and the generality of the provisions also makes it difficult for states to know how 
they should be applied. There are articles of the Code that outline areas, such as fisheries 
management and operations measures, in much greater detail. Furthermore, the F AO has 
developed, and is continuing to develop, technical guidelines that describe how the Code is to be 
applied. 853 Such guidelines provide much greater detail on how the provisions of the Code 
should be implemented.854 FAO members have voiced their strong support for these guidelines 
as important tools for the implementation of the Code. 855 
The Code's generality is one of many problems that hamper its implementation. For the Code to 
operate effectively, it is necessary for cooperation to exist between a large number of different 
groups including government, fishers, non-government organisations, and consumers. 856 The 
large scale of cooperation required means that implementation of the Code will result in gradual 
changes, rather than rapid results.857 This is especially true for krill because of the unique 
difficulties surrounding Antarctic sovereignty and the large area of high seas that krill inhabit in 
the Southern Ocean. Many F AO members have also expressed concern at the lack of financial 
and technical support they have received to implement the Code. 858 If some states do not have 
the funds or knowledge to introduce the Code then it will be less effective and its potential to 
provide a truly comprehensive regime will be reduced. 
organisation's views simply need to be taken into account. The provision detracts from the other Code 
provisions that support regional organisations because it allows states to potentially take actions that 
conflict with a regional organisation's conservation measures. 
852 Bratspies, R. Supra, fn 599, 235. For example, the Code's general principles outlined in Article 6 
require states to prevent overfishing, however, they do not specify when states should take such measures, 
how overfishing is to be prevented, or the definition of overfishing. This particular section (Article 6), 
however, forms part of the Code's general principles. 
853 Doulman, D.J. 1998. Supra, fn 864 
854 For example, the technical guidelines concerning sustainable development advocate the need to 
introduce a "sustainable development reference system" that could be used to develop and organise 
indicators that allow states to determine if sustainable development goals are being met within the ocean 
environment. 
855 FAO Report of the 24th Session of the Committee on Fisheries, Rome, 26th February-
2nd March 2001. 
856 Doulman, D.J. 1998. Supra, fn 864 
857 Ibid 
858 FAO Report of the 24th Session of the Committee on Fisheries, Rome, 26th February-
2nd March 2001. 
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Other developed states are now being called on by the F AO to give increased technical support 
and financial assistance to ensure that the Code is effectively implemented by developing states. 
859 This demonstrates another major obstacle that must be overcome to effectively introduce a 
comprehensive harvesting ban. Not only must there be strong legal obligations on all states in 
respect of marine species, states must also actually implement those measures in practice. 
Without sufficient technical and financial support, many states will find it impossible to 
adequately implement the conservation measures of international instruments such as the Code. 
Efforts are currently being made by the UN to resolve the difficulties arising from a lack of 
resources (see, for example, the discussion later in this Chapter concerning the creation of an 
Assistance Fund by the UN General Assembly). However, the UN FAO itself has recently 
expressed concerns "over the lack of concrete steps taken to ensure the effective application of 
[the F AO Compliance plan; the F AO Code of Conduct; the F AO International Plan of Action; 
and the UN Fish Stocks Agreement], despite national commitments. This situation was caused 
by a variety of reasons, most importantly by the lack of technical and financial capacity and 
administrative hurdles."860 
Although the Code can provide a comprehensive conservation regime, its voluntary status 
lessens its potential effectiveness. If the Code is merely voluntary then states can simply ignore 
its provisions when it suits them or can interpret or apply them in a convenient manner. This will 
also prevent the Code being a truly comprehensive regime because some states can always 
decide to ignore its provisions. As discussed, enforcement against third parties is one ofthe 
major problems of fisheries conventions. If states refuse to abide by the Code, then it would be 
in danger of failing to provide any meaningful solution to the overfishing problem. The Code, 
however, like many other soft law instruments, provides guidelines on how states should act or 
provides an expected standard of behaviour. There is already some evidence that states do regard 
the Code as the proper standard for responsible fisheries. The Code has already been voluntarily 
implemented by the national legislation of many states. 861 
859 Ibid 
860 Paragraphs 46 and 47, Report on the work of the United Nations Open-ended Informal Consultative 
Process on Oceans and the Law of the Sea at its fifth meeting, N59/122, 2004 
861 The Philippines, for example, has adopted the Philippine Fisheries Code which incorporates many of 
the provisions in the Code of Conduct (Shannon, D. 2002. The Future ofMunicipal Fisheries in the 
Philippines: Does the Philippine Fisheries Code Do Enough? Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal, Vol 11: 
717-743 at 732). Canada is also developing a national Code that draws on the provisions of the F AO Code 
(Carr, C.J. and Scheiber, H.N. Supra, fn 837, 72) and the National Marine Fisheries Service of the US 
supports the Code of Conduct and has outlined a plan to implement it (Vigneron, G. 1998. The Most 
Recent Efforts in the International Community to Implement the 1995 United Nations Straddling Fish 
Stocks Agreement. Colorado Journal of International Law and Policy: 225). 
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As discussed previously, soft law instruments can "harden" into customary law if there is 
evidence of a state practice consistent with such agreements and if there is evidence of opinio 
juris. The adoption by states of the Code's provisions provides some evidence of state practice, 
although it would need to be adopted by a majority of states before it became part of customary 
law. The soft law nature of the instrument suggests that there is no opinio juris because states 
may not regard it as a binding practice. However, the adoption of its principles in national 
legislation and the support for its principles in subsequent international instruments can provide 
evidence of opinio juris. Even if the Code is customary law this will not necessarily add to its 
effectiveness because, as discussed, customary law imposes only a weak obligation, although as 
discussed it is unlikely that the Code would currently constitute customary law. 
The Rome Declaration 
One of the subsequent instruments that provide support for the Code of Conduct is the Rome 
Declaration. 862 The Declaration gives direct support for the Code, calling upon users of fisheries 
resources to apply it.863 The Declaration also adds its support to other approaches outlined in the 
Code such as sustainabilitl64 and the ecosystem approach. 865 It also mandates encouraging 
further growth in sustainable aquaculture.866 This objective is, arguably, not in accordance with a 
total krill fishing ban. As discussed, krill has recently been used in aquaculture both as a diet 
supplement and as an additive that stimulates feeding and can increase production. A complete 
ban867 would not accord with the objective of encouraging further growth i~ aquaculture because 
of krill's potential to substantially increase that growth.868 
862 This Declaration was adopted unanimously by an F AO Ministerial Meeting in Rome on 10 and 11 
March 1999 (The Rome Declaration on the Implementation of the Code of Conduct for Responsible 
Fisheries 1999). 126 Members of the F AO supported the Rome Declaration. 
863 Article 12(1), The Rome Declaration on the Implementation of the Code of Conduct for Responsible 
Fisheries 1999 
864 Article 12(c) and (n), The Rome Declaration on the Implementation of the Code of Conduct for 
Responsible Fisheries 1999 
865 Article 6 and Article 12(c), The Rome Declaration on the Implementation of the Code of Conduct for 
Responsible Fisheries 1999 
866 Article 12(n), The Rome Declaration on the Implementation of the Code of Conduct for Responsible 
Fisheries 1999 
867 There are, of course, other species of krill that exist outside Antartica .. 
868 However, Article 12(c) states that highest priority is to be accorded to achievingsustainability of 
aquaculture "within the framework of the ecosystem approach". Because of the reliance of so many other 
species on krill, its exploitation for aquaculture growth may not be necessary under the Rome Declaration 
if an ecosystem approach is applied. 
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The Rome Declaration also emphasises the central role that is given to regional organisations in 
the Code ofConduct.869 Strengthening of regional management o;ganisations such as CCAMLR 
will aid the implementation of the Code's principles and could therefore benefit the Antarctic 
krill. There is also recognition in the Declaration of the need for financial and technical 
assistance for developing states to achieve this goal. 870 
The use of language in the Rome Declaration suggests that it is a non-binding soft law 
instrument.871 However, the reiteration ofthe Code of Conduct's principles in the Declaration is 
a step towards customary acceptance, especially since it was unanimously adopted by 126 states. 
At the very least, it will increase pressure on other States to abide by the Code of Conduct's 
principles which could potentially give added protection on the high seas in Antarctica if more 
pressure were placed on States to join regional fishing organisations such as CCAMLR. 
A further Rome Declaration on IUU fishing was made by the F AO Ministerial Meeting on 
Fisheries on 12 March 2005. The Declaration made statements including that participants would 
"renew our efforts" to undertake activities such as implementing effective catch certification 
schemes; adopting market-related measures (in accordance with international law including 
principles contained in WTO agreements); ensuring appropriate deterrent sanctions .are contained 
in national legislation; and taking action to implement appropriate monitoring, control and 
surveillance mechanisms.872 This new Rome Declaration goes much further because it actually 
attempts to describe some of the measures that should be taken to prevent IUU fishing, including: 
41 Supplementation of current monitoring, control and surveillance systems by encouraging 
fishing fleets to report any suspected IUU fishing they observe; 
41 Exchanging vessel monitoring system and observer data between regional management 
organisations; 
• Developing a comprehensive global record of fishing vessels with the F AO; 
869 Article 8 recognised the "important role that regional fishery management organisations can play in 
respect of the implementation of the Code of Conduct." Article 12( d) gives an undertaking by the parties 
that adopted the Declaration that they will collaborate with states and governmental and non-governmental 
organisations to promote the effective implementation of the Code of Conduct. 
870 Article 5, The Rome Declaration on the Implementation of the Code of Conduct for Responsible 
Fisheries 1999. Article 12(i) also "urges" the F AO to aid such countries and "invites" donor agencies and 
funding institutions to increase technical and financial assistance. The lack of any clear requirement for 
parties to the Declaration to provide aid to developing countries is a weakness and merely "urging" or 
"inviting" them to do so will not solve the implementation problems caused by poor funding and Jack of 
technical knowledge. 
871 The Declaration uses terms such as "encourage", "call upon", "invite" and "urge", rather than using 
language that would designate a binding obligation. 
872 Rome Declaration 1995. FAO Ministerial Meeting on Fisheries, 12 March 2005. 
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• Developing and effectively implementing internationally agreed boarding and inspection 
regimes in accordance with international law; 
• Strengthening coastal and port state measures and effectively regulating transhippment 
with the objective of preventing IUU fishing; and 
• Resolving to provide financial and technical assistance to developing states to implement 
h 1 . . 873 measures sue as vesse momtonng systems. 
This new Rome Declaration highlights real actions that need to be taken to combat IUU fishing. 
As such, it provides a real blueprint for action and gives strong guidance to states as to what they 
need to do to fight IUU fishing. The methods of enforcement outlined by this new Rome 
Declaration will be analysed later in this thesis. 
The Kyoto Declaration 
Another international instrument that lends support to the Code of Conduct is the Kyoto 
Declaration. 874 The aim of the conference leading up to the Declaration was to formulate 
measures that would ensure that fishing makes a sustainable contribution to food security in the 
future. 875 The Declaration also recognises the FAO's prediction of a potential shortfall in the 
supply of fishery products by 2010 which could adversely affect world food security. 876 The 
Declaration contends that this shortfall can be reduced by adopting the measures included in the 
instrument. 877 The Declaration supports states taking "steps for effective application" of the 
F AO Code of Conduct, including timely enactment of domestic legislation, in order to alleviate 
the potential future shortfall. 878 It also gives support to the Law of the Sea, Fish Stocks and 
Compliance Agreements as a means of solving the potential problem. 879 
873 Ibid 
874 The International Conference on the Sustainable Contribution ofFish to Food Security took place in 
Japan on 4 to 9 December 1995. The 95 countries that attended the conference adopted the Kyoto 
Declaration and Plan of Action on the Sustainable Contribution of Fisheries to Food Security by consensus 
(UN FAO website, http://www.fao.org). 
875 UN FAO website, http://www.fao.org 
876 Article 3, Kyoto Declaration on the Sustainable Contribution ofFisheries to Food Security 1995 
877 Article 4, Kyoto Declaration on the Sustainable Contribution of Fisheries to Food Security 1995 
878 Article 5, Kyoto Declaration on the Sustainable Contribution of Fisheries to Food Security 1995 
879 Ibid 
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Parties to the Declaration are, however, under little real obligation, besides a moral one, to 
effectively apply the Code.880 The Kyoto Declaration, like the Rome Declaration, is useful as a 
justification for applying political pressure or as a means of cementing the Code of Conduct's 
principles as expected standards of behaviour or as customary law. 
The Kyoto Declaration recognises the role that marine fisheries and aquaculture play in 
providing food security to the world. 881 The main objective of the Declaration is therefore the 
protection of future fisheries resources for the purpose of providing a sustainable food source in 
the future and to also use aquaculture for this goal. 882 The Rome Declaration also supports the 
Kyoto Declaration and Plan of Action883 and the objective of ensuring a sustainable contribution 
of fisheries to the attainment of world food security. 884 The Rome Declaration requires fisheries 
management to "promote" the availability of fisheries resources for food security. 885 This goal of 
food security appears to be at odds with a complete krill fishing ban. As discussed, krill can have 
enormous benefits to the aquaculture industry both as a dietary supplement and as a feeding 
stimulant. Krill have also been touted as a potential protein source for human consumption. 
Given the potential for krill to contribute to world food security, then it is unlikely that a 
comprehensive harvesting ban would accord with this goal. 
Another objective of the Kyoto Declaration is to make optimum use of harvests, including 
unexploited or underexploited resources, and to identifY new, harvestable aquatic resources. 886 
At present, Antarctic krill are exploited at a level that does not even come close to the 
precautionary catch limits set by CCAMLR, so they could be seen as an underexploited 
resource887 that, under the Kyoto Declaration, should be exploited to optimum level. 
880 However, parties to the Declaration are merely required to "consider" being parties to these 
instruments, which provides little real obligation for them to join. The declaration of support for the Code 
of Conduct requires "steps for effective application", rather than merely a consideration, but what 
constitutes "effective" application is really, without specific guidance, a subjective matter for each state. 
The parties to the Declaration also "declare that we should" adopt such measures, rather than requiring 
them to be adopted. 
881 Article 1, Kyoto Declaration on the Sustainable Contribution ofFisheries to Food Security 1995 
882 The Code of Conduct itself also recognises this food security objective and the Code is intended to 
"promote the contribution of fisheries to food security and food quality, giving priority to the nutritional 
needs oflocal communities" (Article 2(f), FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries 1995). 
883 Article 11, The Rome Declaration on the Implementation of the Code of Conduct for Responsible 
Fisheries 1999 
884 Article 12(n), The Rome Declaration on the Implementation of the Code of Conduct for Responsible 
Fisheries 1999 
885 Article 6.2, The Rome Declaration on the Implementation of the Code of Conduct for Responsible 
Fisheries 1999 
886 Articles l5 and 16, Kyoto Declaration on the Sustainable Contribution of Fisheries to Food 
Security 1995 
887 Although given the uncertainty ofkrill population estimates and the potential effects of krill 
exploitation on another species, it is not certain that krill are actually underexploited. 
187 
The Declaration also "seeks to provide an environment" in which commercial fishers can "make 
an optimum contribution to economic and social welfare".888 Arguably, allowing commercial 
fishers to exploit krill to some extent is necessary to provide them with an environment that can 
help to make an optimum contribution to economic welfare. However, a comprehensive ban is 
not completely at odds with the Kyoto Declaration. 
The Kyoto Declaration also supports the goal of conserving and sustainably using aquatic 
biological diversity including the prevention of genetic erosion and species' extinction.889 Krill, 
as discussed, are important for maintaining aquatic biological diversity in Antarctica and their 
exploitation, even to a minor degree, could threaten currently depleted species that are dependent 
on krill. Krill fishing, even on a small scale, can also cause genetic erosion by potentially 
endangering local predator populations because oflocalised krill fishing. 89° Furthermore, the 
endorsement of the Code of Conduct in the Kyoto Declaration suggests support for Code 
provisions that advocate an ecosystem approach. Such an approach requires the conservation of 
species that are related to a target stock. Therefore, an Antarctic krill fishing ban would not 
cause a major conflict with the Kyoto Declaration because, under an ecosystem approach, krill 
protection is necessary to ensure that other dependent species are maintained and can be 
exploited in a sustainable manner. 891 Environmental concerns surrounding krill must always 
remain paramount because of the pivotal role played by krill in the Antarctic ecosystem. 
Economic and developmental objectives relating to krill should not be given priority in legal 
instruments for this reason. 
888 Article 1, Kyoto Declaration on the Sustainable Contribution of Fisheries to Food Security 1995 
889 Article 12, Kyoto Declaration on the Sustainable Contribution of Fisheries to Food Security 1995 
890 Although, as discussed in Chapter 1, the effect of krill fishing on local predator populations is still 
uncertain. 
891 The Kyoto conference also formulated a set of immediate actions that needed to be taken in its Kyoto 
Plan of Action. These actions included the assessment and monitoring of present and future fishery 
product production and supply and demand (Article 1, Kyoto Plan of Action on the Sustainable 
Contribution of Fisheries to Food Security 1995). The plan of action also required the enhancement of 
regional cooperation and cooperation to strengthen "where necessary" existing regional fishery 
organisations (Article 2, Kyoto Plan of Action on the Sustainable Contribution of Fisheries to Food 
Security 1995). This supports the Code of Conduct's focus on regional organisations. Cooperation to 
strengthen an organisation like CCAMLR could provide greater protection for krill, especially because of 
the large areas of high seas in Antarctica in which krill dwell. 
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Reykjavik Declaration 
The Kyoto Declaration and the F AO Code of Conduct have both had subsequent support in the 
Reykjavik Declaration.892 The conference was an opportunity to decide how ecosystem 
considerations could form part of fisheries management strategies. 893 The concepts of 
sustainable development that were set forth in the Rio Declaration and Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 
have found support in the preamble of the Reykjavik Declaration which "recalls" those political 
commitments. The preamble and main body also give support to the conservation of living 
marine resources by reaffirming the principles of the Law of the Sea Convention and the Code of 
Conduct. 894 
The Reykjavik Declaration places considerable emphasis on adopting an ecosystem approach 
and exploring the best methods of applying such an approach. 895 The Declaration gives clear 
support for an ecosystem approach in any fisheries management regime. At first glance, the 
instrument appears to provide extra support for conservation in the marine environment and 
appears to benefit krill. The instrument's preamble also acknowledges that further scientific 
research is necessary to fully implement such an approach.896 Such undertakings, if carried out 
in relation to krill, would enhance krill management processes and would provide them with 
better protection. 
892 The Reykjavik Conference on Responsible Fisheries in the Marine Ecosystem took place between 1 and 
4 October 2000 in Reykjavik, Iceland (International Institute for Sustainable Development website, 
http://www.iisd.ca). The conference was hosted by Iceland with the cooperation of the FAO and Norway 
(Statement by Halldor Asgrimsson, Minister for Foreign Affairs and External Trade oficeland, During the 
General Debate at the 56th Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, 21 November 2001). 
59 F AO members and observers from 2 non-member nations took part in the conference (UN F AO 
website, http://www.fao.org). Representatives of3 UN agencies attended and 16 Intergovernmental and 
10 Non-Government Organisations were also present (The Reykjavik Conference on Responsible Fisheries 
in the Marine Ecosystem. Presentation by Thorsteinn Ingolfsson, Permanent Representative oflceland to 
the United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development acting as the preparatory committee for the 
World Summit on Sustainable Development. Second preparatory session, Agenda Item 2(c), 28 January 
2002). 
893 International Institute for Sustainable Development website, http://www.iisd.ca 
894Iceland's foreign minister believes there has been little movement on sustainable development 
(Statement by Halldor Asgrimsson, Minister for Foreign Affairs and External Trade oficeland, During the 
General Debate at the 56th Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, 21 November 2001). 
The instrument declares the "determination" of parties to continue effective implementation of the Code, 
which is the "common and agreed guide in strengthening and building fisheries management systems" 
(Article 1, Reykjavik Declaration on Responsible Fisheries in the Marine Ecosystem 1995). 
895 The preamble "recognises" that an ecosystem approach involves taking into account the impacts of 
fisheries on the marine ecosystem and declares that states are "convinced" that such an approach would 
enhance management performance. The preamble also "affirms" that more effective conservation and 
sustainable use can stem from an ecosystem approach that takes species interactions into account. 
896 Article 5 recognises this problem and says that parties "undertake" to identify and describe marine 
ecosystems; species interactions; diet composition and physical and oceanographic factors affecting 
ecosystems. There is also an undertaking to "build or enhance systematic monitoring of natural 
variability" and to "improve the monitoring of by-catch". 
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Uncertainty still surrounds interactions between krill and other species and how environmental 
factors affect krill populations. Uncertainty also surrounds the issue ofby-catch from krill 
harvesting. More research concerning these factors would benefit krill by reducing some of this 
uncertainty. However, the Reykjavik Declaration provides little detail regarding which 
ecosystems and which species the further research is to be carried out on. Furthermore, there is 
no clear financial commitment by specific states to carry out such research. 
The Reykjavik Declaration does recognise that problems still exist with current management 
regimes. 897 The Declaration also gives weight to regional fisheries organisations by stating that it 
is "important to strengthen, improve and where appropriate establish" them. Such a provision 
could provide further support for CCAMLR, however, the Declaration fails to specify how such 
organisations can be improved and does not place obligations on specific states to help improve 
them. 898 The lack of detail in the Reykjavik Declaration is a significant failing. The more recent 
soft law embodied in the 2005 Rome Declaration shows the kind of detail that a soft law 
instrument should embody. The 2005 Rome Declaration is a high value soft law instrument 
because it contains detailed steps that need to be undertaken to combat IUU fishing. 
The Reykjavik Declaration also declares its support for the food security objectives present in the 
Kyoto Declaration.899 This gives greater weight to the Kyoto Declaration's support of the Code 
of Conduct and its food security goals.900 The support for the Kyoto Declaration's food security 
goals must also be clarified by the Reykjavik Declaration's strong emphasis on ecosystem 
approaches to fisheries management. An ecosystem approach means that having some level of 
krill harvesting is not mandatory because of krill's vital role at the base of the ecosystem, despite 
the contribution krill can make to food security. 
897 Article 2 states that there is a "clear need to introduce immediately effective management plans with 
incentives that encourage responsible fisheries and sustainable use of marine ecosystems, including 
mechanisms for reducing excessive fishing efforts to sustainable levels." The Declaration identifies the 
"clear need" but then fails to specify how and by whom "immediately effective management plans are to 
be introduced". 
898 This flaw is also present in Article 6 which states that the "interaction between aquaculture 
development in the marine environment and capture fisheries should be monitored through relevant 
institutional and regulatory arrangements." Monitoring of such interaction could aid krill by looking at the 
interaction between levels of krill harvesting and the use ofkrill in aquaculture. However, the provision 
simply says monitoring is to take place through relevant institutional and regulatory arrangements without 
placing specific obligations on any relevant institutions and without giving any details of the kind of 
monitoring that is to take place. 
899 The preamble states the "awareness" of parties of the contribution that sustainable use of living marine 
resources makes to food security and "confirms" that the ecosystem approach is aimed at ensuring the 
contribution of fisheries to long-term food security as well as conservation and sustainable use. Article 1 
also expresses the "determination" of the parties to continue the effective implementation of the Kyoto 
Declaration. 
900 Although, merely expressing "determination" falls a long way short of any binding obligation. 
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The Reykjavik Declaration has also identified some of the problems in implementing the Code of 
Conduct and seeks to rectify them. The Declaration does seek to address the problem that some 
states have in implementing the Code because of financial and technical deficiencies, but simply 
"urging" organisations to help and expressing "determination" to support such countries may not 
be enough.901 A solid commitment or a binding agreement to help such countries is necessary to 
ensure that the provisions of the Code are implemented. The Code will be a lot more effective if 
it is implemented by as many countries as possible. This deficiency must be remedied for the 
Code's principles to provide any substantive benefit to krill. As discussed above, the F AO itself 
has recently stated its concerns to the UN over the lack of effective implementation of the Code 
due to inadequate financial and technical resources. Without having binding effect on all states, 
its principles will not have the necessary legal power to regulate krill fishing. The Reykjavik 
Declaration also addresses one of the other perceived problems of implementation which is the 
supposed lack of detail on how the Code's provisions are to be carried out.902 
Although the Reykjavik Declaration does not introduce binding obligations, it does reinforce the 
principles espoused in the F AO Code of Conduct. Continual reiteration of these principles in 
instruments such as the Rome, Kyoto and Reykjavik Declarations can only reinforce them as the 
expected standards of behaviour in relation to world fisheries. This gives more states an 
incentive to adopt their provisions and place pressure on states that do not. Eventually, this 
increased acceptance can lead to new customary law rules embodying the principles of the Code. 
Continued reaffirmation of the Code's principles in more international instruments could also 
result in a binding Treaty. Although, many commentators agree that the mere signing and 
ratification of international instruments will not prevent overfishing, one reason being that they 
will not prevent illegal fishing. 903 Achieving compliance with the Code is more important for 
krill conservation than simply introducing binding agreements. 
901 Article 7 expresses "determination" to support developing countries in incorporating ecosystem 
considerations into fisheries management including building expertise in such areas through training. 
Article 9 also "urges" relevant technical and financial organisations and the F AO to cooperate in providing 
technical advice and information about effective management regime. 
902 Article 10 ofthe Declaration gives further support to the FAO's development of technical guidelines for 
best practices including introducing ecosystem considerations into fisheries management. These 
ffluidelines provide the detail needed for effective implementation of the Code's·principles. 
03 Nelson, N. 1999. International Concern for the Sustainability of the World's Fisheries: United Nations 
Efforts to Combat Over-Fishing and International Debate Over State Fishing Subsidies. Colorado Journal 
of International Law and Policy: 157 
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The problem of third party non-compliance with CCAMLR conservation and management 
measures (and the measures of other fishing conventions) threatens the effectiveness of such 
instruments in Antarctica and is the main threat to krill and other exploited Antarctic species. 
Only by finding a means of securing third party compliance can greater protection for Southern 
Ocean species be assured. As mentioned earlier, the UN General Assembly has advocated a 
strengthening of international fisheries management agreements in order to combat IUU fishing. 
This should be seen as a signal that the UN General Assembly will take real action to attempt to 
deal with the problem of third party non-compliance. 
V. World Summit on Sustainable Development 2002 
The World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) was held in Johannesburg, South 
Africa, from the 26 August to 4 September 2002.904 The WSSD recognised that the management 
of natural resources involves problems, because of the trans boundary nature of some resources, 
requiring integrated ecosystem strategies at a regionallevel. 905 Greater regional integration and 
cooperation will aid krill because of the large proportion of Antarctic fishing that is conducted 
outside the auspices of CCAMLR on the high seas. The need for further implementation of 
sustainable development and previous agreements, such as Agenda 21, was outlined in the 
instruments that were adopted by the WSSD. 906 
904 The Summit was intended as a successor conference to the Rio Earth Summit which was held 10 years 
prior. Before the WSSD was concluded, there were a number of conferences and discussions held on the 
problems facing the implementation of sustainable development. Four round tables were held between 2 
and 4 September (World Summit on Sustainable Development 2002, Agenda Item 11, Round Tables, 
Document NCONF. 199117/Add.l) and a number of partnership events were also held. These discussions 
noted the usefulness of regional sustainable development strategies for regional cooperation and 
integration (World Summit on Sustainable Development 2002, Agenda Item 11, Round Tables, Document 
NCONF. 199/17/Add.l). 
905 World Summit on Sustainable Development 2002, Agenda Item 8, Summary of the partnership plenary 
session on regional implementation, Document NCONF. l99/16/Add.3 
906 The round tables also identified the slow progress in implementing Agenda 21 and suggested that a lack 
of political will was the main reason (World Summit on Sustainable Development 2002, Agenda Item 11, 
Round Tables, Document A/CONF. 199117 I Add.l ). They also acknowledged the need for additional 
financial resources to implement Agenda 21 and the agreements arising out of Johannesburg. 
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The WSSD adopted two political resolutions at the conclusion of the conference at the l71h 
plenary meeting on 4 September 2002. The first resolution approved the Johannesburg 
Declaration on Sustainable Development.907 The Johannesburg Declaration reaffirms the 
commitment of the conference attendees to sustainable development.908 However, most of the 
Declaration consists of generalised statements that either state current problems without outlining 
solutions or use flowery language to make highly idealistic statements that have no real 
substance.909 The Declaration has, however, identified a general problem with institutions such 
as CCAMLR which can be ineffective because non-parties are not obliged to comply with their 
measures.
910 
The Declaration does identify some of the needs and problems facing natural resource 
management.911 Although the Declaration does identify the problem of natural resource 
depletion and the need for sustainable development of such resources, it does so only in a very 
general manner. It also fails to outline potential solutions to these problems. These weaknesses 
mean that the Declaration offers little to the regulation of krill and its dependent species. The 
Plan of Implementation contains some more specific solutions to the problem of natural resource 
depletion.912 
The Plan of Implementation was adopted by the second political resolution of the WSSD.913 The 
Plan contains several sections that are specifically aimed at the sustainable development of the 
world's oceans and seas.914 These provisions focus on the economic usefulness of marine 
resources and their role in human food security. Arguably, this suggests that human 
development and human needs are the priority and conservation for the oceans' intrinsic value is 
a subordinate objective.915 However, recognition of the oceans as an "essential component of the 
Earth's ecosystem" also implies that the oceans have intrinsic value. Recognition of this intrinsic 
907 Report of the World Summit on Sustainable Development 2002, Document A/CONF. 199/20 
908 Article 1, Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development 2002 
909 
eg Article 4, "As part of our response to these children, who represent our collective future, all of us, 
coming from every comer of the world, informed by different life experiences, are united and 
moved by a deeply felt sense that we urgently need to create a new and brighter world of hope." 
910 Article 31 states that more effective, democratic and accountable international and multilateral 
institutions are necessary to achieve sustainable development. However, the provision does not mention 
specific problems or institutions and fails to outline even any general solutions. 
911 Article 11 of the Declaration recognises that protecting and managing natural resources are 
"overarching objectives of and essential requirements for sustainable development". Article 13 also 
acknowledges the continuing loss of biodiversity and depletion of fish stocks. 
912 Article 36 commits the parties to the Plan oflmplementation of the World Summit on Sustainable 
Development and to expediting the objectives in it. 
913 Report ofthe World Summit on Sustainable Development 2002, Document NCONF. 199/20 
914 Article 30 recognises that these areas form "an integrated and essential component of the Earth's 
ecosystem and are critical for global food security and for sustaining economic prosperity." 
915 Article 35 of the Johannesburg Declaration also "commits parties to act together to promote human 
development." 
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value would give greater support to a comprehensive krill ban because of the pivotal role played 
by krill in the Antarctic ecosystem. 
The Plan outlines a number of actions that may be necessary to ensure sustainable 
development.916 It offers support for the Law of the Sea Convention.917 As previously discussed, 
the Law of the Sea Convention provides some support for krill conservation, both in Exclusive 
Economic Zones and on the high seas. Unrestricted fishing by third parties on the Antarctic high 
seas is a major problem. Although many of its provisions are very general, ratification of the 
Convention by more parties would place an obligation on such states to conduct high seas fishing 
in accordance with the Convention.918 Regulation of krill fishing on the high seas is crucial if 
they are to be effectively managed, particularly if a comprehensive krill fishing ban is 
introduced. 
The Plan also supports the sustainable development objectives of Agenda 21.919 Supporting 
Agenda 21 makes it unnecessary for the Plan of Implementation to provide a detailed programme 
of action to achieve sustainable development of the world's oceans because a plan of action is 
already detailed in chapter 17 of Agenda 21.920 However, as with the Law of the Sea 
Convention, simply calling on states to "promote" Agenda 21's implementation is unlikely to 
resolve the problem of slow implementation that was identified in the Johannesburg 
Declaration.921 Strong conservation measures that are binding on all states must be introduced 
quickly because of the likely expansion of krill industry. 
916 Article 30 recognises that ensuring sustainable development of the oceans requires effective 
coordination and cooperation between relevant bodies. 
917 Article 30(a) acknowledges the Law of the Sea Convention's role in providing the overall legal 
framework for ocean activities and "invites" states to ratify or accede to it. 
918 However, merely "inviting" parties to ratify the 1982 Convention may not be enough to persuade other 
states to ratify the Convention. If those nations supporting the Johannesburg Plan oflmplementation were 
"required" to ratify the 1982 Convention, then it is far more likely that more states would become parties 
to it. 
919 There is support in Article 30(b) of the Plan for Agenda 21 and its objectives of sustainable 
development. The section provides a brief outline of Chapter 17 's goals of sustainable development of 
oceans (including exclusive economic zones); sustainable use and conservation of marine living resources; 
and strengthening international cooperation and coordination. 
920 Article 30(b) merely seeks to "promote the implementation of Chapter 17 of Agenda 21" rather than 
creating a new plan of action. 
921 If, 10 years after Agenda 21 was formulated, progress is still extremely slow, then it is unlikely that a 
call to "promote" its implementation will solve the problem. As discussed, Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 may 
be particularly relevant to krill because of its requirements for conservation and sustainable use of marine 
resources on the high seas. The timely implementation of Agenda 21 may be facilitated by a 
"requirement" of implementation rather than its mere promotion. 
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The Plan of Implementation, by referring to Agenda 21's implementation, does place political 
pressure on other states to comply with Agenda 21's objectives. As such, it has the potential to 
act as a catalyst for other states to support conservation measures in Antarctica such as those 
adopted under the CCAMLR management regime. 
The Plan of Implementation also focuses on an ecosystem approach as a means of achieving 
sustainable development of the oceans.922 The Plan does not outline what is meant by an 
ecosystem approach, which may make it difficult to implement. However, it does "note" the 
Reykjavik Declaration and decision V/6 of the Conference of Parties to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity. This implies that these instruments can be used to define the ecosystem 
approach as the term is used in the Plan oflmplementation.923 The ecosystem approach, if 
applied by all states, will help to conserve krill because of its requirement to consider species' 
interactions. The approach arguably justifies a krill fishing ban because dependent species 
(especially local predator populations) will be adversely affected by high levels ofkrill 
harvesting. However, merely requiring parties to "encourage" its application is unlikely to 
persuade states to adopt its principles if they already show .reticence in applying the approach. 
The Plan also supports the establishment of marine protected areas, especially during breeding 
periods.924 As discussed previously, there is uncertainty as to where krill breeding and 
maturation take place but there is some speculation that it occurs under or on the boundary of 
Antarctic sea ice. Closing such areas to krill fishing or closing them during krill breeding 
periods would help the recruitment rate and be extremely beneficial to their conservation. As 
discussed, the area around South Georgia is the only year-round krill fishing zone which makes it 
more susceptible to overexploitation, particularly if localised krill populations exist.925 Closing 
this area for certain periods could prevent its overexploitation. 
922 Article 30( d) requires that parties to the Plan "encourage the application by 20 I 0 of the ecosystem 
approach". 
923 Both of these instruments delve into the ecosystem approach in greater detail. The Reykjavik 
Declaration outlines some of the factors that are part of the ecosystem approach, such as considering 
interactions between species and understanding the impact of human activities on the ecosystem. Decision 
V/6 outlines a number of principles that should guide the ecosystem approach and also provides 
operational guidelines for their application (These principles and the ecosystem approach as a whole will 
be discussed in greater depth in Chapter 4 of this thesis). Furthermore, other international instruments that 
have been discussed previously also refer to the ecosystem approach. 
924 Article 32( c) supports the ecosystem approach and suggests the development and use of other diverse 
approaches in accordance with Agenda 21. Other approaches suggested by this provision include the 
establishment of marine protected areas (in a manner consistent with international law) and time/area 
closures of fishing areas for the protection of nursery grounds, especially during breeding periods. 
925 The uncertainty surrounding the existence of genetically distinct populations of krill was discussed in 
Chapter 1. 
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Areas where local predators have suffered from localised krill fishing would also benefit from 
such closures, although there is uncertainty as to whether local predator depletion is actually a 
problem.926 Localised krill fishing bans could therefore provide an alternative to a krill fishing 
moratorium if it were not possible to gain sufficient state support for a complete ban. A local 
fishing ban could still provide some protection to areas which are most sensitive to krill 
harvesting. These provisions do, however, need to be carried out in accordance with Chapter 17 
of Agenda 21.927 Closing areas would therefore be necessarily based on the sustainable use of 
resources and the achievement of maximum sustainable yield. Prima facie, areas could not be 
closed simply as a precautionary measure if sustainable use were not threatened or as a means of 
conserving stocks for their intrinsic worth.928 An alternative argument is that, because the 
precautionary approach now has widespread support in many conservation instruments including 
the F AO Code of Conduct, then closure of krill fishing areas would be justified to allow the 
sustainable use of other Antarctic species because of the uncertainty concerning the effect of krill 
fishing on the Antarctic ecosystem. 
926 The effect of krill fishing on local predator populations was discussed in Chapter 1. 
927 Article 32, Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development 2002 
928 Article 30 of the Plan oflmplementation also outlines a number of institutional measures that may aid 
resource management in the Southern Ocean and other world marine environments. One of these 
measures is the strengthening of regional cooperation and coordination between the relevant regional 
organisations and programmes,. regional fisheries management organisations, other regional organisations 
and the United Nations Environment Programme. There is also a call to promote integrated, 
multidisciplinary and multisectoral ocean management and to encourage and assist coastal states to 
develop such policies. Achieving an integrated and coordinated management approach and having 
cooperation between relevant parties is especially important in the Southern Ocean. The vast distance of 
the Southern Ocean from most States and the large proportion of that ocean that potentially consists of 
high seas areas, make it essential that m~nagement measures are consistent. If relevant parties do not 
cooperate and there is not one overall integrated management approach, then it is unlikely that 
conservation measures will be effective because different parties will be taking different, and possibly 
inconsistent, management approaches. Article 30( c) also calls for the establishment of an "effective, 
transparent and regular inter-agency coordination mechanism on ocean and coastal issues" that could help 
to achieve an integrated approach within the United Nations system. Although cooperation and 
consistency are necessary if Antarctic species are to be effectively conserved, the Plan oflmplementation 
fails to give specifics on how these goals are to be achieved. The Plan of Action also outlines a number of 
actions that are "required" in order to achieve sustainable fisheries (Article 31 ). Using the word 
"required", rather than the discretionary or general language used in other provisions, suggests that there is 
an obligation to perform these actions. Article 31 (a) requires the maintenance or restoration of stocks to 
levels that can produce the maximum sustainable yield. This provision is similar to requirements found in 
other international instruments such as Agenda 21 and the F AO Code of Conduct. As previously 
discussed, such requirements create problems because the interdependence of stocks means that it is 
difficult to maintain or restore all stocks to those levels. The provision also has the aim of achieving such 
levels for depleted stocks on an "urgent" basis and "where possible" not later than 2015. Such a 
requirement may give support to a low level of krill fishing or a total Antarctic krill fishing ban. A 
comprehensive fishing ban may allow krill-dependent depleted stocks to be restored on an "urgent" basis. 
Stocks such as the baleen whales, as previously discussed, are not being restored in a timely matmer 
because of the competition for krill as a food source from other species. A total krill fishing ban may 
provide a greater food supply and may speed the recovery of depleted species, although competition from 
other species could still hamper that process. 
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The Plan also requires the adoption of"relevant United Nations" agreements and "associated" 
regional fisheries agreements.929 Although "relevant" agreements are not defined, the objective 
of the section is to "achieve sustainable fisheries" and so, arguably, "relevant". agreements would 
be those that are aimed at achieving sustainable fisheries. CCAMLR is a regional fisheries 
agreement that seeks to achieve sustainable fisheries which parties would be "required" to not 
only ratify or accede to, but also to effectively implement. Although CCAMLR is not a United 
Nations Agreement, there is still scope to argue that it is an "associated" regional fisheries 
agreement of other United Nations instruments such as the Law ofthe Sea Convention and Fish 
Stocks Agreement. The reason being that these UN agreements attempt to deal with fisheries 
species in general, which is obviously relevant to the Southern Ocean fish stocks. However, a 
regional fisheries management agreement like CCAMLR is really necessary to ensure that the 
broad principles of such a UN agreement are applied in practice when managing regional fish 
stocks. If non-parties to CCAMLR were required to become parties and also effectively 
implement its provisions, then this would go a long way to providing a more effective 
management and conservation regime for the Southern Ocean. Krill would benefit if more 
nations were required to comply with CCAMLR conservation measures, particularly on the 
Antarctic high seas. Third party state compliance is vital if CCAMLR's current conservation 
measures, or a complete krill fishing ban, are to prove effective in the face of likely increases in 
demand for krill products. Problems, however, exist concerning the application of the Plan to 
CCAMLR and other fisheries instruments. The Plan's provisions appear to allow states 
themselves to determine when it is appropriate to ratifY an international agreement.930 
Furthermore, CCAMLR does not necessarily fall within the types of international agreements 
covered by the Plan.931 
929 Article 31 of the Plan oflmplementation also requires the adoption of several international instruments. 
Article 31 (b) requires parties to "ratify or accede to and effectively implement the relevant United Nations, 
and where appropriate, associated regional fisheries agreements or arrangements". 
930 A word such as "effectively" could be interpreted in a very subjective manner which could leave states 
a great deal of discretion as to what constitutes "effective" implementation. An alternative argument may 
be that "effective" implementation should include steps to comply with CCAMLR conservation measures 
and to enforce those measures against national fishing vessels. The provision does, however, qualify the 
requirement of ratification by requiring it only "where appropriate". Such a qualification weakens the 
provision and it may allow states themselves to determine when it is appropriate to refuse to ratify an 
agreement. 
931 CCAMLR may not constitute an "associated" regional fisheries agreement. The section requires parties 
to ratify relevant "United Nations" agreements. Arguably, CCAMLR is not "associated" with any "United 
Nations" agreement. It is not a United Nations agreement itself and the Antarctic Treaty, the agreement 
under which it was concluded, is also not a United Nations agreement and so CCAMLR may not fall 
within the provision's ambit. Although, CCAMLR may potentially be seen as an "associated" agreement 
of other United Nations agreements such as the F AO Code of Conduct because those agreements embrace 
the idea of states acting consistently with the measures of regional fisheries management organisations and 
also are in accordance with the "rational use" objectives ofCCAMLR. 
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The Plan also appears to require specific ratification of the Fish Stocks Agreement.932 The 
Agreement, as discussed, has much stronger conservation provisions than the Law of the Sea 
Convention and so requiring its ratification could benefit the conservation of krill. However, as 
mentioned, it is not entirely certain that the Fish Stocks Agreement applies to krill. The 
Compliance Agreement could also help to curb the problem of IUU fishing in the Southern 
Ocean.933 This is a major problem that has plagued fisheries. conventions like CCAMLR and a 
requirement to ratify and effectively implement the Compliance Agreement will go some way 
towards solving the problem although, what constitutes "effective" implementation is a 
subjective concept. This will be one of the threats to a comprehensive krill harvesting ban, 
especially because oflikely increases in economic returns from krill fishing. 
The Plan also requires the implementation of a related international instrument, the Code of 
Conduct and its international plans of action (IPOAs). 934 The comprehensive nature of the Code 
of Conduct, covering all fishing activities and areas, makes this requirement extremely 
important. The Code of Conduct's support for long-term conservation and sustainable use on the 
high seas, combined with its support for regional fisheries organisations, makes it an important 
instrument for CCAMLR and krill conservation. The further requirement in the Plan, that the 
Code's technical guidelines and plans of action be implemented, enhances the implementation of 
the Code. As previously mentioned, the Code itself could be criticised for being too general but 
the technical guidelines provide much more detail to guide the Code's implementation. 
Requiring the application of the technical guidelines gives this requirement much greater force 
because it reduces the danger of parties using their discretion when implementing the Code. The 
International Plans of Action also provide further details on how the Code is to be 
implemented. 935 
932 Article 31 (b), after its requirement for relevant UN agreements to be ratified, also "notes" in particular 
the Fish Stocks Agreement andthe 1993 Agreement to Promote Compliance with International 
Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas. This suggests that these 
agreements are specific agreements that require ratification by article 31. 
933 The Compliance Agreement will be discussed in Chapter 4. 
934 Article 3l(c) requires the implementation of the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, and the 
relevant international plans of action and technical guidelines of the FAO. 
935 The Plans of Action are supported by Article 31 (d) which requires parties to "urgently develop and 
implement national and, where appropriate, regional plans of action, to put into effect" the Plans of Action. 
In particular, support is given to the Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate IUU Fishing and the 
Plan for Management of Fishing Capacity. These provisions strengthen the other sections that support the 
Plans of Action, by requiring states to develop and implement specific national strategies to apply the 
Plans. Requiring states to set out specific actions that need to be undertaken and then requiring that states 
actually take those actions, makes it more likely that the Plans will be implemented. Although the section 
requires strategies to be "urgently" developed and implemented, no specific time frame is given and the 
term "urgent" may be open to interpretation. The provision would be more effective if specific time 
frames were given for states to develop and implement strategies to apply the Plans of Action. The section 
also requires states to "establish effective monitoring, reporting and enforcement, and control of fishing 
vessels, including by flag States" to further the IUU Plan. This gives greater weight to the need for states 
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The Plan oflmplementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development also recognises 
the technical and financial problems that many countries have had in implementing their fisheries 
obligations.936 Although no specifics are given, if states actually do give technical aid to 
developing countries it will help them to develop more effective fisheries policies.937 If 
developing countries are given sufficient financial aid to implement their regional fisheries 
obligations, then such instruments are likely to be more effective and there may be fewer 
instances where the instruments are breached. Such an outcome can only bolster the 
conservation of world marine resources. Universally binding conservation requirements will 
place an obligation on states to protect krill, however, measures such as a total ban can only be 
effective if all states have the technical and financial resources to implement their obligations. 
As discussed below, the UN General Assembly has made efforts to provide assistance to 
developing countries so that they can implement their fisheries conservation obligations. 
The Plan oflmplementation also focuses briefly on aquaculture.938 As previously discussed, krill 
can be extremely useful to the aquaculture industry as a feeding stimulant and food supplement. 
Therefore, if the sustainable development of aquaculture is to be supported then a total krill 
fishing ban is, arguably, inappropriate. The Plan is, however, aimed at achieving sustainable 
fisheries ahd sustainable use of other fish stocks will, arguably, be unachievable if krill are 
exploited to a high level for aquaculture. However, the Plan also advocates the adoption of the 
ecosystem approach. This thesis submits that a comprehensive·krill fishing ban is still be 
consistent with the Plan because an ecosystem approach would suggest that krill should not be 
exploited for aquaculture use if other species would be detrimentally affected. 
to implement the IUU Plan, although what constitutes "effective" monitoring and enforcement is a matter 
that is left open for interpretation. 
936 Article 30(g) requires states to assist developing countries "in coordinating policies and programmes at 
the regional and subregional levels aimed at the conservation and sustainable management of fishery 
resources." 
937 Article 31 (g) also requires the strengthening of "donor coordination and partnerships between 
intemational financial institutions, bilateral agencies and other relevant stakeholders to enable developing 
countries .... to develop their national, regional and subregional capacities for infrastructure and integrated 
management and the sustainable use of fisheries". 
938 Article 31 (h) requires states, in order to achieve sustainable fisheries, to "support the sustainable 
development of aquaculture .... given its growing importance for food security and economic 
development". 
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The WSSD was also concerned with biological diversity within the world's ecosystems.939 The 
WSSD stated that, for the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity to continue, the 
ecosystem approach of the Biodiversity Convention needs to be implemented. National action 
was seen as the main priority in order to implement this approach, rather than on drafting more 
international agreements.940 Krill, as one of the key components of the Antarctic marine 
ecosystem, could also benefit from implementation of the Biodiversity Convention. 
Implementation of the Convention is likely to give krill more protection than the introduction of 
yet more international instruments that are never fully applied. The failings of the biodiversity 
convention and its very general provisions have been discussed, and some specific guidance on 
its implementation is required before national implementation can be fully achieved. There was 
also a recognition in the WSSD discussions that biodiversity has a cultural and spiritual value, 
rather than just an economic value.941 The acknowledgment of more than simply a monetary 
value to biodiversity is important because it recognises that preserving the biodiversity of 
Antarctic marine species, such as krill, can have an intrinsic value. The discussions on 
biodiversity at the WSSD were reflected in several provisions of the Plan oflmplementation.942 
939 One of the partnership discussions stressed the need to immediately deal with human threats to 
biodiversity (World Summit on Sustainable Development 2002, Agenda Item 8, Chairperson's summary of 
the partnership discussion on water artd sanitation, energy, health, agriculture and biodiversity (WEHAB), 
Document A/CONF. 199/16/Add.2). 
940 World Summit on Sustainable Development 2002, Agenda Item 8, Chairperson's summary of the 
partnership discussion on water and sanitation, energy, health, agriculture and biodiversity (WEHAB), 
Document A/CONF. 199/16/ Add.2 
941 World Summit on Sustainable Development 2002, Agenda Item 8, Chairperson's summary of the 
partnership discussion on water and sanitation, energy, health, agriculture and biodiversity (WEHAB), 
Document A/CONF. 199/16/Add.2 
942 Article 32(a) of the Plan oflmplementation requires states to "promote the conservation and 
management of the oceans, giving due regard to the relevant international instruments to ... maintain the 
productivity and biodiversity of important and vulnerable marine and coastal areas" including areas 
beyond national jurisdiction. This gives support to the Biological Diversity Convention as a "relevant" 
instrument that aims at maintaining biodiversity. Krill, as the base of the marine Antarctic ecosystem, are 
vital for maintaining biodiversity in that ecosystem. The unique status of Antarctica's marine ecosystem 
and the short length of its food chain also make it an "important and vulnerable" marine area whose 
biodiversity should be maintained under the Plan oflmplementation. States are also required to develop 
national, regional and international programmes for halting the loss of such marine biodiversity (Article 
32( d). Such programmes are necessary because of the lack of specificity in the Biodiversity Convention. 
If the Convention is ever to be fully implemented and is to provide any benefit for krill and Antarctica's 
ecosystem, then national programmes are necessary. 
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The Plan of Implementation also advocates the urgent mobilisation of financial resources and 
technological assistance a:nd the development of human and institutional capacity in order to 
implement specific programmes of the Convention on Biological Diversity, such as the Jakarta 
Mandate's work programme.943 Such financial and technological assistance are necessary if the 
Convention on Biological Diversity is ever to be fully implemented and if the biodiversity of 
Antarctica's marine ecosystem is to be preserved. There have already been moves to provide 
funding and to implement the World Summit's commitments. Both state governments and the 
United Nations have already made moves to develop plans of action and to provide the necessary 
funding to implement the goals of the World Summit.944 Such initiatives make it much more 
likely that the commitments made at the World Summit will actually be implemented. 
The effective implementation of the two formal instruments arising from the World Summit on 
Sustainable Development, the Johannesburg Declaration and the Plan oflmplementation, may 
also depend on the legal effect of those instruments. As previously discussed, the Johannesburg 
Declaration consists of extremely general statements of little real substance that are not couched 
in terms of legal obligation, suggesting it is a non-binding instrument. Neither instrument 
requires ratification and this suggests that they do not have the status of legally binding hard law 
agreements.945 The adoption by consensus of the Plan by such a large section of the international 
communit/46 does, however, suggest that it is binding, or that its principles have at least entered 
into customary law. The Plan must be legally binding on all states if its provisions are to provide 
support for a complete krill ban. 
943 Article 32(b), Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development 2002 
944 United Nations officials, after the conclusion of the WSSD, have begun to develop an agenda for action 
within the UN system to implement the Johannesburg commits (Feature Story, UN Taking First Steps 
Toward Implementing Johannesburg Outcome, http://www.johannesburgsummit.org). Governments have 
also made specific announcements as to programmes and partnership initiatives to which they have 
committed in order to comply with their obligations (Feature Story, With a Sense of Urgency, 
Johannesburg Summit Sets an Action Agenda, http://www.johannesburgsummit.org). The partnership 
initiatives are aimed at implementing the sustainable development objectives of Agenda 21 (Partnerships 
for Sustainable Development, http://www.johannesburgsummit.org). There are already commitments to 
implement 228 partnerships constituting $235 million worth of resources (Feature Story, With a Sense of 
Urgency, Johannesburg Summit Sets an Action Agenda, http://www.johannesburgsummit.org). 
945 Some of the language of the Plan oflmplementation such as "inviting" states to ratify the Law of the 
Sea Convention; "promoting" the implementation of Agenda 21; and "encouraging" the application of the 
ecosystem approach is phrased in generalised terms that do not suggest a binding obligation. However, the 
Plan of Implementation, in Article 31, "requires" a particular set of actions to be taken to achieve 
sustainable fisheries. The use of the word "requires", rather than using the general language of other 
provisions, suggests a legally binding obligation to perform the actions .. The absence of any requirement 
to ratify the Plan could, however, suggest a non-binding instrument. 
946 104 Heads of Government were involved in the Summit. There were also more than 9,000 delegates 
and 8,000 members ofNGOs (Feature Story, With a Sense of Urgency, Johannesburg Summit Sets an 
Action Agenda, http://www.johannesburgsummit.org). 
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Customary international law, as previously mentioned, requires evidence of state practice as well 
as opinio juris. Traditional customary law requires a pattern of behaviour established over time 
and opinio juris that suggests that states regard it as a legal obligation. 947 The adoption by 
consensus of the Plan of Implementation may constitute opinio juris to some of the principles 
contained within. 948 The requirements to ratify and implement relevant instruments such as the 
Fish Stocks and Compliance Agreements and to implement the Code of Conduct arid its technical 
guidelines and plans of action are principles that could constitute new custom. Based on the 
language used in the section "requiring" these agreements to be adopted and implemented it 
could be argued that opinio juris exists because it implies that states believe they are bound to 
follow these instruments. The adoption of the Plan of Implementation by consensus also 
provides support for the existence of opinio juris. The alternative argument is that the Plan of 
Implementation is a soft law instrument which implies that states did not intend to be bound by 
its principles. Furthermore, some of the language of the Plan is not in binding terms. Opinio 
juris does not appear to exist for principles such as the "promotion" of Agenda 21's 
implementation or the "encouragement" of the ecosystem approach's application. However, the 
continued support for instruments such as the Fish Stocks Agreement, the Compliance . 
Agreement and the Code of Conduct in other international agreements such as the Rome, Kyoto 
and Reykjavik Declarations gives further weight to the existence of customary principles 
supported by opinio juris. If such principles were to become custom they will bind all states and 
provide a much stronger legal regime for the management of krill. They will also provide a legal 
justification for states to enforce conservation measures on the high seas against flag vessels of 
non-parties to regional management agreements such as CCAMLR. 
The creation of new customary law also requires the existence of state practice, which is 
traditionally shown by the behaviour of states. Domestic law is often evidence of state practice. 
949 As discussed previously, states such as the Philippines, the US and Canada have supported 
the Code of Conduct and its related plans of action. and teclmical guidelines by adopting national 
plans and legislation. Such efforts constitute evidence of state practice relating to the adoption of 
the principles contained within these agreements. The technical guidelines and plans of action of 
the Code of Conduct can also provide a level of detail necessary to establish a specific custom. 
The existence of state practice and opinio juris are also subjective matters. 950 The period of time 
947 Charney, J.I. 1993. Universal International Law. The American Journal of International Law, Vol 87: 
529-551 at 543 
948 The requirement in Article 31 (a) to maintain stocks at maximum sustainable yield and to restore 
depleted stocks may be one such principle. 
949 Chinkin, C.M. Supra, fu 733, 858 
95° Charney, J.L Supra, fu 993, 545 
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and the continuity of the practice along with the number of state participants may be flexible. 951 
That means it is difficult to determine how many states would need to adopt agreements such as 
the Code of Conduct in their domestic practices before its principles became customary law. 
Traditional notions suggesting that evidence of the actual behaviour of an overwhelming 
proportion of states is required before customary law arises may have changed somewhat. The 
International Court of Justice often does not look at the actual behaviour of a large section of the 
international community before it declares principles to be law. 952 The expanding scope of 
international law also suggests that the traditional method is no longer the only means of 
establishing customary law.953 International forums including regional organisations; 
conferences; and the UN General Assembly can now help to create new custom. 954 Some 
commentators believe that the results of such forums can be seen as state practice or opinio juris. 
955 The World Summit on Sustainable Development, as an international forum that was attended 
by a large proportion of the world community, can be seen as such a forum. The principles of 
the Plan of Implementation can therefore be seen as evidence of state practice or opinio juris, 
even if there is no evidence of a sustained pattern of behaviour by states. This can be criticised 
as a means of circumventing the traditional requirement that states must consent to a Treaty to be 
bound by it. 956 States do, however, have an opportunity to present their opinion about a principle 
at the forum itself or after it has concluded. 957 If they do not object then, arguably, voluntary 
consent exists. Acquiescence of states can also establish a general principle of law, even if states 
do not voluntarily consent.958 This arguably constitutes consent, but only if the state is aware that 
they will be taken to consent if they do not object. 959 If, however, states object after a new 
custom becomes law, then they may still be bound by it. 960 International forums such as the 
World Summit on Sustainable Development could, therefore, provide a legitimate avenue for the 
creation of new international law. 
951 Ibid 
952 Ibid, 537 
953 Ibid, 543 
954 Ibid, 544 
955 Ibid, 545 
956 Schachter, 0. 1994. United Nations Law. The American Journal of International Law, Vol88: 1-23 at 3 
957 Charney, J.I. Supra, fn 993, 550 
958 Ibid, 535 
959 Ibid, 537 
960 Ibid, 538 
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Customary law does not require the consent of individual states for it to be binding. 961 So if the 
World Summit's principles are accepted by a majority of states, then that is sufficient for new 
custom to be created. One of the major problems with fisheries regimes such as CCAMLR is 
that they do not bind non-parties. Antarctic resources, such as krill, can be put in extreme danger 
because of third parties who fish on the high seas and who do not abide by CCAMLR's 
conservation and management measures. As discussed, this thesis submits that the Plan of 
Implementation requires a regional fisheries agreement like CCAMLR to be applied by states 
that are currently not parties to it. Such a requirement would provide substantial protection to 
krill and other Southern Ocean marine resources by reducing the number of states that are not 
bound by the Convention's conservation measures. All states must be bound by the management 
regime's measures if a comprehensive krill harvesting ban is to prove effective. Even ifthe Plan 
does not require states to accede to CCAMLR, agreements such as the Code of Conduct; the Fish 
Stocks Agreement; and Compliance Agreements can provide substantial support for krill in high 
seas Antarctic areas.962 If the Plan of Implementation (or any of its provisions on oceans and 
fisheries) does constitute customary international law then it would be binding on all states. All 
states would be required to implement agreements such as the Code of Conduct, although the 
practical reality of enforcing such a binding obligation on third party states is another matter. 
The need for third party states to be bound by instruments such as the Code of Conduct is even 
greater because of the extreme threat that overfishing poses to the whole world community and 
its marine ecosystems. States that do not comply with such instruments will benefit from the 
measures introduced by other states to combat overfishing. New rules of international law that 
bind all states, despite the reticence of some states to be bound, are essential to combat such 
threats.963 A comprehensive krill harvesting ban will only prove effective if all vessels are bound 
by it. Despite the traditional sovereign freedom that states enjoy, modem environmental threats 
that can harm the whole world community may justify some diminution of sovereignty. 964 This 
thesis submits that overfishing is one such threat. As discussed, consent of states is usually 
required to make a rule binding and that fact may prevent the formulation of universally binding 
rules. However, even persistent objectors to a customary law rule cannot prevent that rule 
becoming a new custom.965 So even ifthere are states that object to principles designed to 
prevent overfishing, such principles can still become customary law. 
961 Ibid, 531 
962 The support that the Code of Conduct and the Fish Stocks Agreement can provide has been discussed 
earlier in this Chapter and also in Chapter 2. 
963 Supra, fn 770, 529 
964/bid, 530 
965 Ibid, 542 
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If a rule of international law can be binding on a state, despite it voicing active dissent, then it 
must also be acknowledged that the international legal system has the capacity to legislate 
universally binding principles despite some states objecting.966 If such a proposition is valid, 
then the international community may be able to introduce principles to prevent overfishing 
(such as those in the Code of Conduct) that have universal application .. Universally binding 
principles are crucial for a total krill fishing ban to be successful. Even current CCAMLR 
precautionary catch limits will not be effective unless they are binding on all states. 
Universally applicable rules in the Southern Ocean can help to protect krill by alleviating the 
current problem of non-parties fishing on the high seas in a manner inconsistent with 
CCAMLR's conservation measures. The formation of such universal principles can arise out of 
a level of acceptance that would put the principle in an exceptional category such as jus cogens 
or the common heritage of mankind. 967 Principles embodied in the Plan oflmplementation that 
are designed to combat overfishing may come within the theoretical category of the common 
heritage of mankind. Fisheries resources and the world's marine ecosystems (especially high 
seas resources), arguably, belong to the whole of mankind as a common heritage. This category 
is especially fitting for the Southern Ocean, most of which could potentially consist of high seas 
areas.
968 
. Such categories give universal principles a theoretical strength, although in real terms 
the international community will have practical reasons for establishing a principle in the face of 
some dissent. 969 The strength of consensus and the consequences of non-acceptance help to 
create universal principles. 970 The Plan of Implementation was adopted with the consensus of all 
states attending the World Summit and, as discussed, the international instruments supported by 
the Plan have also received continual support in other international declarations and agreements. 
966 Ibid 
967 Ibid 
968 See the discussion in Chapter 2 on Antarctic marine sovereignty for the debate as to whether Antarctic 
claimants have sovereignty over marine areas. 
969 Charney, J.I. Supra, fu 993, 542 
970 Ibid 
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Furthermore, the consequences of non-acceptance of principles to combat overfishing would be 
extremely grave. If states continue to ignore such principles then there is a danger that the 
overfishing problem will worsen and threaten the world's marine ecosystems, including the 
Antarctic ecosystem, and species like krill that inhabit those ecosystems. These dire 
consequences should provide support for the adoption of universally applicable laws for the 
prevention of overfishing. Likely increases in demand for krill products and greater returns from 
harvesting make the introduction of strong legally binding measures essential. A krill harvesting 
ban will only be successful if all parties are bound by it and such a ban is crucial because of 
krill's vital role in the ecosystem and the uncertainty surrounding its interactions with other 
species. 
VI. General Assembly Resolutions 
The outcomes of the World Summit for Sustainable Development have received support in the 
General Assembly of the United Nations.971 A resolution supporting the Johannesburg 
Declaration and the Plan oflmplementation has been adopted by the General Assembly.972 
"Endorsing" these instruments gives added support to them, but it still falls short of "requiring" 
states to adopt them. Further backing for the actual implementation of these instruments is also 
given in the main body of the resolution.973 The resolution gives greater weight to the need for 
governments and organisations to actually implement the commitments ofthe World Summit and 
the Plan of Implementation, particularly those commitments relating to the marine environment 
and alleviation of the overfishing problem. However, merely "urging" and "calling" for such 
action is not sufficient to ensure that states adopt the provisions of the Plan of Implementation to 
protect against the overexploitation of species such as krill. 
971 Political Resolution 1 of the Summit recommended that the UN General Assembly endorse the 
Johannesburg Declaration. Article 2 ofResolution 2 also recommended the endorsement of the Plan of 
Implementation by the General Assembly (Report of the World Summit on Sustainable Development 2002, 
Document AJCONF. 199/20). 
972 Article 1 of this resolution "takes note with satisfaction" the report of the World Summit giving some 
support to this report, although it is not couched in terms of a binding obligation. The resolution also 
"endorses" the Johannesburg Declaration and the Plan oflmplementation (Article 2, World Summit on 
Sustainable Development, General Assembly Resolution A/RES/57/253, 2002). 
973 Article 4 "urges governments and all relevant international and regional organisations ... to take timely 
actions to ensure the effective follow-up and implementation" of the Declaration and Plan of 
Implementation. Article 6 also "calls for the implementation of the commitments, programmes and 
timebound targets adopted at the World Summit" and "for the fulfillment of the provisions of the means of 
implementation" in the Plan oflmplementation. 
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The General Assembly, at the same time as it adopted its resolution on the World Summit, 
adopted a number of other resolutions that also support the Summit. The first of these 
resolutions relates to the Oceans and the Law of the Sea.974 This resolution welcomes the 
J 
outcome of the World Summit.975 Although these provisions certainly give the added support of 
the General Assembly to the Plan oflmplementation's oceanic commitments, simply 
"welcoming" the Plan probably will not be a sufficient incentive for states to adopt it in a timely 
fashion. Couching the resolution's support for the Plan in language that suggested an obligation 
would provide a greater impetus for its implementation. This resolution also contains provisions 
relating to the adoption of the Law of the Sea Convention and the Fish Stocks Agreement that 
suffer from the same generalised and non-binding language.976 Although the provisions give 
added weight to these agreements, a more binding type of language is vital to emphasise the need 
for states to adopt these instruments. As will be discussed below, the UN General Assembly has 
advocated the strengthening of international fisheries management agreements in order to combat 
IUU fishing. 
Another resolution passed at this time giving support to the World Summit relates to the adoption 
of the Fish Stocks Agreement. This resolution, in its preamble, "welcomes" the outcomes of the· 
World Summit and "reaffirms" those outcomes and the particular outcomes that are relevant to 
the conservation and management of straddling and highly migratory stocks.977 As discussed, the 
Plan of Implementation "requires" ratification or accession to relevant instruments including the 
Fish Stocks Agreement, so these provisions are, in effect, reaffim1ing this requirement to ratify 
or accede to the Fish Stocks Agreement. Such a requirement provides krill with further 
protection from the provisions of the Fish Stocks Agreement which, as discussed, strengthen the 
conservation provisions of the Law of the Sea Convention and provide more detailed protection 
for straddling and highly migratory stocks.978 If the Fish Stocks Agreement is binding on a 
greater number of states it will provide much greater legal protection of krill and will give legal 
support for the enforcement of conservation measures, such as a complete krill fishing ban, on 
the high seas. 
974 Oceans and the Law of the Sea, General Assembly Resolution A/RES/57/141, 2002 
975 The preamble welcomes the outcome of the World Summit. Article 7 also expands on this support and 
"welcomes" the Plan oflmplementation and the specific provisions it contains relating to the sustainable 
development of the oceans and Agenda 21. Article 8 also "welcomes" the specific commitments and the 
attainment of cetiain objectives that will ensure sustainable fisheries and the promotion of the conservation 
and management of the oceans. 
976 The resolution "reaffirms" the Convention (Article 2) and "calls upon" states to adopt it (Article 1) and 
introduce legislation that implements its provisions (Article 3). The resolution also "welcomes" the Fish 
Stocks Agreement's entry into force and "calls upon" states to become parties to it (Article 5). 
977 Article 4, World Summit on Sustainable Development, General Assembly Resolution A/RES/57/253, 
2002 
978 As discussed in Chapter 2, krill may not be covered by the Fish Stocks Agreement as a highly migratory 
species. 
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This particular resolution also provides more direct support for the Fish Stocks Agreement that is 
independent of its support for the World Summit and the Plan of Implementation. However, 
many of its provisions provide merely generalised statements of support for the Agreement. 979 
They do not add any extra protection and do not require states to undertake any specific actions. 
The resolution also "calls upon" states to ratify or accede to the Fish Stocks Agreement and 
"consider" applying it provisionally and "emphasises" the importance of its effective 
implementation. These provisions, although giving more specific support for the Agreement's 
adoption, are still couched in general terms rather than in the binding language necessary to give 
states a greater incentive to adopt the Agreement.980 If krill are classed as highly migratory, then 
cooperation in the Southern Ocean will be necessary for their conservation so that consistent and 
universal protective measures can be adopted on the high seas. However, merely "urging" such 
cooperation on the high seas is unlikely to achieve it. The resolution .also gives more specific 
support to regional fisheries management organisations to achieve the Fish Stock Agreement's 
objectives.981 These provisions endorse regional organisations such as CCAMLR. Greater 
backing for CCAMLR's conservation measures can allow such measures to provide more 
effective protection for krill and other Antarctic species. 
The General Assembly also passed a resolution at this time on unauthorised fishing in national 
jurisdictions and on the high seas and on illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU 
fishing). The preamble of this resolution supports, in generalised terms, the outcomes of the 
World Summit on Sustainable Development.982 The preamble also recognises the problem of 
IUU fishing and "welcomes" and "notes" the role of the International Plan of Action on IUU 
fishing in eliminating the practice. The main body of the resolution gives greater weight to the 
generalised statements of support present in the preamble. 
979 The preamble "welcomes" the Fish Stocks Agreement's entry into force and "notes" the obligations of 
states under the instrument to cooperate to conserve and manage straddling and highly migratory stocks. 
Article 1 also "expresses deep satisfaction" at the instrument's entry into force. 
980 This is also the problem with Article 6 which "urges" states to pursue cooperation in relation to highly 
migratory stocks to ensure effective conservation, management and long-term sustainability of such stocks. 
981 Article 8 "calls upon" all states to ensure that their vessels comply with the conservation measures of 
regional organisations. Article 11 "invites" states and relevant government organisations to support and 
strengthen relevant regional fisheries management organisations. 
982 The outcomes of the Summit are "welcomed", especially those outcomes that relate to achieving 
sustainable fisheries. The preamble also "emphasises" the support given in the Plan oflmplementation to 
ratify or accede to the Fish Stocks and Compliance Agreement and "notes" and "recognises" some specific 
duties of these instruments, such as the duty to exercise effective controls over flag vessels and the 
application of the ecosystem approach. 
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The first few provisions of the resolution are a reiteration of principles found in many of the 
previously discussed international fisheries instruments. Article 1 of the resolution "reaffirms" 
the importance of long-term conservation and management and sustainable use of marine living 
resources and "reaffirms" the World Summit's commitment to restore depleted fish stocks on an 
urgent basis and where possible not later than 2015. This commitment to restore depleted stocks 
is "required" by Article 31 (a) of the Plan oflmplementation. If the resolution "reaffirms" this 
"requirement" of the World Summit, then, arguably, this "reaffirmation" itself constitutes a 
"requirement" for states to restore depleted stocks on an urgent basis. If such a formulation 
holds weight, then this provision would go much further than the other generalised sections used 
in the resolution. As discussed, the requirement for restoration of depleted stocks under the Plan 
oflmplementation adds weight to.a comprehensive krill fishing ban because of the added 
advantages such protection would provide to the restoration of krill dependent species. 
The resolution supports fisheries management concepts like the precautionary and ecosystem 
approaches.983 As with the other resolutions that support the WSSD, this resolution uses very 
generalised and non-binding language that is unlikely to significantly advance the adoption of 
these approaches. The same problem exists with the resolution's support of other international 
fisheries agreements that could provide significant protection to krill if they were fully 
implemented by all states.984 For example, it is doubtful that a mere "appeal" for the 
"promotion" of the Code of Conduct will further its implementation. The Code of Conduct, as 
discussed, could provide significant protection to krill and other exploited species on the 
Antarctic high seas. Using stronger legal language in these General Assembly resolutions can 
prompt more states to adopt the Code's provisions. This particular resolution's support for the 
precautionary approach does give greater weight to a krill fishing moratorium because of the 
scientific uncertainty surrounding the effect of krill fishing on the Antarctic ecosystem. 
983 Article 3 "urges" all states to apply the precautionary approach to highly migratory stocks and Article 4 
"encourages" states to apply the ecosystem approach by 2010. The provision also "notes" other 
international instruments that outline the ecosystem approach such as the Reykjavik Declaration, decisions 
V/6 and VI/12 of the Conference of Parties to the Biodiversity Convention and the Code of Conduct. 
984 Article 7 "appeals to states and regional fisheries organisations ... to promote the application of the Code. 
of Conduct. .. within their areas of competence". 
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In addition, this particular resolution is also concerned with the problem of nJU fishing. The 
resolution gives support to some of the specific measures outlined in international agreements 
that aim to eliminate this problem.985 These provisions add the General Assembly's weight to the 
Compliance Agreement and the need to combat the nJU problem.986 The prevention of vessel 
reflagging and the effective control by states over their vessels on the high seas is necessary if 
the nJU problem plaguing many regional organisations like CCAMLR is to be reduced. The 
IUU Plan of Action provides specific details to prevent and deter IUU fishing. This resolution 
"urges" states to develop and implement national plans of action to put the nJU Plan into effect 
and to coordinate activities and cooperate directly and through relevant regional fisheries 
management organisations to implement the Plan.987 
The current problems with combating IUU fishing are also recognised in the resolution which 
"affirms" the need to strengthen the legal framework for cooperation in the battle against IUU 
fishing. However, the resolution fails to outline how the framework is to be strengthened. 
Decreasing the nJU problem in the Southern Ocean is necessary to alleviate the overfishing 
problem. Reducing nJU fishing would also enhance the effectiveness ofCCAMLR's 
conservation measures and increase the accuracy of the data used to formulate their catch limits. 
However, as with the other resolutions, the generalised language which "urges" and "calls upon" 
states to act is unlikely to prompt timely action, especially from recalcitrant fishing nations. 
Given the likely increase in demand for krill products, IUU fishing must be prevented for a 
comprehensive krill fishing ban to be successful. This can only be done if international 
conservation instruments contain strong legally binding language aimed at preventing nJU 
fishing. 
985 Article 9 "calls upon states and other entities ... that have not deposited instruments of acceptance" of 
the Compliance Agreement to do so, as a matter of priority. Article 10 also gives its support to the 
concepts of effective control of states over flag vessels and the need for authorisation before such vessels 
can fish on the high seas that have been advocated in the Compliance and Fish Stocks Agreements. 
Furthermore, the resolution "calls upon" states to take "effective" action to deter reflagging of their vessels 
(Article 11 ). 
986 The Compliance Agreement and the problems of vessel reflagging and IUU fishing will be discussed in 
greater detail in Chapter 4. 
987 Articles 14 and 15, Large-scale pelagic drift-net fishing, unauthorized fishing in zones of national 
jurisdiction and on the high seas/illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, fisheries by-catch and 
discards, and other developments A/RES/57/142, 2002 
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The final resolution supporting the WSSD that was adopted by the General Assembly at this time 
is focussed on the Biodiversity Convention.988 The resolution backs the outcomes on biological 
diversity that arose as a result of the World Summit.989 As discussed, krill's unique position and 
role in the ecosystem makes it vital for conserving the biological diversity of species in 
Antarctica's ecosystem. If separate populations of krill do exist then, even if a comprehensive 
ban is not introduced, a localised krill harvesting ban will be required to maintain genetic 
biodiversity within the species.990 
As discussed, the Biodiversity Convention does need to be more efficiently implemented if it is 
to be useful in conserving krill, particularly if loss of biodiversity is to be "significantly" reduced 
by 2010.991 Greater financial and technical commitments could help to achieve these goals in a 
timelier manner. The resolution fails to outline how the Biodiversity Convention is to be 
implemented more efficiently and simply "recalls" the World Summit's commitments to greater 
efficiency and "emphasises" the need for greater financial and technical resources, rather than 
requiring them.992 As previously discussed, states should concentrate on giving further guidance 
on how the Biodiversity Convention is to be implemented so that its provisions can be given full 
effect in protecting biodiversity in regions such as the Antarctic. 
988 Convention on Biological Diversity, General Assembly Resolution NRES/57/260, 2002 
989 The preamble of the resolution gives some support for the World Summit by "taking into account" the 
Johannesburg Declaration and the Plan oflmplementation and "noting with interest" the partnership 
initiatives announced by some governments at the Summit. Article 7 "recalls" the World Summit's 
commitments to "pursue a more efficient and coherent implementation" of the objectives of the 
Biodiversity Convention and the "achievement by 2010 of a significant reduction in the current rate of loss 
of biological diversity" including the provision of technical and financial resources to developing countries 
to achieve these goals. There is also an "emphasis" on the need for a substantial increase in such financial 
and technical resources to implement the Biodiversity Convention (Article 13). 
990 This proposition has been discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2. 
991 This is one of the goals of this General Assembly resolution. 
992 The resolution also offers extremely generalised support for the Biodiversity Convention simply 
"reaffirming" it as the key international instrument for the conservation and sustainable use of biological 
resources and "urging" states to become parties to it (The Preamble and Article 4, Convention on 
Biological Diversity, General Assembly Resolution NRES/57/260, 2002). 
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Subsequent General Assembly Resolutions 
Subsequently to these General Assembly resolutions which were .passed just after the World 
Summit in support of its objectives, several other resolutions were passed in late 2003 and late 
2004. The first of these related to Sustainable Fisheries and was passed on 24 November 
2003.993 This resolution "reaffirms" the importance of the Plan oflmplementation and the Law 
of the Sea Convention and also "urges" states to adopt the precautionary approach to fisheries 
management.994 Accordingly, this resolution provides greater support for the introduction of a 
krill fishing moratorium due to the uncertainty surrounding krill. The fact that the resolution was 
adopted without a vote (i.e. there were no dissenting states) provides some support for the 
possibility previously discussed in this thesis that some form of precautionary approach may 
have become part of customary international law. 
This General Assembly resolution also established an assistance fund to help developing states 
implement the provisions of the Law of the Sea Convention.995 The resolution also "recognised" 
the need for stronger port state controls to prevent IDU fishing996 and "called upon" states not to 
permit their flag vessels to engage in fishing on the high seas or areas of national jurisdiction 
unless authorised and unless they have effective control over the activities of such vessels. 997 
The resolution also "urges" states to develop national and regional plans to put the IPOA for IUU 
fishing into effect and to compile records of vessels in order to combat IDU fishing. 998 
993 Sustainable fisheries, including through the 1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions 
of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 r'elating to the Conservation 
and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, and related instruments 
A/RES/58/14, 2003 
994 Articles 1-4, Sustainable fisheries, including through the 1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the 
Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the 
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, and related 
instruments A/RES/58/14, 2003 
995 Article 12, Sustainable fisheries, including through the 1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the 
Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the 
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, and related 
instruments A/RES/58114, 2003 
996 Article 29, Sustainable fisheries, including through the 1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the 
Provisions of the United Nations· Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the 
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, and related 
instruments A/RES/58/14, 2003 
997 Article 19, Sustainable fisheries, including through the 1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the 
Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the 
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, and related 
instruments A/RES/58/14, 2003 
998 Articles 25 and 26, Sustainable fisheries, including through the 199 5 Agreement for the Implementation 
of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to 
the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, and 
related instruments A/RES/58/14, 2003 
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This General Assembly resolution is a vast improvement on soft law instruments of the past in 
respect of usefulness to prevent overfishing. This General Assembly resolution, like the 2005 
Rome Declaration, sets out specific measures that need to be taken to combat IUU fishing. As 
such, it provides political force to the enforcement measures that need to be implemented on a 
wide scale to protect Antarctic species. 
A subsequent resolution on Sustainable Fisheries was adopted on 17 November 2004.999 The 
resolution "reaffirms" the importance the UN attaches to the long-term management and 
sustainable use of the world's marine living resources. 1000 The resolution was also "concerned" 
that IUU fishing threatened to seriously deplete fish populations and significantly damage 
ecosystems and food security. There was a reaffirmation of the types of enforcement measures 
outlined in the previous resolution including calls upon port and flag states to take all measures 
consistent with international law necessary to prevent IUU fishing. 1001 The resolution also 
recognises the Plan oflmplementation's commitments for states to put in place measures to 
implement the IPOA IUU. 1002 Similarly, the resolution once again "reaffirms" the importance of 
the Plan oflmplementation and "urges" all states to apply the precautionary and ecosystem 
approaches to the management of fish stocks. 1003 This gives greater support to the adoption of a 
precautionary approach to krill management which would justify the introduction of krill fishing 
moratorium because of the current scientific uncertainty concerning krill and the effect of krill 
fishing on the Antarctic ecosystem. 
999 Sustainable fisheries, including through the 1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions 
of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation 
and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, and related instruments 
AJRES/59/25, 2004 
1000 Article 1, Sustainable fisheries, including through the 1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the 
Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the 
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratmy Fish Stocks, and related 
instruments AJRES/59125, 2004 
1001 Article 31, Sustainable fisheries, including through the 1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the 
Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the 
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, and related 
instruments AJRES/59125, 2004 
1002 Article 33, Sustainable fisheries, including through the 1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the 
Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the 
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, and related 
instruments AJRES/59125, 2004 
1003 Articles 3 and 4, Sustainable fisheries, including through the 1995 Agreement for the Implementation 
of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of10 December 1982 relating to 
the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, and 
related instruments AJRES/59125, 2004 
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The 2004 Sustainable Fisheries resolution also provides support for other international 
agreements concerning the marine environment. The resolution also "calls upon" states to ratify 
or accede to the Law of the Sea Convention. 1004 As discussed, such calls should also be extended 
to regional management regimes such as CCAMLR (even though CCAMLR is not a UN 
instrument). In a similar vein, the resolution once again emphasises the General Assembly's 
concern over IUU fishing and "affirms" the need to strengthen the international legal framework 
for intergovernmental cooperation in the management of fish stocks and in combating IUU 
fishing in a manner consistent with international law .1005 This thesis has highlighted several 
weaknesses with the current legal and regulatory regime governing the world's marine 
environment. As emphasised throughout this Chapter, by adopting an objective of strengthening 
the international legal framework for managing fish stocks, the UN General Assembly can 
provide an impetus for improvements in the current regime. The General Assembly could also 
be used as an organ to pressure some states into adopting a policy of compliance with the 
conservation measures of regional management organisations such as CCAMLR. 
Another resolution on Oceans and the Law of the Sea was adopted on 23 December 2003.1006 
The resolution "recalls" the recommendations of the WS SD to establish by 2004 a regular 
process under the UN for the global reporting and assessment of the marine environment. 1007 
The establishment of such a process was also supported by a subsequent resolution on Oceans 
and the Law of the Sea that was adopted on 17 November 2004. 1008 Such a process will give the 
world community as a whole a better understanding of the status of the marine environment and 
is a good way of drawing attention to the problems of IUU fishing. 
Both of these resolutions also called upon states to become parties to the Law of the Sea 
Convention1009 and also the Fish Stocks Agreement. 1010 This will place added pressure on states 
to comply with those agreements. This will be particularly beneficial to krill if it falls under the 
Fish Stocks Agreement, although there is some doubt in that regard. The 2004 resolution does 
provide support to a krill fishing moratorium or local krill fishing bans in sensitive areas of 
1004 Article 5, Sustainablefisheries, including through the 1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the 
Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the 
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, and related 
instruments A/RES/59/25, 2004 
1005 Articles 26 and 28, Sustainable fisheries, including through the 1995 Agreement for the 
Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 
1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish 
Stocks, and related instruments A/RES/59/25, 2004 
1006 Oceans and the law of the sea A/RES/58/240, 2003 
1007 Oceans and the law of the sea A/RES/58/240, 2003 
1008 Oceans and the law of the sea A/RES/59/24, 2004 
1009 Article 1, Oceans and the law of the sea A/RES/58/240, 2003 
1010 Articles 1 and 3, Oceans and the law of the sea A/RES/59/24, 2004 
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Antarctica because it "reaffirms" the need for States to continue efforts to develop tools for 
conserving and managing vulnerable marine ecosystems, including establishment of marine 
protected areas. 1011 
Potential Binding Effect of General Assembly Resolutions 
All of the General Assembly resolutions that have been discussed offer at least some support for 
the outcomes of the World Summit on Sustainable Development and the Pl11n of Implementation 
in particular. The question is whether the principles embodied within these resolutions are 
binding on the world community. The UN Charter gives the General Assembly the power to 
make "recommendations" on matters that fall within its competence.1012 There is some 
suggestion that this provision prevents such resolutions being binding on states if there is no 
other legal support for them. 1013 Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice 
also lists the main sources of international law which include treaties, international custom and 
general principles of law recognised by civilised nations. Arguably, because General Assembly 
resolutions are not specifically recognised as a source of international law, they cannot constitute 
such a source and place binding obligations on states. It has been argued that General Assembly 
resolutions fit within one of the recognised forms of international law in Article 3 8(1) of the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice. 1014 However, it is unlikely that General Assembly 
resolutions would fit easily into any of the listed categories, with the possible exception of 
customary law. 1015 One alternative argument is that Article 38(1) is not a closed list of the 
sources of international law and new sources could develop, which could include a customary 
rule that General Assembly resolutions are binding. 1016 
Another argument is that General Assembly resolutions, although they embody aspects of 
international law, will always remain recommendations that states can accept or ignore as they 
choose. 1017 If this contention holds weight, then the protection that the previously discussed 
resolutions offer krill will be severely reduced. The support in these resolutions for the Plan of 
1011 Article 72, Oceans and the law of the sea A/RES/59/24, 2004 
1012 Article 10, United Nations Charter 
1013 Ramey, R.A. 2000. Armed Conflict on the Final Frontier: The Law of War in Space. The Air Force 
Law Review, Vol48: 1-158 at 108 
1014 Schachter, 0. 1994. Supra, fn 1002, 3 
1015 Mendelson, M. The Legal Character of General Assembly Resolutions: Some Considerations of 
Principle. 95-107 at 98 
1016 Ibid 104 
1017 Sch~ebel, S.M. The Effect of Resolutions of the UN General Assembly on Customary International 
Law. 301-309 at 302 
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Implementation and, in particular, its requirements to ratify Conventions such as the Compliance 
and Fish Stocks Agreements and the Code of Conduct can provide significant protection for krill. 
These resolutions also support principles in the Plan of Implementation such as biological 
diversity and the ecosystem approach, both of which, if followed, can help to protect krill. If 
these resolutions were binding on all states then those states would be required to adopt and 
implement these principles and agreements. Universal adoption and implementation of 
conservation measures in the Southern Ocean is necessary for the management of all Antarctic 
species. If these resolutions have no binding effect, then their importance will be significantly 
diminished. Universally binding obligations are fundamental for the successful implementation 
of any comprehensive krill harvesting ban that is introduced in light of likely expansions in krill 
industry. A complete ban is justified under the precautionary approach by krill's pivotal role in 
the ecosystem and the uncertainty surrounding krill population and its interactions with other 
dependent species. 
There is a strong argument for the non-binding status of General Assembly resolutions and there 
are. If General Assembly resolutions have gained general acceptance or are accepted as the 
international standard for longperiods they may have greater authority. 1018 General acceptance 
by a large proportion of states can, therefore, give such resolutions a much greater status and 
possibly even binding effect. One argument that has been raised is that General Assembly 
resolutions are binding if all of the major powers accept them. 1019 This argument holds little 
weight because of the principle that states are equal under intemationallaw.1020 General 
Assembly resolutions that have been supported by a massive majority of the Assembly and have 
not been opposed by a large number of states can show that the international community intends 
to follow the principles of the resolutions despite the fact that they may not be legally binding. 1021 
Such resolutions are an indication of the intention of the states that have passed them. 1022 
1018 Ramey, R.A. Supra, fu 1059, 114 
1019 D' Amato, A. 1995. Human Rights as Part of Customary International Law: A Plea for Change of 
Paradigms. Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law, Vol 25: 4 7-98 at 62 
1020 Ibid 
1021 Ong, D.M. 1999. Joint Development of Common Offshore Oil and Gas Deposits: "Mere" State 
Practice or Customary International Law? The American Journal of International Law, Vol93: 771-804 at 
780 
1022 Ibid 
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Three of the recent resolutions that support the World Summit were adopted without a vote by 
consensus.
1023 One of the resolutions, on Oceans and the Law of the Sea, was adopted by a vote 
of 132 in favour with one dissenting vote by Turkey and 2 abstentions by Columbia and 
Venezuela. 1024 Both of the 2003 and 2004 resolutions on Sustainable Fisheries were adopted 
without a vote by consensus. The 2003 and 2004 resolutions on Oceans and the Law of the Sea 
were also passed with only a couple of dissenters. Such overwhelming support, arguably, 
indicates that the states that passed these resolutions have an intention to comply with the 
requirements of the Plan oflmplementation and the other principles outlined in the resolutions. 
By indicating their intentions in the resolutions, states may have generated other legal 
consequences. The adoption by consensus of several of these resolutions has created reasonable 
expectations in other states that they will abide by them. 1025 This implies a general consensus for 
the principles of these resolutions that, arguably, creates a new principle of international law. 1026 
If adoption of these resolutions does create reasonable expectations in other states that they will 
fulfill the requirements of the Plan of Implementation then there will be a legal obligation to 
implement agreements such as the Code of Conduct that would benefit krill on the high seas. 
Universally binding conservation obligations are fundamental for the successful implementation 
of a comprehensive krill fishing ban. 
General Assembly resolutions that are unanimously adopted can also be seen as establishing a 
form of estoppel that binds states that voted for the resolutions. 1027 Such an estoppel would, in 
general terms, prevent States from denying representations that they have made and that other 
states rely on, although the nature of estoppel in international law is still unclear. 1028 States that 
adopted the resolutions by consensus are, arguably, estopped from acting contrary to those 
resolutions and, for example, acting inconsistently with the Plan of Implementation. 
1023 General Assembly Press Release, GA/10122, 10 December 2002 
1024 General Assembly Press Release, GA/10122, 10 December 2002 
1025 Schwebel, S.M. Supra, fu 1063, 303 
1026 Ibid 
1027 Mendelson, M. Supra, fn 1061, 96 
1ozs Ibid 
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One potential criticism is that the extremely general language used in these resolutions prevents 
other states from arguing that any clear and unequivocal representations exist. In the 2003 and 
2004 resolutions, however, greater detail is provided such as the need to implement port state 
controls. It is also difficult to have an estoppel that is based on a representation in a resolution 
about intention or what the law is (rather than a representation as to existing facts). 1029 The 
resolutions in the current situation are mainly aimed at declaring what states should do, rather 
than at outlining the existence of particular facts. Reliance is also likely to be absent if the only 
possible reliance is that other states have relied on the resolution's binding effect. 1030 The fact 
that several ofthese resolutions were adopted without a vote by consensus (rather than by 
actually taking a vote and being adopted unanimously) can prevent states from being bound by 
an estoppel because of the absence of a positive vote for the resolutions. 
Apart from potential estoppel, an alternative argument is that the resolutions are binding in their 
own right. In the Nicaragua case1031 the International Court of Justice went much further in 
giving more status to General Assembly resolutions than merely soft law instruments. 1032 The 
International Court of Justice has sometimes, in cases such as the Western Sahara case1033 and 
the South- West Africa case, 1034 acknowledged the legal force of some UN declarations. 1035 
Resolutions will bind states, if the Nicaragua decision is strictly followed, if those states did not 
object to a consensus resolution. 1036 The Nicaragua case appears to support the notion that, if a 
resolution is allowed to pass by consensus without a state recording an express negative vote, the 
state is bound by the resolution1037 Acquiescence to a resolution could, therefore, make it 
binding on a state. 1038 Several of the discussed resolutions were adopted by consensus. 
Arguably, because no state recorded an express negative vote then they are bound by some of the 
resolutions discussed above. Such an outcome would provide an enormous boost to the 
protection of krill and other species in Antarctica. 
1029 Ibid 
1030 Ibid, 97 
1031 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua Case (Nicaragua v USA) (Merits) ICJ 
Rep 1986 14 . 
103
: Morrison, F.L. 1987. Appraisals of the ICJ's Decision: Nicaragua v United States (Merits). The 
American Journal ofinternational Law, Vol81: 160-166 at 161 
1033 Advisory Opinions on Western Sahara, 1975 ICJ REP. 12 (Oct. 16) 
1034 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South- West 
Africa) notwithstanding Security Council resolution 276 (1970), 1971 ICJ REP. 16 (June 21) 
1035 Schachter, 0. 1994. Supra, fu 1002, 3 
1036 Morrison, F.L. Supra, fn 1078, 161 
1037 Ibid 162 
1038 Ibid, 
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As discussed, one of the resolutions "reaffirms" the "requirement" in the Plan of Implementation 
to ratify or accede to relevant UN and associated fisheries agreements. If CCAMLR is included 
within this provision, then a binding obligation placed on all states to ratify or accede to 
CCAMLR would help to alleviate the problem of non-compliance with CCAMLR's conservation 
measures. Krill and other Antarctic species would benefit enormously if more states acted 
consistently with the CCAMLR measures. The Fish Stocks and Compliance agreements are 
specifically mentioned in this resolution and implementation of the Code of Conduct is also 
required. Greater high seas protection for Antarctic species could be a likely outcome if this 
resolution placed a binding obligation on States to adopt and implement such agreements. 
Universally binding obligations are crucial for the effective implementation of a comprehensive 
krill fishing ban. 
The adoption by consent of these resolutions does not necessarily mean that they have binding 
effect. A General Assembly resolution that is passed unanimously can still have a reduced legal 
effect if the specific states that are affected by it do not observe its principles. 1039 States whose 
vessels currently fish on the high seas and who do not observe the principles of these resolutions 
and do not take measures to implement the approaches advocated by the Plan oflmplementation 
will cause the resolutions to have a diminished legal effect. Additionally, even unanimously 
adopted resolutions or resolutions adopted by "consensus" are not necessarily binding because 
often states do not meaningfully support a resolution's principles. 1040 States can go along with a 
consensus resolution, even if they have major reservations, for political reasons because voting 
against it is unpopular. 1041 Voting against a resolution aimed at preventing overfishing in the 
world's oceans would be likely to receive an unpopular reception. So it is likely that there are 
states that did not expressly vote against the resolutions that were adopted without a vote by 
consensus, despite reservations concerning them. States can also fail to consider that their 
actions in the General Assembly will alter international law or place a binding obligation on 
them. 1042 This is even more likely to be the case because of the type of language used in the 
resolutions. Most of the sections of these resolutions are framed in extremely general language 
that does not imply a legally binding obligation. The resolutions are unlikely to impose binding 
obligations if they are not couched in binding terms. 
1039 Schachter, 0. 1994. Supra, fu 1002, 3 
1040 Schwebel, S.M. Supra, fn 1063, 302 
1041 Ibid 
1042 Ibid 
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General Assembly resolutions are not necessarily binding, however, they are at a minimum 
secondary sources of intemationallaw. 1043 Resolutions that are drafted in a manner suggesting 
that nations have an obligation to comply with them are, in particular, viewed as a source of 
international law .1044 The resolutions discussed are, for the most part, drafted in language that 
does not suggest an obligation to comply and so they have less weight. Resolutions adopted 
unanimously or by consensus, at a minimum, have moral or political weight. 1045 Political 
pressure can be applied on parties who have supported the discussed resolutions but fail to 
comply with the principles outlined within, such as the Plan of Implementation of the World 
Summit. Even if they are not binding, General Assembly resolutions are still an indication of the 
views of the international community. 1046 The expression of such views can lead to the 
development ofnew customary law. 
General Assembly resolutions can potentially play a role in the creation of new customary 
internationallaw.1047 There is some suggestion that statements made by governments in the UN, 
and resolutions of UN organs, may constitute evidence of state practice and opinio juris. 1048 
There may be support for this view in the Nicaragua Case. 1049 The court in that case supported 
the role of a number of General Assembly resolutions in the creation of new customary law. 1050 
However, there is not universal support for this proposition. 1051 Such a situation would not be in 
accordance with the traditional requirement that the behaviour of states provides evidence of 
state practice. 1052 Resolutions adopted unanimously or by consensus can indicate opinio juris. 1053 
The adoption by consensus of the previously discussed resolutions is arguably evidence of opinio 
juris of a new customary law embodying the principles of these resolutions, particularly the 
principles supporting the Plan of Implementation of the World Summit. The fact that the Plan of 
Implementation was also adopted by consensus at the Summit gives further support to this 
proposition. 
1043 Ong, D.M. Supra, fn 1067, 780 
1044 Charlesworth, H. 1994. The Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Violence Against Women. 
The American Society of International Law Newsletter, June Edition. 
1045 Schwebel, S.M. Supra, fn 1063, 305 
1046 Charlesworth, H. Supra, fn 1090 
1047 Ibid 
1048 Schachter, 0. 1994. Supra, fn 1002, 3 
1049 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua Case (Nicaragua v USA) ICJ Rep 1984 
392 Ong, D.M. Supra, fn 1067, 780 
1050 Ibid 
1051 Ibid 
1052 Schachter, 0. 1994. Supra, fn 1002, 3 
1053 Schwebel, S.M. Supra, fn 1063, 305 
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State practice is also required for new customs to be created. As discussed, traditionally state 
behaviour is required as evidence of state practice. General Assembly resolutions alone are, 
arguably, insufficient evidence of state practice to create customary law. 1054 However, as 
discussed previously, methods of creating customary law have changed and General Assembly 
resolutions may now be indicative of state practice. 1055 There is also an argument that the 
repetition of principles in a series of resolutions may show evidence of a practice that states have 
acknowledged as law. 1056 Some of the principles acknowledged by these resolutions have 
already been adopted as state practice. The principles of the Code of Conduct (as discussed), for 
example, have been included in the legislation of several States. 
Support for the Code and other conservation principles such as the ecosystem approach is also 
found in many international instruments pre-dating these resolutions. The continual adoption of 
such principles in a series of international agreements culminating in these resolutions will give 
greater weight to the emergence of new customary law. The inclusion of the Code's and other 
instrument's conservation and sustainable use principles in customary law would make such 
principles binding on all states. As discussed, the problem of IUU fishing and non-compliance 
with CCAMLR measures by non-parties can be alleviated if all states are required to abide by 
these measures. All states must be bound by management measures for the successful 
introduction of a comprehensive krill fishing ban to ensure greater security for the Southern 
Ocean ecosystem. 
1054 Ibid 302 
1055 Ong', D.M. Supra, fn 1067,780 
1056 Schwebel, S.M. Supra, fn 1063, 304 
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Conclusion 
This Chapter has examined international "soft" law and the role it can play in the introduction of 
a comprehensive krill harvesting ban or the maintenance of current precautionary catch limits. 
Although this type of law is non-binding, it is still important for a krill fishing moratorium, or 
even a less extensive form of protection, because of its role in shaping expected standards of 
behaviour. At the very least, soft law can provide political pressure on states to comply with 
international conservation measures such as an Antarctic krill fishing moratorium. Some soft 
law instruments, if it can be argued they have hardened into customary law, could be used as a 
legal justification for states to enforce conservation measures against third party state vessels on 
the high seas in regions such as the Southern Ocean. However, this thesis concludes that the 
current "soft" law regime cannot adequately ensure the security of the Antarctic krill and their 
dependent species, particularly if a fishing moratorium is introduced. 
The Stockholm and Rio Declarations both support conservation but focus on human needs and 
sustainable development, which is not fully consistent with a krill fishing moratorium. The 
instruments are also general in nature and are non-binding, however, there is some scope for the 
conservation principles embodied these agreements to become binding customary law if they are 
accepted by a significant proportion of nations. 
The Rio Conference also gave rise to Agenda 21 which contains specific provisions aimed at 
sustainable use of the world's oceans and at placing greater control over flag state vessels, but its 
arguably non-binding status detracts from its strengths. The Agenda will fail to provide effective 
protection if it is non-binding and does not harden into customary international law. The UN 
Fish Stocks Agreement can provide greater binding force on the high seas however its 
application to krill is not completely certain. Binding obligations on the high seas are vital to 
prevent the risk of IUU fishing from likely increases in demand for krill products if a ban is 
introduced. 
The Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries could provide effective protection for krill 
because of its universally applicable conservation principles. However, the concepts of 
optimum utilisation and maximum sustainable yield embodied in the Code prima facie appear to 
be at odds with complete krill protection. This thesis submits that support in the Code for the 
preservation of ecosystem biodiversity and depleted stock numbers justifies a total fishing krill 
ban because of krill's vital role in the ecosystem. This hypothesis is given further support 
because of the Code's recognition of the precautionary approach which arguably justifies a krill 
fishing moratorium in light of the uncertainty surrounding the effect of krill fishing on the 
222 
Antarctic ecosystem. Furthermore, because of krill's vital role in the ecosystem, a krill fishing 
moratorium would allow greater annual recruitment of other species in the Antarctic ecosystem 
and would facilitate the long-term conservation and sustainable use of other species in 
accordance with the Code's objectives. 
The Code's generality and voluntary status reduce its effectiveness. However, support for the 
Code's conservation principles is found in subsequent instruments such as the Rome, Kyoto and 
Reyjavik Declarations which could aid in those principles becoming part of binding customary 
international law. Furthermore, the 2005 Rome Declaration highlights real actions that need to 
be taken to combat IUU fishing, which gives states guidance as to steps they must take in this 
respect. 
The World Summit on Sustainable Development in late 2002 saw the consolidation of many 
environmental principles aimed at protection of the world's oceans. In particular, the 
Johannesburg Declaration and Plan oflmplementation give support to conservation principles 
contained in the Law of the Sea Convention, Agenda 21 and the Biodiversity Convention. 
Furthermore, the Plan, arguably, also requires specific ratification of certain agreements such as 
CCAMLR and the Fish Stocks Agreement. The mandatory ratification of such instruments 
would provide significant protection to krill because of their enhanced conservation 
requirements. There are, however, doubts as to the binding nature of the Plan oflmplementation. 
The Plan's principles could enter into customary international law, although whether the 
requisite opinio juris exists is questionable. Only with laws that bind all states can a 
comprehensive krill fishing ban be successful. 
The principles arising from the World Summit have received subsequent support in a number of 
General Assembly resolutions aimed at protection of the world's oceans. These resolutions also 
support the adoption of other agreements such as the Law of the Sea Convention and the Fish 
Stocks Agreement, however, the non-binding nature of the language used reduces the impact of 
these resolutions. The binding nature of General Assembly resolutions is uncertain but they will 
have more legal force if they are adopted unanimously or by consensus. However, even with 
unanimous backing they may still only be secondary sources of international law, although this 
can still lead to the formation of new customary law. If the General Assembly resolutions do 
constitute customary international law then, as discussed above, their real force will lie in the 
political pressure that they will place on states to comply with conservation measures on the high 
seas and the legal justification they provide for other states to enforce such measures. In a recent 
2004 resolution, the General Assembly also highlighted the need to strengthen the current 
international legal framework in respect of fisheries management in order to combat IUU fishing. 
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This call by the General Assembly may provide the impetus for states to work towards 
strengthening the current legal framework. Such a move is necessary to combat the problems of 
non-parties to regional fish management agreements flouting conservation measures. 
The Plan oflmplementation also focuses on IUU fishing which is the one of the major problems 
facing krill under current conservation regimes. Soft international law could aid krill because it 
may induce an expected standard ofbehaviour for conservation of marine species. However, its 
non-binding nature reduces its effectiveness in combating IUU fishing. The next chapter of this 
will look at IUU fishing and other practical implementation problems that could hamper the 
introduction of an effective krill fishing ban. 
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CHAPTER 5- APPROACHES TO FISHERIES MANAGEMENT AND 
ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS TO COMBAT IUU FISHING 
Introduction 
An effective legal regime governing Antarctic fisheries is necessary to guard against the 
overfishing problem that has plagued marine ecosystems in other regions. Permitting krill 
harvesting could be detrimental to dependent species, particularly because of the uncertainty 
concerning krill population and interactions with these dependent species. 
Part I of the chapter will focus on the ecosystem approach to fisheries management. In 
particular, CCAMLR's approach will be examined to determine its potential effectiveness in 
protecting krill stocks. Furthermore, the meaning and standing of the ecosystem approach in 
international law will be analysed to determine whether it is possible to uniformly and practically 
implement the concept. 
A comprehensive ban on krill harvesting is necessary because of krill's vital role in the 
ecosystem. As discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis, the precautionary approach justifies 
introducing a krill fishing moratorium even though there is scientific uncertainty concerning the 
effect of krill fishing on the Antarctic ecosystem. For such a ban to provide effective protection, 
a strong regulatory regime must be in place to combat illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing 
(IUU). IUU fishing has, in the past, threatened the effectiveness of many international 
instruments, The likely increase in krill harvesting levels because of greater demand and reduced 
costs, combined with the rise of the aquaculture industry, means that strong mechanisms are 
required to reduce the threat to krill from IUU fishing, especially if a total ban were enacted. 
Part II of this Chapter will focus on current international instruments aimed at curbing IUU 
fishing and the use of flags of convenience to evade these measures. An effective ban on krill 
fishing could not be enforced in the face of likely increases in krill harvesting if stakeholders find 
ways to avoid having to abide by such instruments. CCAMLR's Catch Documentation Scheme 
("CDS") is one such measure aimed at curbing IUU fishing. The CDS is currently focussed on 
Patagonian Toothfish but if the CDS is effective, it could also be used to reduce any IDU fishing 
resulting from the introduction of a krill fishing moratorium. 
Part III of this chapter will discuss the effectiveness of mechanisms used to secure compliance of 
national fishing vessels such as logbooks, observers, inspection systems, patrol vessels, and 
vessel monitoring systems. Strong mechanisms are necessary if krill protection or conservation 
measures are to be effective. A comprehensive ban on krill fishing would, in particular, require 
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strong compliance measures if it were to be maintained in the face of TIJU fishing. In particular, 
the need for an effective system of detention and punishment of IUU vessels will be outlined. 
I. The Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries Management 
CCAMLR uses an ecosystem approach that focuses on the whole ecosystem, rather than single 
species. A single species regime was not seen as viable in the Southern Ocean because of small 
numbers of species and high interdependence between species. 1057 CCAMLR's approach 
distinguishes it from other fisheries instruments which focus on one species. 1058 The "Antarctic 
marine ecosystem" is defined as the complex of relationships of Antarctic marine living 
resources with each other and with their physical environment. 1059 
The ecosystem approach utilises a technique called feedback management. CCAMLR has a 
target population value for each species. Deviation from this target allows the system's control 
mechanisms to be changed to achieve the target. The practical application of such a procedure is 
quite difficult because, if the population size declines below the target, the adult population may 
not be able to maintain recruitment. 1060 Other factors besides living organisms also need to be 
considered in the adoption of an ecosystem approach. Factors such as nutrient levels; currents; 
temperature; quantity of light; and the time of year can affect the ecosystem.1061 Considering 
these factors can also make the practical application of an ecosystem approach quite complicated. 
1057 Overholt, D.H. Supra, fn 392, 239 
1058 Baird, R. Supra, fn 25, 167 
1059 Article !(3), CCAMLR 
1060 Nicol, S. and De la Mare, W. Supra, fn 80, 45 
1061 Howard, M. Supra, fn 35, 115 
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The Convention itself advocates harvesting at a level of maximum sustainable yield. 1062 The 
Working Group on Fish Stock Assessment (WG-FSA) has recognised that maximum sustainable 
yield models for krill management are likely to be unacceptable for taking into account 
ecosystem considerations and interactions. 1063 Maximum sustainable yield models assume that 
systems are stable; that the exploited stock comes from only one species; and that there is a 
predictable relationship between population size and growth and harvesting levels. 1064 For 
species such as krill which are found at a low level in the food chain these assumptions usually 
do not apply because they ignore the more important role that organisms at a lower level have on 
other species and it is not appropriate to look at them on a single species basis. 1065 The 
assumptions are also inapplicable to krill because they form swarms that often do not mix with 
other swarms and so, as discussed, there can be problems with localised harvesting. 1066 The 
difficulties with maximum sustainable yield have led to CCAMLR taking a broader ecosystem 
approach to krill management. Such an approach is necessary because of the complex 
interactions of krill with other species. If krill were to be harvested at maximum sustainable 
yield then, arguably, other species would be detrimentally affected. The harvesting of krill at 
these levels would actually prevent other species being harvested to maximum effect. A 
comprehensive ban on krill harvesting would facilitate the exploitation of other, more 
economical species at maximum sustainable yield because of krill's vital role in the food chain. 
The CAMLR Commission introduced the Ecosystem Monitoring program (CEMP) in 1985 to 
monitor the effects of fishing on harvested and dependent species and to detect changes in the 
ecosystem. 1067 CEMP was set up because of the uncertainty surrounding interactions within the 
Antarctic ecosystem, the lack of data on population trends of exploited species and the problems 
with predicting the effect of harvesting on the ecosystem. 1068 Predator numbers and breeding 
success are measured at particular locations and CEMP tries to relate changes in these numbers 
to fluctuations in krill abundance. CEMP also attempts to identify natural variability in 
populations. 1069 This data is used in mathematical models to predict future changes and to 
formulate catch limits. 1070 
1062 The problems with such an approach have already been highlighted. 
1063 '11 M1 er, D.G.M. 2002. Supra, fn 247, 176 
1064 Ibid 
1065 Ibid 
1066 Ibid, 177 
1067 CCAMLR website, http://www.ccamlr.org 
1068 Ibid, 177 
1069 Nicol, S. and Endo, Y. Supra, fn 77, 109 
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° Krill Yield Model has been discussed previously. 
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Models concerning interactions between species in the ecosystem are also required. For 
example, predators that have several prey animals often feed more on a particular species when 
there is a shortage of another prey species. 1071 However, there is currently insufficient data on 
such interactions to formulate an accurate model. 1072 Information on ecosystems is not easy to 
obtain and statistical information and estimates can be disputed. 1073 Natural variability of 
populations of Antarctic species is also uncertain. 1074 Uncertainty will prevail without the large 
amount of data necessary to implement the ecosystem approach. 1075 However, as discussed 
above, the precautionary approach advocates taking action even when there is great uncertainty. 
The problem is also one of strengthening the current regime to ensure that any management 
measures taken are effective. 
The CAMLR Commission is required to recommend conservation measures based on the best 
scientific evidence available and analyse the effectiveness of such measures. 1076 Conservation 
measures can include the designation of protected species and catch limits for harvested 
species. 1077 The Commission faces problems with a lack of data and the inherent uncertainty 
surrounding estimates. This makes it difficult to base decisions on the best scientific evidence. 
Insufficient or inconclusive data can result in members doing nothing and the convention 
becoming unenforceable. 1078 Alternatively, some fishing nations will attempt to delay the 
introduction of measures because of insufficient data. 1079 As discussed, the precautionary 
approach advocates the maintenance of comprehensive management measures despite 
uncertainty. Krill's vital role in the ecosystem means that strong management must be 
maintained, especially because of likely increases in harvesting levels. 
A lack of data impedes the implementation of adequate management measures, creating 
problems with the adoption of an ecosystem approach. Insufficient or inaccurate knowledge 
about species interrelationships creates difficulties in assessing the impact of a krill fisheries 
industry on dependent species. Different time spans for population life cycles of predators also 
makes it hard to assess the impact of krill harvesting on the whole ecosystem. In some cases the 
effect is not ascertainable for several years. 1080 
1071 Nicol, S. and De la Mare, W. Supra, fn 80, 47 
1072 Ibid, 47 
1073 Puissochet, J. Supra, fn 48, 74 
1074 Basson, M. and Beddington, J.R. Supra, fn 138, 65 
1075 Baird, R. Supra, fn 25, 169 
1076 Article IX(l)(e) and (f), CCAMLR 
1077 Article IX(2), CCAMLR 
1078 Baird, R. Supra, fn 25, 170 
1079 Gulland, J.A. Supra, fn 7, 235 
1080 Basson, M. and Beddington, J.R. Supra, fn 138, 60 
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It is also likely that stocks of particular species will not recover if adult stock is reduced to low 
levels. Depleted adult populations can result in some fish species producing extremely small 
numbers of offspring. 1081 This poses a significant threat for exploited fish species. Even if the 
impact of krill fisheries on the ecosystem is monitored extensively, irreparable damage can occur 
before detection is possible. A complete ban on krill harvesting would eliminate the problems 
with inadequate data concerning interactions between krill and other species. This would reduce 
the scope for detrimental change to populations of dependent species. Such an approach is in 
accordance with the Madrid Protocol's ecosystem conservation objectives. 
CCAMLR is currently investigating a potential new approach to managing krill through the use 
of predator estimates. 1082 This new procedure could eliminate the problems with insufficient 
information that currently plague the ecosystem approach. However, current predator 
information is, arguably still too uncertain to introduce a predator based system. 1083 There is also 
a danger that significant changes in predator numbers would only be detected after the damage 
has been done. CCAMLR's precautionary approach to management can overcome such 
difficulties and allow the implementation of a predator based system provided that strong 
enforcement mechanisms are in place to ensure compliance. 
The meaning of an "ecosystem approach" 
Difficulties arise in defining exactly what constitutes an ecosystem approach and how it is to be 
implemented. The parties to the Biodiversity Convention have provided some practical guidance 
on the implementation of the ecosystem approach. 1084 Decision V/6 recognises that, for the 
Biodiversity Convention, the ecosystem approach seeks to balance conservation; sustainable use; 
and the fair and equitable sharing of genetic resources. If the purpose of the ecosystem approach 
is to achieve a balance between sustainable use and conservation, then the approach, arguably, 
would not justify a comprehensive krill harvesting ban. Arguably, a total ban would not reach an 
appropriate balance because sustainable use of krill is ignored. 
1081 Ibid, 61 
1082 CCAMLR should investigate such alternatives because of the difficulty in gaining accurate 
information concerning krill population. 
1083 As previously discussed, it is also difficult to gain accurate data concerning the interactions between 
predators and other species in the Antarctic ecosystem. 
1084 Decision VI/12 of the Conference of Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity provides 
practical guidance on the implementation of an ecosystem approach. The Decision suggests that 
governments and organisations submit case studies on the implementation of the ecosystem approach. 
Entities relating their own experiences on implementing an ecosystem approach may provide useful 
information that enables other parties to overcome the difficulties associated with practical 
implementation. 
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However, Decision V /6 also states that the ecosystem approach can integrate other approaches 
such as having protected areas and the way in which the approach is implemented will depend on 
local conditions. A comprehensive harvesting ban could therefore be justified under an 
ecosystem approach because other approaches such as a total ban can be integrated into the 
ecosystem approach. The unique local conditions in Antarctica also support complete protection. 
The extreme importance of krill to the Antarctic ecosystem and the short Antarctic food chain are 
local conditions that should alter the way in which the ecosystem approach is adopted in 
Antarctica. Even if a comprehensive ban is not adopted, as previously discussed, seasonal or 
regional bans can be adopted to protect areas where krill harvesting poses significant danger or 
where fishing is highly concentrated. 
Decision V/6 also supports CCAMLR's feedback management system. 1085 This is an appropriate 
method of managing krill, however, the effect of time lags can be detrimental. IfCCAMLR 
adopts a particular catch limit, then the effects on the ecosystem of that limit take time to 
ascertain. When new data comes to light CCAMLR can adjust its precautionary limits under the 
feedback management system. But if detrimental harm has already occurred, changing the limits 
after the event will only prevent further harm from occurring. Consequently, a feedback 
management system is not able provide total security to krill and its dependent species. 
Decision V/6 also contains a number of principles concerning the ecosystem approach. 1086 In 
particular, several of these principles focus on the need to consider economic factors when 
adopting the approach. 1087 If this principle is a fundamental part of the ecosystem approach, then 
a total krill harvesting ban is, arguably, unjustified under that approach. If krill need to be 
managed in an economic context then their economic benefits must be taken into account. 
1085 The Decision stresses that management must be adaptive to respond to uncertainties arising from time 
lags in ecosystem processes and the absence of complete knowledge on the ecosystem. This would seem 
to support CCAMLR' s feedback management method of adjusting precautionary catch limits when new 
data comes to light. 
1086 Principle 3 states that ecosystem managers should consider the actual or potential effects of their 
activities on other ecosystems. This principle suggests that CCAMLR should consider the effects of its 
management activities on mainland Antarctica and other world ecosystems. CCAMLR does take an 
approach that considers the effects of krill fishing on land based predator populations. 
1087 Principle 4 says that the ecosystem needs to be managed in an economic context. To further this goal, 
management systems need to align incentives to promote biodiversity conservation and sustainable use and 
to intemalise costs and benefits in the given ecosystem to the extent feasible. Principle 10 also gives 
further support to the inclusion of economic objectives in the ecosystem approach by stating that it 
involves a balance between conservation and use of biodiversity. 
Under principle 11, the ecosystem approach should involve all relevant sectors of society. Presumably this 
would include fisherman and others involved in potential markets for krill, including usage in aquaculture 
and pharmaceuticals. Operational Guideline 5 of Decision V /6 also requires the integration of the 
ecosystem approach into fisheries and intersectoral cooperation.in implementing the approach.· If the 
views of these different sectors were taken into account then, under an ecosystem approach, sustainable 
use of krill would be preferable to complete conservation. 
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Operational Guideline 2 of Decision V/6 states that one objective of the ecosystem approach is to 
maintain or restore the benefits derived from the ecosystem. Furthermore, it emphasises that the 
ecosystem's functions should benefit stakeholders responsible for their production and 
management. Consequently, it would appear that the ecosystem approach embodies an economic 
element that seeks to utilise the resources of the ecosystem. A comprehensive harvesting ban 
would not permit the utilisation of such economic benefits and so CCAMLR's objective of 
allowing sustainable use of krill resources is, arguably, more appropriate under an ecosystem 
approach. However, this thesis submits that managing krill in an economic context still permits a 
total harvesting ban because such a ban would facilitate sustainable exploitation of other krill 
dependent species. Furthermore, it is submitted that a comprehensive ban still accords with the 
principles set out in Decision V /6 because conserving krill would protect the functioning of the 
whole ecosystem. 1088 
As discussed, the time lags that can occur before the effects of particular activities on the 
ecosystem are known can result in detrimental harm. The setting of long term krill conservation 
objectives advocated by Decision V/6 supports a total ban on krill fishing. 1089 Because of the 
danger that krill fishing poses to dependent species, a comprehensive ban is justified because of 
the time lags before damage from fishing will become apparent. At such a time the harm will 
have already occurred, which makes it more prudent to enact conservation measures before the 
damage actually takes place. For a harvesting ban to be effective, the current legal regime must 
be strengthened. Enforcement problems mean that illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing 
(IUU) will create difficulties in maintaining an effective ban, especially in light of likely 
improvements in economic returns from krill fishing and greater demand for krill products. 
1088 Principle 5 of Decision V/6 also states that the conservation of ecosystem structure and functioning 
should be a priority target of the ecosystem approach. As krill are found at the base of the ecosystem, they 
are essential for the functioning of the ecosystem. If the functioning of the ecosystem is a priority target of 
the ecosystem approach then, under such an approach, it may be possible to disregard krill's economic 
value because of the priority of protecting krill in order to conserve the functioning of the ecosystem. 
Principle 6 also requires management to look at environmental conditions that limit the natural 
productivity and functioning of the ecosystem. As discussed, the extent of Antarctic sea ice may be one of 
the major factors that limit krill productivity. Under an ecosystem approach, it may be necessary to accord 
greater protection to krill in order to avoid the uncertainty associated with krill recruitment and sea ice 
cover. 
1089 Principle 8 of Decision V/6 requires management to set long term objectives because of the time lags 
that are present in ecosystem processes. 
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II. · Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported Fishing in the Southern Ocean 
A total ban on krill fishing would require effective measures to prevent IUU fishing, especially if 
a significant demand for krill arose because of new products and decreased fishing costs. 
Accordingly, a strong legal regime is required to ensure that the level of IUU fishing is kept low. 
CCAMLR and other regional fisheries management organisations have been plagued by 
illegal1090, unregulated1091 and unreported1092 (IUU) fishing. The UN FAO has produced 
estimates that suggest that in some fisheries the proportion of total catches coming from IUU 
fishing is as great as 30%.1093 Finfish have been one of the major targets ofiUU fishers. 1094 As 
previously discussed, it is now likely that krill harvesting levels will increase. 1095 There are now 
a wider range of uses for krill and some markets, such as aquaculture, have the potential for rapid 
growth. Krill harvesting technology is also improving and, with a decrease in costs, there will be 
better economic returns from krill fishing. IUU fishing could therefore pose a threat to krill in 
the same'way as it has harmed the Patagonian toothfish. Accordingly strong legal mechanisms 
are required to restrict the level of IUU fishing, especially in light of likely increases in 
harvesting and greater demand for krill products. 
1090 Illegal fishing involves fishing by vessels within a state's jurisdiction in contravention of its laws or 
fishing by flag vessels in contravention of the conservation measures of regional management 
organisations of which the flag state is a member (Article 3.1, International Plan of Action on Illegal, 
Unreported and Unregulated Fishing). 
1091 Unregulated fishing refers to the misreporting, or the failure to report, fishing activities occurring 
within the zone of control of a particular regional management organisation (Article 3.2, International 
Plan of Action on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing). 
1092 Unregulated fishing refers to harvesting activities carried out by vessels from flag states that are not 
members of the relevant regional management organisation (Alticle 3.3, International Plan of Action on 
Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing). 
1093 UN FAO website 
1094 The Patagonian toothfish in particular has been a major focus of IUU fishing. Conservative estimates 
have reported IUU catches as constituting at least half of all toothfish harvested. IUU fishing in one 
particular year around Crozet island decimated 25% of the population in that area (Popick, I.J. 2001. Are 
There Really Plenty ofFish in the Sea? The World Trade Organization's Presence is Effectively 
Frustrating the International Community's Attempts to Conserve the Chilean Sea Bass, Emory Law 
Journal, Vol 50: 939-985 at 943). NZ has come up with figures ofUS$300 million for the value of the 
illegal industry. AFMA believes that the legal catch around Macquarie Island only has a value of AUD$5 
million for 1000 tonnes of fish (Baird, R. Supra, fu 25, 179). 
1095 See Chapter 1 for a detailed discussion on this topic. 
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There have been several international instruments introduced to stem the problem of IUU fishing. 
The Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management 
Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas ("the Compliance Agreement) was adopted in 
November 1993 by the Twenty-seventh Session of the F AO Conference in resolution 15/93.1096 
The Compliance Agreement is aimed at giving nations effective means to deter vessel reflagging 
by nationals. 1097 The legally binding nature of the Compliance Agreement makes it a useful 
means of combating IUU fishing. As it applies to all fishing vessels on the high seas, 1098 it has a 
wide scope that can help to protect against IUU fishing in the Antarctic. As previously 
discussed, although there are large concentrations of krill near some sub-Antarctic islands, there 
are also large concentrations in high seas areas. The Compliance Agreement also contains 
. . h h 1· f . 1099 Th · · prov1s1ons t at try to ensure t e comp ranee o non-part1es. ese prov1s10ns are necessary 
that the deterrent and enforcement mechanisms are implemented by the maximum number of 
states to curtail IUU fishing. Such mechanisms are clearly relevant to any imposition of a krill 
fishing moratorium or seasonal/localised fishing bans. 
The F AO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries mirrors large parts of the Compliance 
Agreement.1 100 Other provisions of the Compliance Agreement have also been included within 
the International Plan of Action for IUU fishing (IPOA). The IPOAs are voluntary instruments 
that were formulated within the Code framework. 1101 The Code and the IPOA can help to create 
a standard practice for dealing with IUU fishing that could pressure other states to comply with 
their provisions. The Code of Conduct and the Compliance Agreement are, in any case, a move 
towards more effective protection of fisheries and the marine ecosystem. 1102 Strong international 
instruments and mechanisms that reduce IUU fishing are necessary to ensure the effectiveness of 
any form of krill harvesting ban. 
1096 Doulman, D.J. 1998. Supra, fn 864 
1097 Ibid 
1098 Article 2 
1099 Article VIII of the Agreement outlines how it applies to non-parties. Parties are required to encourage 
non-parties to act consistently with the Agreement and also to cooperate consistently with international law 
so that flag vessels of non-parties do not undermine the Agreement. 
1100 Bratspies, R. Supra, fn 599, 234. The Code, in Article 1.1, specifically acknowledges that FAO 
Conference resolution 15/93 states that the Compliance Agreement forms an "integral" part of the Code. 
1101 The IPOA for IUU fishing was approved by the FAO Committee on Fisheries at its 24th session in 
2001 (UN FAO website, http://www.fao.org). 
1102 Song, Y. Supra, fn 879, 863 
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Both the Code and the IPOA require states to exercise control over their nationals so that they do 
not engage in IUU fishing. 1103 States are required to discourage nationals from flagging vessels 
under a state not meeting its responsibilities. 1104 States are also required to exercise such control 
in an effective manner so that nationals do not undermine regional conservation and management 
measures.
1105 Placing this requirement on states makes it more likely that regional conservation 
measures will be observed. States are in the best position to control and punish their own 
nationals. Requiring them to prevent nationals undermining regional conservation measures may 
mean that more effective controls are implemented to ensure compliance with regimes such as 
CCAMLR. However, the Code and IPOA are merely voluntary and they may not result in states 
actually implementing effective controls over nationals. A recent survey by the F AO has 
indicated that, of those members that responded, only 24% (15 states) indicated that they were 
currently formulating a national plan of action to put the IPOA-IUU into place. 1106 Effective 
controls are vital if a krill harvesting ban is to be introduced. Even if a regional or seasonal ban 
were introduced to protect the more sensitive areas, robust controls are still necessary to prevent 
IUU fishing particularly because of likely increases in economic returns and demand for krill 
products. As discussed in a previous Chapter, the F AO itself has highlighted the need to improve 
effective implementation of these instruments. 
The IPOA requires states to prevent flag vessels from resupplying IUU vessels or transshipping 
fish to or from those vessels. 1107 Prior authorisation from the flag state is also required before 
flag vessels transship at sea. 1108 Transshipping fish is a technique to avoid regulation by 
transferring IUU catches between vessels. Strong mechanisms are required to prevent 
transshipment because it is used as a means to facilitate nm fishing. However, it still occurs at 
present. 1109 Likely increases in economic returns from krill harvesting and demand for krill 
products makes it an absolute necessity to wipe out transshipment and other techniques of 
avoiding regulation. Efforts that are being made by CCAMLR to stamp out such practices will 
be discussed later in this Chapter. 
1103 Article 18, International Plan of Action on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, Article 6.11, 
FAD Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries 1995 
1104 Article 19, International Plan of Action on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing 
1105 Article 6.11, FAD Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries 1995 
1106 Paragraph 68, Teclmical Consultation to Review Progress and Promote the Full Implementation of the 
IPOA to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate IUU Fishing and the IPOA for the Management of Fishing 
Capacity, Rome, Italy, 24-29 June 2004, Action Taken by FAD Members to Implement the International 
Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (IPDA-IUU) 
1107 Article 48, International Plan of Action on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing 
IIOS Article 49, International Plan of Action on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing 
1109 Carr, C.J. and Scheiber, H.N. Supra, fn 837, 62 
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The Code makes flag states responsible for enforcement but it provides few actual methods to 
stop non-parties from flouting it. 1110 Requiring flag state control is an appropriate method of 
reducing IUU fishing by flag state vessels, however, it depends on how vigorously states exert 
control over their vessels. Many fishing vessels are privately owned, making it unlikely that they 
will faithfully represent the interests of their flag states. 1111 Conflict is therefore likely between 
flag states and their vessels. 1112 States that actively enforce measures also put themselves at a 
disadvantage to other nations that have less strict flag controls. 1113 This leads to some states 
publicly advocating flag state control whilst implementing weak controls over their vessels. A 
recent survey by the FAO did, however, report that 59% (23 members) of member states that 
responded had taken appropriate action (eg observers, inspections, satellite monitoring) to ensure 
that their flag vessels do not undermine high seas conservation and management measures. 1114 It 
is difficult to effectively enforce controls over flag vessels, particularly in the Southern Ocean, 
because vessel owners are motivated by private interests. Competition from vessels under 
weaker controls can force some flag state vessels to engage in IUU fishing so that they remain 
economically viable. Effective flag state control is vital to ensure the effectiveness of a 
comprehensive or limited krill harvesting ban. Greater economic returns from krill harvesting 
will make it vital to have a strong regime to prevent IUU fishing and this cannot be achieved if 
flag states do not control their own vessels. Even with stricter controls, there is still a risk that 
vessels will make greater use of flags of convenience. 1115 
1110 Bratspies, R. Supra, fn 599,235. Article III(l)(a) of the Compliance Agreement also requires states to 
take such measures "as may be necessary" to ensure that their flag vessels do not undermine the 
effectiveness of international conservation and management measures. 
1111 Silk, R.J. 2001. Non-binding Dispute Resolution Processes in Fisheries Conflicts: Fish Out of Water? 
Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution, Vol 16: 791 
1112 Ibid 
1113 Popick, I.J. Supra, fn 1140,964 
1114 Paragraphs 74 and 76, Technical Consultation to Review Progress and Promote the Full 
Implementation of the IPOA to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate IUU Fishing and the IPOA for the 
Management of Fishing Capacity, Rome, Italy, 24-29 June 2004, Action Taken by FAG Members to 
Implement the International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and 
Unregulated Fishing (IPOA-IUU) 
1115 Ibid 
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CCAMLR also contains provisions that advocate flag state control. Article XXI of CCAMLR 
requires Contracting Parties to take measures within their competence to ensure compliance with 
CCAMLR. Article XXI is intentionally ambiguous by making "within its competence" part of 
the provision. This allows claimant and non-claimant states to interpret the provision 
differently. 1116 Claimants can argue that the provision gives them jurisdiction over citizens of all 
nations entering the claimed area. 1117 Non-exercise of jurisdiction does not affect their claim 
because of Article IV of CCAMLR. 1118 Non-claimants can argue that the provision simply 
allows flag State enforcement and flag state prosecution for breaches. 1119 Krill and other 
Antarctic marine species would receive greater protection if claimants had jurisdiction over all 
nationals entering the claimed area. If claimants had such jurisdiction then they would be likely 
to exercise effective control over all IUU fishers in this zone to bolster their claims. This would 
give greater protection against IUU fishing in these areas, particularly since large krill 
concentrations are found off the Antarctic mainland and other claimed sub-Antarctic islands. 
Permitting merely flag state enforcement makes it difficult to protect against IUU fishing of non-
flag state vessels. A comprehensive or seasonal/regional ban on krill harvesting would be more 
effective if enforcement mechanisms were strengthened. 
Enforcement of CCAMLR is therefore quite difficult because flag vessels of non-members can 
ignore the Convention's conservation measures. This creates an obstacle to implementing and 
enforcing any effective ban on krill fishing because non~members of CCAMLR could simply 
ignore the ban. Illegal fishing boats can, however, be seized if they trespass into the Exclusive 
Economic Zone of any country. 1120 Australia has, detained illegal fishing boats with Patagonian 
Toothfish in its declared EEZ around Heard and MacDonald Islands. In early 2002 an Australian 
navy patrol boat detained two Russian vessels, the Lena and Volga that were engaged in illegal 
harvesting ofToothfish within these EEZs. 1121 Under the 1982 Convention Article 62, vessels 
fishing in an EEZ are required to comply with conservation measures of the sovereign state and 
that can include measures relating to catch quotas or determining which species may be caught. 
So, as previously discussed, a krill fishing moratorium could be introduced by coastal states in 
their EEZs around sub-Antarctic islands. Even a regional krill ban in sensitive areas would 
provide some benefit to krill and their dependent species. 
1116 Howard, M. Supra, fn 35, 139 
1117 Ibid 
1118 Ibid,140 
1119 Ibid 
1120 Baird, R. Supra, fn 25, 169 
1121 CCAMLR Report of Member's Activities in the Convention Area 2001-02- Australia. France has also 
taken control of illegal boats in its EEZ around Crozet and Kerguelen Islands (Baird, R. Supra, fn 25, 169) 
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The greater capacity, and perhaps a greater willingness, of coastal states to exercise control over 
foreign vessels operating in their EEZs, arguably, makes it easier to achieve a reduction in IUU 
fishing in these zones. The high concentration of krill around some sub-Antarctic islands (as 
previously discussed) means that, if a total ban were introduced, krill in these EEZs could receive 
a high level of protection from any IUU fishing. Some coastal states, such as Argentina, 
Canada, Chile, Iceland, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, and Indonesia, have sought greater control 
over conservation and management of marine resources outside their 200 mile EEZs on the high 
seas.
1122 If states were given some measure of control outside their EEZs then it would be easier 
to control IUU fishing because states would not be able to evade conservation measures simply 
by fishing outside the EEZ. 
CCAMLR has also recently introduced measures applying to non-Contracting Parties to attempt 
to garner their compliance with CCAMLR conservation requirements. At each of its annual 
meetings, the Commission will identify non-Contracting parties whose vessels have been 
engaged in IUU activities in contravention of the Convention. 1123 In addition, CCAMLR now 
makes a presumption that all non-Contracting Party vessels sighted fishing in the Convention 
area are undermining the effectiveness of CCAMLR conservation measures. Accordingly, any 
such vessel entering a port of a Contracting Party is not permitted to offload its catch unless the 
vessel establishes that the fish were caught in compliance with all CCAMLR conservation 
requirements. Port state control and inspection measures are discussed in more detail below. 
Flags of Convenience 
The introduction of strong control measures by flag states to regulate their vessels could actually 
lead to an increase in IUU fishing. Strong enforcement measures taken by states against their 
nationals often result in the ref1agging of vessels to fly "flags of convenience" .1124 Fishing 
vessels often change their flag registration to states who have little regulation or who are not 
parties to regional fisheries organisations. 1125 This allows them to avoid stricter regulatory 
controls and monitoring. One example is the huge _number of tuna vessels that changed 
registration from the US to other countries to avoid being subject to strict dolphin protection 
1122 Joyner, C. C. 1998. Compliance and Enforcement in New International Fisheries Law. Temple 
International and Comparative Law Journal, Voll2: 271-300 at 272 
1123 CCAMLR Conservation Measure 10-07 (2003) 
1124 Carr, C.J. and Scheiber, H.N. Supra, fu 837, 60 
1125 Warner-Kramer, D.M. and Canty, K. 2000. Stateless Fishing Vessels: The Current International 
Regime and a New Approach. Ocean and Coastal Law Journal, Vol5: 227-243 at 232 
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legislation. 1126 Fishing boats of members of CCAMLR occasionally fly under the flags of non-
member states in order to circumvent the Conven!ion. 1127 This problem creates extreme 
difficulties in maintaining any krill harvesting ban. Even if flag vessels vigorously enforced a 
ban against their own vessels, reflagging the ships provides a mechanism to avoid the ban. 
Flag state implementation of agreements is usually poor, so some international instruments have 
looked at means of deterring reflagging. 1128 Uniform standards are one such method. 1129 If all 
states adopt the same level of control over flag vessels, then vessels will have less reason to 
reflag. If the controls of all states are strict, then vessels cannot reflag to a state with less 
regulation. However, it will be difficult for all states to impose uniform standards, particularly 
for developing states who may not have the resources to introduce and monitor significant 
regulatory requirements. As discussed above, this has been one of the impediments to effective 
fisheries management that has been highlighted by the FAO. The UN General Assembly has 
also established an Assistance Fund to aid developing countries in this respect. States are 
required to also take all "practicable" steps to prevent "flag hopping" of vessels. 1130 These steps 
should include denying a vessel the right to reflag and an authorisation to fish. 1131 If states with 
less stringent controls or less capacity to control their flag vessels do prevent IUU vessels 
reflagging to their nationality, decreased usage of flags of convenience will be the result. 
Reflagging must be prevented if a comprehensive ban is to be effective. Vessels cannot be 
allowed to avoid a krill harvesting ban by simply changing their flag allegiance. 
However, the IPOA and the Compliance Agreement will, arguably, have little real impact on the 
use of flags of convenience. The F AO has looked at reflagging in the wake of the Compliance 
Agreement to gauge its impact on the practice. 1132 Only a small proportion of all reflaggings 
(around 15%) were motivated by a desire to use a flag of convenience. 1133 However, the 
proportion of vessels flagged under "flag of convenience" countries was still around 5% of the 
total world fleet after the Compliance Agreement was originally implemented. 1134 
1126 Carr, C.J. and Scheiber, H.N. Supra, fu 837, 61 
1127 Baird, R. Supra, fu 25, 169 
1128 The Rome Declaration supports the adoption of the IPOA as a means of effectively dealing with IUU 
fishing and "flags of convenience" (Article 12(j), The Rome Declaration on the Implementation of the 
Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries 1999). 
1129 The IPOA requires states to deter their flag vessels from reflagging to avoid compliance with 
conservation and management measures (Article 38, International Plan of Action on Illegal, Unreported 
and Unregulated Fishing). Flag states are also required to adopt uniform standards so that there are no 
incentives to reflag (Article 38). 
1130 Article 39, International Plan of Action on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing 
1131 Ibid 
1132 Doulman, D.J. 1998. Supra, fu 864 
1133 Ibid 
1134 Ibid 
238 
A recent survey by the F AO reported that over half of those that responded had inadequate 
financial resources to develop a national plan of action to combat IUU fishing and there were 
also reports of lack of funds hampering efforts to actively enforce fisheries management 
measures.
1135 This implies that the Compliance Agreement and IPOA originally had little impact 
on the use of flags of convenience. If these agreements are not going to decrease the use of flags 
of convenience, a total ban on krill fishing will be extremely difficult to implement. With likely 
increases in returns from harvesting and greater demand from krill products, reflagging must be 
prevented if a ban is to prove effective. If vessels simply use flags of convenience they can 
evade any ban and continue to harvest krill as IUU vessels. However, the Compliance 
Agreement and IPOA have not had time to adequately deal with the problem. International 
agreements take time to implement and states could simply need more time (and have 
international pressure placed on them) to effectively implement these instruments. 
Stateless Vessels 
Greater control over vessel reflagging has resulted in an increase in the number of vessels now 
fishing without being registered to any particular nationality. 1136 The 1982 Convention prohibits 
states changing flags during a voyage 1137 and prevents states sailing under two or more flags as a 
means of convenience. 1138 Such vessels can be classed as stateless ships. 1139 Use of flags of 
convenience has also meant that states are now deregistering many vessels under pressure from 
the international community. 1140 The IPOA requires states to take measures consistent with 
international law in relation to stateless vessels engaged in IUU fishing on the high seas. 1141 
1135 Paragraphs 74 and 76, Technical Consultation to Review Progress and Promote the Full 
Implementation of the IPOA to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate IUU Fishing and the IPOA for the 
Management of Fishing Capacity, Rome, Italy, 24-29 June 2004, Action Taken by FAO Members to 
Implement the International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and 
Unregulated Fishing (IPOA-IUU) 
1136 Warner-Kramer, D.M. and Canty, K. 2000. Supra, fn 1171,227 
1137 Article 92(1), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 
1138 Article 92(2), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 
1139 Ibid 
1140 Warner-Kramer, D.M. and Canty, K. 2000. Supra, fn 1171,227 
1141 Article 20, International Plan of Action on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing 
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Jurisdiction can be exercised over stateless vessels by any state because they do not come under 
national or international law. 1142 Because any state can assert jurisdiction over stateless 
vessels, 1143 freedom of the high seas and non-membership of regional management organisations 
will not provide barriers to enforcement against such vessels. If political pressure forces more 
states to deregister vessels flying flags of convenience then it will be easier to enforce 
conservation measures on the high seas against stateless vessels. More ships are likely to be 
made stateless by the application of the Compliance Agreement if it is effectively 
implemented.1144 This would give other states greater power to reduce IUU fishing conducted by 
stateless vessels previously flying under flags of convenience. Because krill are found in large 
tracts of the high seas in the Southern Ocean, effective enforcement of CCAMLR measures 
against stateless vessels on the high seas would be a necessity if a total ban on krill harvesting 
were introduced. 
Port State Measures 
The IPOA, Compliance Agreement and Fish Stocks Agreement contain measures to prevent IUU 
fishing that are aimed at port states. Vessels need to seek permission to enter ports and provide a 
copy of their authorisation to fish and details of their catch quantities and their fishing trip. 1145 
This places a control mechanism on fishing vessels trying to unload IUU catches. Although, the 
details of catch quantities and fish trip are open to fraud. 
Port states with evidence that a vessel has been IUU fishing must prevent it landing or 
transshipping fish and must notify its f1ag state. 1146 Information on catch and transshipped catch 
1142 Anderson, H. E. 1996. The Nationality of Ships and Flags of Convenience: Economics, Politics, and 
Alternatives. The Maritime Lawyer, Vol 21: 139-170 at 141 
1143 The case of Molvan v A. G. for Palestine 81 L.I.L. Rep. 277 (1948) held that stateless vessels are not 
protected by any state, suggesting that jurisdiction can be asserted over these vessels by any state (Warner-
Kramer, D.M. and Canty, K. 2000. Supra, fu 1171, 230). This has also been upheld in United States v. 
Victoria, 876 F.2d 1009 (1st Cir. 1989) by US Courts which found that the US had jurisdiction over a 
vessel captured on the high seas because it was stateless. Such findings may make it easier to limit IUU 
fishing. 
1144 Warner-Kramer, D.M. and Canty, K.. 2000. Supra, fu 1171,233 
1145 Article 55, International Plan of Action on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing 
1146 Article 56, International Plan of Action on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing. Article V(2) 
of the Compliance Agreement also requires a port state to notify a flag state where it has reasonable 
grounds for believing a vessel in that port has undermined the effectiveness of international conservation 
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must also be given to relevant regional management organisations.1147 These measures allow 
flag states to maintain some control over their flag vessels. If port states comply with the 
requirements and inform the flag state of any IUU fishing, flag sta~es can enforce sanctions 
against their vessels. A recent survey by the FAO reported that 81% (35 states) of countries that 
responded had measures in place to prohibit landings and transshipments from vessels in port 
where those vessels are found to have engaged in or supported IUU fishing after a port 
inspection. 1148 A vast majority of states surveyed attempted to verify information concerning the 
vessel's identity and origins of the catch during port inspections. 1149 
This information also allows flag states to scrutinize reported vessels in the future or to consider 
deregistering such vessels if repeated violations occur. More effective control of flag states over 
their registered vessels may reduce instances of IUU fishing and could help to increase the 
effectiveness of CCAMLR conservation measures. The requirement to report IUU fishing and 
other catch and transshipment data to relevant regional organisations will hopefully improve 
conservation measures. 
Precautionary catch limits can be made more effective when more accurate data is available. If 
more accurate data on IUU fishing and other catches is made available to CCAMLR then it will 
be able to implement more appropriate precautionary catch limits for krill and other species 
based on its statistical models. To this end, CCAMLR has recently introduced measures to 
require all Contracting Parties to prohibit all fishing in the Convention zone without a licence. 1150 
Licences can only be issued where the particular party is satisfied of its ability to require vessels 
to: 
• give it timely notification of entry/exit from the Convention zone and from any ports; 
• provide CCAMLR with sufficient catch data; and 
• maintain an onboard Vessel Monitoring System ("VMS") (see discussion below). 
and management measures. Port states that have "reasonable grounds to suspect" that a vessel has been 
IUU fishing must report this to the flag state and relevant regional management organisations (Article 59, 
IPOA). The port state may also take other action with the consent of the flag state. The Code, in Article 
8.3.2, also requires port states to assist flag states regarding non-compliance with regional conservation 
and management measures where a fishing vessel is voluntary in a port of the port state. 
1147 Article 58, International Plan of Action on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing 
1148 Paragraphs 74 and 76, Technical Consultation to Review Progress and Promote the Full 
Implementation of the IPOA to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate IUU Fishing and the IPOA for the 
Management of Fishing Capacity, Rome, Italy, 24-29 June 2004, Action Taken by FAO Members to 
Implement the International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and 
Unregulated Fishing (IPOA-IUU) 
1149 Paragraph 58, Technical Consultation to Review Progress and Promote the Full Implementation of the 
IPOA to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate IUU Fishing and the IPOA for the Management of Fishing 
Capacity, Rome, Italy, 24-29 June 2004, Action Taken by FAO Members to Implement the International 
Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (IPOA-IUU) 
115
° CCAMLR Conservation Measure 10-02 (2004) 
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From 1 August 2005, Flag States are required to provide the CCAMLR Secretariat with detailed 
data within 7 days of issuing a licence, including data in respect of the vessel itself ( eg name, 
registration number, photos of the vessel, name of operators, vessel power etc); authorised time 
period for fishing; target species; type of fishing gear used; and area of fishing. 1151 
All Contracting Parties are required to verify compliance with the licence to fish in the 
Convention zone by inspecting vessels at that Party's departure and arrival ports. Any non-
compliance requires the Party to apply sanctions under its nationallegislation.1152 The 
introduction of these measures has the potential to provide a much more effective means of 
combating IUU fishing in the Southern Ocean. This type of port state control and inspection 
combined with the licensing requirements, should be utilised as part of the implementation ofa 
krill fishing moratorium. Such measures increase the chance that IUU catches landed in the ports 
of CCAMLR parties will be detected and can be prevented from being sold or transshipped to the 
countries of non-parties to CCAMLR. The increased difficulty in selling IUU catch is likely to 
provide a disincentive to some IUU fishers or at the very least will increase the chances of such 
fishers eventually being detected. 
Port states can also presume that vessels of flag states that have fished in an area of a regional 
management organisation (that are not members of that organisation and have not agreed to 
cooperate with those organisations) have been IUU fishing. 1153 
As discussed above, CCAMLR also now makes this presumption that all non-Contracting Party 
vessels sighted fishing in the Convention area are undermining the effectiveness of CCAMLR 
conservation measures. Accordingly, any such vessel entering a port of a Contracting Party is 
not permitted to offload its catch unless the vessel establishes that the fish were caught in 
compliance with all CCAMLR conservation requirements. 1154 Port state control and inspection 
measures are discussed in more detail below. 
1151 Ibid 
1152 Ibid 
1153 Article 63, International Plan of Action on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing 
1154 CCAMLR Conservation Measure 10-07 (2003) 
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Under the IPOA-ITJU, the port states can prohibit the landing and transshipment of catch if the 
vessel does not establish that the catch was taken in accordance with the conservation measures 
of the relevant organisation. 1155 Such a measure could provide more effective protection against 
IUU fishing. Placing the burden of proof on the fishing vessel rather than the port state makes it 
more difficult for a fishing vessel to cover up its IUU fishing activities because the vessel will 
. need to provide evidence concerning its catch and fishing activities. This will make it harder for 
IUU vessels to unload their catch in port states. The fact that CCAMLR has adopted this 
presumption would also aid in the effective implementation of a krill fishing moratorium, 
especially if only localised fishing bans were introduced. The presumption would allow port 
states to detain all Antarctic krill caught in the Convention zone. 
Such port state controls and inspections can be used to deter the use of flags of convenience. 1156 
Inspections can be aimed at breaches of regional conservation measures and other international 
treaties. Port state controls and inspections can deter vessels owners from permitting IUU 
fishing through the detention of vessels or the prevention of vessels entering the port, measures 
which would lead to loss of profits. 1157 Owners are less likely to engage in IUU fishing if they 
cannot unload their catch anywhere or if there is a risk that a port state will detain their vessel if 
an IUU catch is discovered. The idea of port state inspections and controls has been around for 
some time. 1158 In 1991, a much greater percentage of flags of convenience states' vessels were 
being detained. 1159 Greater controls imposed by flag states will reduce the incentive to reflag and 
will restrict IUU fishing in some respects. More effective controls on IUU fishing will give 
greater protection to exploited Antarctic species. 
1155 Article 63, International Plan of Action on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing 
1156 Anderson, H.E. Supra, fn 1188, 167 
1157 Ibid 
1158 The Paris Memorandum of Understanding 1982 (Memorandum of Understanding on Port State 
Control in Implementing Agreements on Maritime Safety and Protection of the Marine Environment, 1982, 
21 I.L.M. 1.) was signed by 17 European countries and Canada. This Memorandum requires signature 
states to inspect 25% ofvessels (Anderson, H.E. Supra, fn 1188, 167). 
1159 Ibid 
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Catch Documentation Scheme 
CCAMLR has instituted its own system of port state controls known as the Catch Documentation 
Scheme ("CDS") to curtail IUU fishing of Patagonian Toothfish. 1160 The CDS prevents imports 
of fish into member countries without the appropriate documentation. 1161 CCAMLR members 
will not accept imports unless documentation is provided that specifies the route of the fish from 
harvest to transhipment to land and what will happen to it after it is landed. 1162 The scheme 
relates to all fishing areas and applies outside the Treaty zone. 1163 Furthermore, the scheme is 
open to non-contracting parties who can also bind themselves to CCAMLR. This new system 
gives better catch estimates and provides verification of data. 1164 The focus on the origin and 
destination of the catch provides similar port state controls to the other systems outlined above 
and will limit the ability of fishing vessels to engage in IUU fishing by restricting their ability to 
land and sell their catch. The extension of the system to Antarctic krill would provide greater 
restrictions on krill fishing in light of a likely expansion of krill industry. The adoption of the 
CDS for krill would be extremely important if a comprehensive ban were not introduced. The 
scheme could also be used to monitor and enforce a total ban. 
Up until the introduction of the CDS, CCAMLR's measures to protect the Patagonian Toothfish 
were relatively ineffective.1165 The Commission believes that the CDS has been extremely . 
successful in dealing with enforcement problems for the Patagonian Toothfish. 1166 A deterrence 
element may account for a decline in visible illegal vessels. 1167 Depletion of stock or better 
subterfuge by illegal vessels could also be a reason for this decline. 1168 The Antarctic and 
Southern Ocean Coalition (ASOC) in its ECO 5 report in 1999 did not believe that a CDS could 
end ruu fishing. 1169 ASOC was in favour of greater trade restrictions, better enforcement 
mechanisms, and CCAMLR observers on every licensed fishing vessel. 1170 Stronger and more 
effective measures must be put in place because of a likely expansion of krill industry, 
particularly if a comprehensive harvesting ban is introduced. 
116° CCAMLR website, http://www.ccamlr.org 
1161 Popick, I.J. Supra, fu 1140, 940 
1162 Ibid, 942 
1163 Its application outside the Treaty zone gives more weight to CCAMLR's conservation measures. 
1164 More accurate data is needed on catch numbers if CCAMLR is to formulate appropriate catch limits. 
1165 Baldwin, M., Davis, E. C. and Witham, B.D. 2000. A Review of Developments in Ocean and Coastal 
Law. Ocean and Coastal Law Journal, Vol5: 367-397 at 390 
1166 Effective enforcement mechanisms are vital if the problem ofiUU fishing is to be curtailed. 
1167 The CDS may make it more difficult for illegal fishers to offload and sell their catch. 
1168 The CDS will only be effective if it actually deters illegal fishing, rather than simply encouraging 
illegal vessels to become more adept at avoiding detection. 
1169 Popick, I.J. Supra, fu 1140, 972 
1170 Ibid 
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ASOC has supported the CDS' role in data gathering. 1171 However, it criticised the CDS' lack of 
enforcement mechanisms if a violation was detected and the lack of means to verifY the data on 
the catch documents. 1172 The CDS will also be less effective if it is not adopted by all port states. 
If a significant number of port states do not adopt it, they can provide a means to offload and sell 
IUU catches. The main ports for landing Toothfish that are caught by IUU fishers are located in 
countries that are not parties to CCAMLR. 1173 China, for example, originally decided not to 
participate in the CDS and gave fisherman a port where they could sell illegal catches of 
Patagonian toothfish1174 (although it is now part of the system). If, however, a large number of 
states do embrace and rigorously enforce the CDS, it will be a very effective system. Ensuring 
that a total ban on krill fishing or precautionary catch limits for krill are observed will be difficult 
because of the inadequacies ofcurrent enforcement mechanisms. The CDS system can provide a 
means to enforce a total krill fishing ban, especially with likely increases in demand for krill and 
greater profitability from harvesting. 
CCAMLR has recently (2004) made improvements to its CDS by requiring all Contracting 
Parties to attempt to identifY the origins ofToothfish imported or exported from their territories 
and whether it was caught in accordance with CCAMLR requirements. 1175 Each Flag vessel 
Master is required to complete a Toothfish catch document each time a shipment is landed or 
transhipped and, in addition, Toothfish can only be landed or transhipped from the ports of a 
Contracting Party when accompanied by a valid catch document. 1176 Non-contracting parties are 
also permitted to issue such catch documents in accordance with the requirements laid down by 
CCAMLR. 1177 Data contained in the catch documents can be verified using satellite linked VMS 
data. 1178 These types of verification measures will enhance the effectiveness of the CDS in 
combating IUU fishing. Even if CCAMLR sticks with current precautionary catch limits for the 
Antarctic krill and does not introduce any form of ban, this thesis submits that the CDS should 
still be extended to Antarctic krill. 
1171 Ibid 
1172 Ibid 
1173 Illegal Fishing in the Southern Ocean: the problem, practices and perpetrators. 2003. Australian 
Antarctic Magazine, Vol5: 16-18 at 18 
1174 Floren, D.W. 2001. Antarctic Mining Regimes: An Appreciation of the Attainable. Journal of 
Environmental Law and Litigation, Vol 16: 467-513 at 487 
1175 CCAMLR Conservation Measure 10-05 (2004) 
1176 Ibid 
1177 Ibid 
1178 For example, see CCAMLR Resolution 17/XX. 
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CCAMLR Conservation Measure I 0-05 (2004) also sets out guidelines for the use of a CDS 
Fund to help improve the effectiveness ofthe CDS. Any proceeds from the sale of seized 
Toothfish can be transferred to this Fund by a Contracting Party. Such a move may help to 
provide CCAMLR member states with more funds to improve the effectiveness of the CDS. 
National Compliance 
National compliance with fishing measures has often involved states either putting limitations on 
fishing vessels, seasons and areas or putting catch limits in place. 1179 
The Compliance Agreement gives state governments the main enforcement role. 1180 
Governments usually prosecute offenders who breach international fishing instruments in 
accordance with their locallaw. 1181 The IPOA requires coastal states to effectively monitor and 
control fishing activities in their EEZs. 1182 States are likely to abide by this condition because 
they will want to protect their sovereignty. Sanctions of sufficient severity are required for IUU 
fishing by vessels and nationals under a state's jurisdiction to deter such activities and to prevent 
offenders from reaping the rewards of IUU fishing. 1183 Civil sanctions can be adopted but all 
sanctions should be applied consistently. 1184 Such national legislation must address all aspects of 
. IUU fishing in an effective way. 1185 National legislation, with appropriate sanctions for 
violations, is required for fisheries resource conservation and management. 1186 Both the Code 
and Compliance Agreement have almost identical provisions concerning the implementation of 
sanctions by flag states. As with the IPOA, sanctions are required to be of sufficient severity to 
secure compliance and deter violations, depriving offenders of any benefits of their activities. 1187 
These sanctions can include the refusal, withdrawal or suspension of fishing authorisation if there 
are serious violations. 1188 Serious sanctions are a way of deterring IUU krill fishing, especially 
in light of likely increases in demand for krill products and greater profitability from harvesting. 
1179 Joyner, C.C. 1998. Supra, fn 1168,286 
1180 Ibid 
'. 
1181 Ibid 287 
1182 Arti~le 51.1, International Plan of Action on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing 
1183 Article 21, International Plan of Action on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing 
1184 Ibid 
1185 Article 16, International Plan of Action on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing 
1186 Article 7.7.1 and 7.7.2, FAO Code ofConductfor Responsible Fisheries 1995 
1187 Article 8.2.7, FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries 1995 and Article 8, Agreement to 
Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on 
the High Seas 1993 
1188 Article 8.2.7, FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries 1995 and Article 8, Agreement to 
Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on 
the High Seas 1993 
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The sanction requirements in these international instruments are necessary to reduce the 
instances of IUU fishing. Simply receiving a token punishment will not deter IUU fishing. Civil 
sanctions are insufficient, even if they constitute a large fine. Criminal sanctions against both the 
fishers and their sponsors are necessary if there is to be any effective deterrence against IUU 
fishing. Withdrawing the authorisation to fish will not prevent IUU fishing but at least it can 
attempt to prevent IUU fishers hiding under the guise of legality as an authorised fishing vessel 
of a flag state. A recent survey by the F AO reported that only one in four of member states that 
responded had taken appropriate action to legislate against conducting business with those 
engaged in or supporting IDU fishing. 1189 National sanctions must actually be enforced as well. 
Simply including sanctions in national legislation will not deter IUU fishing unless they are 
actively enforced and are enforced to maximum effect. Watering down of sanctions by the 
judiciary or a lack of active enforcement by the flag state government will prevent sanctions 
having any meaningful effect on IUU fishing. Strong sanctions that are consistently applied by 
flag states are needed if a krill fishing ban were to be introduced. 
Registration 
Registration of a vessel as a national gives it the right to be identified under the flag of that state 
so long as it abides by the state's laws. 1190 States can register vessels at their discretion, but that 
right is tempered by international law. 1191 Many international instruments require states to 
maintain a registry and record of flag vessels. 1192 Some states have relatively lax requirements 
for vessels to become registered as flag vessels. 1193 In the past countries such as Liberia and 
Panama, however, have had open registries with few restrictions needing to be fulfilled for 
registration. 1194 Open registries or inadequate restrictions on registration can provide the impetus 
for flags of convenience. IfiUU vessels are able to easily register their vessels in countries with 
lax requirements concerning international fishing conventions or without the resources to enforce 
such law, it is easier for such vessels to engage in IUU fishing without attracting significant 
consequences. 
1189 Paragraphs 74 and 76, Technical Consultation to Review Progress and Promote the Full 
Implementation of the IPOA to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate IUU Fishing and the IPOA for the 
Management of Fishing Capacity, Rome, Italy; 24-29 June 2004, Action Taken by F AO Members to 
Implement the International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and 
Unregulated Fishing (IPOA-IUU) 
1190 Anderson, H.E. Supra, fn 1188, 143 
1191 Ibid, 150 
1192 The IPOA requires states to maintain records of registered vessels and ensure before it registers a 
vessel that it can exercise responsibility to ensure the vessel does not engage in IUU fishing (Articles 24.2 
and 35, International Plan of Action on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing). The Compliance 
Agreement, in Articles III and IV, and the Code in Article 8.2.1 also require states to maintain a registry 
and record of flag vessels. 
1193 Anderson, H.E. Supra, fn 1188, 140 
1194 Ibid, 155 
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The 1982 Convention also requires a "genuine link" to exist between a state and a ship for it to 
register with that state. 1195 A greater level of implementation of this requirement and the 
potential entry of this principle into customary international law will make it increasingly 
difficult for vessels to reflag. 1196 If vessels need to establish a genuine link with a state before 
they can be classed as a flag vessel, it will be more difficult for vessels to reflag and use flags of 
convenience. However, the effectiveness of this requirement will depend on the willingness of 
states to withhold registration for those vessels not displaying a genuine link. The UN 
Convention on the Conditions for Registration of Ships was the first attempt at defining a 
"genuine link". 1197 The Convention maintained the need to have an economic link between the 
vessel, its owners and the registering state. 1198 Strict requirements for registration are necessary 
to prevent flags of convenience being used. 
The requirement for registered vessels to have an authorisation to fish is an important concept 
related to registration. The IPOA has several provisions regarding the authorisation to fish of 
vessels. Authorisation is required for flag vessels fishing outside the areas of the flag state's 
sovereignty. 1199 States must ensure that vessels will not undermine international conservation 
measures before an authorisation is given and must give information on cancelled authorisations 
to relevant organisations. 1200 States are also required to base that authorisation on fishing in a 
manner consistent with international law on high seas fishing including the 1982 Convention. 1201 
Making it necessary for states to evaluate the potential for vessels to breach international 
conservation measures before an authorisation to fish is given will go some way towards 
reducing the instances of IUU fishing because states are required to scrutinize vessels, their crew 
and owners in much greater detail. Furthermore, requiring states to relay information concerning 
cancelled authorisations to relevant organisations will allow such organisations to be more 
vigilant. If an organisation like CCAMLR knows which vessels and vessel owners have had 
1195 Article 91(1), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 
1196 Warner-Kramer, D.M. and Canty, K. 2000. Supra, fu 1171,233 
1197 Anderson, H.E. Supra, fu 1188, 150 
1198 This also requires a certain number of the crew and officers to be nationals or permanent residents or 
domiciles of the flag state. The US, for example, has strict registration requirements such as requiring the 
owner to be a US citizen or by entities controlled by US citizens or by companies incorporated in the US 
and also with citizenship requirements for the controllers (Anderson, H.E. Supra, fu 1188, 150 and 152 
discussing the Vessel Documentation Act 1980). 
1199 Article 45, International Plan of Action on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing. The Code, in 
Article 8.2.2, also requires states to ensure that flag vessels on the high seas and in other states' jurisdiction 
have been authorised to fish and have a Certificate of Registry. Similarly, the Compliance agreement, 
Article III(2) and Fish Stocks Agreement, Article 22, oblige states to introduce authorisation of flag vessels 
fishing on the high seas. 
1200 Articles 24.1 and 29, International Plan of Action on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, 
Article III(5), Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management 
Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas 1993. 
1201 Article 44, International Plan of Action on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing 
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their authorisations to fish cancelled in the past, then it gives the organisation an idea as to which 
vessels are likely to engage in IUU fishing in the future. Information on suspected IUU vessels 
could be used to monitor any vessels that would be likely to flout any krill fishing moratorium 
that was introduced. 
IUU Vessel List 
CCAMLR has recently established an "IUU Vessel List" containing details of any vessels of 
Contracting States that have been engaged in IUU fishing. 1202 Contracting Parties who acquire 
information concerning the IUU fishing activities of Flag vessels of other Contracting Parties are 
required to submit a report outlining evidence of that activity to CCAMLR. Imports ofToothfish 
from vessels on the IUU Vessel List are prohibited. 1203 In a recent 2005 UN report, it was also 
proposed that the UN General Assembly pass a resolution calling on States to establish lists of 
vessels that had engaged in IUU fishing. 1204 Such a list enables problem vessels to be identified 
so that port states can ban these vessels and prohibit any catch from them being landed. This will 
also provide flag states with information on repeat offenders so that these vessels can have their 
licences to fish in the Convention zone removed. A more extreme measure would be to 
deregister these vessels, although it is likely that they would reflag in another state. The seizure 
and destruction or forced sale of persistent IUU fishing vessels under national legislation would 
eliminate this risk. An IUU Vessel List would also place pressure on Flag States that are not 
parties to CCAMLR to curb the IUU fishing activities of these repeat offending vessels. 
1202 CCAMLR Conservation Measure 10-06 (2004) 
1203 Ibid 
1204 Report on the work of the United Nations Open-ended Informal Consultative Process on Oceans and 
the Law of the Sea at its sixth meeting, A/60/99, 2005 
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III. Compliance with International Instruments 
International pressure has resulted in states becoming parties to an international fishing 
agreement so that they are not seen as "flags of convenience" states. 1205 However, domestic 
pressure can result in such treaties not being fully implemented. 1206 Some flag states simply 
disregard breaches of international law or even sanction them. 1207 Compliance problems by 
states also occur for less sinister reasons. Lack of funds 1208 or poor regulatory mechanisms 
prevent countries from fully implementing fishing instruments. 1209 Similarly, provisions in the 
agreements themselves reduce compliance. For example, the requirement for a flag state to 
investigate a breach of the Fish Stocks Agreement allows it to cover up such a breach. 1210 
However, the need to inform the inspecting state can prevent flag states from using such 
improper practices. 1211 Effective measures to prevent ruu fishing are essential for a 
comprehensive krill harvesting banning to be successful. If states merely pay lip service to such 
agreements, it is unlikely that they will have any effect on IUU fishing. As discussed in a 
previous Chapter, the F AO has recently informed the UN of its concerns about the effective 
implementation of international fisheries management agreements, including the lack of 
technical and financial resources to do this. 
There are usually no strong centrally controlled procedures to enforce international fisheries 
agreements and so diplomatic pressure is one of the main mechanisms of enforcing compliance. 
1212 International pressure can help to ensure that instruments aimed at preventing ruu fishing 
are fully implemented. 1213 Flag states are, however, sometimes constrained in implementing 
such agreements by domestic pressures. 1214 Giving financial or other benefits to states that 
comply with fishing agreements can induce conformity with such instruments. 1215 Developing 
states in particular could be swayed by financial incentives. To its credit, the UN General 
Assembly has recently set up an Assistance Fund for this very purpose which, hopefully, will 
allow developing states to fulfil their obligations under fisheries management agreements. The 
support of all states in monitoring and enforcing international conservation instruments is 
1205 Carr, C.J. and Scheiber, H.N. Supra, fu 837, 60 
1206 Joyner, C.C. 1998. Supra, fu 1168,277 
1207 Christopherson, M. Supra, fn 603, 378 
1208 Joyner, C.C. 1998. Supra, fn 1168,277 
1209 Warner-Kramer, D.M. and Canty, K. 2000. Supra, fn 1171, 232 
1210 Vigneron, G. Supra, fu 907, 611 
1211 Ibid 
1212 Joyner, C.C. 1998. Supra, fn 1168, 287 
1213 Silk, R.J. Supra, fu 1157 
1214 Ibid 
1215 Vigneron, G. Supra, fn 907, 613 
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necessary for the effective implementation of fisheries conservation measures, including 
comprehensive or seasonal/regional ban on krill harvesting. 
Non-Government Organisations ("NGOs") can also help in ensuring compliance with treaties. 1216 
NGOs can provide information on breaches or on the accuracy of reported data by States and 
fishing vessels. 1217 NGOs may also influence States into complying with fisheries 
obligations. 1218 NGOs are able to institute public campaigns in the media that can put pressure 
on governments or they can pressure governments directly. 1219 Some NGO environmental 
organisations have been extremely active in promoting the enforcement of international fisheries 
instruments. 1220 This support would be useful in publicising and supporting a krill fishing 
moratorium. 
Compliance through Data Reporting 
There are many enforcement mechanisms used by states to ensure compliance with international 
fishing agreements. States can, for example, make the granting of an authorisation to fish 
conditional on vessels reporting data concerning catch levels and fishing patterns. 1221 The Code 
of Conduct and the Compliance Agreement oblige states to ensure that flag vessels collect and 
report such data. 1222 Accurate fishing data can help regional organisations to formulate 
appropriate precautionary catch levels. Data from vessels and states concerning krill harvesting, 
for example, would be used to model the CCAMLR precautionary catch limit for krill. 
CCAMLR introduced a specific data reporting system for krill fisheries during 2002. 1223 
However, there has been some indication by CCAMLR organs that more detailed "haul-by-haul" 
data on krill fishing is required before adequate management decisions can be made. 1224 
1216 Ibid, 617 
1217 Ibid 
1218 Ibid, 618 
1219 Joyner, C.C. 1998. Supra, fn 1168, 282 
1220 Ibid. Some examples ofNGOs include the World Wildlife Federation, Greenpeace, the Cousteau 
Society and the American Fisheries Society. 
1221 Article 47, International Plan of Action on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing 
1222 Article III(7), Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management 
Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas 1993, Article 6.11, FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible 
Fisheries 199 5 
1223 Management of the Antarctic Krill: Ensuring the Conservation of the Anta'rctic Marine Ecosystem. 
October 2004. A submission presented by the Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition (ASOC) to the 
CCAMLR Commission and Scientific Committee at 11 
1224 Ibid 
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In general, reporting requirements can be based on vessels keeping fishing logbooks. 1225 The 
authorisation to fish can be made conditional, under the IPOA, on maintaining such records. 1226 
Coastal states should also ensure that vessels in their jurisdiction keep logbooks. 1227 Logbooks 
are a cost efficient means of recording data concerning catch and fishing activities. However, 
there are a number of problems with logbooks that prevent them from being an effective 
monitoring tool. The reliability of data that fishers enter into logbooks is one of the greatest 
concerns. Fishers can be inclined to underestimate catch data or they can simply make mistakes 
when recording. 1228 Logbooks can also be deliberately falsified or vessels may even keep one 
accurate logbook and an alternative one that can be given to officials. 1229 Inaccurate data on 
fishing patterns will lessen the effectiveness of precautionary catch measures for Antarctic krill. 
Inaccurate data will also make it extremely difficult to gauge the effectiveness of any krill 
harvesting ban that is implemented. However, as discussed above, data can, in some respects, 
now be corroborated using Vessel Monitoring Systems 
Inaccurate data reporting can be curtailed somewhat by the use of appropriate monitoring 
systems. For example, the IPOA and Code of Conduct require states to implement observer 
programmes including requiring flag vessels to carry observers. 1230 Observers on vessels can 
improve the quality of reported data. 1231 However, placing observers on vessels is expensive and 
fishing behaviour can be biased because of the presence of observers. 1232 Furthermore, the 
effectiveness of observers is constrained because they are only able to cover a small number of 
vessels at one time. 1233 Consequently, the use of observers cannot be extremely effective at 
ensuring high data quality. 
1225 Articles 47.5 and 51.5, International Plan of Action on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing 
1226 Article 47.5, International Plan of Action on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing 
1227 Article 51.5, International Plan of Action on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing 
1228 Vigneron, G. Supra, fn 907, 606 
1229 Carr, C.J. and Scheiber, H.N. Supra, fn 837, 62 
1230 Article 24.4, International Plan of Action on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, Article 
8.4.3, FAD Code ofConductfor Responsible Fisheries 1995 
1231 McElderry, H. 2002. Aligning Data Needs with Program Objectives paper prepared for the Biannual 
International Fishers Forum, November 22nc12002, Hawaii 
1232 Ibid 
1233 Ibid 
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Data reliability can also be enhanced through the use of patrol vessels and at sea inspections. 
France and the UK have, for example, used patrol vessels in the past to prevent IUU fishing. 1234 
Both the IPOA and Code of Conduct require states to implement inspection programmes. 1235 
CCAMLR also has its own system of inspection for the Convention zone. Inspectors are entitled 
to board fishing or research vessels in the Convention zone. 1236 Vessels are required to stop and 
allow inspectors to transfer to them as soon as requested. 1237 Inspectors are also allowed to 
inspect all catch and all records concerning that catch. 1238 These wide inspection powers can 
help to enhance data reliability, although the CCAMLR inspection system may not be seen as 
fully independent (even if it is fully independent) because inspectors are to be members of the 
flag state appointing them. 1239 Furthermore, the vast expanse of the Southern Ocean means that a 
more complicated inspection system would need large numbers of ships to implement and this 
would be expensive for CCAMLR members. 1240 ASOC has recently recommended to CCAMLR 
that each krill fishing vessel should carry a scientific observer. 1241 An inspection and observer 
system will help to enforce a comprehensive ban on krill fishing, however, additional 
mechanisms are still required to ensure that such a ban is effective. 
1234 Baird, R. Supra, fu 25, 180 
1235 Article 24.10, International Plan of Action on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, Article 
8.4.3, FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries 1995 · 
1236 Text of the CCAMLR System of Inspection. CCAMLR VII, paragraph 124. 
1237 Ibid 
1238 Ibid 
1239 Ibid 
1240 Puissochet, J. Supra, fu 48, 76 
1241 Management of the Antarctic Krill: Ensuring the Conservation of the Antarctic Marine Ecosystem. 
October 2004. A submission presented by the Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition (ASOC) to the 
CCAMLR Commission and Scientific Committee at 14 
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Vessel Monitoring Systems 
The problems with monitoring such a large area as the Southern Ocean may be reduced by the 
use of vessel monitoring systems. CCAMLR now requires all registered vessels of member 
states to have VMS equipment for certain fisheries. 1242 VMS is used mainly to track vessels by 
fitting a global positioning satellite transponder to the vesse1. 1243 The transponder can then use a 
satellite system to transmit the real-time location of the vessel, its course and speed, the depth of 
the ocean, and whether fishing equipment is being used. 1244 Aerial monitoring can then be used 
to identify unregistered vessels fishing illegally, although effective aerial monitoring in the 
Southern Ocean may be a near impossibility. 1245 However, New Zealand has in the past used 
surveillance planes over the Ross Sea. 1246 Even with only limited aerial surveillance, requiring 
VMS to be used may reduce the level of IUU fishing. A recent survey by the F AO reported that 
40% of the member states that responded were implementing a VMS or expanding the use of 
current VMS technology. 1247 Even though VMS technology is expensive, developing countries 
have made greater use of it as the price has declined. 1248 Funding needs to be provided to 
developing countries to fully implement such systems. 
Because VMS monitoring is in real-time, states are better able to monitor vessel fishing activities 
and confirm the reliability of vessel records concerning areas of fishing. The use of VMS may 
also be an effective deterrent against non-compliant behaviour. 1249 VMS could be used by 
CCAMLR to close off certain areas of the Southern Ocean and ensure that flag vessels of 
CCAMLR member states did not fish in those protected zones. 1250 This would be extremely 
beneficial for krill, especially if a total ban were imposed. CCAMLR could potentially close off 
areas of high krill concentration to fishing and use VMS to ensure that no fishing vessels entered 
those zones. 
1242 CCAMLR Conservation Measure 148/XVII. Similarly, the IPOA, in Article 24.3, also obliges states, 
where appropriate, to require flag ships and other vessels under their jurisdiction to carry an on board 
vessel monitoring system 
1243 Davies, C., Hoban, S. and Penhoet, B. 1999. Moving Pictures: How Satellites, the Internet, and 
International Environmental Law can Help Promote Sustainable Development. Stetson Law Review, Vol 
28: 1091-1153 at 1130 
1244 Popick, I.J. Supra, fu 1140, 974 
1245 Davies, C., et a!. Supra, fn 120 I, 1131 
1246 Baird, R. Supra, fu 25, 180 
1247 Paragraph 27, Technical Consultation to Review Progress and Promote the Full Implementation of the 
IPOA to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate IUU Fishing and the IPOA for the Management of Fishing 
Capacity, Rome, Italy, 24-29 June 2004, Action Taken by FAD Members to Implement the International 
Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (IPOA-IUU) 
1248 Louka, E. 1996. Cutting the Gordian Knot: Why International Environmental Law is Not Only About 
the Protection of the Environment. Temple International and Comparative Law Journal, VollO: 79-121 at 
109 
1249 Davies, C., et al. Supra, fn 1201, 1131 
1250 Ibid, 1132 
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Only CCAMLR member flag vessels would be required to have VMS and so such a system 
would not be fully effective for the introduction of krill conservation zones. A stronger legal 
regime is necessary to ensure that all vessels are required to use VMS. 
One variation of the VMS is a new electronic monitoring system that can be used for both catch 
determination and to monitor time and area restrictions placed on fishing vessels. 1251 This 
system captures data on catch and vessel position (captured using a camera, radio frequency 
identification and GPS receiver). Such an electronic system can capture data more accurately 
and more cost effectively than placing observers on vessels. 1252 The device is tamper proof and 
contains an array of vessel sensors, video cameras and an operating system. 1253 A computer 
operating system is used to continuously gather data on the vessel's operations including the 
setting of fishing gear. 1254 The system has been tested in Canada for monitoring of halibut 
fisheries with some success detailed in an April 2003 report for the Pacific Halibut Management 
Association and the Pacific Scientist Advice Review Committee of Fisheries and Oceans 
Canada, suggesting that it can provide a viable cost effective alternative to current data collection 
and monitoring systems. 1255 The Canadian study found that the system could distinguish, based 
on video images, thirteen species and was accurate to within 10%.1256 If the system is accurate 
enough or can be modified for use in krill fishing industry, then it would provide a cost effective 
means of enforcing a comprehensive or regional krill ban or enforcing precautionary catch limits 
for krill. 
As of last year (2004), CCAMLR now requires all vessels licenced by Contracting Parties to fish 
in the Convention Area to carry a satellite linked VMS allowing for the continuous reporting of a 
vessel's position in that Area. 1257 The VMS must communicate certain data, including the 
vessel's position and speed and course, every four hours to a land-based monitoring centre. 
States are also required to ensure that the VMS is tamper-proof(eg located in a sealed unit). 
However, the requirement to carry a VMS does not apply to vessels participating in a krill 
fishery only. 
1251 McElderry H.,Schrader J. and Illingworth J. of Archipelago Marine Research Ltd. The Efficacy of 
Vidoe-Based Electronic Monitoring Technology for At-Sea Monitoring of the Halibut Long line Fishery. 
1252 Ibid 
1253 Ibid 
1254 Ibid 
1255 Ibid 
1256 Ibid 
1257 CCAMLR Conservation Measure 10-04 (2004) 
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ASOC has recently recommended to CCAMLR that this requirement be extended to those 
vessels engaged in krill fishing. 1258 ASOC's recommendation should be immediately adopted by 
CCAMLR. Such a system will help to effectively monitor krill fishing in the Southern Ocean 
and can be used to verify information provided by vessels in their logbooks or on catch 
documents needed in order to land fish in ports of CCAMLR members and supporters. There is 
no apparent reason why the system should not be adopted in respect of krill, particularly because 
of the scientific uncertainty surrounding the effect of krill fishing on the Antarctic ecosystem. 
Requiring krill fishing vessels to can-y a VMS would also help to identify whether and how often 
fishing was being carried out in areas adjacent to sensitive land based predator colonies. 
Pursuit and Detention of IUU Vessels 
VMS may allow patrol boats to more effectively identify vessels engaged in IUU fishing, 
however, in order to enforce conservation measures states must be able to catch and detain boats 
and impose sanctions. Article 111 of the 1982 Convention gives coastal states a right of hot 
pursuit where a vessel has violated laws within the EEZ. Hot pursuit cannot be continued within 
the seas of another state. The right of hot pursuit can only be exercised by military ships or 
aircraft or other ships clearly in government service. One recent Australian example involved 
hot pursuit by an Australian ship of a Uruguayan vessel, Viars a 1, that had illegally been 
harvesting Patagonian Toothfish near Heard island in the CAAMLR zone. 1259 The vessel was 
successfully detained and its crew were prosecuted under the Australian Fisheries Management 
Act 1991. If a total ban on krill were imposed, hot pursuit would allow states to pursue vessels 
that were fishing in the EEZs of sub-Antarctic islands. Ordinarily, non-CCAMLR member 
vessels could not be detained on the high seas for fishing in contravention of the Convention, 
however, hot pursuit allows states to pursue IUU fishers out of the EEZ and detain them on the 
high seas. This is an extremely important right because high concentrations of krill do exist 
within some EEZs surrounding sub-Antarctic islands and sovereign states must have the power 
to pursue any vessels flouting a krill harvesting ban. 
1258 Management of the Antarctic Krill: Ensuring the Conservation of the Antarctic Marine Ecosystem. 
October 2004. A submission presented by the Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition (ASOC) to the 
CCAMLR Commission and Scientific Committee at 12 
1259 Australian Antarctic Division website, http://www.aad.gov.au 
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In addition to catching IUU fishers, states must also have the power to detain and sanction them. 
The 1982 Convention, in Article 73, allows coastal states to board and arrest vessels within their 
EEZs. However, the arrested vessels and crew must be promptly released on the posting of a 
reasonable bond or other security. Any penalties for violations within the EEZ cannot include 
imprisonment. Article 292 of the 1982 Convention also obliges states to promptly release 
detained vessels and crew on the posting of a reasonable bond or other security. Arguably, 
because of the threat posed by IUU fishing to krill and other Antarctic species, imprisonment 
should be permitted both as a deterrent and as a punishment. Mere civil penalties are not 
sufficient to deter IUU fishing. Furthermore, the confiscation of vessels could reduce the 
instances of IUU fishing. Allowing IUU vessels and their crew to be released on posting of a 
"reasonable" bond is not a sufficient sanction. Even when governments do attempt to 
sufficiently punish by requiring a large bond to be posted, their efforts may be frustrated. In one 
case before the Law of the Sea Tribunal (the Camouco case) France seized a vessel with 7,600kg 
ofPatagonian toothfish in its EEZ around Crozet Island. 1260 The Law of the Sea Tribunal did not 
regard the bond proposed by the French government as reasonable. 1261 The French also seized a 
vessel carrying toothfish in its EEZ around the Kerguelen islands in the Monte Confurco case. 1262 
The Law of the Sea Tribunal held that the proposed bond was unreasonable in this case too. 1263 
If states are unable to even impose significant fines on vessels, then it is unlikely that they will be 
deterred from IUU fishing. If a total ban were imposed on krill fishing, then states will find it 
difficult to enforce it in their EEZs given the likely increase in demand for krill products 
combined with better economic returns. As mentioned earlier, the UN General Assembly has 
recently supported the strengthening of the international legal framework in order to combat IUU 
fishing. 
States are able to board and detain non-CCAMLR members while they are IUU fishing within an 
EEZ, but this power does not exist on the high seas. As discussed in previous chapters, high 
concentrations of krill are present around some sub-Antarctic islands where claimed EEZs exist. 
However, concentrations of krill that do not fall within an EEZ would not be protected against 
non-CCAMLR members. There is no power under CCAMLR to board the vessels of such states. 
As previously discussed, the Fish Stocks Agreement in Article 21 does give states that are 
members of regional fishing organisations the power to board and inspect flag vessels of parties 
to the agreement who are not members of the particular fishing organisation and they can detain 
vessels in port for this purpose. 
126° Franckx, E. 2002. "Reasonable Bond" in the Practice of the International Tribunal for the Law of the 
Sea. California Western International Law Journal, Vol32: 303-342 at 312 
1261 Ibid, 314 
1262 Ibid, 315 
1263 Ibid, 319 
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The Fish Stocks Agreement therefore contains an inducement for states to become members of 
regional fishing organisations. 1264 Having the power to board non-CCAMLR members on the 
high seas would give CCAMLR member states an enhanced means of dealing with IUU fishing 
outside their EEZs. Although, the boarding articles present in the Fish Stocks Agreement are 
copies of existing allegedly ineffective models, so they may not have a major impact on IUU 
fishing in the CCAMLR zone. 1265 To its credit, Australia has stepped up its efforts to combat 
IUU fishing in Antarctica. On 17 December 2003, the Prime Minister announced that Australia 
would increase surveillance and enforcement mechanisms in the Antarctic to protect the marine 
ecosystem. 1266 Australia announced that a heavily armed vessel would be stationed in the 
Antarctic year-round for the specific purpose of targeting illegal fishing vessels. Legal 
Australian fishers have been able to aid efforts by alerting Australian authorities to IUU fishers 
spotted in the CCAMLR zone. 1267 
More effective control of IUU fishing could, arguably, be achieved if CCAMLR members were 
allowed to detain all IUU fishing vessels in Antarctica regardless of whether they were fishing in 
an EEZ. Any total ban on krill may be more successful if such a power existed. Canada has 
already experimented with this kind of approach. Because of the collapse of Canadian cod 
stocks, the Canadian government introduced legislation giving it the power to detain foreign 
vessels outsi'de its EEZ. 1268 In 1995, a Spanish vessel that was suspected of overfishing in a high 
seas area was detained in a Canadian port and the captain and crew were arrested. 1269 This is 
arguably a breach of the provisions of the 1982 Convention relating to the freedom of fishing on 
the high seas. It also goes further than the Fish Stocks Agreement and allows detention of 
vessels of flag states that are not party to any specific international instrument. Although such a 
regime can provide better protection for krill, their conservation should not be achieved by 
breaching international law. 
1264 Ardia, D.S. 1998. Does the Emperor Have No Clothes? Enforcement oflnternational Laws Protecting 
the Marine Environment. Michigan Journal of International Law, Voll9: 497-543 at 542 
1265 Christopherson, M. Supra, fu 603, 377 
1266 Australian Antarctic Division website, http://www.aad.gov.au 
1267 Ibid 
1268 Grzybowski, D.M. Supra, fu 773,69 
1269 Christopherson, M. Supra, fu 603, 363 
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States could argue the doctrine of necessity as a justification for precluding their responsibility 
for a wrongful act not in accordance with international obligations. If the act of detention was 
the only means of safeguarding an essential interest of the state against grave and imminent peril, 
the doctrine of necessity could be invoked. 1270 Arguably, detention of IUU fishing vessels is 
justified because it is the only way of stopping a grave and imminent threat to the world's 
oceanic ecosystems which will affect states with interests in those ecosystems. 1271 
1270 Article 33(1)(a), International Law Commission Draft Articles on State Responsibility 1980 
1271 Although it may not be possible to invoke the doctrine for a wrongful act stemming from an 
international obligation arising out of a peremptory norm- Article 33(2)(a), International Law 
Commission Draft Articles on State Responsibility 1980 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the practical investigation, management and enforcement measures 
that are necessary to ensure conservation of krill and the Antarctic ecosystem. The many 
international conservation instruments that exist will only provide effective protection to krill if 
they apply universally to all vessels and if strong enforcement and deterrent mechanisms exist to 
ensure compliance. Accordingly, this chapter concludes that a stronger system of universally 
binding enforcement must be implemented to ensure the success of a krill fishing moratorium. 
Krill are extremely important to dependent species and their protection is vital to ensure that no 
detrimental harm occurs to them. A krill fishing moratorium can facilitate this objective and is 
justified under a strong form of the precautionary approach because of the uncertainty 
surrounding krill population and its interactions with other species. The mathematical models 
used by CCAMLR to formulate its precautionary catch limits for krill under its ecosystem 
approach do attempt to take this uncertainty into account, however, they will still" prove 
ineffective because of the legal deficiencies of the current regime. The flaws contained within 
the CCAMLR instrument, including its inability to bind non-party vessels, must be resolved if 
these catch limits, or a total fishing ban, are to prove effective. 
CCAMLR utilises an ecosystem approach to fisheries management. Such an approach is 
appropriate because of the interactions between species in the Antarctic and the consequences 
that exploiting one species can have on all other species. However, the concepts of maximum 
sustainable yield and optimum utilisation that are present in the Convention do not sit 
comfortably with an ecosystem approach. The ecosystem approach is also difficult to implement 
because of the lack of data concerning species interactions and the uncertainty of data that does 
exist. Although CCAMLR's precautionary catch models do take such uncertainty into account, a 
comprehensive harvesting ban should be introduced because of the detrimental harm that could 
occur to dependent species, particularly in light of a likely expansion of krill industry. The 
ecosystem approach is also difficult to implement because of uncertainty as to what it actually 
means. Even instruments that do go into some detail as to its meaning focus on economic 
factors, rather than environmental conservation, in its implementation. 
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IUU fishing is a major threat to many international conservation instruments, including 
I 
CCAMLR. A likely expansion of krill industry because of greater demand and higher economic 
returns means that IUU fishing will be a danger to the effective implementation of a 
comprehensive krill harvesting ban. There are some international instruments that currently 
focus on the reduction ofiUU fishing in the world's oceans. The UN General Assembly has 
advocated the need to strengthen the international legal framework in respect of fisheries 
management to combat IUU fishing. Similarly, the F AO has criticised current efforts to 
effectively implement international fisheries agreements. Accordingly, this is likely to provide 
the impetus for states to re-examine the current regulatory regime and this may result in reforms 
that will provide greater legal strength to current instruments. 
Even if universally binding obligations are implemented, they will only be effective if strong 
compliance and deterrence mechanisms are introduced. Some of the current enforcement 
methods such as logbooks, observers, and inspection systems can improve compliance with 
international instruments, however, they are still not fully effective and can be circumvented. 
Patrol vessels would prove useful in policing a fishing ban within coastal state EEZs or on the 
high seas, however, such measures are too costly to implement on any massive scale. Electronic 
vessel monitoring systems will prove a much more cost effective mechanism, particularly if they 
are made compulsory on all fishing vessels in the Southern Ocean. A strong system of detention 
and punishment must be introduced so that vessels are deterred from flouting a total fishing ban. 
The wider use of these mechanisms and, in particular, the application of the CDS and VMS to 
krill fisheries would go a long way towards protecting krill from IUU fishing. Similarly, if a krill 
fishing moratorium were not introduced, implementing a system of scientific observers on krill 
fishing vessels would give CCAMLR greater knowledge about krill fishing industry and help to 
protect against krill fishing in sensitive local areas in Antarctica ( eg opposite local predator 
colonies). 
A comprehensive krill fishing ban is vital because, as highlighted in Chapters 1 and 2 of this 
thesis, and in the section of this Chapter dealing with the ecosystem approach, krill plays a 
pivotal role in the Antarctic ecosystem and harvesting poses a danger to dependent species. This 
chapter has examined some of the mechanisms that can be used to enforce krill conservation 
measures in the Antarctic and elsewhere in the world when krill are shipped for sale. This is 
vital because of the threat of IUU fishing, particularly in light of a likely expansion of krill 
industry caused by greater demand for krill products and higher economic returns from krill 
fishing. The next chapter of this thesis will examine in greater detail one of the specific 
compliance mechanisms that has been utilised in the past for environmental protection. In 
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particular, the chapter will focus on the use of trade related measures to conserve krill and other 
species and the status of such measures under the World Trade Organization system. 
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CHAPTER 6: TRADE RESTRICTIONS FOR ANT ARCTIC CONSERVATION UNDER 
THE FREE TRADE PRINCIPLES OF THE WTO SYSTEM 
Introduction 
A potential means of curbing the IUU fishing problem is through the introduction of restrictive 
trade measures. The purpose of this Chapter is to examine the types of trade related restrictions 
that could be introduced in order to combat IUU fishing and protect Antarctic species such as 
krill. The legality of such environmental trade measures will be examined in light of World 
Trade Organization ("WTO") free trade principles and the interaction of such principles with the 
provisions of multilateral environmental agreements ("MEAs"). Part I of this Chapter will begin 
by broadly outlining the general free trade principles with which WTO Members must comply 
and which could be violated by the introduction of any trade restrictions aimed at protecting 
Antarctic species. Part II of this Chapter will then examine certain "environmental" exceptions 
to these trade principles that are outlined in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 
("GATT"). 1272 These exceptions permit a departure from the general WTO free trade principles 
in certain circumstances provided that there is otherwise no unjustifiable or arbitrary 
discrimination. In particular, there will be an examination of how these provisions may apply to· 
any trade restrictions introduced to protect Antarctic species. This examination will also focus 
on the WTO Panel's restrictive interpretation of the exceptions. 
This Chapter will then analyse the current status of environmental protection issues within the 
WTO system in light of the WTO Panel's restrictive approach to the abovementioned 
environmental exceptions. It is also important for this thesis to consider the WTO's attitude 
towards States taking unilateral action in respect of high seas fisheries. Such action can be an 
effective means of enforcing environmental measures in respect of high seas fisheries in an area 
like the Southern Ocean, however, the WTO does not appear to support such measures. The 
ineffectiveness of the WTO's Committee on Trade and Environment ("CTE") will be highlighted 
in Part III, together with the need for real change to the WTO system if it is to act as a 
mechanism for world environmental protection. 
Furthermore, there is a potential for MEAs to conflict with WTO principles. Part III continues 
by analysing how that conflict can and should be resolved in light of international legal 
principles. The Chapter will also look at the specific application ofWTO principles to 
conservation under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna 
1272 This agreement forms part of the legal texts of the WTO system and is binding on WTO Members. 
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and Flora ("CITES") and also to CCAMLR's Catch Documentation Scheme ("CDS"). In this 
respect, it is also appropriate for this Chapter to consider the interaction between WTO principles 
and environmental protection under customary international legal principles. 
As discussed previously, trade related measures could provide an effective means to regulate a 
comprehensive krill ban or localised krill protection. It is also necessary to determine whether, 
in the absence of the environmental exceptions to GATT, particular types of trade measures 
relating to krill would breach the WTO's general trade principles. Part IV looks at a range of 
different trade measures that could be used in managing krill fisheries and the legitimacy of such 
measures under GATT. This is particularly important in light of the WTO Panel's reluctance to 
accept the precautionary approach to resource management. This Chapter will also discuss the 
need for the WTO to accept the precautionary approach so that environmental conservation is not 
hampered by free trade concerns. 
The potential for conflict between the WTO and MEAs gives rise to a potential need to amend 
the WTO principles. Part V of this Chapter concludes by examining some alternatives that may 
give greater recognition to environmental issues within the WTO system. Finally, it considers 
whether the WTO system is an appropriate institution to manage environmental concerns and 
whether Antarctic species would receive greater protection if trade disputes relating to the 
environment were governed by another international body. 
264 
I. Background to the WTO 
After World War II, the international community formulated a set of trade related principles 
known as the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs ("GATT"). The GATT, which came into 
force on 1 January 1948, contains a series of principles that govern international trade. The 
GATT is simply an agreement and was never an institution in itself, altho_ugh a dispute 
settlement body was later established to resolve disputes between parties to GATT. The 
establishment of an institutional world trade body occurred when the World Trade Organization 
("WTO") was created. The WTO is a true international institution with its own institutional 
structure, including a legal Panel to resolve trade disputes. The WTO was founded under the 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, which was signed in April 
1994. 
The GATT, although no longer applicable as an agreement in its own right, became part of the 
Marrakesh Agreement and consequently its principles still apply to WTO Members. Several 
other trade-related agreements have been negotiated and also form part of the Marrakesh 
Agreement. 1273 The WTO's primary function is to ensure the "implementation, administration, 
and operation as well as to further the objectives" of these agreements. 1274 Accordingly, the 
WTO has control over the operation of these agreements such as the GATT and acts as a dispute 
resolution mechanism between member states in respect of world trade disputes concerning these 
agreements. The WTO performs other functions including providing a means of negotiating 
future trade agreements and current trade issues and to facilitate this dispute resolution 
mechanism. 1275 
The WTO's structure is made of two main oversight bodies which are known as the Ministerial 
Conference and the General Council. The Ministerial Conference is the primary arm of the 
WTO system of government and is made up of a group drawn from all member States. The 
General Council looks after the Dispute Settlement Body and another review body of the WTO 
and is subordinate to the Ministerial Conference.1276 The General Council also oversees a series 
of Councils and Committees, such as the Trade and Environment Committee, which will be 
discussed in greater detail below. 
1273 For example, the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 
1274 Article III, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization 
1275 Ibid 
1276 Matsushita,M., Schoenbaum, T. and Mavroidis, P. The World Trade Organization: Law, Practice and 
Policy. 2003. Oxford University Press, Oxford at 9-10 
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As with all international agreements, only States that are contracting parties to the WTO 
Agreement or who have subsequently become members of the WTO and consented to be bound 
by the agreement, must observe the WTO trade principles. These trade principles are embodied 
in the individual agreements that form part of the WTO Agreement. 
Dispute Settlement 
As discussed above, one of the WTO's functions is to resolve trade disputes that arise between 
member States in respect of the specific WTO trade agreements. The dispute settlement process 
is governed by a specific WTO agreement known as the Uruguay Round Understanding on Rules 
and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes. This agreement, in effect, draws on some 
of the existing dispute settlement principles that were present in GATT, such as the need for 
dispute resolution mechanisms where parties were not carrying out their obligations under GATT 
or were applying trade related measures that conflicting with GATT. 1277 The WTO system 
expands on GATT by introducing a specific Dispute Settlement Body which is an institution that 
administers the dispute settlement process and sets up specific "panels" which make decisions on 
trade disputes between members and can recommend sanctions for breaching the WTO 
agreements (the Dispute Settlement Body actually administers and authorises these decisions and 
recommendations). 1278 
Under the WTO system an "Appellate Body" also exists which members can appeal to for a 
review of a specific decision made by a WTO dispute resolution panel. This gives members an 
appeal mechanism similar to those existing in domestic judicial systems. The ability of the 
Dispute Settlement to authorise trade sanctions against another State provides a mechanism to 
coerce parties to accept decisions ofWTO panels. This is enhanced by the self-interest factor 
that States may have in accepting adverse WTO panel decisions because they may in the future 
want to rely on a decision of a WTO panel that is in their favour. 
1277 See, for example, Article XXII of GATT 
1278 Matsushita,M., Schoenbaum, T. and Mavroidis, P. Supra, fu 1322, 22-23 
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GATT 
The GATT provisions prevent WTO Members from engaging in certain practices that could 
restrict word trade. The economic theory of comparative advantage provides a rationale for the 
free trade principles embodied in GATT. This theory suggests that, if countries specialise when 
producing goods, their economies will function more efficiently. 1279 Accordingly, the theory of 
comparative advantage suggests that the promotion of free trade will stimulate world economic 
growth by making economies more efficient. The GATT outlines a number of basic principles 
that are intended to prevent restrictive trade practices between States and thus promote economic 
growth. Some of these principles are outlined below and will subsequently be examined in 
respect of environmental conservation. 
Guiding Principles 
Most Favoured Nation Principle 
The most favoured nation principle requires that the best tariff and non-tariff conditions allowed 
to any WTO contracting party need to be given to all other contracting parties. 1280 This principle 
is aimed at preventing WTO Members from discriminating between other Members. It requires 
states to give similar treatment to "like products" of different Members. 
The principle is intended to increase international economic efficiency. It allows commercial 
organisations to sell products in foreign markets without having any uncompetitive 
disadvantages placed on them by foreign governments and also allows organisations to gain 
access to low-cost foreign supplies. 1281 Non-discrimination is aimed at allowing free access to 
markets, providing consumer choice and preventing misuse of market power by large market 
players. 1282 
Binding of Tariffs 
Tariff levels, under this principle, must be fixed by States at certain agreed levels and cannot be 
subsequently raised. 
1279 Popick, I.J. Supra, fn 1140, 945 
1280 Paragraph 58, Sutherland, P. eta!. The Future of the WTO. 2004. Report by the Consultative Board to 
the Director-General Supachai Panitchpakdi. This principle is outlined in Article 1 of GATT. 
1281 The Multilateral System: 50 Years of Achievements, WTO website, http://www.wto.org 
1282 Trade and the Environment Document produced by the WTO Secretariat, WTO website, 
http://www.wto.org 
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National Treatment 
Article III of GATT requires States to apply domestic taxes and charges in a similar manner to 
both the products of domestic producers and to imported foreign products. In effect, this 
prevents discrimination between domestic and foreign products. The Article requires States to 
ensure "equality of competitive conditions for imported products in relation to domestic 
products."1283 
Article III(4) also requires that imported products be accorded no less favourable treatment than 
national products in respect of all laws and regulations affecting their internal sale. 
1283 Japan- Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, Report of the Appellate Body 1996 
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II. Trade and the Environment at the WTO 
Current Status 
Trade restrictions can be used as a mechanism to facilitate conservation or protection of species. 
CCAMLR's Catch Documentation Scheme is an example of this usage, and this particular 
scheme will be discussed in further detail below. The GATT contains several exceptions to the 
mandatory trade practices outlined above that allow States to impose restrictive trade measures in 
certain circumstances. These exceptions are potentially available in respect of restrictions such 
as a total ban upon imports of Antarctic krill (and related products) or restrictions on trade in krill 
caught through IUU fishing. The exceptions could be used to justify these trade restrictions ?f 
they infringed GATT principles. The following discussion is based on the assumption that trade 
restrictions of this type would infringe the trade requirements of GATT (although this would not 
necessarily be the case). 
The discussion that follows will examine the range of trade measures that could be introduced in 
respect of krill and whether such measures would infringe WTO principles. The inter-
relationship between MEAs, customary international law and GATT will also be examined. 
However, it is first necessary to analyse the applicability of the GATT exceptions to any trade 
restrictions that would be introduced in respect of the Antarctic krill and other Antarctic species. 
In particular, Article XX outlines a number of general exceptions to GATT which are relevant to 
the introduction of restrictive trade measures to protect the environment. The relevant exceptions 
are outlined as follows: 
"Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would 
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where 
the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in 
this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any 
contracting party of measures: 
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; 
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are 
made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption." 
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As an exhaustible natural resource, trade measures introduced to protect krill would prima facie 
appear to fall within the Article XX(g) exception. However, it is necessary to examine the WTO 
Panel's interpretation of these clauses to determine exactly how they would apply to any trade 
restrictions in respect of krill related products (or in respect of trade restrictions on other 
Antarctic species). 
Article XX(b) 
In the Tuna-Dolphin cases the WTO Panel examined the legality of certain import restrictions 
enacted by the US in light of the Article XX exceptions to GATT. Broadly, the relevant trade 
measures restricted tuna imports where that tuna had been caught using processes that were 
unfriendly to dolphins. In particular, there were restrictions on the import of tuna that had been 
harvested with particular types of nets that were harmful to dolphins. Imports of tuna caught 
with such nets were banned unless the country from which they were imported had a particular 
regime in place regulating tuna harvesting techniques that conformed to certain criteria set out by 
the US government. In the Tuna-Dolphin cases 1284 the WTO Panel recognised that Article 
XX(b) could be relied upon to protect dolphin life and health. Article XX(b) permits trade 
restrictions that are "necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life or health." 
Article XX(b) is therefore an exception that could be used to justify trade measures introduced to 
protect Antarctic krill such as a total ban on krill imports or measures used to protect against IUU 
krill fishing in Antarctica. 
A trade measure will only be "necessary" where there is no alternative measure available that 
could be reasonably expected to be employed rather than the relevant trade restrictions. 
(Thailand-Cigarettes case1285). In the EC-Asbestos case1286 it was held that "the more vital or 
important the common interests or values", then it would be more likely that the relevant 
measures were "necessary". It would be difficult to rely on this exception in respect of krill 
because, arguably, there are alternative measures available such as vessel monitoring in 
Antarctica. However, there is an equally strong argument that trade restrictions are necessary for 
krill because of the problems with monitoring vessels in the vast expanse of the Southern Ocean. 
Accordingly, there may be no other alternative measure that could prevent a total ban on krill 
from being enforced other than trade restrictions. 
1284 30 ILM 1594 (1991) and 33 ILM 839 (1993) 
1285 Thailand- Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes DS 1 0/R 3 7S/200 (1990) 
1286 European Communities- Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos Containing Products 
WT/DS135/AB/R (2001) 
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Furthermore, krill is vital to the common interests of the global community because of the 
essential part krill plays in maintaining the health of the Antarctic ecosystem. There may be 
practical difficulties involved with this approach in that it is unlikely to be accepted by the WTO 
Panel. As outlined below, the WTO appears to be reluctant to accept the precautionary approach 
discussed in previous Chapters and the WTO Panel also seems to be reluctant to allow any States 
to rely on this environmental exception. 
Article XX( g) 
As discussed above, Article XX(g) outlines an exception to GATT principles where there are 
trade restrictions "relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures 
are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption." 
In the Gasoline Standards case the WTO Panel held that where Article XX(g) requires that there 
be trade measures "relating to" conservation, the provision means that those measures have to be 
"primarily aimed at" conservation. 1287 This standard would not be satisfied if there were trade 
measures that attempted to make other States adopt different environmental policies. The US-
Gasoline case held that a "substantial relationship" would be more likely to show that a 
particular trade measure related to the conservation of natural resources rather than trade 
measures that were only incidentally or inadvertently aimed at conservation. 
Prima facie, trade restrictions that prevented any trade whatsoever in krill or krill products (i.e. a 
total ban on krill fishing and trade in krill products) or restrictions aimed at IUU fishing would 
appear to be "primarily aimed at" conservation. Such measures would be aimed squarely at 
conserving not only the Antarctic krill itself but also other Antarctic species that rely directly or 
indirectly on krill as a food source. The WTO Panel also interpreted the following phrase in 
Article XX(g): 
"if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic 
production or consumption of natural resources" 
as meaning that the relevant trade restrictions had to be placed on both imported and domestic 
products. 1288 A total trade ban on all krill products would ostensibly satisfy this requirement, 
although a ban on krill products caught through IUU fishing may not. The reason for this being 
that, if the relevant CCAMLR member country were to restrict importation of krill caught by 
1287 US- Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline 35 ILM (1996) 
1288 Ibid 
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vessels of non-CCAMLR members, then this would still allow krill products caught/processed by 
domestic fishers to be sold. This would fall foul of the WTO 's interpretation of the Article 
XX(g) exception as outlined above. 
Introductory Paragraph to Article .XX 
The introductory paragraph to Article XX requires that any trade restrictions adopted comply 
with specific standards. These standards require that the trade restrictions do not constitute 
arbitrary discrimination; unjustifiable discrimination; or a disguised restriction on international 
trade. According to the WTO Appellate Body, the introductory paragraph to Article XX was a 
means of qualifying the GATT exceptions and of ensuring that rights given by these clauses were 
exercised reasonably. 1289 The introductory paragraph of Article XX suggests that "nothing" will 
prevent the exceptions from applying where the relevant measures conform to the objectives of 
the introductory paragraph. 1290 The language of Article XX does not appear to exclude even 
trade measures that significantly restrict free trade so long as they are in accordance with the 
objectives. 1291 Accordingly, provided that there is no arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or 
a disguised trade restriction, then any trade measures should be permissible. This would appear 
to provide a legal justification if States acted to ban all imports of krill products because such a 
trade restriction would not discriminate, it would apply to all imports. 
In the US-Gasoline1292 case it was held that trade measures can, under the introductory paragraph 
to Article XX, discriminate so long as such discrimination does not have an arbitrary or 
unjustifiable basis. This provides weight to any argument that the Article XX(g) exception can 
also apply to import restrictions that are specifically targeted at krill products derived from krill 
that were caught through IUU fishing. If particular States (eg CCAMLR members) adopted such 
restrictions they would, prima facie, be doing so solely for the conservation of krill and other 
Antarctic species that rely on them. Arguably then, there would be no "arbitrary" or 
"unjustifiable" discrimination. On the contrary, there would be a strong conservation" motive to 
justify such discrimination. However, the strict approach taken by the WTO Panel when 
interpreting the introductory paragraph of Article XX makes it highly likely that the Panel would 
not adopt a similar interpretation. 
1289 US- Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Reports of the Panel and Appellate 
Bodies (1998) 
1290 Howse, R. 2002. The Appellate Body Rulings in the Shrimp/Turtle Case: A New Legal Baseline for 
the Trade and Environment Debate. Columbia Journal of Environmental Law: Vol27: 491-521 at 493 
1291 Ibid 
1292 US- Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline 3 5 ILM (1996) 
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The US Shrimp-Turtle case1293 highlights the strict interpretation that the WTO Panel has taken in 
respect of"arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination" for the purposes of the Article XX(g) 
exception. This case involved the protection of endangered and threatened sea turtle species. 
These turtle species were in danger from direct fisheries exploitation. They were also in danger 
because they were being caught inadvertently in the nets of fishers who were targeting other 
species. A large number of turtles were being captured by fishing vessels engaged in other 
fishing activities. The US implemented a ban prohibiting the harvesting of certain sea turtle 
species in US waters and on the high seas. The US prohibited the importation of any shrimp 
which were harvested in a manner that could adversely affect sea turtles, unless specific 
requirements were met by the harvesting flag State. 
In the US Shrimp-Turtle case it was held that the particular trade restrictions were "unjustifiable 
discrimination" because the US had made no attempt to negotiate internationally with other 
countries in order to solve the problem of sea turtle exploitation.1294 The WTO believed that 
there was an alternative course of action open to the US government in that particular case. To 
avoid breaching the "unjustifiable discrimination" requirement, there must have been a serious 
effort to negotiate with affected countries and the relevant trade measure adopted must be 
flexible. 1295 
In the Tuna-Dolphin cases, the WTO Panel adopted a similar stance in its reasoning. The Panel 
stated that trade restrictions could not be justified merely on the basis that a country had a 
different environmental policy to that of the State imposing the restrictions: 
" ... the provisions of the [GATT] impose few constraints on a contracting party's 
implementation of domestic environmental policies. The Panel recalled ... that under 
these provisions, a contracting party is free to tax or regulate imported products and like 
domestic products as long as its taxes or regulations do not discriminate against imported 
products or afford protection to domestic producers, and a contracting party is also free 
to tax or regulate domestic production for environmental purposes. As a corollary to 
these rights, a contracting party may not restrict imports of a product merely because it 
originates in a country with environmental policies different from its own."1296 
1293 United States- Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, adopted on 6 November 
1998 
1294 US- Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Reports of the Panel and Appellate 
Bodies (1998) 
1295 As discussed, these views were espoused in the Shrimp-Turtle case. 
1296 United States- Restrictions in Imports of Tuna (Tuna-Dolphins I) 30 ILM 1594 (1991) at 6.2 
273 
"It seemed evident to the Panel that, if the Contracting Parties were to permit import 
restrictions in response to differences in environmental policies under the general 
agreement, they would need to impose limits on the range of policy differences justifying 
such responses and to develop criteria so as to prevent abuse. If the Contracting Parties 
were to decide to permit trade measures of this type in particular circumstances it would 
therefore be preferable for them to do so not by interpreting Article XX, but by 
amending or supplementing the provisions of the general agreement or waiving 
obligations thereunder." 1297 
The reasoning adopted in the US Shrimp-Turtle case therefore appears to place a severe 
restriction on the ability of States to rely on Article XX(g) in the context of krill protection. 
Where a State simply imposed a ban on any products made from krill caught by non-CCAMLR 
members, such a ban may not be justifiable under Article XX(g). In such a case, the relevant 
State would not have made a serious attempt to negotiate and so there would likely be 
"unjustifiable discrimination" in accordance with the US Shrimp-Turtle case. 
However, the WTO Panel's reasoning does not necessarily mean that a State could not impose a 
comprehensive trade ban on all krill products. As discussed above, it is difficult to see how such 
trade restrictions could discriminate in any fashion where they applied to all States. Accordingly, 
Article XX(g) seems to be available in such a situation. Although, given the WTO Panel's 
reluctance to permit trade restrictions on environmental grounds, this would not necessarily be 
the view adopted by the WTO. 
Subsequent to the US Shrimp-Turtle case, an action was brought against the US relating to the 
implementation of the finding in that case. 1298 The case involved a consideration of whether the 
US was required to completely lift the shrimp importation ban to comply with the WTO finding. 
It was held that, because the US had made "good faith" efforts to negotiate an international 
agreement relating to sea turtle protection, the US had complied with the WTO finding. 
1297 United States- Restrictions in Imports of Tuna (Tuna-Dolphins 1) 30 ILM 1594 (1991) at 6.3 
1298 United States- Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, adopted on 21 November 
2001 
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In this respect, the WTO Appellate Body said: 
Para 185 "In reaching these conclusions, we wish to underscore what we have not 
decided in this appeal. We have not decided that the protection and preservation of the 
environment is of no significance to the Members of the WTO. Clearly, it is. We have 
not decided that the sovereign nations that are Members of the WTO cannot adopt 
effective measures to protect endangered species, such as sea turtles. Clearly, they can 
and should. And we have not decided that sovereign states should not act together 
bilaterally, plurilaterally or multilaterally, either within the WTO or in other international 
fora, to protect endangered species or to otherwise protect the environment. Clearly, 
they should and do." 
Para 186: "What we have decided in this appeal is simply this: although the measure of 
the United States in dispute in this appeal serves an environmental objective that is 
recognised as legitimate under paragraph (g) of Article XX of the GATT 1994, this 
measure has been applied by the United States in a manner which constitutes arbitrary 
and unjustifiable discrimination between Members of the WTO, contrary to the 
requirements of the chapeau of Article XX. For all of the specific reasons outlined in 
this Report, this measure does not qualify for the exemption that Article XX of the 
GATT 1994 affords to measures which serve certain recognised, legitimate 
environmental purposes but which, at the same time, are not applied in a manner that 
constitutes a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where 
the same conditions prevail or·a disguised restriction on international trade. As we 
emphasised in United States- Gasoline [adopted 20 May 1996, WT/DS2/AB/R, p.30], 
WTO Members are free to adopt their own policies aimed at protecting the environment 
as long as in doing so, they fulfill their obligations and respect the rights of other 
Members under the WTO Agreement." 
This narrow interpretation of the Article XX exceptions in an environmental context makes it 
difficult for a state to utilise these exceptions unless the state can also rely on a multilateral 
environmental Treaty that exists with the other party to the dispute. 1299 There is, implicit in these 
decisions, an attempt to prevent states from using environmental measures as an excuse for 
implementing trade restrictions. 
1299 Dixon, M. and McCorquodale, R. Supra, fu 801, 713 
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Arguably, in the US Shrimp-Turtle case there was some recognition of environmental protection 
by the WTO because the Panel held that the particular ban on shrimp was "related to" the 
preservation of sea turtles. 1300 The reasoning in the above extracts from the US Shrimp-Turtle 
case also evidence that there is some basis in GATT for the implementation of trade measures 
where multilateral environmental agreements exist to justify those measures. 1301 
Accordingly, krill trade restrictions that were agreed upon by CCAMLR members would prima 
facie be justifiable even if they did discriminate. CCAMLR is the type of multilateral 
action/agreement that appears to be sanctioned by the WTO Panel's reasoning above. The 
interaction of multilateral environmental agreements ("MEAs") with the WTO system is 
discussed further below. 
In order for CCAMLR member States to place krill trade restrictions on non-members, the WTO 
Panel ruling appears to firstly require some serious negotiation with all non-members in an 
attempt to reach an international agreement concerning krill protection. This would clearly be a 
time consuming exercise which would require a high level of resources and would not 
necessarily be practicable. 
A further illustration of the WTO Panel's consideration of environmental measures can be found 
in the US-Canadian Tuna case. 1302 In that case, the US imposed an import ban on Canadian 
Tuna in retaliation for Canada's seizure of US fishing vessels which were fishing in an area 
Canada asserted jurisdiction over. The US did not recognise Canada'sjurisdiction over this area. 
Canada contended that the US was disregarding its obligations under GATT by using trade 
restrictions as a means of exerting pressure on Canada. The US argued that its actions were 
justified under Article XX(g) of GATT. The US was of the view that the measures were 
implemented in conjunction with measures aimed at restricting domestic production or 
consumption of tuna. Accordingly, the US argued that the import ban related to the conservation 
of tuna because its aim was to avoid and deter threats to the international management approach 
which the US believed was necessary for conservation of tuna stocks. The US believed that 
seizure of US vessels by Canada impaired this management approach and such unilateral 
measures would discourage international cooperation in respect of preventing overfishing. The 
US also argued that the requirement in Article XX(g) that there are trade restrictions "relating" to 
conservation of exhaustible resources did not mean that conservation had to be the exclusive 
1300 US --Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Reports of the Panel and Appellate 
Bodies (1998) 
1301 Birnie, P. and Boyle, A. Supra, fu 233, 713 
1302 United States- Prohibition of Imports of Tuna and Tuna Products from Canada, adopted on 22 
February 1982 
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motivation for the trade measures. The case held that the US import restriction breached Article 
XI(l) of GATT and reliance could not be placed on Article XI(2) and Article XX(g) to justify 
this breach. 
The WTO's decision was partly based on the fact that the US had only imposed domestic fishing 
restrictions on some species of tuna during the period when the Canadian ban had effect. The 
Canadian ban, however, was placed on all tuna species. 1303 The WTO Panel therefore held that 
the US could not rely on Article XX(g) because the ban had not been made effective in 
conjunction with restrictions on US domestic production or consumption of all tuna and tuna 
products. 1304 Although the case did not uphold the US restrictions, arguably, these restrictions 
were not a genuine environmental protection measure but were a retaliatory measure against 
Canadian actions concerning US fishing vessels. A similar practical problem exists in respect of 
any trade restrictions relating to Antarctic krill. As discussed, in the US-Canadian Tuna case the 
WTO Panel showed a reluctance to allow environmental trade restrictions, particularly where the 
manner in which the restrictions operated on domestic products was not exactly the same as for 
imported products. In particular, trade restrictions in respect of krill related products could face 
legal difficulties under the WTO system. This would be the case where CCAMLR members 
imposed import bans on krill products sourced from WTO Member States engaged in IUU 
fishing, but did not place restrictions on krill products that were produced domestically or were 
produced from krill caught by domestic fishing vessels. 
Trade Restrictions Based on Product Processing 
The Tuna-Dolphin cases held that a State cannot impose trade restrictions that ban products 
based on the process/means used to produce that product. This prohibition is based on Article III 
of GATT because this type of trade restriction involves discrimination between the same types of 
product. 
The prohibition was raised in the Tuna-Dolphin cases despite the face that the particular trade 
restrictions in that case were imposed on all countries. In those cases, the relevant trade 
restrictions were related to how tuna were caught (i.e. using techniques hanp.ful to dolphins) 
rather than banning the products themselves (i.e. the tuna). Accordingly, it was held that the 
trade restrictions could not be justified under Article III of GATT. 
1303 Paragraph 4.6 
1304 Paragraph 4.12 
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The abovementioned cases raise the issue of whether any trade restrictions in respect of the 
Antarctic krill would be viewed as a ban on the process or means used to produce that product, 
rather than a ban on the product itself. If trade restrictions were placed on all Antarctic krill 
because of the introduction of a comprehensive krill fishing ban, then these restrictions would 
clearly be placed on the product itself. Accordingly, such trade measures would not be a 
restriction as to process and would not fall foul of the principle outlined in the Tuna Dolphin 
cases. However, a different situation may arise if partial trade restrictions were imposed on 
Antarctic krill products from krill that had been caught by IUU fishers (who were residents of 
WTO Member states). There is an argument that such restrictions would not fall within the 
Article XX(g) exception. Arguably, such trade restrictions would not relate to the product (i.e. 
krill) but rather the process by which it had been produced. This would be the case if IUU 
fishing could be viewed as a process to produce krill. This author does not hold the view that the 
simple fact that a fishing activity is IUU in nature could be viewed as a production process. The 
Tuna Dolphin cases seem to be aimed at actual production processes, such as particular fishing 
techniques. Trade restrictions aimed only at krill products sourced from IUU fishing activities 
should not be seen as a process restriction. However, given the apparent reluctance of the WTO 
Panel to uphold environmentally based trade restrictions this will not necessarily be a view 
shared by.the WTO. There is an argument that products should not be considered "like 
products" in any event in respect of GATT's non-discrimination Article where they are produced 
or harvested using different methods. Implementing such a view would likely require an 
amendment to the GATT. 1305 
Extraterritorial Application of Trade Restrictions 
Assuming that the Article XX(g) exception could be relied upon to permit trade restrictions on 
krill related products, there is an issue as to how far the exception extends. In particular, whether 
trade restrictions could be applied against imports from all foreign nationals where the products 
in question were harvested extraterritorially. 
The first Tuna-Dolphin case decided that Article XX(g) only has a domestic application to 
exhaustible resources within the territory of the contracting party. The second Tuna-Dolphin 
case held that Article XX(g) could apply extra-territorially but that trade restrictions based on 
this provision could only be enforced against nationals ofthe particular State and flag vessels of 
that State. The second Tuna-Dolphin case seems to conclude that Article XX(g) can have 
1305 Birnie, P. and Boyle, A. Supra, fu 233, 722 
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extraterritorial effect because a State has the right to control its subjects. However, the Article 
does not have extra-jurisdictional effect. 1306 
The Appellate Body in the Shrimp-Turtle case restricted, but did not entirely dismiss, the 
possibility of States imposing unilateral trade measures with application beyond State borders. 1307 
Arguably, in the Shrimp-Turtle case there was some recognition of environmental protection by 
the WTO because the case held that the relevant ban on shrimp was "related to" the preservation 
of sea ,turtles. 1308 
However, the findings in the Tuna-Dolphin cases narrow the application of Article XX(g) to 
trade restrictions on Antarctic species. Applying the reasoning in the second Tuna Dolphin case, 
a State could apply trade restrictions against its own nationals outside of its own territory. 
However, the Article XX(g) restriction could not be used to justify a State imposing trade 
restrictions on krill related products outside the State's jurisdiction. In particular, States could 
not impose traqe restrictions outside their territorial waters by relying on Article XX(g) as a legal 
justification. This would make it difficult for a State to apply trade restrictions on krill products 
in a high seas area if that State wanted to utilise the Article XX(g) exception in GATT. 
Furthermore, Article III(4) of GATT requires that imported products be accorded no less 
favourable treatment than national products in respect of all laws and regulations affecting their 
internal sale. The Tuna-Dolphin cases1309 illustrate that there is a difference between regulations 
which are part of domestic laws and import prohibitions. There is a difficulty in differentiating 
between the two situations. Internal regulations are permissible if all states are bound by them in 
accordance with Article III, but Article XI prohibits import restrictions (except in certain limited 
circumstances).1310 Accordingly, for the enforcement of a comprehensive krill ban, from a legal 
perspective it would be better if any trade restrictions on krill related products were in the form 
of domestic regulations on internal sale rather than a ban on importations per se. 
1306 Ibid 709 
1307 Ibid' 712 
1308 US~ Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Reports of the Panel and Appellate 
Bodies (1998) 
1309 30 ILM 1594 (1991) and 33 ILM 839 (1993) 
1310 Dixon, M. and McCorquodale, R. Supra, fu 801, 533 
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HI. Effectiveness of the WTO CTE 
GATT currently does give some recognition to environmental protection matters through the 
exceptions in Article XX. However, the WTO cases discussed above indicate that the WTO 
Panel is quite reluctant to pennit restrictive trade measures on environmental grounds. This 
signals that some conflict exists between environmental protection and trade principles under the 
WTO system. In light of such potential conflicts, the WTO' s Committee on Trade and 
Environment ("CTE") was setup in 1994 under the Marrakesh Ministerial Decision on Trade and 
Environment. The CTE's mandate includes the task of looking at interactions between trade 
measures and the environment in order to promote sustainable development. 1311 Indeed, the 
Marrakesh Decision succinctly concludes that no policy contradiction exists in promoting both of 
these objectives within the WTO system: 
"Considering that there should not be, nor need be, any policy contradiction between 
upholding and safeguarding an open, non-discriminatory and equitable multilateral 
trading system on the one hand, and acting for the protection of the environment, and the 
promotion of sustainable development on the other". 1312 
In theory, there may be no policy contradiction between these objectives. For example, 
CCAMLR is aimed at sustainable development in respect of Antarctica's marine living 
resources. Catch limits are imposed on Antarctic krill and other marine species, however, free 
trade in these Antarctic species is still permitted up to those catch limits. Prima facie, the 
environmental protection policy does not conflict with WTO principles because free trade is 
promoted up to the catch limits. Accordingly, it would appear that environmental matters could 
be protected within the WTO system without causing a conflict with the WTO's free trade 
principles. However, in practice the WTO's primary role is as an institution aimed at promoting 
free trade and this can be evidenced by the WTO Panel's seeming reluctance to allow countries 
to impose trade restrictions in order to protect the environment. From a practical perspective it is 
therefore difficult for the WTO system to play a significant role in environmental conservation. 
1311 Trade and the Environment Document produced by the WTO Secretariat, WTO website, 
http://www.wto.org at 5 
1312 Ministerial Decision on Trade and Environment, 14 April 1994 
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The potential for policy conflicts to arise becomes even more apparent when more complex 
scenarios arise. Throughout this thesis, the introduction of a comprehensive ban on all krill 
fishing in the Southern Ocean has been advocated. The policy rationale being that the Antarctic 
krill provide a vital link in the extremely short and fragile Antarctic food chain. Conserving the 
Antarctic krill will give greater protection to species higher up the food chain from the threat of 
overfishing and other dangers. Higher species in the food chain have a greater economic value 
than the Antarctic krill. Accordingly, it would be more beneficial from a trade perspective to 
allow free trade in such species (subject to catch limits) whilst giving the long term sustainability 
of such fishing industries a boost by banning exploitation of Antarctic krill. A comprehensive 
krill ban or localised krill bans in certain sensitive Antarctic areas1313 may not even infringe the 
WTO's non-discrimination principles (see discussion below). Policy-wise it would appear to be 
possible to promote both environmental and trade goals within the WTO system in respect of the 
Antarctic krill. However, as discussed above, from a practical perspective the current structure 
of the WTO and GATT makes it unlikely that the WTO would adopt a similar view. 
The CTE was set up in order to resolve such problems. The terms of the CTE require it to 
identify the relationship between trade and environmental measures in order to promote 
sustainable development. The CTE's mandate also requires it to make recommendations on any 
modifications to WTO rules that are necessary in respect of environmental conservation 
measures and also in light of the objectives in Agenda 21 and the Rio Declaration. 1314 Both the 
Doha Ministerial Declaration1315 and the Marrakesh Declaration1316 require the CTE to examine 
the effect of environmental measures on market access (and in particular on developing 
countries). Accordingly, the CTE's function is ostensibly to provide policy recommendations to 
the WTO in order to balance environmental and trade concerns within the WTO system. As 
discussed above, there is arguably only very limited recognition within the current WTO system 
of environmental matters and the need for restrictive trade measures in certain circumstances in 
order to preserve the environment. The CTE's mandate requires it to make recommendations for 
changes to WTO rules in order to facilitate sustainable development. Furthermore, the WTO 
Members themselves want an examination of the manner in which environmental measures can 
be introduced so that they are consistent with WTO rules but still meet the legitimate objectives 
of importing countries (and developing countries). 1317 This evidences a clear need for are-
1313 The possibility of introducing localised krill bans has been discussed throughout this thesis. 
1314 Ministerial Decision on Trade and Environment, 14 April 1994 
1315 Paragraph 32(i) 
1316 Item 6 
1317 Trade and the Environment Document produced by the WTO Secretariat, WTO website, 
http://www.wto.org at 15 
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examination of the WTO's current environmental policy. The effectiveness of the CTE's role in 
this respect is discussed further below. 
Although any trade restrictions introduced to protect the Antarctic krill would not necessarily 
infringe WTO principles, 1318 modifications to WTO rules could ensure that specific and detailed 
guidelines are available to apply trade principles in an environmental context. This would 
provide the WTO Panel with a framework in which to rule on environmentally related trade 
measures and would give the Panel a specific mandate to recognise environmental protection 
principles. As discussed above, the WTO Panel's previous decisions in respect of the 
environment appear to limit the role of environmental principles in determining trade disputes. 
Consequently, the CTE could recommend changes to the WTO rules to give such detailed 
recognition to environmental matters. In respect of the Antarctic krill, a greater recognition of 
environmental principles in the dispute resolution mechanism could allow the introduction of 
blanket krill import bans by some WTO member States or krill import bans that discriminated 
based on whether the import was from a known ruu fisher or was from a non-member of 
CCAMLR. For example, several countries during the negotiation of the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services proposed that specific exceptions be permitted in respect of services trade 
relating to the environment and sustainable development, however, no agreement was 
reached. 1319 
There has been criticism of the CTE and its first Report adopted at the WTO Ministerial 
Conference in Singapore in 19961320 because of its lack of action in respect of environmental 
matters. Criticism has been leveled at the CTE's inability to make any substantive 
recommendations as to GATT/WTO reform in respect of environmental dispute resolution. 1321 
For example, the CTE Cancun Report1322 stated that there was a general recognition by the CTE 
of the "importance of achieving the objective of sustainable development in the fisheries sector". 
However, the Report does not outline any practical methods or steps for achieving this objective. 
1318 See discussion below including the discussion on CCAMLR's catch documentation scheme. 
1319 Trade and the Environment Document produced by the WTO Secretariat, WTO website, 
http://www.wto.org at 30 
1320 Report of the WTO Committee on Trade and the Environment, Nov. 14, 1996 
1321 Winter, R. 2000. Reconciling the GATT and WTO with Multilateral Environmental Agreements: Can 
We Have Our Cake and Eat It Too? Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy, 
Vol11(1): 224-255 at 240 
1322 Committee on Trade and Environment: Report to the 51h Session of the WTO Ministerial Conference in 
Cancun, 11 July 2003 at 5 
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Similarly, in the Report of the Chairperson of the CTE Special Session to the Trade Negotiations 
Committee, 15 July 2003, the CTE reiterated a number of outstanding issues concerning the 
relationship between MEAs and the WTO rules but failed to actually reach any conclusion nor to 
outline any practical actions that were going to take place to further define this relationship. 
Finally, in the Doha Work Programme: Decision adopted by the General Council on 1 August 
2004, the WTO General Council took note of the CTE's special sessions and reaffirmed WTO 
Members' commitment to the environment negotiations but did little else to indicate positive 
action on the issue of trade and the environment. 
All of the examples above illustrate that there has been little real action by the CTE to draft 
recommendations for substantive changes to WTO rules in order to better facilitate 
environmental protection principles. Given the growing importance of the WTO system, it is 
vital that environmental protection measures receive recognition whether within or outside that 
system. At present, the environment does not receive sufficient practical recognition within the 
WTO system and given th~ CTE's past record this is unlikely to change in the near future. 1323 
Any trade measures introduced to protect Antarctic species (even perhaps those relating to 
CCAMLR's Catch Documentation Scheme1324) are under a cloud of uncertainty because of this 
lack of recognition. 
The current status of environmental protection within the WTO system also raises the issue of 
whether a system aimed primarily at promoting free trade is an appropriate forum for enforcing 
environmental protection measures. The WTO itself has previously recognised that it is not an 
institution that is aimed at protecting the environment and any environmental concerns it focuses 
on are limited to those relating to trade restrictions. The WTO has stated that its function is to 
ensure that trade is open; that environmental policies do not prevent open trade; and that trade 
requirements do not prevent domestic environmental policies from providing adequate 
protection. 1325 One commentator has argued that there is an "inherent conflict of interest" 
concerning the WTO's adjudication of environmental-related trade disputes and that the WTO 
will permit environmental protection only so far as such protection does not conflict with free 
trade. 1326 
1323 In 2005, the CTE did outline some general principles in respect of multilateral environmental 
agreements and the WTO which are discussed later in this Chapter. 
1324 See discussion below. 
1325 Trade and the Environment Document produced by the WTO Secretariat, WTO website, 
http://www.wto.org at 6 
1326
'Cavros, G. 2003. The Hidden Cost of Free Trade: The Impact of United States World Trade 
Organization Obligations on United States Environmental Law Sovereignty. ILSA Journal of International 
and Comparative Law, Vol9: 563-585 at 578-9 
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Given the WTO's trade mandate, institutions or treaties (i.e. multilateral environmental 
agreements) that focus exclusively on the environment seem to be the most effective means of 
providing protection to Antarctic species such as krill. These agreements can then specifically 
provide for any required environmental protection measures including those relating to trade. 
However, if trade restrictions are introduced within the specific framework of an MEA an issue 
then arises as to what happens if such measures conflict with WTO principles. This question will 
now be considered. 
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IV. Future Interaction Between WTO and MEAs 
During the Doha Ministerial conference, WTO Members agreed to conduct further work in order 
to clarify the relationship between WTO rules and multilateral environmental agreements 
("MEAs") but only in respect of parties to those agreements. 1327 These negotiations are currently 
taking place and there have been some suggestions during the course of them that principles must 
be developed to regulate the relationship between WTO rules and environmental treaties. 1328 As 
discussed above, the introduction of trade restrictions in MEAs could in some circumstances 
conflict with GATT principles. Trade restrictions that were introduced as part of CCAMLR in 
order to protect Antarctic krill would be subject to this risk. Accordingly, it is important to 
determine what outcome would be achieved in such a situation. 
Dispute resolution 
The WTO system has in place a specific mechanism for determining trade disputes between 
WTO members. Where an MEA conflicts with GATT rules, the parties could elect to bring an 
action through this WTO dispute settlement procedure. The question then remains as to how the 
WTO would resolve this inconsistency. This would clearly impact on any specific trade 
obligations that were introduced into CCAMLR to protect Southern Ocean species (this could 
potentially include CCAMLR's Catch Documentation Scheme which is discussed below) which 
came into conflict with WTO trade principles. Winter argues that GATT and MEAs are based 
on inconsistent policy objectives that could potentially lead to a future conflict between an 
MEA's environmental protection measures and the GATT. 1329 Winter also contends that, 
because the WTO is a centralised and powerful institution, it poses a threat to MEAs if they are 
inconsistent with GATT. 1330 An examination of the WTO's previous decisions relating to the 
environment is warranted to determine the importance placed on MEAs by the WTO. 
1327 Trade and the Environment Document produced by the WTO Secretariat, WTO website, 
http://www.wto.org at 39 
1328 Trade and the Environment Document produced by the WTO Secretariat, WTO website, 
http://www.wto.org at41 
1329 Winter, R. Supra, fn 1367, 224 
1330 Ibid, 232 
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The unilateral action taken by the US in respect of tuna imports in the Tuna-Dolphin cases made 
it subsequently possible for a multilateral agreement to be concluded that protected dolphins and 
allowed a lifting of the restrictive trade measures.1331 Arguably, the Shrimp-Turtle case also 
evidences that there is some justification in GATT for trade measures where MEAs exist.1332 
One commentator argues that the US Shrimp-Turtle case shows that particular MEAs will be held 
to be WTO consistent. Arguably, if a multilateral approach is taken, then environmental 
concerns can take precedence over trade concerns within the WTO system. There is also an 
argument that the US Shrimp-Turtle case suggests that unilateral measures could be valid too if 
there have been prior attempts to negotiate a multilateral solution. 1333 Both of these cases show 
that the WTO will look more favourably on environmentally related trade measures where they 
relate to an MEA. 
In this regard, the WTO's main concern appears to be the imposition of unilateral trade 
restrictions. One commentator has argued that the Tuna-Dolphin and US Shrimp-Turtle cases 
imply that the concept of free trade contains a principle of non-coercion i.e. against using trade 
measures to coerce compliance with regulation. 1334 However, where an MEA is in place there is 
consent to those trade restrictions and no coercion exists. This is all very well for existing 
contracting parties to an MEA like CCAMLR. As discussed throughout this thesis, one of the 
biggest threats to CCAMLR's management regime (including the precautionary catch limits that 
apply to Antarctic krill) is IUU fishing. This is a particular problem in the Southern Ocean 
because a significant proportion of the area constitutes high seas (Antarctic territorial claims 
notwithstanding). As discussed in Chapter 1, a major proportion of areas of high Antarctic krill 
concentration are also located in high seas areas of the Southern Ocean. Arguably, the 
imposition of unilateral trade restrictions against non-complying countries is necessary to 
increase the effectiveness of CCAMLR (including the precautionary measures it contains that are 
aimed at krill fishing), however, this risks infringing any implied "coercion" principle that exists 
under the WTO regime. 
1331 Birnie, P. and Boyle, A. Supra, fn 233, 714 
1332 Ibid 713 
1333 McRae, D. 2003. Trade and the Environment: Competition, Cooperation or Confusion? Alberta Law 
Review, Vol41: 745-760 at 755 
1334 Driesen, D. 2001. What is Free Trade?: The Real Issue Lurking Behind the Trade and Environment 
Debate. Virginia Journal of International Law: Vol 42(2): 279-368 at 304 
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Unilateral Trade Restrictions 
The WTO Secretariat itself has specifically stated that multilateral solutions to environmental 
problems are preferable to unilateral ones. 1335 The WTO advocates co-ordination of 
environmental protection efforts, including trade related measures, rather than unilateral action. 
The WTO Secretariat believes that unilateral action can lead to discrimination and "disguised 
protectionism". 1336 These views support those espoused in the WTO cases discussed above and 
show that the WTO has a clear aversion to the use of unilateral trade restrictions as an 
environmental protection mechanism. Such a position does not fit comfortably with the 
imposition of any unilateral trade restrictions such as an import ban on Antarctic krill as a 
disincentive towards IUU fishing in Antarctic waters. 
Despite the WTO 's attitudes, unilateral action can be an effective means of enforcing 
environmental measures in respect of high seas krill fisheries in an area like the Southern Ocean. 
For example, US unilateral action has, in the past, proved somewhat successful. In one instance, 
the possibility of US trade sanctions culminated in a multilateral agreement to stop high seas 
fishing of Atlantic salmon. 1337 Multilateral treaties imposing trade sanctions may encourage 
parties to join those agreements. 1338 Specific trade restrictions introduced as part of CCAMLR 
provide an incentive for new countries to become parties to that Treaty (see also the discussion 
on the Catch Documentation Scheme below). However, the alternative view is that unilateral 
trade measures will not prove to be an effective means of environmental protection. One 
commentator has argued that if a State imposes trade restrictions ~n an attempt to change the 
environmental policies of another State, then that other state could decide to maintain its existing 
policies and suffer the consequences of reduced exports. 1339 
1335 Trade and the Environment Document produced by the WTO Secretariat, WTO website, 
http://www.wto.org at 35 
1336 Trade and the Environment Document produced by the WTO Secretariat, WTO website, 
http://www.wto.org at 8 
1337 Lundsgaard, D. and Spracker, S. 1993. Dolphins and Tuna: Renewed Attention on the Future of Free 
Trade and Protection of the Environment. Columbia Journal of Environmental Law: Vol 18: 385-418 at 
409 
1338 Driesen, D. Supra, fn 1380, 304 
1339 Howse, R. Supra, fn 1336, 492 
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In a similar vein, Hoffmann argues that trade restrictions may only serve to encourage illegal 
international trade rather than curb the activities that they are aimed at preventing.1340 Such an 
argument holds trade coercion to be an ineffective means of environmental protection and, when 
applied against non-parties to MEAs, to constitute an infringement of national sovereignty. 1341 
On the other hand, there is an equally valid alternative view that trade sanctions do not infringe 
the sovereignty of other States. 1342 There is also a possibility that permitting unilateral action 
through trade restrictions on environmental grounds would be subject to abuse if those measures 
were introduced for trade protection purposes. 1343 Such risks do not outweigh the potential 
benefits to be gained in protecting the Antarctic krill and should not be used as a justification for 
allowing unrestricted trade in Antarctic species such as krill by non-members to CCAMLR. 
CITES and CCAMLR Catch Documentation Scheme (CDS) 
A case in point in respect of trade restrictions is the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora ("CITES"). CITES is a Treaty aimed at protecting 
endangered species. CITES prohibits trade in certain endangered species and also regulates trade 
in other species. CITES uses trade restrictions on the import or export of particular tln·eatened or 
endangered species for this purpose. 1344 One commentator has argued that CITES has achieved 
some success because it is directly aimed at using trade restrictions as a means of environmental 
protection, as opposed to environmental protection agreements that do not focus specifically on 
using trade restrictions. 1345 Accordingly, the introduction of specific provisions directly focusing 
on trade restrictions into the CCAMLR document itself and the inclusion of such restrictions as 
part of the CCAMLR management system, would be likely to achieve some success in restricting 
IUU fishing. 
1340 Hoffmann, U. 2003. Specific Trade Obligations in Multilateral Environmental Agreements and their 
Relationship with the Rules of the Multilateral Trading System- A Developing Country Perspective. 
United Nations Trade and Environment Review: 1-32 at 13 
1341 Oxley, A. 2003. Commentaries on Article 1: The Relationship Between MEAs and WTO Rules. 
United Nations Trade and Environment Review: 93-96 at 93,95 
1342 Lundsgaard, D. and Spracker, S. Supra, fn 1383, 410 
1343 Ibid, 412 
1344 Winter, R. Supra, fn 1367,230 
1345 Driesen, D. Supra, fn 1380, 306 
288 
As discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, the vital role that krill plays in the Antarctic ecosystem 
justifies using measures to protect it against future growth of krill fishing industry. As 
CCAMLR is the current mechanism for regulating krill fishery, any general trade provisions 
included within the CCAMLR instrument could be applied to krill. Practically, this could be 
done as part of CCAMLR's current management system by using its existing system of 
"conservation measures" (these are specific documents that CCAMLR releases outlining 
measures that CCAMLR has taken in respect of particular fisheries). There is, however, an 
argument that CITES trade bans that are used to ensure compliance with CITES could conflict 
with the WTO system. 1346 The outcome of such a situation is discussed below. 
CCAMLR's Catch Documentation Scheme ("CDS") currently utilises one particular form of 
trade restriction by attempting to prevent IUU fishers from off1oading their catch. The CDS is 
aimed at stopping those fishers from finding a market for their product. The UN Food and 
Agriculture Organisation's International Plan of Action on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated 
Fishing ("IUU-IPOA") suggests the implementation of national legislation by States to prevent 
trade in IUU catches1347 (including stock specific trade measures). 1348 Therefore, the IPOA-IUU 
does provide some support for trade related measures. Furthermore, trade restrictions under the 
CDS could be used as a means to enforce a comprehensive krill ban. However, instruments such 
as the F AO Code of Conduct on Responsible Fisheries require States to maintain practices in 
accordance with WTO principles so that those practices do not form obstacles to trade. 1349 The 
CDS could breach WTO rules1350, although there is an alternative view that the CDS does not 
really restrict trade and so the kind of trade measures used by the CDS are, arguably, permissible 
under WTO rules. 1351 If there were a conflict between the CDS and WTO principles, then there 
is an issue as to, legally, which rules should prevail. This question is considered in more detail 
below. The CDS is aimed at preventing fisheries catches being offloaded, but the introduction of 
more direct trade restrictions could also boost the effectiveness of the system. Such direct trade 
restrictions could be aimed at preventing the importation of Antarctic species or products derived 
from those species (such as Antarctic krill concentrate used in the aquaculture industry), although 
direct trade restrictions would be more likely to conflict with WTO/GATT principles. 
1346 Hoffmann, U. Supra, fu 1292, 15 
1347 Article 74, International Plan of Action on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing 
1348 Articles 69 and 70 , International Plan of Action on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing 
1349 Article 6.14, FAO Code of Conduct on Responsible Fisheries 1995; Articles 65 and 66, International 
Plan of Action on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing 
1350 Popick, I.J. Supra, fu 1140, 940 
1351 Ibid, 979 
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Unilateral Action in MEAs and WTO rules 
The WTO contends that "the GATT/WTO agreements already provide significant scope for 
countries to pursue national environmental policies, provided the policies do not 
discriminate."1352 However, violation of the WTO discrimination principle could still arise in 
respect of environmental issues, despite the fact that the specific prov.isions of an MEA may 
require a State to introduce the relevant trade restrictions. The WTO Secretariat itself 
acknowledges that there may be conflict between MEAs and the GATT non-discrimination 
principle where, for example, an MEA permits contracting states to trade in a particular product 
but prohibits trade in that product with non-contracting states. 1353 There is a possibility that 
disputes concerning MEAs would be brought within the WTO dispute settlement procedure. 1354 
A significant risk exists that the WTO PaneVAppellate Body would rule in favour of WTO rules 
in this situation, particularly in light of past environmentally-related decisions that have come 
before the WTO Panel. An outcome of this nature would result in trade princip"res being placed 
ahead of specific environmental obligations in MEAs. Such a situation is far from ideal because 
it would relegate environmental matters to an area of low priority within the WTO system. This 
would impact upon the efficacy of any trade related measures introduced through CCAMLR and 
those relating to Antarctic krill in particular. 
The preamble to the WTO Agreement does make mention of sustainable development, although 
it does not appear to clarify the relationship between MEAs and the GATT/WT0. 1355 
Accordingly, there is currently no specific provision within the legal instruments governing the 
WTO that provides for MEAs to prevail over WTO rules to the extent of any inconsistency. 
There was, however, a proposal at the WSSD in Johannesburg for the WTO to be able to 
override international environmental agreements but this proposal was defeated. 1356 
1352 WTO website, http://www.wto.org 
1353 Trade and the Environment Document produced by the WTO Secretariat, WTO website, 
http://www.wto.org at 36 
1354 Ibid 
1355 Winter, R. Supra, fn 1367, 236 
1356 Eichenberg, T. and Shapson, M. 2004. The Promise of Johannesburg: Fisheries and the World Summit 
on Sustainable Development. Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol 34: 587-643 at 622 
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The CTE has recently considered the interaction ofMEAs and WTO principles. During the 11 111 
meeting of the CTE in February 2005, the CTE raised some general principles in respect of how 
future MEAs are to be negotiated: 1357 
• MEAs need to be open for all countries to become signatories; 
• MEAs need to reflect broad based support; 
• MEA trade measures need to be drafted with precision; 
• MEAs need to treat non-parties on the same basis as parties if the non-parties comply 
with their provisions; and 
• MEAs have to explicitly consider WTO principles. 
These general principles, particularly the requirement for future MEAs to explicitly consider 
WTO prinoiples, imply that the CTE believes that WTO principles are paramount. Ostensibly, 
there are situations where WTO principles should not take priority over MEAs because of 
specific environmental issues such as the need to protect Antarctic species. 
Putting aside the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, it is necessary to consider the relationship 
between conflicting WTO and MEA provisions under general international law principles. The 
Vienna Convention governs the interpretation and application of international treaties. The legal 
instruments governing the WTO constitute an international agreement and consequently should 
be interpreted in accordance with the Vienna Convention. 
Article 30 of the Vienna Convention requires parties that are legally bound by conflicting treaties 
to apply the Treaty concluded later in time in preference to the earlier one to the extent of the 
conflict. Accordingly, any MEAs that were concluded after the 1994 Marrakesh Declaration 
came into force should take priority over any inconsistencies with the GATT and the trade 
principles it contains. However, in respect of Antarctic species, CCAMLR was concluded well 
before the Marrakesh Declaration came into force and so it would not currently be possible to 
rely on Article 30 to resolve any inconsistencies between those two treaties in favour of 
CCAMLR. 
1357 Report by the Chairperson of the Special Session of the Committee on Trade and Environment to the 
Trade Negotiations Committee, 14 March 2005 
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The international law doctrine of lex specialis also provides that specific treaties should take 
preference over general treaties, suggesting that specific trade provisions in MEAs should 
override the GATT. 1358 However, CCAMLR does not currently contain specific trade restriction 
provisions in respect of Antarctic species. As previously discussed, the CCAMLR Commission 
does use a particular type of trade related measure in the form of the Catch Documentation 
Scheme. Arguably though, because the CCAMLR instrument itself does not contain specific 
provisions relating to trade, the general conservation provisions of CCAMLR can be overriden 
by the specific provisions in GATT concerning trade and the restriction of trade. To give more 
legal weight to CCAMLR and the CDS, the Convention should be amended to introduce specific 
provisions relating to trade and the use of trade restrictions for the management of Antarctic 
species. Such an amendment would have an even greater priority if trade restrictions that were 
more direct than the CDS (eg import bans) were put in place by CCAMLR members. 
As discussed, a more direct form of trade restriction in respect of the Antarctic krill would be 
likely to conflict with GATT free trade principles. However, CCAMLR could be amended to 
introduce specific provisions in the Convention in respect of the use of trade restrictions for the 
management of Antarctic species. These specific provisions could then be used to apply trade 
restrictions in respect of the Antarctic krill. The amendment of t~e Convention would, arguably, 
introduce provisions that, under Article 30 Vienna Convention, would take precedence over the 
earlier GATT provisions. Furthermore, this would create specific provisions in CCAMLR that 
should take priority over the general trade principles of GATT. This would strengthen the 
position in international law of any trade restrictions introduced under CCAMLR. A major 
practical problem with this approach would be the legal view taken by the WTO Panel as to the 
interaction of the two systems. One would have to question the neutrality of the Panel in any 
decision involving the legal reconciliation between the WTO treaties and other international 
agreements. In order to resolve such conflict, an apparently neutral arbiter such as the 
International Court of Justice would be the appropriate dispute resolution forum. 1359 
1358 Winter, R. Supra, fu 1367, 236 
1359 See discussion later in this Chapter on alternative arenas for hearing trade related disputes where there 
is a conflict with other international agreements. 
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Despite general international law doctrine, there is also an argument that WTO rules override 
other international law principles because of a devolution of sovereignty to the WTO. The WTO 
Panel itself has stated that WTO Members have agreed to exercise sovereignty in accordance 
with the WTO Agreement: 
"The WTO Agreement is a Treaty- the international equivalent of a contract. It is self-
evident that in an exercise of their sovereignty, and in pursuit of their own respective 
national interests, the Members of the WTO have made a bargain. In exchange for the 
benefits they expect to derive as Members of the WTO, they have agreed to exercise 
their sovereignty according to the commitments they have made in the WTO 
Agreement."1360 
The WTO Committee advocates the "international-level power allocation" to the WTO because 
of the "co-ordination benefits" that it brings i.e. co-ordination of government efforts is necessary 
because where each individual State acts independently, damage may be done to all States. 1361 
This gives weight to the view that States have, at least from the WTO's perspective, ceded some 
measure of sovereignty to the WTO. Orford succinctly summaries the situation in that "decision-
making over ever larger areas of what was once considered to be central to popular sovereignty 
and substantive democracy is now treated as legitimately within the province of economists in 
institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank. The shifting of decision-making authority 
from governments to international economic institutions affects both popular sovereignty and 
substantive democracy."1362 If the view is taken that WTO Member States have indeed ceded a 
portion of their sovereignty to the WTO (or in the very least agreed to exercise their sovereignty 
in accordance with WTO principles) then this has implications for the subsequent exercise of 
power by those states since becoming parties to the WTO Agreement. The proposition that a 
state can cede a portion of its sovereignty has greater weight in this context because the WTO is 
not simply an ordinary international agreement between states. The WTO system, in addition to 
constituting a series of legal agreements, is also an international institution with many of the 
mechanisms necessary for creating its own body of jurisprudence (e.g. a judiciary including a 
dispute resolution mechanism; an executive Committee; and a bureaucracy). Accordingly, the 
WTO would appear able to exercise in its own right any powers ceded to it by Member States. 
1360 Japan- Alcoholic Beverages II, p.16, Dispute Settlement Reports (DSR) 1996: 1, p.97 at 108 
1361 Paragraph 129, Sutherland, P. eta!. The Future of the WTO. 2004. Report by the Consultative Board to 
the Director-General Supachai Panitchpakdi. 
1362 Orford, A. 1997. Locating the International: Military and Monetary Interventions After the Cold War. 
Harvard International Law Journa/443 at 470 
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If, at the very least, WTO Member states have agreed to exercise sovereignty according to WTO 
principles, then states should act in that manner subsequent to joining the WTO system. If this 
view holds weight, then it follows that those WTO Members should exercise their sovereignty in 
accordance with WTO principles when entering into new international agreements. Accordingly, 
there is an argument that WTO Members cannot enter into international agreements subsequent 
to becoming members ofthe WTO if such agreements are inconsistent with WTO principles. If 
this argument had merit, it would mean that a WTO Member could not commit to any 
amendments to CCAMLR that introduced specific trade provisions if those provisions were 
inconsistent with GATT. Furthermore, it would prima facie be illegal for WTO Members to 
enter into new environmental agreements which contained trade principles that were inconsistent 
with GATT. 
Customary International Law 
In light of the above discussion concerning MEAs, it is appropriate to consider the interaction 
between the WTO principles and environmental protection under customary international law 
principles. The WTO Consultative Board has acknowledged the WTO Appellate Body's 
acceptance of the fact that the WTO is subject to the general customary international law rules of 
Treaty interpretation as set out in the Vienna Convention. 1363 This adds weight to the possibility 
that the WTO Panel/Appellate Body would apply Article 30 of the Vienna Convention if 
amendments were made to CCAMLR. Applying Article 30 would mean that specific trade 
provisions introduced into CCAMLR would take priority over GATT principles. However, the 
WTO Consultative Body has also stated that "the customary international law rules of 
interpretation are, themselves, sometimes questionable when applied in the context of very 
detailed and intricate economic obligations of the WTO." 1364 This creates doubt surrounding the 
WTO' s true position in respect of both the rules of interpretation in the Vienna Convention, as 
well as other principles of customary international law. 
1363 Paragraph 233, Sutherland, P. et al. The Future of the WTO. 2004. Report by the Consultative Board to 
the Director-General Supachai Panitchpakdi. 
1364 Ibid, Paragraph 235 
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As discussed in Chapter 3, for customary international law to arise there needs to be evidence of 
both State practice and opinio juris. Winter argues that the development of customary 
international law may, in the long-term, legitimise restrictive trade measures used for 
environmental protection. However, it is likely that GATT will influence state practice, making 
it difficult for such customary law to develop. 1365 Accordingly, even if a customary international 
law principle does exist (or subsequently develops) supporting sustainable development of 
fisheries in Antarctica, it is unlikely that it extends to the use of trade restrictions for 
environmental protection. If a majority of states act in accordance with WTO principles, then the 
state practice required for the development of a customary international law principle permitting 
trade restrictions for environmental protection will not arise. Customary international law can be 
a useful source for international institutions, such as the International Court of Justice, to 
interpret the law when determining disputes. However, it is uncertain whether the WTO 
Panel! Appellate Body would apply any customary international law principles that were not 
strictly in accordance with WTO trade principles. Indeed, one commentator argues that the 
application of customary international laws to specific WTO provisions that conflict with those 
customary laws may undermine the whole WTO system. 1366 Arguably, the WTO system 
embodies a code of world trade law and should not be added to by ~ustomary international 
law. 1367 Accordingly, the development of customary international law may not be an appropriate 
means of dealing with environmental issues within the WTO system. An alternative mechanism 
of providing for environmental issues within the WTO may be preferred. 
1365 Winter, R. Supra, fn 1367, 246 
1366 McGinnis, J. 2003. The Appropriate Hierarchy of Global Multilateralism and Customary International 
Law: The Example of the WTO. Virginia Journal of International Law: Vo144(1): 229-284 at 264 
1367 Ibid, 268 
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V. Trade related krill protection 
As discussed previously, trade related measures could provide an effective means to regulate a 
comprehensive krill ban or localised krill protection. Earlier in this Chapter, the application of 
the environmental exceptions in Article XX of GATT to such krill protection measures was 
examined. However, it is also necessary to determine whether, in the absence of the Article XX 
exceptions, particular types of trade measures relating to krill would breach the broad GATT 
principles. 
It is important to note that the WTO principles only apply to WTO Member States. As discussed 
in previous Chapters, one of the most prevalent problems with international fisheries is IUU 
fishing by vessels without a flag State. Combating the use of unflagged vessels is a necessary 
goal of fisheries regulation. Such vessels claim that they do not fall under the jurisdiction of any 
individual State and, accordingly, WTO member States are not bound to apply the WTO 
principles in respect of such vessels. This means that trade restrictions can be vigorously 
imposed in respect of Antarctic species caught by the fishers of such vessels without any breach 
of GATT principles. 
A related issue is whether trade related protection measures can be imposed against fisheries 
products of WTO members. In the absence of Article XX, it would be necessary for a WTO 
Member to comply with GATT principles. Environmental protection policies can be introduced 
in such a situation provided that there is no discrimination between like products or between 
WTO Member States. 1368 
The Most Favoured Nation principle in Article I of GATT requires that, in respect of customs 
charges and duties and rules and formalities in connection with importation and exportation, 
broadly any advantage given to one contracting State should be equally applied to "like 
products" of any other contracting States. Similar requirements can be found in Article III which 
is, broadly, aimed at non-discrimination between the domestic products of one State and "like 
products" of other contracting States. This includes discrimination based on laws and regulations 
affecting the product's internal sale or offer for sale and internal taxes and charges. 
1368 Trade and the Environment Document produced by the WTO Secretariat, WTO website, 
http://www.wto.org at 7 
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The imposition of trade restrictions by a WTO Member on all krill related products produced 
domestically and also on similar products of other States would not appear to breach the non-
discrimination principles because all "like products" would be treated equally. However, if trade 
restrictions were used by a WTO Member against only a limited class of other nations (eg IUU 
fishers from Member States or States who were not parties to CCAMLR) then it is likely that the 
non-discrimination principles described above would be breached. The existence of these non-
discrimination principles would make it difficult for CCAMLR parties (who were also WTO 
members) to introduce selective trade restrictions without breaching GATT principles, unless 
those parties could rely upon the exceptions in Article XX. 
GATT also contains further measures that prevent the use of import restrictions by WTO 
Members. Article XI(l) requires that there are no prohibitions or restrictions on the importation 
of any product of the territory of any other contracting state. Article XI(2) also contains several 
exceptions to this requirement. In particular, Article XI(l) does not apply to import restrictions 
on any fisheries product imported in any form necessary for the enforcement of governmental 
measures which operate to restrict the quantities of the like domestic product permitted to be 
marketed or produced or, if there is no substantial domestic production of the like product, of a 
domestic product for which the imported product can be directly substituted (Article XI(2)(c)(i)). 
One further requirement for this exception is that public notice must be given of the total quantity 
of the product permitted to be imported. 
Prima facie, import prohibitions imposed by CCAMLR parties on krill related products would 
breach Article XI(l) of GATT. The abovementioned exception in respect of import restrictions 
on fisheries products necessary to enforce domestic regulations would, at first glance, appear to 
be available. This is provided that a comprehensive ban on all krill related products (irrespective 
of jurisdiction) was introduced. Article XIII also requires any import prohibitions or restrictions 
of "like products" to be applied in a non-discriminatory manner between WTO members. Import 
restrictions on krill related products that were aimed only at non-CCAMLR members or IDU 
fishers would not appear to conform to these requirements. 
As discussed, if comprehensive importation barriers were introduced for krill related products 
then GATT offers a potential exception to the normal prohibition against import restrictions. 
The fisheries exception only applies to governmental measures which "operate to restrict the 
quantities of the like domestic product permitted to be marketed or produced or, if there is no 
substantial domestic production of the like product, of a domestic product for which the imported 
product can be directly substituted." There would be legal problems in certain situations if this 
exception was relied upon in respect of import restrictions on krill products. Although a 
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particular country may apply restrictions against all krill related products, the GATT fisheries 
exception appears to be premised on there being substantial production of a domestic product. If 
there is no such substantial domestic production of a like product, then there must be restrictions 
on a domestic product for which the imported product can be directly substituted. 
There are many countries that do not engage in substantial production of krill related products. 
Accordingly, to rely on the exception there needs to be government restrictions in respect of 
substantial domestic production of a direct substitute for krill related products. It is difficult to 
see what a direct substitute would be for krill related products. Therefore, from a legal 
perspective, it may not be possible to rely on this exception to justify comprehensive importation 
restrictions on krill related products (this same reasoning may apply for other Antarctic fisheries 
as well). This would mean that the Article XX exceptions would need to be used as a legal 
justification for different types of trade restrictions that could, as discussed above, breach GATT 
principles. 
Precautionary Approach 
If comprehensive krill trade restrictions do breach GATT principles then, as discussed above, it 
would be necessary to rely on the Article XX exceptions to GATT. In respect of Article XX(g), 
there is an issue as to whether such restrictions could be said to relate to the conservation of 
exhaustible natural resources if their introduction is premised on the precautionary approach to 
resource management. This raises the question of how the precautionary principle interacts with 
GATT trade principles. Arguably, the specific Treaty requirements of the GATT should prevail 
over the precautionary principle if the two are in conflict (i.e. if the precautionary principle does 
indeed constitute customary internationallaw). 1369 The European Community has previously 
contended that the precautionary principle applies in respect of GATT, however, the WTO did 
not accept this argument. 1370 Some commentators argue that customary international law 
principles such as the precautionary approach (if it does constitute customary law) should take 
precedence over multilateral agreements. 1371 The converse argument is that a precautionary 
approach would potentially allow States to impose trade restrictions without scientific 
justification to clandestinely protect domestic industries. 1372 Furthermore, a general 
precautionary principle approach in international trade law may also conflict with economic 
concerns and may not be accepted by developing nations. 1373 
1369 McGinnis, J. Supra, fn 1412,260-261 
1370 WTO Appellate Body Report on EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products, 16 January, 1998 
1371 McGinnis, J. Supra, fu 1412,262 
1372 Ibid 271 
1373 JbiJ 274 
' 
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The WTO 's refusal to accept the existence of a precautionary principle is inconsistent with the 
underlying basis of CCAMLR's fisheries management approach, which is premised on such an 
approach. Furthermore, as discussed above and in previous Chapters, the precautionary 
approach provides the justification for krill trade protection measures and a comprehensive ban 
on krill related products. The precautionary approach should find a place within the WTO 
framework so that trade restrictions can be used for conservation purposes in the absence of 
certainty concerning scientific information. There is an issue, therefore, as to how the 
precautionary approach interacts with WTO principles when those principles conflict with 
specific MEAs. 
A case in point in this respect is the conflict between the WTO Agreement on the Application of 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures ("the SPS Agreement") and the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety. The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety ("the Cartagena Protocol") is aimed at 
protecting biodiversity and human health from organisms that have been genetically modified. 1374 
The Cartagena Protocol, in Article 1 0.6, recognises a form of the precautionary principle. In this 
respect, the SPS Agreement also gives recognition to a particular form of the precautionary 
principle. However, the SPS form of the precautionary principle requires that particular actions 
taken in reliance on that principle be founded on scientific principles. The SPS Agreement also 
requires that there be scientific information to justify those actions. The two agreements are in 
conflict in respect of the precautionary approach because of the requirement in the SPS 
Agreement for "sufficient" scientific evidence before action can be taken. 
In this regard, the Japan- Apples case1375 held that a form of precautionary principle "has· not 
been written into the SPS Agreement as a ground for justifying SPS measures that are otherwise 
inconsistent with the obligations of [WTO] Members". Furthermore, trade restrictions are not 
warranted if any of the requirements in the SPS Agreement are not met. These requirements 
include the need for sufficient scientific information before action can be taken. As the 
precautionary principle relied upon under management regimes such as CCAMLR is based upon 
taking action where scientific data is lacking, the WTO has apparently rejected the use of this 
stronger form of the precautionary principle. 
1374 Vallely, P. 2004. Tension between the Cartagena Protocol and the WTO: The Significance ofRecent 
WTO Developments in an Ongoing Debate. Chicago Journal of International Law, Vol5: 369-378 at 370 
1375 Japan- Measures Affecting the Importation of Applies, Report of the WTO Appellate Body, 26 
November 2003 
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As krill protection, and many other environmental conservation efforts, are based on the 
precautionary principle it is difficult to see how trade restrictions in respect of such efforts would 
be justified under GAIT if the WTO does not recognise a strong form of the precautionary 
principle. As discussed above, the WTO system in general does not place a strong emphasis on 
environmental protection where that protection involves trade restrictions that conflict with 
GATT requirements. In light of this and the inaction of the WTO CTE, there is a clear need to 
either: 
e Change the current WTO system so that there is greater recognition of environmental 
principles; or 
• Use other fora to determine environmental disputes where they are trade related. 
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VI. Changing the WTO System 
There are several alternative means that could be used to change the WTO system. One way of 
providing greater recognition for MEAs and the environment is through the use of Article IX of 
GATT. This Article allows the WTO to waive GATT obligations in particular circumstances. 
The Article could be used to waive GATT obligations in respect of trade restrictions that were 
introduced pursuant to MEAs. 1376 Although CCAMLR does not contain specific provisions 
relating to trade restrictions, the waiver provision in Article IX of GATT could still be used to 
legitimise trade restrictions implemented under the CCAMLR management regime. As 
discussed above, specific management conservation measures could be introduced in respect of 
the Antarctic krill to impose restrictions in respect of trade in krill. The use of Article IX would 
help to facilitate the removal of inconsistencies between WTO principles and the use of 
environmentally based trade restrictions by MEAs, including any restrictions on krill trade that 
might be introduced under CCAMLR. 
It is important to note that the waiver provision does require a 75% majority ofWTO Members, 
which would appear to be a difficult target to achieve. Other WTO Members have also put 
forward the view that the waiver provision alone will not adequately deal with the problems 
concerning the interaction between MEAs and the WTO system. This view is based on the 
contention that the waiver provision is aimed at merely facilitating temporary trade measures 
where exceptional circumstances exist. 1377 Accordingly, a more long-term solution based on 
amendment of GATT is preferable. This is particularly preferable in respect of the Antarctic krill 
because of the current scientific uncertainty concerning the impact of fishing on, not only the 
Antarctic krill, but species higher up in the food web. A long-term measure that is flexible 
enough to permit changes in the types of trade restrictions used for krill is needed because of this 
uncertainty. As more scientific data is gathered or there are changes in the Antarctic 
environment or to populations of other Antarctic species, it may be necessary to change the 
manner in which krill trade restrictions are imposed. The use of the waiver mechanism would 
probably not accommodate these long-term needs. 
1376 Report (1996) of the Committee on Trade and Environment, page 4 
1377 Report (1996) of the Committee on Trade and Environment, page 5 
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An amendment to GATT could take a variety of forms. The European Community has 
previously proposed Article XX of GATT should be amended to include an exception for trade 
restrictions that are introduced because of a requirement in an MEA. 1378 Accordingly, an 
additional exception could be introduced for MEA trade restrictions. For such an exception to be 
applied in a truly objective manner, it is likely that the relevant MEA would need to have a 
specific provision(s) dealing with trade restrictions. CCAMLR would not qualify for any MEA 
exception drafted in this manner because there is currently no specific provision in CCAMLR 
dealing with trade restrictions. Changes to GATT permitting an MEA exception would 
(depending on how the changes were drafted) likely require the insertion of a specific provision 
in CCAMLR outlining when and how trade restrictions can be applied in respect of Antarctic 
species. In order for an MEA exception to be applicable for Antarctic krill, any such specific 
provision introduced into the text of CCAMLR would need to be wide enough to permit trade 
restrictions even where a species was not currently threatened or endangered. This would 
constitute a stronger form of the precautionary approach currently embodied in CCAMLR and 
would facilitate the use of trade restrictions to conserve the Antarctic krill in the light of 
uncertainty concerning the effect of krill fishing on krill population and on populations of 
dependent species. 
An alternative proposal to deal with MEAs relates to the WTO dispute settlement mechanism 
itself. This proposal is linked to the abovementioned idea regarding the need for MEAs to have 
specific clauses dealing with trade. The WTO CTE has canvassed the possibility of basing WTO 
dispute settlement in respect of MEAs upon whether the relevant trade measures are specifically 
provided for in the MEA and whether those trade measures apply to WTO contracting parties or 
to non-parties to the MEA. 1379 A further alternative amendment could focus WTO dispute 
settlement processes on the environmental policy behind the particular trade measures. This 
would require the WTO Panel to examine the legitimacy of the policy itself as well as whether 
the trade restrictions are necessary to achieve those policy aims. 1380 The practical difficulty with 
implementing environmental amendments based on a policy examination is that they allow the 
WTO Panel too much discretion in whether to overturn the relevant trade restrictions. 
1378 /bid 
1379 Report (1 996) of the Committee on Trade and Environment, page 7 
1380 Birnie, P. and Boyle, A. Supra, fn 233, 722 
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The necessary amendment should focus on providing an exception to GATT principles for 
MEAs with specific trade related provisions. 1381 As discussed above, an amendment to 
CCAMLR would be required if this proposal were adopted to introduce specific trade provisions 
into the text of CCAMLR. Provided the specific trade provisions were drafted wide enough to 
allow trade restrictions even where the relevant species were not endangered or threatened, then 
such specific trade provisions could be used by WTO member states to introduce trade 
restrictions in respect of krill fishery without infringing GATT principles. An MEA exception to 
GATT principles would introduce a greater level of objectivity when applying the exception and 
would give the WTO Panel less opportunity to ovemlle trade restrictions in favour of free trade 
principles where those restrictions are specifically provided for in a MEA 
An overhaul of the WTO system and GATT is clearly overdue in respect of environmental 
issues, however, an amendment to GATT may be a long way off. Under Article X, amendments 
can only be passed by a two-thirds majority ofWTO Members. This fact makes it likely that 
political interests would stifle the introduction of an environmentally based amendment in the 
short-term. As outlined above, the slow progress of the CTE on the trade-environment 
relationship will also impede the introduction of any changes to the WTO system. There is also 
an issue as to whether the WTO is even an appropriate forum for environmental dispute 
resolution. Some quarters within the WTO itself do not support the administration of 
environmental policy through the WTO system, for example: 
"Modern commercial policy theory today also argues persuasively that if there are two 
objectives, income and the environment, then generally two policies will help 
governments attain them both to the best advantage. So, the correct policy solution is to 
fix the environment through an appropriate environmental policy and to maintain open 
trade to maximise gains from trade and hence economic prosperity." 1382 
As discussed previously in this Chapter, because the WTO system is primarily focused on trade 
objectives it may not be the appropriate body to deal with disputes concerning trade restrictions 
introduced on environmental grounds and also to administer environmental policy. Accordingly, 
a "carve out" amendment to the WTO dispute settlement process may be appropriate to devolve 
power to deal with MEA related disputes to another international body. 
1381 Although this would require an amendment to CCAMLR if it were to apply to that instrument. 
1382 Paragraph 33, Sutherland, P. eta!. The Future of the WTO. 2004. Report by the Consultative Board to 
the Director-General Supachai Panitchpakdi. 
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Potential alternatives to WTO dispute settlement include dispute settlement through the 
International Court of Justice; dispute settlement bodies provided for within the MEAs 
themselves; or dispute settlement under UNCLOS. Arguably, UNCLOS would provide an 
appropriate forum because it is already involved in international environmental law and has a 
strong system for resolving disputes. 1383 However, UNCLOS' dispute settlement body, the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea ("ITLOS") may be equally reluctant to take into 
account environmental issues and conservation needs. In the 2002 Volga case1384, ITLOS 
appears to have given insufficient consideration to conservation issues when considering a case 
concerning the release of an IUU fishing vessel held by Australia. 1385 A lack of consideration of 
conservation issues by ITLOS could undermine the conservation measures of regional 
organisations such as CCAMLR.1386 Although ITLOS may be just as conservative as the WTO 
in respect of environmental issues, it may still be appropriate for ITLOS to adjudicate trade 
disputes with an environmental focus because the WTO's primary role focuses on trade. 
Accordingly, ITLOS may be more independent when dealing with environmental trade disputes 
because it is not an institution whose primary purpose is to promote free trade. 
Any trade restrictions in respect of krill could be dealt with using the UNCLOS dispute 
settlement mechanism. This mechanism has an established history of dealing with disputes 
relating to the marine environment and international law and is specifically aimed at such 
disputes. Accordingly, it would be the most appropriate means of dealing with trade disputes 
concerning krill. CCAMLR's dispute settlement mechanism requires contracting parties to refer 
the dispute to the ICJ or arbitration. As CCAMLR does not have a separate institutional body to 
deal with disputes, settlement under the UNCLOS system would be preferred. Once again, 
however, an amendment to GATT to devolve power in respect of environmental disputes from 
the WTO Panel to ITLOS is unlikely in the near future. 
1383 Winter, R. Supra, fn 1367, 252 
1384 The Volga (The Russian Federation v The Commonwealth of Australia), 23 December 2002 
1385 Oppenheim, A. 2004. The Plight ofthe Patagonian Toothfish: Lessons from the Volga Case. Brooklyn 
Journal of International Law, Vol 30: 293-328 at 295-297 
1386 Ibid 
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This raises an issue concerning the choice of forum in respect of determining a dispute 
concerning trade and the environment. The current system operates in such a manner that it is 
possible for different states to bring actions under both the WTO system and under other 
international dispute settlement mechanisms. Indeed, this is the very situation that arose in the 
Chile-Swordfish case1387. The Chile-Swordfish case involved a dispute between several 
European countries and Chile regarding swordfish fisheries in the South Pacific. Chile had 
introduced legislation to prevent fishing vessels that were harvesting swordfish in a particular 
region from unloading their catch in Chilean ports. Actions were brought by the different parties 
to the dispute under both the WTO system and ITLOS. The European countries brought an 
action before the WTO Panel claiming that Chile had breached Articles V (a provision relating to 
freedom of transit) and XI (a provision aimed at the elimination of quantitative restrictions on 
products) of GATT by introducing the abovementioned trade measures. Chile brought 
proceedings at the ITLOS on the basis that there had been a breach ofUNCLOS Articles 641388 , 
116-1191389, and the section 300 requirement that parties act i~1 good faith. The counter argument 
was that Chile had itself breached several UNCLOS provisions. 139° Furthermore, the European 
countries argued that Chile had violated the freedom of the high seas1391 and the prohibition on 
States exerting sovereignty over the high seas. 1392 
In respect of this dispute, proceedings in the two different fora were subsequently suspended. 
The case does, however, highlight the potential conflict between the WTO and other 
international institutions. If the case were to have been executed to its conclusion in both fora, 
there could potentially have been conflicting decisions given by the two international bodies. 
This would raise an interesting legal dilemma for states that were legally bound to follow two 
conflicting decisions of two separate international bodies. Such a possibility has clear 
implications for any trade restrictions introduced pursuant to CCAMLR to protect Antarctic 
species from nJU fishing. A reconciliation of the interaction between WTO principles and 
environmental issues (including those covered by MEAs) is clearly necessary to ensure that this 
form of conflict does not arise. One could, for example, envisage a situation of conflict that may 
arise if trade restrictions were adopted in respect of Antarctic krill by a WTO member state. 
Another member state that disputed the restrictions may bring an action under the WTO system, 
which could lead to a counter-action in another forum such as the ICJ or ITLOS on the grounds 
of a breach of a conservation instrument to which both states were parties. Accordingly, if the 
1387 Case Concerning the Conservation and Sustainable Exploitation of Swordfish Stocks in the South-
Eastern Pacific Ocean, ITLOS No.7 (2001) 
1388 This Article is concerned with the conservation of highly migratory species. 
1389 These Articles are concerned with the conservation of living resources on the high seas. 
139
° Chile's alleged breach was of Articles 64, 116-119 and 300. 
1391 Article 87 ofUNCLOS. 
1392 Article 89 ofUNCLOS. 
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different fora came to different decisions, the efficacy of krill trade restrictions would be 
diminished because of this unresolved conflict. 
The administration of environmental policy and the settlement of environmental disputes 
concerning trade should be separated from the purely trade objectives of the WTO. This is a 
realistic objective because, as outlined in further detail above, the WTO itself has had advice 
provided to the Director-General by a WTO Consultative Board to the effect that environmental 
matters should be divorced from the trade concerns of the WTO. If the WTO itself is 
considering this course of action, then it is a very real possibility indeed. As outlined in detail 
above, the WTO Committee on Trade and the Environment has also recently in 2005 begun a 
process of consideration concerning the interaction ofMEAs and the WTO system. 
Accordingly, the role that the WTO should play in respect of the environment is clearly a live 
issue within the WTO itself and there is a very real possibility of change in respect ofthe WTO's 
approach to environmentally based trade disputes. 
Given the danger posed to Antarctic marine resources by IUU fishing and the difficulties of 
restricting such fisheries activities, trade restrictions are a necessary defensive tactic to impede 
these practices. Separating environmental policy from trade interests will allow the imposition of 
trade restrictions to aid in the conservation and management of Antarctic marine species such as 
krill. Such a move could also help to provide more objective hearings of trade disputes involving 
the environment through a completely independent international body. Given the controversy 
that may surround a localised or blanket krill ban in Antarctica because there is still great 
uncertainty concerning the effect of krill fishing on the Antarctic ecosystem, there would likely 
be a challenge to any trade restrictions that were introduced in respect of krill. Accordingly, it 
would be extremely important that a completely independent international body heard any such 
dispute, rather than the WTO, which has as its primary objectives the promotion of free trade 
principles, under the current system. 
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Conclusion 
This thesis has concluded that the current legal regime, management and enforcement of 
conservation measures for the Antarctic krill are not adequate. Accordingly, it is appropriate to 
canvass alternative means of protecting the Antarctic krill. This chapter has examined one such 
alternative in the form of trade restriction that could be used to combat IUU fishing in the 
Antarctic. This chapter has also considered the legality of such measures under the trade 
principles of the WTO system. 
GATT does contain several exceptions which allow parties to introduce trade restrictions 
provided that they do not constitute arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries or 
a disguised restriction on international trade. These exceptions could potentially be used to 
justify trade restrictions in respect of Antarctic marine species. The language of the Article XX 
exceptions appears to permit even trade measures that significantly restrict free trade so long as 
they are in accordance with the requirements of those exceptions. If trade restrictions were 
adopted by particular states, such as CCAMLR members, solely for the management and 
conservation of Antarctic species, then it is difficult to see how there would be "arbitrary" or 
"unjustifiable" discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade. However, the WTO Panel and 
Appellate body have taken a very restrictive view of these exceptions in respect of environmental 
issues. The WTO's previous rulings on these environmental exceptions also suggest that 
CCAMLR members must have made serious efforts to negotiate with other countries before 
placing trade restrictions on the products of those countries. 
The WTO, in the Tuna-Dolphin cases, also disallowed trade restrictions that were based on a 
production method where the relevant parties relied on one of the GATT Article XX exceptions. 
This paper submits that trade restrictions which were based on whether particular products were 
sourced from IUU fishing activities would not necessarily constitute prohibited "production 
process" trade measures. The Tuna-Dolphin cases do, however, severely restrict the application 
of the Article XX exceptions in respect of Antarctic species because ttade restrictions cannot be 
applied extra-jurisdictionally. This would make it difficult to apply trade restrictions against 
foreign nationals in respect of high seas areas of Antarctica. 
The strict interpretation by the WTO Panel/ Appellate body of the Aliicle XX exceptions shows 
the potential conflict between environmental issues and trade principles that exists within the 
WTO system. The WTO's Committee on Trade and Environment was set up to resolve such 
conflict, however, to date there has been little substantive progress in that respect. 
307 
There is a huge potential for conflict between WTO rules and multilateral environmental 
agreements. In particular, both CITES and CCAMLR's Catch Documentation Scheme could 
conflict with WTO trade requirements. In respect of CCAMLR, the provisions of CCAMLR 
may not legally prevail over those of the WTO agreements. Furthermore, if a dispute were 
brought before the WTO in respect of a conflicting MEA, the WTO Panel/Appellate Body's 
strict stance on environmental issues in the past suggests that the dispute would be likely to be 
resolved in favour of the WTO principles. Furthermore, specific trade restrictions aimed at 
combating IUU fishing in the Antarctic may not even infringe GATT at all (depending on the 
type of restriction used). 
The abovementioned conflict within the WTO system between environmental and trade concerns 
must be resolved. This paper submits that the WTO is not the appropriate body to resolve trade 
disputes concerning the environment because it is essentially an institution aimed at promoting 
free trade rather than the environment. This paper submits that Article XX of GATT should be 
amended to include an exception that would permit trade restrictions where they were provided 
for within the specific trade provisions of an MEA. Furthermore, the power to resolve trade 
disputes with an environmental focus should be given to another international institution such as 
UNCLOS. This could be done by amending the GATT, although such an amendment is 
unlikely in the near future. 
The WTO needs to give greater recognition to environmental issues and reform to GATT is the 
most obvious method of achieving this objective. As discussed above in this Chapter, the WTO 
itself, including its Committee on Trade and the Environment as well as its governing body, is 
currently considering the role that the WTO should play in environmental disputes. A WTO 
consultative report has already raised the desirability of divorcing environmental policy from 
trade policy objectives, such as those that govern the WTO. Accordingly, change to the WTO's 
approach to environmental matters and its role in environmentally based trade disputes is very 
likely to change because of this current focus of the WTO on this issue. Trade restrictions can 
play an important part in combating IUU fishing in Antarctica and there needs to be certainty that 
such trade measures will not be prohibited by the WTO. In particular, this thesis concludes that 
trade restrictions could play a vital role in the effective implementation of an Antarctic krill 
fishing moratorium. 
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The next Chapter will also examine the WTO trade principles in the context of fishing subsidies. 
In particular, the issue of overcapacity in the world's fishing fleet will be discussed, together 
with the effect of subsidies on overcapacity and the role that the WTO can play in curbing these 
subsidies. An examination of the overcapacity issue is critical because of the effect that 
overcapacity has on IUU fishing and therefore the issue is significant to the imposition of a krill 
fishing moratorium. 
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CHAPTER 7: FISHING OVERCAPACITY, SUBSIDIES AND THE WTO SYSTEM 
Introduction 
Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated ("IUU") fishing is a significant problem hindering the 
effective implementation of fisheries conservation measures. This phenomenon has caused 
enormous difficulties for many international fisheries management regimes. Overfishing of the 
world's oceans has caused many fishers to tum their attention to previously unexploited species 
and alternative fishing grounds, such as the Antarctic, including species which have not, in the 
past, been as heavily exploited, such as the Antarctic krill. 
The overcapacity of the world's fishing fleet has been touted as a primary cause of overfishing, 
both in terms of the number of vessels and the capacity of those vessels to catch fish. This is 
particularly alarming for the Southern Ocean region if excess fleet capacity is moved to that area 
because it will mean a much greater focus by fishers on Antarctic species, such as krill which 
have not yet been exploited at high levels in relation to other fish species around the world. The 
purpose of this chapter is to examine the overcapacity problem in the context ofiUU fishing in 
the Antarctic and the impact of overcapacity on Antarctic krill. An examination of the 
overcapacity issue is critical because of the risk that excess capacity will be used to increase 
harvests of alternative species such as the Antarctic krill. 
Part I of this chapter will briefly look afthe overcapacity problem. Firstly, this part will examine 
what is meant by fishing capacity and the problem that excess capacity can cause. An 
examination of the links between IUU fishing and overcapacity in the Antarctic region and the 
Antarctic krill in particular will follow. Finally, this part will look at the current status of the 
world's fishing fleet and whether fleet overcapacity is still and will continue to be an issue for 
marine species in the Antarctic. 
Part II of this chapter will then outline several potential means of alleviating fleet overcapacity 
and whether any of these solutions are likely to have a significant impact. In particular, potential 
solutions such as restricting access to fisheries resources; restrictions placed on fishing gear and 
vessels; and vessel buyback schemes will be examined. The impediments to successfully 
implementing these solutions will also be analysed. 
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Several international instruments aimed at reducing fleet overcapacity will be highlighted in Part 
III of this chapter. The efficacy of these instruments in combating the overcapacity problem will 
be briefly examined together with recent efforts by the UN General Assembly to focus greater 
attention on the problem. 
One of the potential causes of fleet overcapacity is the maintenance of fishing subsidies by 
national governments. The nature of these fishing subsidies will be examined in Part IV of this 
chapter together with the problems they may cause iri terms of increasing capacity and therefore 
the potential for harm to the Antarctic krill from such increased capacity. The question of 
whether any fishing subsidies at all should be permitted will also be addressed. 
Finally, this chapter will examine in Part V the status of fishing subsidies under the World Trade 
Organization ("WTO") system. In particular, the status of fishing subsidies under the WTO 
system will be analysed to determine whether the maintenance of such subsidies is permissible. 
Furthermore, there will also be an examination of the appropriateness of the WTO as an 
institution regulating fishing subsidies together with the need for additional measures to those 
currently existing in WTO agreements in order to prevent overcapacity and its corresponding 
potential effects on krill fishery. 
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I. Fishing Overcapacity- The problem defined. 
Fishing capacity is defined by the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation ("F AO") as the ability 
of a fleet to catch fish. 1393 The actual practical measurement of fleet fishing capacity is difficult 
because of the whole variety of factors that it depends on. Fishing capacity can be measured by 
examining the number and size of vessels (i.e. Gross Tonnage), the type of equipment used and 
the number of days the vessels operate each year. 1394 Other countries have used more complex 
measures to define fleet fishing capacity which combine measures such as vessel length and 
tonnage and engine power and the type of fishing gear used. 1395 The problem of fishing fleet 
overcapacity arises when there is a difference between the maximum possible fisheries output 
and an optimum level of output. 1396 
The question therefore is why overcapacity is a problem at all. According to the F AO, 
overcapacity of the world's fishing fleet can lead to overfishing of species that are currently 
exploited to maximum level. Even more concerning is the potential for fleet overcapacity to lead 
to IUU fishing. A recent Consultation to the F AO noted that IUU fishing is linked to fishing 
overcapacity. 1397 This is of particular concern in respect of the Antarctic krill because of the 
extreme problems of IUU fishing in the Southern Ocean that have been highlighted throughout 
this thesis. In particular, the lack of a strong legal regime governing Southern Ocean fisheries 
combined with the difficulties of enforcing conservation measures in the Southern Ocean make 
IUU fishing a vital issue in respect of Antarctic krill conservation. If fishing overcapacity is a 
contributing factor to IUU fishing in Antarctica, then this issue needs to be addressed as part of 
any long-term conservation plan for the Antarctic krill. The specific effect that the overcapacity 
issue could have in respect of the Antarctic, and in particular the Antarctic krill, will now be 
considered. 
1393 UN F AO website, http://www.fao.org 
1394 Ibid 
1395 Paragraphs 13 and 14, Technical Consultation to Review Progress and Promote the Full 
Implementation of the IPOA to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate IUU Fishing and the IPOA for the 
Management ofFishing Capacity, Rome, Italy, 24-29 June 2004, Implementation of the International Plan 
of Action for the Management of Fishing Capacity (IPOA-Capacity): Review and Main Issues 
1396 Newby, J., Gooday, P. and Elliston, L. 2004. Structural Adjustment in Australian Fisheries. Report 
prepared for the Fisheries Resources Research Fund at 11 
1397 FAO Fisheries Report No. 752. Report of the Technical Consultation on the Use of Subsidies in the 
Fisheries Sector, Rome, 30 June- 2 July 2004 at 3 
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IUU Fishing in Antarctica 
The problem of fleet overcapacity is especially concerning in high seas areas such as those in the 
Southern Ocean. The F AO reports that less than 50% of countries are exerting effective control 
over flag vessels fishing on the high seas. 1398 
Clearly, overcapacity of the world's fishing fleet may result in fishing vessels focusing their 
attention on more remote, high seas, fishing grounds such as the Southern Ocean. A shift of this 
overcapacity to the Antarctic is especially worrying because areas where open fisheries take 
place (i.e. fisheries where there are no restrictions) cause fishing effort to increase until the 
industry cannot provide any more profit to fishers. 1399 As outlined in Chapter 1 of this thesis, 
many of the major areas of high krill concentration in the Antarctic are in high seas zones. 
Accordingly, flag vessels of non-CCAMLR member states have a huge opportunity to utilise 
their excess fleet capacity in these high seas zones where that capacity can be used to exploit the 
Antarctic krill with little regulatory barriers. 
Although Antarctic fisheries are regulated to some extent under CCAMLR, there are many 
enforcement difficulties because of the geographic isolation and the lack of a strong legal regime 
governing the Southern Ocean. Weak regulatory and enforcement mechanisms make the 
Southern Ocean an attractive alternative fishing ground. Overexploitation of fish stocks has lead 
to a shift in fisheries towards lower quality fish stocks as fish numbers. decrease. 1400 When 
existing commercial target species become overexploited, fishers must turn to lower quality fish 
stocks or species lower down the food chain, such as the Antarctic krill. These species would 
otherwise receive less interest from fishers because they provide lower economic returns. This is 
particularly pertinent to the Antarctic krill because, as described in Chapter 1, krill have not 
previously been exploited at high levels because of the high costs involved in processing and 
storing krill and the lack of a high demand for krill products. However, Chapter 1 has clearly 
demonstrated that economic returns from krill are improving, and are likely to improve more in 
the future, because of improvements in harvesting and processing technology for the Antarctic 
krill and increased demand for krill products in industries such as aquaculture and 
pharmaceuticals. 
1398 UN F AO website, http://www.fao.org 
1399 Newby, J., Gooday, P. and Elliston, L. Supra, fn 1442, 10 
1400 Stone, C. 1997. Too Many Fishing Boats, Too Few Fish: Can Trade Laws Trim Subsidies and Restore 
the Balance in Global Fisheries? Ecology Law Quarterly, Vol24: 505-542 at 508 
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The greater demand for krill products in aquaculture discussed in Chapter 1, together with 
increased world demand for aquaculture, makes the overcapacity issue increasingly pertinent to 
krill in particular because a rise in economic benefits from the krill fishery provides a huge 
incentive for fishers to tum their excess capacity towards this weakly regulated fishery. 
Furthermore, the examples cited in Chapter 1 of recent improvements in krill harvesting and 
processing technology improve the harvesting capacity of krill fishing vessels. Accordingly, this 
compounds the fishing overcapacity problem specifically in respect of the Antarctic krill. 
Improving economic returns from krill fishery resulting from greater demand for new krill 
products and cost reductions due to improved technology provides fishers elsewhere in the world 
with an incentive to relocate excess fleet capacity to the Southern Ocean to harvest Antarctic 
krill. 
Status of the World's Fishing Fleet 
The world's fishing fleet has not increased at the same rapid rate in recent times as it did several 
decades ago. In Latin America, for example, between the early nineteen seventies and mid 
nineteen nineties, the capacity of the fishing fleet increased from 165,000 Gross Tonnes to 1.4 
million Gross Tonnes. 1401 However, the number of new vessels being built throughout the world 
is now down to an average of 300 per year from 2,500 per year in the 1980s. 1402 The F AO 
believes that the size of the world's fishing fleet has stabilised since 1992 and for OECD 
countries it is actually declining. 1403 However, the F AO believes that overcapacity is still present 
in many fishing industries around the world. 1404 
1401 Technical Consultation to Review Progress and Promote the Full Implementation of the IPOA to 
Prevent, Deter and Eliminate IUU Fishing and the IPOA for the Management of Fishing Capacity, Rome, 
Italy, 24-29 June 2004, International Plan of Action for the Management of Fishing Capacity (IPOA-
Capacity): Review of Progress in Latin America and the Caribbean at 5 
1402 UN FAO website, http://www.fao.org 
1403 Ibid 
1404 Ibid 
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Furthermore, a stabilisation in the number of vessels is quite deceptive because greater efficiency 
including new technology has countered the fishing capacity lost through the reduction in the 
number of vessels. 1405 Use of technology such as Global Positioning Systems, fish detecting 
equipment, aerial co-ordination etc allow fishing fleets to increase their capacity by reducing 
inefficiencies through use of fuel and search time. 1406 A reduction in vessel numbers is also 
offset by a replacement of old vessels with new ships with higher harvesting capacity and more 
modem harvesting technology. 1407 
According to the OECD, significant funds are being spent on vessel modernisation and the 
development of new technologies. 1408 As discussed in the preceding section, there are clear 
examples of increased funds being put towards improving krill harvesting and processing 
technology. Krill fishing capacity will increase as a consequence, which makes the overcapacity 
problem a particular issue for krill. This is particularly the case because excess capacity in the 
form of excess vessels, as well as excess capacity deriving from modernised vessels with higher 
capacity, is likely to be targeted at fisheries which are weakly regulated. Antarctic krill fishing is 
a prime target because krill have not previously been exploited at high levels and economic 
returns from the fishery are now likely to be much greater, which provides an incentive to move 
excess capacity into this fishery which is poorly regulated and, in any event, is difficult to 
regulate because of the geographical isolation of the Southern Ocean. Accordingly, fishing fleet 
overcapacity is still very much a problem for world fisheries such as the Antarctic krill. The first 
issue to consider is the reason why fleet overcapacity arises. 
1405 Ibid 
1406 Technical Consultation to Review Progress and Promote the Full Implementation of the IPOA to 
Prevent, Deter and Eliminate IUU Fishing and the IPOA for the Management of Fishing Capacity, Rome, 
Italy, 24-29 June 2004, International Plan of Action for the Management of Fishing Capacity (IPOA-
Capacity): Review of Progress in Latin America and the Caribbean at 11 
1407 Ibid, 12 
1408 Cox, A. 2002. OECD Work on Defining and Measuring Subsidies in Fisheries. OECD Workshop on 
Environmentally Harmful Subsidies, Paris at 12 
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II. Alleviating the Overcapacity Problem 
The overfishing problem that overcapacity is partly responsible for, makes it crucial that world 
fishing capacity is reduced. In particular, a reduction in fleet capacity would reduce the risk of 
excess fleet capacity being aimed at the Antarctic krill fishery, particularly in light of the 
enhanced economic incentives for excess capacity to be used to harvest krill. Moves have 
already been made by some States, such as Australia, to reduce capacity, however, efforts need 
to be increased in this respect. The types of measures taken by States will be discussed further 
below. About a quarter of States that responded to a recent F AO survey said that they had 
implemented a capacity reduction programme, although about half out of the 80 States that 
responded to the survey said that intended to do so in the next 5 years. 1409 Greater efforts also 
need to be made to manage existing fleet capacity to ensure that advances in technology do not 
lead to a recurrence of the capacity problem. In particular, advances in krill processing 
technology will lead to a greater capacity for individual vessels to harvest krill in the Southern 
Ocean. If efforts are not made to manage existing fleet capacity, then there is a real risk that 
excess capacity that currently exists in other regions of the world could be redirected towards 
new fisheries like krill and add to the extra capacity currently being created in that industry by 
new krill harvesting technologies. Two thirds of States that responded to a recent F AO survey 
·said that they had implemented or intended to develop a capacity management policy. 1410 The 
purpose of this section is to examine some of the methods that states have adopted to reduce 
capacity. 
Restricted Access 
One method of reducing fleet capacity is to place restrictions on the number of vessels that can 
access a particular fish stock. This is in contrast to open fishing (i.e. fisheries where there are no 
restrictions) which is seen as contributing to overcapacity in the Asian region for example. 1411 
Accordingly, restricting access to particular fisheries may address the capacity problem. The 
F AO believes that the only method by which long-term reductions in overcapacity can be 
1409 Paragraph 23, Technical Consultation to Review Progress and Promote the Full Implementation of the IF 
Deter and Eliminate IUU Fishing and the IPOA for the Management of Fishing Capacity, Rome, Italy, 24-2S 
Implementation ofthe International Plan of Action for the Management of Fishing Capacity (IPOA-Capacit) 
Main Issues 
1410 Ibid, Paragraph 20 
1411 Technical Consultation to Review Progress and Promote the Full Implementation ofthe IPOA to Preven1 
Eliminate IUU Fishing and the IPOA for the Management of Fishing Capacity, Rome, Italy, 24-29 June 200· 
Plan of Action for the Management of Fishing Capacity (IPOA-Capacity): Review of Progress in Southeast 
316 
achieved is by limiting the number of fishers who have access to fish stocks. 1412 A recent F AO 
survey has shown that most of the 80 countries that responded have put limits on the number of 
new vessels entering the fishing industry. 1413 At its simplest, restricted access involves limiting 
·the number of vessels accessing fisheries resources through a licensing system. A more 
complicated form involves allocating a particular catch limit to a target species in a specified 
fishing area. A global catch limit for a target species may not, however, eliminate overcapacity. 
Capacity may not be utilised at its maximum potential because fishers will simply be required to 
stop fishing once the catch limit is reached. 1414 This effectively causes fishers to "nice" to catch 
as much as possible until the limit is reached. Accordingly, such a system can still result in 
market inefficiencies and may not create an equitable outcome for fishers. 
CCAMLR currently does have such a global system of precautionary catch limits in place in 
respect of the Antarctic krill in particular CCAMLR "zones". These are very large areas of the 
main CCAMLR zone in which certain precautionary catch limits are globally set for a particular 
fishing season. As discussed above, such a system does not necessarily permit fishing to be 
utilised to maximum capacity and so it does not reduce the risk of overcapacity in the Southern 
Ocean. The FAO's view that overcapacity reductions can be achieved by restricting the number 
of fishers that have access to particular fisheries in particular areas could be further implemented 
under CCAMLR in respect of krill. CCAMLR could release conservation measures to licence 
the number of krill fishing vessels. Such a measure may reduce the risk arising from increased 
krill fishing capacity through new krill fishing technology e.g. if there are only a certain number 
of vessels that are permitted to access krill fishery, less funds will be invested in improving krill 
harvesting technology which has the potential to boost krill fishing capacity. The difficulty with 
any system of catch limits imposed under CCAMLR is, of course, that the catch limits only apply 
to flag vessels of CCAMLR member states. Accordingly, the CCAMLR system can never 
ensure that excess capacity does not damage krill Excess capacity in localised areas is 
. particularly harmful in respect of krill because, as highlighted in Chapter 1, krill fishing can have 
a particularly detrimental effect where it is localised because of localised populations of 
dependent species. 
1412 UN FAO website, http://www.fao.org 
1413 Ibid 
1414 Newby, J., Gooday, P. and Elliston, L. Supra, fi1 1442, 14 
317 
Market Quotas 
A more complicated means of restricting access is to split up the global catch limit into 
individual transferable quotas ("ITQs") which can be allocated to individual fishers and would 
give them a right to catch a particular amount of fish. Individual quota systems have been 
introduced in a number of European Union ("EU") countries such as the UK. 1415 A system of 
individual transferable quotas is also being introduced in some Latin American countries. 1416 For 
example, Chile has introduced such a system. These ITQs are a form of property right and can be 
freely transferred between fishers. 1417 This practice essentially results in an open market for . 
ITQs and supply and demand will determine the price paid by a fisher for an ITQ. Two of the 
potential benefits of this form of quota are that: 
• It can reduce fishing capacity by permitting fishers to sell their fishing rights embodied 
in the ITQs; and 
• It gives fishers an incentive to conserve fish resources because of the long-term 
economic nature ofiTQs.1418 
ITQs can also benefit the fishing industry by increasing the efficiency of the industry if quotas 
are transferred from inefficient fishers to more efficient ones. 1419 
One of the criticisms of this type of system is that it gives an incentive to consolidate fishing 
capacity and reduces the participation of small-scale fishers in the industry. 1420 However, there 
are also benefits to having a concentrated fishing industry. If the industry is concentrated in the 
hands of a few major players such as large corporations, this is likely to give rise to greater 
efficiencies through economies of scope and scale. Accordingly, the decreased costs of fishing 
for these legitimate large players could make it uneconomical for some IUU fishers to compete 
in the industry. Consolidation of the fishing industry may also create some efficiencies in 
regulating the industry because it may be easier to regulate a small number of large scale fishers 
rather than a multitude of small scale fishers. Although, if the fishing industry became too 
1415 Technical Consultation to Review Progress and Promote the Full Implementation of the IPOA to Preven1 
Eliminate IUU Fishing and the IPOA for the Management of Fishing Capacity, Rome, Italy, 24-29 June 200· 
Plan of Actionfor the Management of Fishing Capacity (IPOA-Capacity): Review of Progress in Europe at 
1416 Technical Consultation to Review Progress and Promote the Full Implementation of the IPOA to Preven1 
Eliminate IUU Fishing and the IPOA for the Management of Fishing Capacity, Rome, Italy, 24-29 June 200· 
Plan of Action for the Management of Fishing Capacity (IPOA-Capacity): Review of Progress in Latin Arne 
Caribbean at 13 
1417 Gutreuter, J. 1999. Quota Allocation Methods in the Management oflntemational Marine Fisheries: 
Future Implications. Tulane Environmental Law Journal, Vol 12: 4 79-496 at 486 
1418 Ibid, 487 
1419 Newby, J., Gooday, P. and Elliston, L. Supra, fu 1442, 15 
1420 Gutreuter, J. Supra, fu 1463, 487 
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concentrated there may be issues relating to reduced market competition and the possibility of 
uncompetitive behaviour such as price fixing. 1421 
Iceland uses a sys.tem of ITQs and has specific mechanisms in place to prevent a small number of 
entities from controlling the fishing industry through ownership of a large percentage of ITQs. 
In particular, a company is prohibited from holding more than 12% of the value of the combined 
quotas for all species with total allowable catch limits. 1422 Furthermore, certain limits have been 
introduced for each major fish species on the percentage of the total allowable catch that can be 
held by a company or group of associated companies. These measures try to prevent ownership 
ofiTQs becoming too concentrated, which would reduce competition in the fishing industry. 
CCAMLR currently requires member States to licence their vessels fishing in the Convention 
Area. An aggregate total allowable catch for each fishery is used to manage fish stocks. Each 
member is required to report catch taken to CCAMLR at designated reporting times. CCAMLR 
then notifies members of the total aggregate catch taken by members and provides an estimate to 
members of the date when total allowable catch is likely to be exceeded.1423 When total 
allowable catch is exceeded the fishery is closed for the season. In the North Atlantic, the 
Northeast Atlantic Fisheries Commission is also setting individual quotas for high seas areas. 1424 
There is an issue as to whether individual quotas would be appropriate in high seas areas of the 
Southern Ocean for the Antarctic krill. One potential problem with ITQs in the Southern Ocean 
is that a large proportion of ITQs may end up with fishers from a small number of countries. 
This would reduce the incentive for other countries to finance enforcement efforts in the 
Southern Ocean if their fishers were receiving no benefit from ITQs. This is particularly crucial 
for the Antarctic krill because a major proportion of areas of high krill concentration in 
Antarctica constitute high seas areas. 
1421 However, national competition legislation such as the Australian Trade Practices Act should be able to 
curb these problems somewhat. It should also be noted that the argument outlined in this paragraph is 
merely a hypothesis which would need to be subject to further economic analysis to determine its validity. 
1422 UN FAO website, http://www.fao.org 
1423 CCAMLR Conservation Measure 23-01 (2004) 
1424 Technical Consultation to Review Progress and Promote the Full Implementation of the IPOA to Preven1 
Eliminate IUU Fishing and the IPOA for the Management of Fishing Capacity, Rome, Italy, 24-29 June 200· 
Plan of Action for the Management of Fishing Capacity (IPOA-Capacity): Review of Progress in Europe at 
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However, there may be an incentive for the countries benefiting from the ITQs to invest more 
money in enforcement and for their fishers to provide more help to authorities in reporting IUU 
fishing. If some form of krill fishing ban were not introduced, ITQs could be used as an 
incentive for states to invest more in mechanisms to protect localised krill populations and for 
fishers to aid the prevention ofiUU fishing in such localised areas. However, there would 
potentially still be inadequate financial resources made available for enforcement if only a few 
countries were actively involved. One possible way to resolve this problem would be to issue a 
set number of ITQs to each country and then permit those particular ITQs to be onsold to flag 
vessels ofthat same country. Although this would solve the problem of a small number of 
countries holding all the ITQs, it would not allow a totally free market for ITQs in the Southern 
Ocean and would create some market inefficiencies. 
No Fish Zones 
Another means of restricting capacity is to create zones where no fishing is permitted, such as 
localised fishing bans in Antarctica. There has been some research suggesting that the 
establishment of marine reserves can actually benefit fishers by increasing economic returns. 1425 
Accordingly, the creation of localised no-fishing zones in the Antarctic could benefit Antarctic 
species by increasing economic returns to legitimate fishers (although the risk is that IUU fishers 
would also benefit from increased economic returns). 
What are no-fish zones? 
As mentioned, no-fish zones are areas where fishing or fishing of certain species is not permitted. 
No-fish zones are really a sub-set of"marine protected areas" which are areas that are devoted to 
the protection of biological diversity and of natural resources .in general. 1426 Marine protected 
areas do not just include areas of open ocean and also include other marine habitats such as 
marsh areas. 1427 Accordingly, in the case of the Antarctic krill, marine protected areas could 
include areas close to the sea ice where krill breed. 
1425 Newby, J., Gooday, P. and Elliston, L. Supra, fn 1442, 13 
1426 See, for example, Australian Department of Environment and Heritage website, 
http://www .deh.gov .au/coasts/mpa 
1427 See, for example, Australian Department of Environment and Heritage website, 
http://www. <;ieh. gov .au/coasts/mp.!:! 
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There are several varieties of marine protected areas, namely: 
• Areas where no resource exploitation is permitted and are inaccessible to humans; 
• Areas where no resource exploitation is permitted; and 
• Areas which provide a controlled environment for the sustainable use of natural 
resources.
1428 
The World Conservation Union ("IUCN") further categorises marine protected areas according 
to their usage as follows: 
Marine Protected Areas 
Marine Protected Area 
Category 
Strict nature reserve 
Wilderness area 
National park 
Natural monument 
Usage 
Managed primarily for scientific 
research or environmental 
monitoring. 
Protected and managed to preserve 
its unmodified condition. 
Protected and managed to preserve 
its natural condition. 
Protected and managed to preserve 
its natural or cultural features 
Managed primarily, including (if 
necessary) through active 
Habitat/species management 
intervention, to ensure the 
area 
Protected 
Landscape/ seascape 
maintenance of habitats or to meet 
the requirements of specific species. 
Managed to safeguard the integrity 
of the traditional interactions 
between people and nature. 
Managed resource protected Managed to ensure long-term 
1428 This definition is based on the World Conservation Union concepts concerning marine protected areas, 
Australian Department of Environment and Heritage website, http://w_!Y_w.deh.gov.au/coasts/mpa 
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• Enhance settlement/recruitment 
HABITAT 'QUALITY' (secondary medium- to long-term benefits) 
• Protect and allows recovery of 'natural' habitat characteristics 
• Increase biodiversity 
• Protect against loss of keystone species, and cascading or indirect effects of fishing 
on community structure 
• Re-establish 'natural' community composition, trophic structure, food webs, and 
ecosystem processes 
• Improve amenities and resources for other non-fisheries sectors of society 
species/stocks, or the agencies responsible for managing those stocks/species and regulating 
those fisheries. 
Source: The above is a reproduction of a table in Ward, T., Heinemann, D. and Evans, N. December 2001. 
The Role of Mqrine Reserves as Fisheries Management Tools: A Review of Concepts, Evidence and 
International Experience. Report to the Australian Government, Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and 
Forestry at 23. 
In respect of the above, a no-fish zone in particular areas for krill could simply be integrated as 
part of the traditional CCAMLR control mechanisms for regulating fisheries. 1431 Such zones also 
have the benefit of potentially providing higher fishing profits to individual vessel operators from 
increased availability and size/quality of fish. 1432 Overf1shed species are usually the most 
economically valuable ones. 1433 In respect of krill, maintenance of the level of krill recruitment 
by the use of no-fish zones could help to maintain the yields of other marine stocks because of 
krill's vital role in the food web. Protecting the yields of fish stocks will help to maintain the 
economic returns for legitimate Southern Ocean fishers in respect of these stocks with a higher 
economic value. 
1431 Ward, T., Heinemann, D. and Evans, N. December 2001. The Role of Marine Reserves as Fisheries 
Management Tools: A Review of Concepts, Evidence and International Experience. Report to the 
Australian Government, Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry at 23. 
1432 Ward, T., Heinemann, D. and Evans, N. December 2001. The Role of Marine Reserves as Fisheries 
Management Tools: A Review of Concepts, Evidence and International Experience. Report to the 
Australian Government, Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry at 23. 
1433 Ward, T., Heinemann, D. and Evans, N. December 2001. The Role of Marine Reserves as Fisheries 
Management Tools: A Review of Concepts, Evidence and International Experience. Report to the 
Australian Government, Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry at 23. 
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Marine protected areas may also be able to assist surrounding areas of the ocean which are not 
protected by allowing emigration of protected species out of the marine protected area. 1434 The 
following illustrates some of the potential benefits of marine protected areas that occur outside 
the area itself: 
Potential Benefits of Marine Protected Areas - Outside the Areas 
SPILLOVER (direct medium-term benefits) 
• Result in net emigration of juveniles and adults from reserves 
• Increase catches of larger, more valuable individuals near reserves 
o Increase abundance of trophy-sized fish near reserves 
LARVAL EXPORT (direct medium-term benefits) 
• Result in net export of eggs and/or larvae to fished areas 
• Enhance recruitment to fisheries (i.e. fished stocks) outside reserves 
FISHERIES (indirect medium to long-term benefits) 
• Increased catches, fisheries yields, profits 
• Decreased variability in catches, fisheries yields, profits 
• Reduce conflict between fisheries/fishers 
• Reduce conflict between different users 
• Maintain diversity of fishing opportunities 
• Sustain fisheries for vulnerable species 
• Increase likelihood that existing fishing effort levels are sustainable 
• Increase long-term stability of fisheries 
Source: The above is a reproduction of a table in Ward, T., Heinemann, D. and Evans, N. December 2001. 
The Role of Marine Reserves as Fisheries Management Tools: A Review of Concepts, Evidence and 
International Experience. Report to the Australian Government, Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and 
Forestry at 26. 
1434 Australian Department of Environment and Heritage website, http://www.deh.gov:au/coasts/mpa 
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In respect of the Antarctic krill, marine protected zones could provide krill to export to non-
protected areas and enhance the viability of dependent species. 
What evidence is there to support no-fish zones? 
Marine protected areas have been implemented in many areas around the world including 
Australia (eg Great Australian Bight protected area) and New Zealand (eg no-fish zone Long 
Island-Kokomohua Marine Reserve). 1435 There is a question, however, as to whether such 
marine protected areas are actually effective conservation mechanisms. If there is no evidence to 
support their effectiveness, then there may be less weight in respect of arguing for krill no-fish 
zones in the Southern Ocean. 
There is a substantial amount of evidence which shows that marine protected areas can be 
effective in respect of reef fish populations. 1436 Furthem1ore, there is evidence to show that there 
is increased abundance of species at which the marine protected areas are targeted, as well as 
increases in the abundance of non-target species. 1437 However, there have not been a great 
number of independent studies conducted before and after the introduction of marine protected 
areas that are introduced in open water ecosystems.1438 Accordingly, there is not a great deal of 
substantive evidence to show that marine protected areas will be highly effective in open ocean 
areas or non-reef coastal areas. This makes if difficult to categorically state that marine protected 
areas in respect of the Antarctic krill will definitely benefit krill and dependent species. 
However, as discussed, there is evidence that marine protected areas have been effective in 
certain ecosystems where substantial studies have been conducted in that respect. If a substantial 
body of evidence does not exist in respect of the specific types of ecosystems in question, this 
should not prevent marine protected areas/no-fish zones being implemented in respect of the 
Antarctic krill the where those areas have been shown to be effective in other ecosystems. 
1435 Australian Department of Environment and Heritage website, h.t!Q://www.deh.gov.au/coasts/mpa 
1436 Ward, T., Heinemann, D. and Evans, N. December 2001. The Role of Marine Reserves as Fisheries 
Management Tools: A Review of Concepts, Evidence and International Experience. Report to the 
Australian Government, Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry at 89. 
1437 Ibid, 90. 
1438 Ibid, 89-92. 
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Resource fees 
The Icelandic government introduced a resource fee in 2004 based on the net profit generated by 
each fishing vessel. The resource fee is imposed on gross profit, calculated on the basis of 
earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortisation. In particular, the fee is calculated 
by reference to the total value of landed catch less labour costs, fuel costs and other operating 
costs. 1439 The resource fee is aimed at fishing rights allocation. In addition, quota transfer fees 
ar(1 paid when ITQs are traded. The resource fee will increase the cost of fishing and, 
consequently, is likely to reduce capacity by forcing inefficient vessels ovt of the industry. 1440 In 
a similar fashion, the Australian government also imposes levies to recover costs of management 
services in respect of the allocation of fishing rights through ITQs. 1441 In respect of CCAMLR 
obligations, CCAMLR members could introduce such resource fees on vessels licenced to fish in 
the Southern Ocean, thus increasing the costs of these fisheries. In particular, fees imposed 
specifically on any krill fishery vessels would counter the improved economic returns from the 
fishery due to increased demand and, accordingly, act as a disincentive for excess fleet capacity 
to move into the fishery. 
Gear restrictions 
Another method that has been used to reduce fleet capacity has been through the use of gear 
restrictions. Effectively, this means that vessels are restricted in the quantity and type of fishing 
gear that they can carry ( eg restrictions on the size of nets that can be used). The aim of these 
restrictions is to reduce the amount of fish that a particular vessel can catch over a period of time. 
The EU has implemented a policy of restricting the type and amount of fishing gear used on 
vessels. 1442 Gear reduction programmes have also been used in Australia as a means of reducing 
overcapacity ( eg reducing net length). 1443 However, there have been some criticisms concerning 
the effectiveness of such measures. 1444 One could, however, see the merit in introducing such 
restrictions in respect of krill fishing vessels. Because improvements in krill harvesting 
technology will increase harvesting capacity, the use of gear restrictions could be used to ensure 
1439 UN F AO website, http://www.fao.org 
1440 Technical Consultation to Review Progress and Promote the Full Implementation of the IPOA to Prevem 
Eliminate IUU Fishing and the IPOA for the Management of Fishing Capacity, Rome, Italy, 24-29 June 200· 
Plan of Action for the Management of Fishing Capacity (IPOA-Capacity): Review of Progress in Europe at 
1441 Australian Fisheries Management Authority website, http://www.afma.gov.au 
1442 Ibid, 2 
1443 Newby, J., Gooday, P. and Elliston, L. Supra, fn 1442, 15 
1444 Technical Consultation to Review Progress and Promote the Full Implementation of the IPOA to Prevem 
Eliminate IUU Fishing and the IPOA for the Management of Fishing Capacity, R,ome, Italy, 24-29 June 200· 
Plan of Action for the Management of Fishing Capacity (IPOA-Capacity): Review of Progress in Latin Ame 
Caribbean at 13 
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that increased capacity of individual fishing vessels does not result in an increased risk to 
localised krill populations in which a vessel operates. 
Boat replacement policy 
The introduction of a national boat replacement policy is another way of trying to reduce fleet 
capacity. The EU has attempted to reduce fleet capacity by placing restrictions on the 
characteristics (e.g. size ) of replacement vessels. 1445 The effectiveness of such measures is not 
yet known. 1446 
Vessels buybacks 
Another method used to reduce fleet capacity is for a government to buy-back fishing vessels or 
to make direct payments to fishers to leave the industry. 1447 Fishing vessel buy-back schemes to 
restrict vessel numbers like restrictions on the number of daysat-sea, have been used by several 
EU countries to address overcapacity. 1448 Similarly, China recently outlined a buyback system 
aimed at reducing its fleet by 7% (or 30,000 ships). 1449 Vessel buyback schemes can produce 
long term economic benefits to fishers if catch limits are in place in respect of the relevant 
fishery. 1450 However, reducing the size of the world fleet may not necessarily cause a reduction 
in capacity due to better fish finding equipment and more efficient methods of catching fish. 1451 
1445 Technical Consultation to Review Progress and Promote the Full Implementation of the IPOA to Preven1 
Eliminate IUU Fishing and the IPOA for the Management of Fishing Capacity, Rome, Italy, 24-29 June 200· 
Plan of Action/or the Management of Fishing Capacity (JPOA-Capacity): Review of Progress in Europe at 
1446 Technical Consultation to Review Progress and Promote the Full Implementation of the IPOA to Prevenl 
Eliminate IUU Fishing and the IPOA for the Management of Fishing Capacity, Rome, Italy, 24-29 June 200· 
Plan of Action for the Management of Fishing Capacity (JPOA-Capacity): Review of Progress in Latin A me 
Caribbean at 13 
1447 Cox, A. Supra, fn 1454, 11 
1448 Technical Consultation to Review Progress and Promote the Full Implementation of the IPOA to Prevelll 
Eliminate IUU Fishing and the IPOA for the Management of Fishing Capacity, Rome, Italy, 24-29 June 200· 
Plan of Action for the Management of Fishing Capacity (JPOA-Capacity): Review of Progress in Europe at 
1449 UN FAO website, http://www.fao.org 
1450 Newby, J., Gooday, P. and Elliston, L. Supra, fn 1442, 17 
1451 UN FAO website, http://www.fao.org 
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There is a risk that vessel buy-back systems could result in greater financial investment in 
existing fishing vessels to improve capacity or money received through such programmes could 
be used to purchase new vessels. 1452 In the past there have also been problems with vessel buy-
back schemes permitting the export of decommissioned vessels to third party States. 1453 This 
simply moved fishing capacity to another region without eliminating it. The EU fishing subsidy 
programme only permitted exports of decommissioned vessels to third party countries up until 
December 2004.1454 This problem with fleet capacity being shifted to other regions and the 
reinvestment of funds into remaining fishing vessels can negate the benefits of a buyback 
programme. This is of particular concern if decommissioned vessels are redeployed on the high 
seas as stateless vessels or as flag vessels of States with poor control over their fishing fleets. 
Some commentators believe that buyback programmes should be implemented to support a 
strong fisheries management regime and simply buying back vessels per se may not provide 
tangible benefits. 1455 Accordingly, a vessel buyback system alone may not be an appropriate 
mechanism for CCAMLR members to reduce any danger that overcapacity poses to fisheries in 
the CCAMLR zone, particularly in respect of the Antarctic krill. This thesis submits that the 
problem with IUU fishing in the zone is a greater threat than any "fishing overcapacity that 
CCAMLR members may have in their national fleets and more financial resources should be 
directed towards increasing the level of enforcement in the Southern Ocean rather than on 
directing significant funds towards capacity reduction measures. 
1452 Technical Consultation to Review Progress and Promote the Full Implementation of the IPOA to Preven1 
Eliminate IUU Fishing and the IPOA for the Management of Fishing Capacity, Rome, Italy, 24-29 June 200· 
Plan of Action for the Management of Fishing Capacity (JPOA-Capacity): Review of Progress in Southeast 
1453 Technical Consultation to Review Progress and Promote the Full Implementation of the IPOA to Preven1 
Eliminate IUU Fishing and the IPOA for the Management of Fishing Capacity, Rome, Italy, .24-29 June 200· 
Plan of Action for the Management of Fishing Capacity (IPOA-Capacity): Review of Progress in Europe at 
1454 Ibid 
1455 Newby, J., Gooday, P. and Elliston, L. Supra, fu 1442, 20 
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Free Market Capacity Reduction 
An alternative to introducing specific measures to reduce fleet capacity is to simply remove all 
government subsidies and intervention and allow market forces to determine the optimum level 
of fleet capacity. Key players in the fishing industry in Latin America, for example, believe that 
this overcapacity is something that should be rectified by market forces rather than government 
regulation. 1456 However, arguably, the right course of action would not be to leave capacity 
reduction up to free market forces. Overfishing is a problem affecting world fisheries resources 
at the current time and there are no guarantees that leaving capacity reduction up to the free 
market would deliver results in a timely fashion. Such a proposal is particularly concerning to 
krill because of the potential for market forces to have a significant impact on krill industry. 
Greater demand for new krill products, and cost reductions through improved technology provide 
an incentive, in an unregulated market, for excess fishing capacity to be turned towards krill 
fishing. This is particularly concerning given that new technology is already increasing vessel 
capacity in the fishery. Simply leaving the world fleet overcapacity problem up to market forces 
would not provide an adequate solution and would enhance the risk that the Antarctic ecosystem 
could be adversely affected by excess capacity. 
Problems with capacity reduction programmes 
There are several impediments to States implementing capacity reduction programmes. For 
example, the provision of subsidies to fishers can cause those fishers to expect ongoing 
government funding which can impede the reform of fisheries management. 1457 The F AO has 
also identified the following major problems with capacity reduction efforts in a recent survey 
dealing with overcapacity: 
• Difficulties in finding alternative employment for displaced fishers; 
• Pressures from the flshing industry to maintain capacity; 
• Problems in effectively monitoring compliance with capacity reduction measures; and 
1456 Technical Consultation to Review Progress and Promote the Full Implementation of the IPOA to Prevem 
Eliminate IUU Fishing and the IPOA for the Management of Fishing Capacity, Rome, Italy, 24-29 June 200· 
Plan of Action for the Management of Fishing Capacity (IPOA-Capacity): Review of Progress in Latin Arne 
Caribbean at 11 
1457 Cox, A. Supra, fn 1454, 14 
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• Lack of technical capabilities to research, develop and implement capacity management 
plans.I458 
The Australian government has recently announced a massive scheme to buy back Australian 
fishing licences in respect of overexploited species. 1459 Part of this scheme is aimed at 
minimising the impact from the types of problem outlined above. In particular, money is to be 
spent on helping fishermen to retrain and seek new jobs; to restructure businesses related to the 
fishing industry such as fish processors; and to help fishing related businesses obtain professional 
advice about their options concerning the buy back scheme. These measures are likely to reduce 
the impact of the buy back scheme on people involved in the fishing industry and such measures 
should be adopted for buy back schemes introduced by other states. 
The OECD has identified the export of fishing capacity to third party countries and the high seas 
as one of the problems with governments introducing capacity reduction programmes. 1460 
Similarly, the F AO has found in a recent study that there has been a reduction in fishing capacity 
in some countries due to fishing vessels relocating to foreign countries or taking part in high seas 
fisheries. 1461 Clearly, this will not reduce worldwide overcapacity and it poses a risk to Antarctic 
krill which are mainly concentrated in high seas areas of the Southern Ocean. Even if vessels are 
not relocated to other countries there can also be problems with higher harvesting capacity being 
introduced on vessels and also increasing capacity due to advances in technology. 1462 As 
outlined, increasing capacity on krill harvesting vessels due to technology advances is likely to 
occur in respect of krill fishery. Accordingly, the biggest threat to Antarctic krill and other 
marine stocks in the Southern Ocean from capacity reduction programmes would be the export of 
fishing vessels to high seas areas of the Antarctic and the subsequent use of those vessels in krill 
fishing industry because krill are not currently being exploited at high levels. 
1458 Technical Consultation to Review Progress and Promote the Full Implementation of the IPOA to Preven1 
Eliminate IUU Fishing and the IPOA for the Management of Fishing Capacity, Rome, Italy, 24-29 June 200· 
of the International Plan of Action for the Management of Fishing Capacity (IPOA-Capacity): Review and A 
1459 The Australian government has announced a total package of $220 million in respect of this buy back 
scheme. Fisheries crisis plan to hit prices, the Age newspaper, 24 November 2005. $220 to secure 
Australia's fishing future, Media Release and attachment by Senator Ian McDonald, Australian Minister 
for Fisheries, Forestry and Conservation, 23 November 2005. 
146
° Cox, A. Supra, fn 1454, 12 
1461 UN FAO website, http://www.fao.org 
1462 Technical Consultation to Review Progress and Promote the Full Implementation of the IPOA to Preven1 
Eliminate IUU Fishing and the IPOA for the Management of Fishing Capacity, Rome, Italy, 24-29 June 200· 
Plan of Action for the Management of Fishing Capacity (IPOA-Capacity): Review of Progress in Latin A me 
Caribbean at 12 · 
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Furthermore, this thesis submits that any new capacity reduction programmes introduced by 
CCAMLR members that were aimed specifically at protecting Antarctic fisheries would not be 
appropriate because CCAMLR members are already required to authorise their vessels to fish in 
the Convention Area and they could reduce capacity in that Area by reducing the number of 
authorisations. This would, however, be unlikely to put any crimp on increases in krill harvest 
numbers or ecosystem threats in respect of local krill populations unless the authorisation limits 
applied specifically in respect of krill fishing. 
The F AO supports the view expressed above and believes that the only method by which long-
term reductions in overcapacity can be achieved is by limiting the number of fishers who have 
access to fish stocks. 1463 Similarly, some other commentators are of the view that any 
government subsidies aimed at reducing fishing capacity need to be supported by a strong 
management regime with measures specifically aimed at the overcapacity problem. 
Accordingly, capacity reduction programmes would potentially be appropriate for governments 
so long as they are aimed at a national fishing fleet as a whole and are part of a comprehensive 
national fisheries management regime. 
1463 UN FAO website, http://www.fao.org 
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III. Legal Instruments Aimed at Overcapacity 
There are several international instruments that have highlighted the problem of fleet 
overcapacity. These instruments are important because they draw the attention of the 
international community to the problem. However, several of these instruments are merely what 
is known as "soft" law and will not bind States to take definitive action on reducing 
overcapacity. Furthermore, even where States are obliged to take action, the problem will only 
be addressed if States actually do begin to implement the necessary capacity reduction and 
management strategies. 
One soft law instrument aimed at reducing the overcapacity problem was the Rome Declaration 
1995. This Declaration called upon States to reduce economic incentives leading to overcapacity 
(i.e. subsidies). Accordingly, there has been a legal recognition by the world community of the 
need to eliminate fishing subsidies. The elimination of fishing subsidies will be discussed in 
greater detail later in this thesis. The Declaration also required States to address fleet 
overcapacity and ensure that measures aimed at reducing capacity did not result in a 
redeployment of capacity to other fisheries or areas. 1464 As discussed above, this is one of the 
key risks that capacity reduction programmes pose to high seas fisheries like krill. Accordingly, 
it is important that States ensure that capacity is not redeployed into high seas areas of the 
Southern Ocean or to exploit alternative fisheries like krill. 
Support for the reduction of world fishing fleet capacity is also found in the International Plan of 
Action for the Management of Fishing Capacity ("IPOA-Capacity"). The IPOA-Capacity 
recognises the problem of fishing overcapacity and outlines measures that States need to take in 
order to address the issue. For example, Article 8 of the IPOA-Capacity requires States to take 
specific actions in respect of fishing capacity, including: 
• Making assessments of capacity and means of improving capacity; 
• Developing and implementing national plans of action to manage capacity; 
• Strengthening regional fisheries management organisations to improve capacity; and 
• Taking action in respect oftransboundary, straddling, highly migratory and high seas 
fisheries. 
1464 Rome Declaration 1995. FAO Ministerial Meeting on Fisheries, 12 March 2005. 
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Originally, the IPOA-Capacity was intended to be fully implemented by 2003 and no later than 
2005. 1465 A recent FAO report in June 2004looked at the progress by FAO member States in 
implementing the IPOA-Capacity. 1466 There has been considerable progress towards 
implementing the IPOA-Capacity with all major fish producers having at least made preliminary 
assessments of national fishing capacity. Furthermore, Article 19 of the !PO A-Capacity was 
aimed at States developing and impiementing national plans of action for fishing capacity 
management. Approximately two thirds of members that responded to a recent F AO survey had 
developed or intended to develop such a policy. 1467 However, there are still some improvements 
that need to be made to ensure full implementation of the !PO A-Capacity. For example, the 
2004 F AO survey mentioned above reported that less than 40% of responding States had adopted 
a national plan of action to combat fishing fleet overcapacity. 1468 Similarly, Article 20 of the 
!PO A-Capacity was also aimed at requiring States to monitor capacity, but so far only 
approximately 50%1469 of States that responded to the F AO' s survey have done so. There needs 
to be a greater effort by States in this regard so that the provisions ofthe IPOA-Capacity are put 
into action. If fishing capacity is reduced then there will also be fewer vessels searching for new 
resources to exploit in order to maintain their profitability. Krill fishing is one of the new 
industries that fishing vessels are likely to exploit with increased vigour as stocks of more 
profitable species decrease in size and there are greater returns from krill harvesting. 
There has been a renewed focus by the UN General Assembly on fishing overcapacity in the two 
Sustainable fisheries resolutions that were previously discussed in Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
Firstly, the 2003 UN General Assembly resolution called upon States and regional fisheries 
management organisations to implement the IPOA-Capacity and to take effective measures to 
reduce the capacity problem. 1470 The resolution also requested States, when doing this, to take 
int~ account the need to prevent a redeployment of capacity. The 2004 resolution made the same 
calls of States in respect of implementing the !PO A-Capacity by 2005. 1471 Greater efforts are 
needed so that national governments fully implement the IPOA-Capacity and calling attention to 
1465 Article 7, International Plan of Action for the Management of Fishing Capacity 
1466 Technical Consultation to Review Progress and Promote the Full Implementation of the IPOA to Preven1 
Eliminate IUU Fishing and the IPOA for the Management of Fishing Capacity, Rome, Italy, 24-29 June 200· 
of the International Plan of Action for the Management of Fishing Capacity (IPOA-Capacity): Review and J\ 
1467 Ibid, Paragraph 20 
1468 Ibid 
1469 Ibid, Paragraph 13 
1470 Article 30, Sustainable fisheries, including through the 1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the 
Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the 
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, and related 
instruments NRES/58114, 2003 
1471 Article 39, Sustainable fisheries, including through the 1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the 
Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the 
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, and related 
instruments NRES/59/25, 2004 
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IV. Fleet Overcapacity and Subsidies 
The World Trade Organization's Committee on Trade and the Environment noted in a recent 
report that a group of WTO Members believed that fishing overcapacity was caused by 
government subsidies. 1474 Some delegates to a recent F AO Consultation also recognised that 
over reliance on subsidies can have a detrimental effect on fisheries by increasing overcapacity. 
1475 In particular, the OECD has estimated that in 1999, there was almost USD$5.97 billion of 
total government financial transfers by OECD countries to the marine fisheries industry. 1476 
Even more alarming is a 1999 World Bank estimate that placed total government fishing 
subsidies at around USD$11-20 billion per year. 1477 The problem with fishing subsidies is that 
they enable fishermen to increase their catch beyond levels that would otherwise be possible and 
consequently if the stock is depleted all other fishermen lose out. 1478 Arguably, fishing subsidies 
cause market distortions by artificially increasing prices or reducing costs. 1479 Subsidies 
therefore create inefficiencies which result in excess investment in fishing capacity beyond what 
the market would otherwise dictate ifthere were no subsidies. 1480 Accordingly, subsidies lead to 
distortions of the free market which will be examined in the context of the WTO system later in 
this Chapter. Subsidies can therefore mean that, once a particular fishery is overfished, the 
fishing fleet will then turn to uneconomic or previously unexploited alternative fishing 
resources.
1481 Accordingly, the use of fisheries subsidies is a danger to species such as krill 
because they may increase economic returns from krill fishing and become an incentive for more 
vessels to engage in such fishing. More work would need to be conducted on the actual 
economics of krill fisheries (including costs and benefits) in order to determine how profitable 
the industry is and the effect that providing subsidies would have on profitability. There are a 
wide variety of subsidies given by governments which will now be examined. 
1474 Committee on Trade and Environment: Report to the 51h Session of the WTO Ministerial Conference in 
Cancun, 11 July 2003 at 5 
1475 F AO Fisheries Report No. 752. Report of the Technical Consultation on the Use of Subsidies in the 
Fisheries Sector, Rome, 30 June- 2 July 2004 at 3 
1476 Cox, A. Supra, fn 1454 
1477 Nelson, N. 1999. Supra, fn 949 
1478 Mattice, A. 2004. The Fisheries Subsidies Negotiations in the World Trade Organization: A "Win-win-
win" for Trade, the Environment and Sustainable Development. Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol 
34: 573-586 at 582 
1479 Nelson, N. 1999. Supra, fn 949 
1480 Stone, C. Supra, fu 1446, 514 
1481 Mattice, A. Supra, fu 1538, 576 
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Types of Subsidies 
There are a whole range of mechanisms which have been used by governments to subsidise the 
fishing industry. The OECD has identified three categories of subsidies which are broadly as 
follows: 
11 Direct payments to fishers; 
11 Cost reducing measures; and 
• General subsidies. 1482 
Direct payments to fishers can include such payments as income or price support payments; 
grants to purchase new vessels; grants for modernising vessels; and compensation for reduced 
seasons to name a few. 1483 There are also subsidies that involve paying fishers to keep their 
vessels in port. 1484 
Subsidies are also provided in the form of cost reducing measures such as fuel tax exemptions; 
subsidised loans; low cost insurance; funding for the introduction of new fishing gear 
technology; and subsidised bait. 1485 Australia's provision in the past of diesel fuel rebates is one 
example of a tax-related subsidy. 1486 This type of subsidy would be concerning for krill fishery if 
any government subsidised the development of improvements in harvesting technology that are 
currently taking place. 
The OECD has also identified a general category of subsidies that includes expenditure on such 
things as research and development and on support to build port facilities for fishers. 1487 Another 
means of subsidising domestic fishers is through price support by the imposition of trade 
measures such as tariffs. 1488 
However, some subsidies are aimed at other activities such as acquiring sustainable fishing gear; 
providing VMS; and improving fisheries management monitoring and data reporting. 1489 This 
thesis submits that subsidies, which artificially distort the free market, should be scrapped. 
1482 Cox, A. Supra, fn 1454 
1483 Ibid 5 
1484 Sto~e, C. Supra, fn 1446, 542 
1485 Cox, A. Supra, fn 1454, 5 
1486 Eichenberg, T. and Shapson, M. Supra, fu 1402, 597 
1487 Cox, A. Supra, fu 1454, 5 
1488 Ibid, 6 
1489 Eichenberg, T. and Shapson, M. Supra, fu 1402, 598. Iceland's government, for example, uses fund to 
support fishing surveillance activities by its government and also funds its Marine Research Institute, UN 
FAO website, http://www.fao.org. 
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Although this may not alleviate the overcapacity problem in the short-term, it will likely provide 
less economic incentive for entities to increase fleet capacity in the future. Accordingly, with 
less incentive to increase fleet capacity, there is less incentive to move capacity to the Southern 
Ocean and to fish for Antarctic krill, a species which is currently not being fished at high levels, 
although there has been a very vibrant krill fishery in the past. As discussed above in Chapter 5, 
developing countries should be given greater financial and technical assistance so that they can 
effectively implement controls over their vessels such as VMS. This would allow better 
monitoring of vessels in the Southern Ocean to give effect to a localised or complete krill fishing 
ban. However, this thesis submits that, in respect of developed countries, the fishers who benefit 
economically from the industry should be required to at least partially fund mechanisms to 
manage fisheries and enforce conservation measures. This is particularly the case with subsidies 
used to reduce vessel capacity because fishers are the primary recipients of any benefits. 1490 New 
Zealand and Australia already recover around 50% and 24% respectively of the cost of fisheries 
research, management and enforcement from fishers. 1491 
The case for whether there should be zero subsidisation of management and enforcement 
mechanisms is less clear (i.e. full funding by industry). There are several possible effects of a 
particular country ( eg Australia) placing the full cost of management and enforcement on fishers 
which: 
• This may actually allow an adjustment of the demand-supply curve so that the market is 
producing the optimum level of goods at the market determined price (i.e. the extra costs 
involved in producing the fish will simply cause an adjustment in price and consequently 
demand and supply); 
• The resulting cost adjustment may force fishers out of the industry thus reducing vessel 
capacity; 
• There may be an increase in reflagging of vessels to avoid the requirements and hence an 
increase in IUD fishing, which would be detrimental to Antarctic krill and other 
Southern Ocean marine species; 
• Vessels may maintain their flag but begin or increase their level of IUU fishing to pay 
for the increased costs; 
• Any reductions in fleet capacity of a particular country could provide an opportunity for 
IUU fishing vessels to take advantage of the reduced fish production in a particular area. 
1490 Newby, J., Gooday, P. and Elliston, L. Supra, fu 1442, 4 
1491 Cox, A. Supra, fu 1454, 6 
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These are merely theoretical possibilities and further statistical work would need to be done to 
determine the exact effects of full funding from the fishing industry. Fishers of a particular 
country such as Australia are the beneficiaries from enforcement mechanisms ( eg a new 
Antarctic patrol boat) designed to prevent IUU fishing. The Australian Fisheries Management 
Authority currently takes the general view that costs of surveillance measures should be funded 
by the fishing industry, and costs of enforcement should continue to be funded by the 
government. Most of the AFMA's costs associated with CCAMLR are funded by the 
government, and the remaining costs are recovered from those Australian fishers involved in 
fishing in the CCAMLR area. Surveillance of Australia's remote fisheries is taxpayer funded. 1492 
This thesis submits that there should be partial subsidisation of both surveillance and 
enforcement and management mechanisms for the following reasons: 
• Enforcement of conservation measures does not just benefit fishers. It also benefits the 
public as a whole by protecting the ecosystem for future generations. In an Antarctic 
context, the enforcement of conservation measures in respect of krill will benefit fishers 
as a whole because of the pivotal role that krill play in that ecosystem. Accordingly the 
public should fund part of the cost of protection in the Southern Ocean. 
• As the effect of pushing the entire cost onto the fishing industry is unknown, 
governments should maintain partial subsidisation as a precautionary measure to guard 
against any potential rise in IUU fishing by placing increased costs on the fishing 
industry. This is particularly the case in the Southern Ocean because of the difficulties 
that are already present in regulating IUU fishing in that area. 
1492 Australian Fisheries Management Authority (AFMA) Cost Recovery Impact Statement, February 2004, 
Australian Fisheries Management Authority website, http://www.afma.gov.au 
339 
V. WTO and Fishing Subsidies 
There has been an increased focus on using the WTO as a means of reducing or eliminating 
fishing subsidies. 1493 The elimination of fishing subsidies is likely to reduce excess fleet 
capacity and, accordingly, reduce the risk that excess capacity will be used to harvest krill. This 
risk is particularly high for krill because it is primarily located in weakly regulated high seas 
areas of the Southern Ocean; it is a species that is currently not being exploited at high levels; 
and the economic returns from krill fishing are improving. The current WTO regime governing 
subsidies is found primarily in the Agreement on Subsidies and Co1,1ntervailing Measures ("the 
ASCM"). It will be useful to briefly examine this regime c;tnd its applicability to fishing 
subsidies. Broadly, Article 1 of the ASCM deems a subsidy to exist where: 
• There is a "financial contribution" by a government or other public body of a WTO 
Member or there is any form of price or income support in the sense of Article XVI of 
GATT; and 
• A benefit is conferred because of this financial contribution or support. 
Article XVI of GATT also contains a provision in respect of subsidies. Subsection one of the 
provision only requires States to discuss limiting a subsidy where it directly or indirectly 
increases product exports or reduces product imports in a manner that causes "serious prejudice" 
to another WTO Member. Subsection 3 does prohibit subsidies on primary products but only 
where they result in the relevant State having more than an "equitable share" of world trade 
export in that product. Furthermore, subsection 4 prohibits subsidies which cause export price to 
be lower than the domestic price of that product. However, this requirement does not apply to 
primary products. Accordingly, it can be seen that the GATT provisions are very weak in their 
application to subsidies relating to primary products, such as fisheries products. Therefore, the 
focus of this paper will be on the ASCM, which contains much stronger measures relating to 
subsidies provided by the governments ofWTO Members. 
1493 Mattice, A. Supra, fh 1538, 577 
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It is clear from the ACSM definition of"subsidy" that many government/quasi-government 
benefits provided to the fishing industry would constitute "subsidies".1494 To be governed by the 
ACSM, a subsidy mus't also be a "specific" subsidy, which broadly means that it must be: 
• Specific to a particular company or group of companies; 
• Specific to a particular industry; 
• Specific to a particular geographical region; or 
• Within a category of subsidies that are specifically "prohibited" by the ACSM. 
Fishing subsidies could clearly be subsidies that fulfil the "specificity" requirements of the 
ACSM. 
Prohibited subsidies are those contingent on export performance or on the use of domestic goods 
over imported ones. As the name suggests, this type of subsidy is strictly prohibited. Fishing 
subsidies whose provision was subject to this form of contingency would be prohibited under the 
ACSM. 
A second class of subsidies, known as "actionable subsidies", 1495 is not prohibited per se. 
However, WTO Members can challenge the subsidies through the WTO dispute settlement 
system if they have adverse effects on other Members. 1496 A subsidy will have an adverse effect 
where there is: 
• Injury to the domestic industry of another Member; or 
• Nullification or impairment of benefits accruing to Members under GATT 1994; or 
• Serious prejudice1497 to the interests of another Member. 
There may be difficulties with these provisions effectively curbing the use of fishing subsidies 
for several reasons. Firstly, fishing subsidies that fall into the "actionable" category are not 
prohibited per se. There is a requirement that positive action be taken by another WTO Member 
first. Furthermore, the subsidies must have an adverse effect on another Member, as defined 
above. With high seas fisheries, it would be particularly onerous to prove that subsidies provided 
to vessels of a Member State that fished on the high seas caused adverse effects to other 
Members. 
1494 The ACSM also provides a list of the types of financial contributions by governments. 
1495 There was previously a third class of "non-actionable" subsidies. 
1496 Article V of the ACSM. 
1497 Serious prejudice is defined in greater detail in the ACSM. 
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Mattice also contends that because exploitation of fish stocks affects all other fishermen, not just 
those currently engaged in the particular industry, it may be difficult to establish price and 
market distortion effects from fishing subsidies. 1498 The current WTO rules relating to subsidies 
which focus on market distortions may therefore be difficult to comply with. 1499 Brazil believes 
that fishing subsidies can also cause trade distortions at the level of production of fisheries 
resources because subsidised and non-subsidised fleets are competing at the same level for these 
resources.
1500 
The WTO is currently (during 2005) considering proposals to introduce a specific regime aimed 
at fishing subsidies. Such a regime is necessary because the current system does not appear to 
have adequately dealt with the problem of fishing subsidies. Several alternate proposals have 
been submitted to the WTO for a comprehensive fishing subsidies regime. Argentina, Chile, 
Ecuador, New Zealand, Philippines and Peru made a submission in November 20041501 that 
advocated a blanket prohibition on all fishing subsidies, with WTO Members to then negotiate 
exceptions to the prohibition. These WTO delegates argued that the benefits of a blanket. 
prohibition are that it is simple and easy to enforce; it allows transparency; and it permits 
flexibility in allowing Members to negotiate specific exceptions from the ban. Other countries 
such as Japan did not support this approach and advocated an approach whereby particular 
subsidies would be permitted and particular subsidies prohibited. 1502 The US argued that Japan 
would be able to exempt its own fishing subsidies from any disciplines under the Japanese 
proposal. 1503 This approach has also been criticised by a number of other WTO Members. 1504 
The WTO Members are still negotiating the approach to be· adopted by the WTO in respect of 
fishing subsidies during 2005. 
As previously discussed, many entities including the UN F AO have touted the provision of 
fishing subsidies as one of the reasons for fishing fleet overcapacity. The removal of subsidies is 
likely to have some effect on alleviating that problem. This thesis submits that, due to the 
potential harm overcapacity can pose if vessels begin to exploit new fisheries such as krill, an 
1498 Mattice, A. Supra, fn 1538, 583 
1499 Ibid 
150
° Contribution to the Discussion on the Framework for Disciplines on Fisheries Subsidies. Paper from 
Brazil, 31 March 2005. WTO TN/RL/W/176. 
1501 Communication from Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, New Zealand, Philippines, Peru to the WTO 
Negotiating Group on Rules, 2 November 2004, TN/RL/W/166 
1502 The Intemational Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) website, WTO Members 
disagree on subsidy approach, BRIDGES Trade BioRes, Volume 5, Number 1, 21 January 2005 
1503 The Intemational Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) website, WTO Members 
scrutinise Japan's Fisheries Proposal, BRIDGES Trade BioRes, Volume 4, Number 18, 8 October 2004 
1504 Communication from Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, New Zealand, Philippines, Peru to the WTO 
Negotiating Group on Rules, 2 November 2004, TN/RL/W/166 
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immediate blanket ban on fishing subsidies would be appropriate in accordance with the 
abovementioned proposal. 
Overcapacity is a significant problem for krill, in particular, because of the tendency for excess 
capacity to be used in exploiting new fisheries. Krill is particularly at risk because of the 
difficulties of regulating the fishery in high seas areas and the added economic incentives for 
excess capacity to move into the fishery due to new krill fishing technology and greater demand 
for krill products. Brazil has recently submitted a proposal (31 March 2005) to the WTO in 
respect of fishing subsidies. Brazil proposes that only fishing subsidies that do not distort 
production by increasing capacity and causing overexploitation should be non-actionable 
subsidies under the Agreement for Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.1sos Brazil suggests 
that such subsidies could include government grants for the purposes of improving 
conservation/sustainable use; for adopting environmentally friendly gear; for retraining fishers 
out of the industry; and for capacity reduction. 1506 
This author agrees that any blanket prohibition on fishing subsidies should contain a number of 
exceptions aimed at fisheries management and conservation. As discussed above, it is 
appropriate for there to be some level of government assistance because conservation of the 
marine environment is also for the public good as well as the economic benefit of fishers. In 
respect of krill, conservation is necessary to ensure survival of the Antarctic ecosystem as a 
whole because of the pivotal role that krill plays in that ecosystem. Accordingly, conservation 
measures aimed at krill are not only for the benefit of krill fishers, they also benefit fishers of 
dependent species and the public as a whole. Brazil has also proposed that any prohibition on 
fishing subsidies should take into account the needs of developing countries that may actually 
lack fishing capacity. 1507 This thesis submits that the WTO, as the international institution 
regulating world trade, is the appropriate body to regulate fishing subsidies and the WTO should 
take action to prohibit such subsidies during the course of the 2005 negotiations. 
1505 Contribution to the Discussion on the Framework for Disciplines on Fisheries Subsidies. Paper from 
Brazil, 31 March 2005. WTO TN/RL/W/176. 
1506 Ibid 
1507 Ibid 
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Conclusion 
This Chapter has examined the issue of overcapacity in the world's fishing fleets and concludes 
that the world community must comprehensively address the issue because of the risk that excess 
capacity will relocate to new regions and begin harvesting alternative species such as the 
Antarctic krill. This is a significant issue because of the enforcement difficulties caused by the 
Southern Ocean's isolation and current legal weaknesses that could threaten the effectiveness of 
an Antarctic krill fishing moratorium. Furthermore, the WTO must address the issue of 
government subsidies that contribute to the overcapacity problem through the introduction of a 
comprehensive regime aimed at fisheries. 
Fleet capacity reduction programmes have been implemented by a number of states, however, 
greater efforts need to be made in this respect. There are also difficulties in determining which 
type of programme will be most effective. Some programmes focus on restricting access to 
fishing areas either through the use of licences; through seasonal/geographic fishing bans; or 
through market based quota systems. Other programmes are aimed at restricting the number of 
fishing vessels or placing restrictions on fishing gear or vessel characteristics (such as size). 
Some of these programmes aim to reduce vessel numbers by "buying-back" the vessels. 
However, reduction programmes generally will not necessarily be effective because of 
improvements in catch and processing technologies that increase the capacity of existing vessels. 
Furthermore, the buy-back type of programme also creates a risk that monies paid for existing 
vessels will be used to improve the efficiency of remaining vessels or to purchase new ones. 
One of the major problems with programmes aimed at reducing fishing capacity is that they can 
cause the relocation of that capacity to other countries and to high seas areas. High seas areas of 
the Southern Ocean would be one region faced by such a risk. This thesis also submits that any 
new capacity reduction measures specifically aimed at the Southern Ocean would not be 
appropriate because CCAMLR can, to some extent, already control Member State capacity in 
that region through the use of authorisations to fish. Any capacity reduction programmes that 
were implemented to control world fleet capacity would need to be accompanied by strong 
regulatory measures. 
Strong international and national legal regimes aimed at dealing with the capacity issue are 
imperative. There are several international instruments that have provisions focussing on the 
issue, although many such instruments are merely non-binding "soft law", which reduces their 
legal force. Their real strength stems from the fact that they focus the attention of the 
international community on the issue and make it more likely that definitive action will be taken. 
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As outlined by this thesis, one of the most important international instruments in this respect is 
the IPOA-Capacity. The IPOA-Capacity outlines specific measures that States must adopt in 
respect of the overcapacity problem. Many states have adopted or are beginning to adopt these 
measures, however, there are still other states that have not begun to implement the IPOA-
Capacity. Accordingly, greater efforts need to be made to ensure that all States fully implement 
the provisions of this instrument in order to combat the overcapacity problem. 
One factor which has potentially contributed to fleet overcapacity is the provision of government 
subsidies to the fishing industry. Such subsidies, arguably, distort market demand and supply 
and create excess investment in fishing capacity. Subsidies enable fishing fleets to exploit 
otherwise uneconomic fisheries resources or to invest in previously unexploited resources. 
Subsidies could therefore permit more vessels to become engaged in exploiting a species such as 
the Antarctic krill because they increase the economic returns from fishing. This thesis submits 
that such distorting subsidies should be removed, however, subsidies should still be permitted 
where they are aimed at facilitating sustainable fisheries and conservation, such as through the 
subsidisation ofVessel Monitoring Systems. This thesis also submits that the cost of 
enforcement and management of fisheries should still be partially borne by governments because 
of the long term benefit of such activities to oceanic ecosystems and hence the public as a whole. 
The provision of subsidies in general is governed by a specific legal regime within the World 
Trade Organization. Ostensibly, the existence of such a regime should be sufficient to deal with 
the fishing subsidies problem. However, it may be difficult to establish an action in the WTO 
against such subsidies, particularly in respect of high seas fisheries. Accordingly, it may be 
necessary to introduce a specific instrument dealing with fishing subsidies, a possibility which 
the WTO is currently considering. 
This thesis submits that the WTO is the appropriate international body to regulate fishing 
subsidies, however, a specific regime needs to be introduced to comprehensively deal with the 
issue. The most appropriate solution would be a total ban on fishing subsidies with certain 
limited exceptions, such as for subsidies aimed at conservation and fisheries management. 
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GENERAL CONCLUSION 
This thesis has examined the vital role played by the Antarctic krill in the Antarctic ecosystem. 
Furthermore there is scientific uncertainty concerning the Antarctic krill population and the 
effect of krill fishing on dependent species. This uncertainty is cause for concern in light of 
advances if fishing technology and greater demand for new krill products which are likely to 
result in higher fishing levels. This thesis submits that a strong form of the precautionary 
approach to resources management would justify the adoption of an Antarctic krill fishing 
moratorium in light of this uncertainty and krill's pivotal role. At the very least, the 
precautionary approach would justify localised or seasonal krill bans to minimise harm to 
vulnerable dependent species. 
This thesis concludes that the current system of international "hard" law is not sufficiently strong 
or wide-reaching to effectively secure the safety of krill and dependent species and to adequately 
implement a krill fishing moratorium. Compliance by non-parties on the high seas to binding 
treaties is a particular problem that threatens the effectiveness of Southern Ocean fisheries 
management measures. International "soft" law does contain a raft of useful conservation 
principles, however, its ability to play a role in krill conservation is limited because of its non-
binding status. Only with strong legal obligations that bind all parties can an Antarctic krill 
fishing moratorium be successfully implemented. In a recent 2004 resolution, the General 
Assembly also highlighted the need to strengthen the current international legal framework in 
respect of fisheries management in order to combat IUU fishing. Similarly, the F AO has 
criticised current efforts to effectively implement international fisheries agreements. 
Accordingly, this is likely to provide the impetus for States to re-examine the current regulatory 
regime and this may result in reforms that will provide greater legal strength to current 
instruments. 
Universally binding legal instruments must be supported by an effective system of investigation, 
management and enforcement to effectively implement an Antarctic krill fishing moratorium. 
This is especially the case because of the threat of IUU fishing from a likely increase in demand 
for krill products and greater economic returns. A stronger dentention and punishment system, 
combined with the application of the CCAMLR Catch Documentation Scheme and VMS to krill 
fisheries would go a long way towards protecting krill from IUU fishing. 
The deficiencies in the current legal regime make it critical to consider alternative means of 
conserving the Antarctic krill and other Antarctic species. This thesis contends that the use of 
trade related measures to combat IUU fishing would help to ensure the effective introduction of a 
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krill fishing moratorium. This thesis contends that the trade exceptions in the World Trade 
Organization GATT should be amended to resolve potential conflict between trade measures 
introduced for environmental reasons and the broad free trade principles of the WTO. 
Overcapacity of the world's fishing fleet will compound the IUU fishing problem, particularly 
due to enforcement difficulties in the geographically isolated Southern Ocean. Relocation of 
excess capacity to the Southern Ocean and to alternative fisheries such as the Antarctic krill is of 
particular concern. Accordingly, it is important that the world community address the fleet 
overcapacity issue. In particular, States must address the effect of government fishing subsidies 
on fleet capacity and the potential for these subsidies to artificially inflate the economic returns 
from a particular fisheries stock, such as krill. WTO legal provisions which specifically govern 
fishing subsidies are needed and this is something that the WTO is currently considering. This 
thesis submits that the most appropriate solution under the WTO system would be a total ban on 
fishing subsidies with certain limited exceptions, such as for subsidies aimed at conservation and 
fisheries management. 
The Antarctic krill is one of the most pivotal species in the Antarctic ecosystem, channelling vital 
nutrients to species higher up the food chain. As such, krill must be protected to ensure the 
continued survival of dependent species and the whole Antarctic ecosystem. The history of 
natural resource exploitation in Antarctica must lead to the conclusion that this is a true tragedy 
of the commons. Stocks of all marine living resources have been plundered until there is a 
severe depletion in numbers and the species is no longer commercially viable. Then the next 
species is attacked. Based on this history of overexploitation in Antarctica, krill harvesting is 
likely to have a detrimental effect on krill population and this must not be allowed to occur 
because of the uncertainty surrounding both krill population itself, and the interaction of krill 
with other species. Even a small level of krill harvesting has the potential to have a major impact 
on dependent species that have already been threatened by the Southern Ocean's history of 
overexploitation. 
The pivotal role of krill in the ecosystem and the dependence of so many species on krill make it 
crucial that krill population is protected through the introduction of a moratorium on Antarctic 
krill fishing. Particularly because greater demand combined with cost reductions from improved 
harvesting technologies will lead to increased returns from krill fishing and higher levels of krill 
fishing. At the very least, localised krill fishing bans should be introduced in sensitive areas in 
Antarctica where fishing may have the most impact. As discussed above, a strong form of the 
precautionary approach to resource management justifies the introduction of a krill fishing 
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moratorium because of the potential harm to the .A..ntarctic ecosystem, even though there is still 
scientific uncertainty as to the exact effects of krill fishing. 
This thesis has shown that any form of Antarctic krill fishing ban will only be successful if it is 
·supported by a strong regulatory system and universally binding legal obligations. Many 
existing international conservation instruments only bind parties, leaving non-party vessels to 
flout their objectives on the high seas. This is one of the great difficulties with effectively 
implementing these agreements. A krill harvesting ban will be threatened by IUU fishing if 
strong legal controls are not in place to prevent it. Only with a strong legal obligation that binds 
all parties, even on the high seas, can krill receive the protection they need. This thesis has 
shown that CCAMLR is the appropriate body to implement and monitor a krill fishing 
moratorium. 
Furthermore, a comprehensive enforcement regime must be in place to ensure compliance with 
any universally binding conservation measures. Fishers and the owners of vessels that flout the 
ban or any other marine conservation measures must be subjected to harsh sanctions to deter 
them from engaging in IUU fishing. Improvements in enforcement mechanisms will help 
CCAMLR to restrict IUU fishing in the Southern Ocean. 
The history of Southern Ocean overexploitation of almost every marine species is a poor track 
record of our ability to sensisbly and sustainably manage legal marine resources. For species 
higher in the food chain, this has, in many cases, led to commercial extinction or the threat of 
overexploitation. However, the commercial extinction of Antarctic krill, as the pivotal species for 
marine life in the Southern Ocean, would threaten the entire Antarctic ecosystem. This must not 
be allowed to happen. Our ability to conserve the Antarctic marine wilderness, will depend on a 
krill legal management regime that is commercially, scientifically and economically 
comprehensive, binding, and enforceable. The UN General Assembly's recent calls for a 
strengthening of the international legal framework for fisheries management may provide an 
impetus for the international community to re-examine and strengthen current regulatory 
arrangements to achieve this aim for the Antarctic krill. 
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AFMA 
ASCM 
ASOC 
CCAMLR 
CDS 
CEMP 
CITES 
CTE 
EEZ 
EFZ 
EU 
GATT 
ICJ 
IPOA 
ITLOS 
IUU fishing 
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